{"id": "2021/1565", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2021/1565", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T10:04:27Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1565", "title": "Practical, Round-Optimal Lattice-Based Blind Signatures", "creators": ["Shweta Agrawal", "Elena Kirshanova", "Damien Stehle", "Anshu Yadav"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Blind signatures are a fundamental cryptographic primitive with numerous practical applications. While there exist many practical blind signatures from number-theoretic assumptions, the situation is far less satisfactory from post-quantum assumptions. In this work, we provide the first overall practical, lattice-based blind signature, supporting an unbounded number of signature queries and additionally enjoying optimal round complexity. We provide a detailed estimate of parameters achieved -- we obtain a signature of size slightly above 45KB, for a core-SVP hardness of 109 bits. The run-times of the signer, user and verifier are also very small.\n\nOur scheme relies on the Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan signature [STOC'08] and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for linear relations with small unknowns, which are significantly more efficient than their general purpose counterparts. Its security stems from a new and arguably natural assumption which we introduce, called the one-more-ISIS assumption. This assumption can be seen as a lattice analogue of the one-more-RSA assumption by Bellare et al. [JoC'03]. To gain confidence in our assumption, we provide a detailed analysis of diverse attack strategies.", "date_submitted": "2021-12-02T02:40:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T10:04:27Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2022/541", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2022/541", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T08:18:42Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/541", "title": "The Generals’ Scuttlebutt: Byzantine-Resilient Gossip Protocols", "creators": ["Sandro Coretti", "Aggelos Kiayias", "Cristopher Moore", "Alexander Russell"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "One of the most successful applications of peer-to-peer communication networks is in the context of blockchain protocols, which—in Satoshi Nakamoto's own words—rely on the \"nature of information being easy to spread and hard to stifle.\" Significant efforts were invested in the last decade into analyzing the security of these protocols, and invariably the security arguments known for longest-chain Nakamoto-style consensus use an idealization of this tenet.\n\nUnfortunately, the real-world implementations of peer-to-peer gossip-style networks used by blockchain protocols rely on a number of ad-hoc attack mitigation strategies that leave a glaring gap between the idealized communication layer assumed in formal security arguments for blockchains and the real world, where a wide array of attacks have been showcased.\n\nIn this work we bridge this gap by presenting a Byzantine-resilient network layer for blockchain protocols. For the first time we quantify the problem of network-layer attacks in the context of blockchain security models, and we develop a design that thwarts resource restricted adversaries.\n\nImportantly, we focus on the proof-of-stake setting due to its vulnerability to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks stemming from the well-known deficiency (compared to the proof-of-work setting) known as nothing at stake.\n\nWe present a Byzantine-resilient gossip protocol, and we analyze it in the Universal Composition framework. In order to prove security, we show novel results on expander properties of random graphs. Importantly, our gossip protocol can be based on any given bilateral functionality that determines a desired interaction between two \"adjacent\" peers in the networking layer and demonstrates how it is possible to use application-layer information to make the networking-layer resilient to attacks.\n\nDespite the seeming circularity, we demonstrate how to prove the security of a Nakamoto-style longest-chain protocol given our gossip networking functionality, and hence, we demonstrate constructively how it is possible to obtain provable security across protocol layers, given only bare-bone point-to-point networking, majority of honest stake, and a verifiable random function.", "date_submitted": "2022-05-10T08:10:02Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T08:18:42Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2022/1430", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2022/1430", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T02:19:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1430", "title": "Indistinguishability Obfuscation via Mathematical Proofs of Equivalence", "creators": ["Abhishek Jain", "Zhengzhong Jin"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Over the last decade, indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) has emerged as a seemingly omnipotent primitive in cryptography. Moreover, recent breakthrough work has demonstrated that iO can be realized from well-founded assumptions. A thorn to all this remarkable progress is a limitation of all known constructions of general-purpose iO: the security reduction incurs a loss that is exponential in the input length of the function. This ``input-length barrier'' to iO stems from the non-falsifiability of the iO definition and is discussed in folklore as being possibly inherent. It has many negative consequences; notably, constructing iO for programs with inputs of unbounded length remains elusive due to this barrier. \n\n    We present a new framework aimed towards overcoming the input-length barrier. Our approach relies on short mathematical proofs of functional equivalence of circuits (and Turing machines) to avoid the brute-force ``input-by-input'' check employed in prior works.\n - We show how to obfuscate circuits that have efficient proofs of equivalence in  Propositional Logic with a security loss independent of input length. \n - Next, we show how to obfuscate Turing machines with unbounded length inputs, whose functional equivalence can be proven in Cook's Theory $PV$. \n - Finally, we demonstrate applications of our results to succinct non-interactive arguments and witness encryption, and provide guidance on using our techniques for building new applications.\n\n    To realize our approach, we depart from prior work and develop a new gate-by-gate obfuscation template that preserves the topology of the input circuit.", "date_submitted": "2022-10-20T21:35:30Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T02:19:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2022/1618", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2022/1618", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T14:38:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/1618", "title": "Witness-Succinct Universally-Composable SNARKs", "creators": ["Chaya Ganesh", "Yashvanth Kondi", "Claudio Orlandi", "Mahak Pancholi", "Akira Takahashi", "Daniel Tschudi"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (zkSNARKs) are becoming an increasingly fundamental tool in many real-world applications where the proof compactness is of the utmost importance, including blockchains. A proof of security for SNARKs in the Universal Composability (UC) framework (Canetti, FOCS'01) would rule out devastating malleability attacks. To retain security of SNARKs in the UC model, one must show their simulation-extractability such that the knowledge extractor is both black-box and straight-line, which would imply that proofs generated by honest provers are non-malleable. However, existing simulation-extractability results on SNARKs either lack some of these properties, or alternatively have to sacrifice witness succinctness to prove UC security.\n\nIn this paper, we provide a compiler lifting any simulation-extractable NIZKAoK into a UC-secure one in the global random oracle model, importantly, while preserving the same level of witness succinctness. Combining this with existing zkSNARKs, we achieve, to the best of our knowledge, the first zkSNARKs simultaneously achieving UC-security and constant sized proofs.", "date_submitted": "2022-11-20T21:23:57Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T14:38:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2023/1080", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2023/1080", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T13:00:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1080", "title": "ACORN-QRE: Specification and Analysis of a Method of Generating Secure One-time Pads for Use in Encryption", "creators": ["Roy S Wikramaratna"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "REAMC Report-007(2023)\n[Reissued October 2026 with modified licence CC BY-NC-ND; no other changes]\nACORN-QRE: Specification and Analysis of a Method of Generating Secure One-time Pads for Use in Encryption\nRoy S Wikramaratna (email: rwikramaratna@gmail.com)\nAbstract\n\nThe Additive Congruential Random Number (ACORN) generator is straightforward to implement; it has been demonstrated in previous papers to give rise to sequences with long period which can be proven from theoretical considerations to approximate to being uniform in up to k dimensions (for any given k).\n\nThe ACORN-QRE algorithm is a straightforward modification of ACORN which effectively avoids the linearity of the original algorithm, while preserving the uniformity of the modified sequence.  It provides a new method for generating one-time pads that are resistant to attack either by current computers or by future computing developments, including quantum computers. The pads can use any alphabet (including both binary and alphanumeric) and can be used with a Vernam-type cypher to securely encrypt both files and communications.\n\nThis report explains how the ACORN-QRE algorithm works and provides evidence for the claim that the resulting one-time pads are inherently not susceptible to cryptanalysis and that they will remain secure against foreseeable developments in computing, including the potential development of quantum computers.\n\nThe ACORN-QRE algorithm is patented in the UK under Patent No. GB2591467; patent applied for in the US under Application No. 17/795632.  The patents are owned by REAMC Limited, 4 Nuthatch Close, Poole, Dorset BH17 7XR, United Kingdom", "date_submitted": "2023-07-11T13:47:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T13:00:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/1873", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/1873", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T09:33:42Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1873", "title": "Cirrus: Performant and Accountable Distributed SNARK", "creators": ["Wenhao Wang", "Fangyan Shi", "Dani Vilardell", "Fan Zhang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs) can enable efficient verification of computation in many applications. However, generating SNARK proofs for large-scale tasks, such as verifiable machine learning or virtual machines, remains computationally expensive. A promising approach is to distribute the proof generation workload across multiple workers. A practical distributed SNARK protocol should have three properties: horizontal scalability with low overhead (linear computation and logarithmic communication per worker), accountability (efficient detection of malicious workers), and a universal trusted setup independent of circuits and the number of workers. Existing protocols fail to achieve all these properties.\n\nIn this paper, we present Cirrus, the first distributed SNARK generation protocol achieving all three desirable properties at once. Our protocol builds on HyperPlonk (EUROCRYPT'23), inheriting its universal trusted setup. It achieves linear computation complexity for both workers and the coordinator, along with low communication overhead. To achieve accountability, we introduce a highly efficient accountability protocol to localize malicious workers. Additionally, we propose a hierarchical aggregation technique to further reduce the coordinator’s workload.\n\nWe implemented and evaluated Cirrus on machines with modest hardware. Our experiments show that Cirrus is highly scalable: it generates proofs for circuits with 33 million gates in under 40 seconds using 32 machines with 8 cores each. Compared to the state-of-the-art accountable protocol Hekaton (CCS'24), Cirrus achieves over 7$\\times$ faster proof generation for PLONK-friendly circuits such as the Pedersen hash. Our accountability protocol also efficiently identifies faulty workers within just 4 seconds, making Cirrus particularly suitable for decentralized and outsourced computation scenarios.", "date_submitted": "2024-11-16T00:27:53Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T09:33:42Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/1968", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/1968", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T04:48:14Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1968", "title": "SoK: Pseudorandom Generation for Masked Cryptographic Implementation", "creators": ["Rei Ueno", "Naofumi Homma", "Kazuhiko Minematsu"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "This paper investigates pseudorandom generation in the context of masked cryptographic implementation. Although masking and pseudorandom generators (PRGs) have been distinctly studied for a long time, there has been little study on how randomness should be generated in masked implementation. The lack of analysis on mask-bits generators obscures the practical security of masked cryptographic implementation, potentially confusing practitioners (e.g., designer, implementer, and evaluator) about how to realize them securely. This paper provides a novel viewpoint and comprehensive analyses by developing three new models, each of which corresponds to a practical scenario: leakage assessment, experimental evaluation of attack success rate or key lifetime, and deployment. We reveal what PRG properties are required. In particular, we support a long-held belief/folklore through proof and experiment: for the output of PRG for masking, cryptographic security (i.e., unpredictability) is not necessary. In addition, we thoroughly investigate the practical security of PRGs within the masking context. We conclude this paper with some recommendations for practitioners and a proposal of leakage-resilient method offering comparative performance.", "date_submitted": "2024-12-05T14:35:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T04:48:14Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/2086", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/2086", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T00:18:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2086", "title": "How To Think About End-To-End Encryption and AI: Training, Processing, Disclosure, and Consent", "creators": ["Mallory Knodel", "Andrés Fábrega", "Daniella Ferrari", "Jacob Leiken", "Betty Li Hou", "Derek Yen", "Sam de Alfaro", "Kyunghyun Cho", "Sunoo Park"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "End-to-end encryption (E2EE) has become the gold standard for securing communications, bringing strong confidentiality and privacy guarantees to billions of users worldwide. However, the current push towards widespread integration of artificial intelligence (AI) models, including in E2EE systems, raises some serious security concerns.\n\nThis work performs a critical examination of the (in)compatibility of AI models and E2EE applications. We explore this on two fronts: (1) the integration of AI assistants within E2EE applications, and (2) the use of E2EE data for training AI models. \nWe analyze the security implications of each, by (1) providing a new definitional framework and threat modeling approach for E2EE security ranging from theory to practice, including a new concept called caveat features, based on which (2) we offer a novel analysis to distinguish approaches to AI integration that are and are not compatible with E2EE. Then, we analyze legal implications of integrating AI models in E2EE applications, given how AI integration can undermine the confidentiality that E2EE promises. Finally, we offer a list of detailed recommendations based on our technical and legal analyses, including: technical design choices that must be prioritized to uphold E2EE security; how service providers must accurately represent E2EE security; and best practices for the default behavior of AI features and for requesting user consent. We hope this paper catalyzes an informed conversation on the tensions that arise between the brisk deployment of AI and the security offered by E2EE, and guides the responsible development of new AI features.", "date_submitted": "2024-12-27T20:08:40Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T00:18:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/161", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/161", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T19:35:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/161", "title": "Stronger Security for Blind Signatures with Attributes", "creators": ["Foteini Baldimtsi", "Julia Kastner", "Julian Loss", "Omar Renawi"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Single-use anonymous credentials are issued once and allow users to unlinkably authenticate exactly once. Recent anonymous-token and age-verification systems increasingly rely on such credentials to minimize credential reuse and simplify revocation. These systems are typically instantiated from blind signatures, yielding lightweight credentials whose presentation reduces essentially to signature verification. Many deployments additionally require embedded attributes and selective attribute disclosure. While this functionality can be achieved through Blind Signatures with Attributes (BSAs), only a handful of blind-signature constructions support attributes, and the security guarantees of selective disclosure are not yet fully understood or properly formalized.\n\nWe close this gap by first revisiting the security definitions for BSAs and introducing stronger notions capturing secure showing under partial attribute reveal. We then present a generic transformation that lifts a broad class of two- and three-move blind signatures into BSAs supporting embedded attributes and selective disclosure. Our construction uses Merkle commitments and cut-and-choose techniques to enforce attribute consistency and achieves concurrent one-more unforgeability, upgraded blindness, and the stronger secure-showing notion. Finally, we prove that the well-known Anonymous Credentials Light (ACL) construction satisfies these stronger notions without modification in the ROM+AGM.", "date_submitted": "2025-02-03T15:36:02Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T19:35:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/445", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/445", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T01:37:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/445", "title": "A proof of P≠NP (New symmetric encryption  algorithm against any linear attacks and  differential attacks)", "creators": ["Gao Ming"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "P  vs  NP  problem  is  the   most  important  unresolved  problem  in  the  field  of computational complexity. Its impact has penetrated into all aspects of algorithm design,  especially  in  the  field  of  cryptography.  The  security  of  cryptographic algorithms  based  on  short  keys  depends  on  whether  P  is  equal  to  NP. In fact, the security requirements for cryptographic keys are much stricter than those for P$\\neq$NP, the security of the key must ensure not only a sufficiently high computational complexity to crack it, but also consider the security of each bit of the key, while fully avoiding the effectiveness of various attack methods.\n\nIn this paper, we innovatively propose a new encoding mechanism and develop a novel block symmetric encryption algorithm, which be named Eagle,  whose encryption and decryption can be completed in linear time. The key consists of 10 variables, for the attacker, in the case when only the plaintext-ciphertext correspondence is known, the problem of cracking the key is equivalent to solving a system of equations about ten unknown variables $(w_{1}, w_{2}, ..., w_{9}, w_{10})$ together with some implicit variables which are generated by the encryption process. \n\nIn this paper, we will prove that there is no universal algorithm without brute-force searching at least one variable during the process of verifying four variables $(w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}, w_{4})$ whose computational complexity is not greater than solving the ten variables. After performing elimination the implicit variables, the problem of verifying the four variables will be equivalently transformed into a series of general quintic equations about one variable $w_{9} \\oplus w_{10}$ with coefficient given by other four variables $(w_{5}, w_{6}, w_{7}, w_{8})$, according to the conclusion that ``there is no algebraic solution to quintic equations\", we can't establish a system of algebraic equations only containing the other four variables $(w_{5}, w_{6}, w_{7}, w_{8})$. Without solving the other four variables, the problem of verifying the four variables $(w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}, w_{4})$ is equivalent to solve the slope and intercept of a line given the x-coordinates or y-coordinates of several points on it (points with x-coordinates known cannot have their y-coordinates known, and vice versa), this implies that there is no universal algorithm without brute-force searching at least one variable to verify the four variables $(w_{1}, w_{2}, w_{3}, w_{4})$. Since the computational complexity of brute-force searching any single variable is exponential, thus the complexity of cracking the key is exponential. Thus decryption is a one-way function, and according to ``the existence of one-way function means P$\\neq$NP\", solving the unsolved problem of P vs NP. \n\nIn addition, this paper delves into the underlying mathematical laws of this new encoding mechanism, and develops a right multiplication operation to binary. Based on this right multiplication operation, we further constructed a nonlinear operation and designed another block symmetric encryption algorithm, which be named $Eagle^{*}$. The key of $Eagle^{*}$ is composed of three independent variables. Given any plaintext ciphertext correspondences, the problem of verifying any two variables in the key is equivalent to solving a system of quintic equations. Based on the conclusion that there is no algebraic solution to quintic equations, we assert that there is no fast algorithm to verify any two variables, and thus the computational complexity of cracking the key is equal to the computational complexity of completely exhausting the three variables. In addition, we conducted an in-depth analysis that without cracking the key, it is not possible to directly decrypt new ciphertext by simply collecting a large number of ciphertext plaintext correspondences. Due to the fact that ciphertext consists of two parts, one part is completely random, while the other small part is calculated using plaintexts, keys, and random numbers, and their distribution is also completely random, thus $Eagle^{*}$ is resistant to all forms of linear and differential attacks.", "date_submitted": "2025-03-08T18:06:39Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T01:37:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/667", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/667", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T19:51:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/667", "title": "Vector Commitment Design, Analysis, and Applications: A Survey", "creators": ["Vir Pathak", "Sushmita Ruj", "Ron van der Meyden"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Due to their widespread applications in decentralized and privacy preserving technologies, commitment schemes have become increasingly important cryptographic primitives. With a wide variety of applications, many new constructions have been proposed, each enjoying different features and security guarantees. In this paper, we systematize the designs, features, properties, and applications of vector commitments (VCs). We define vector, polynomial, and functional commitments and we discuss the relationships shared between these types of commitment schemes. We first provide an overview of the definitions of the commitment schemes we will consider, as well as their security notions and various properties they can have. We proceed to compare popular constructions, taking into account the properties each one enjoys, their proof/update information sizes, and their proof/commitment complexities. We also consider their effectiveness in various decentralized and privacy preserving applications. Finally, we conclude by discussing some potential directions for future work.", "date_submitted": "2025-04-13T02:11:13Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T19:51:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/722", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/722", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T08:41:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/722", "title": "One-Step Schnorr Threshold Identification", "creators": ["Foteinos Mergoupis-Anagnou"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Threshold cryptographic primitives have not been widely adopted in real-world distributed systems (i.e., beyond the closed committee model) presumably due to state-synchronization overhead and complex certification processes for the shareholders. These are both aspects of their overreliance on infrastructure,  an assumption that is usually glossed over in their design. In this work, we propose OSST, a real-time threshold identification protocol that achieves non-interactivity and non-reliance on public shares by means of direct proof interpolation. Given a Shamir $(n, t)$-shared secret $x$, the proposed scheme allows any $t^* \\ge t$ (but no less) shareholders to prove over designated communication channels that their key shares interpolate to $x$ without revealing any information beyond that. Provers do not engage in distributed computations, sending their packets to the verifier asynchronously; conversely, verifiers need only know the combined public key $y \\equiv g ^ x$, without need to pre-validate and register the individual member identities. The protocol is intended for use in permissionless or unmanaged meshes that lack both overlay networks and trust infrastructure or governance, a use case space that has been tacitly neglected as ''niche'' by the current mainstream. No publicly verifiable setup is required beyond distributing $x$ according to Shamir's secret sharing (or equivalent distributed key generation scheme) and advertising its public counterpart; in particular, the protocol is intended to be secure against impersonation without relying on the auditability of any advertised public shares. We provide evidence that this has good chances to hold true by giving a reasonably restricted security proof in the random oracle model under the one-more discrete-logarithm (OMDL) hardness assumption.", "date_submitted": "2025-04-22T21:06:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T08:41:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2025/775", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/775", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T14:15:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/775", "title": "AuthOr: Lower Cost Privacy-Free Garbling of Arbitrary Boolean Circuits", "creators": ["Osman Biçer", "Ali Ajorian"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Privacy-free garbling schemes of Frederiksen et al. (Eurocrypt\n’15) are designed to satisfy only the authenticity criterion of Bellare\net al. (ACM CCS ’12) and to be more efficient than full-fledged garbling\nschemes. In this work, we improve the state-of-the-art privacy-free version\nof half-gates (HG) garbling of Zahur et al. (Crypto ’15) by allowing\nan AND gate to be garbled with zero ciphertexts whenever at least one\nof its input wires is freely settable by the garbler. Our full solution, AuthOr,\nthen combines the ideas from the information-theoretic garbling\nof Kondi and Patra (Crypto ’17) with the improved HG-based scheme\nwe obtain. AuthOr has a lower communication cost (i.e., garbled-circuit\nsize) than HG garbling without any additional security assumptions.\nTheoretically, AuthOr’s garbled-circuit size reduction over HG garbling\nranges from 0% to 100%, with the exact improvement depending on the\ncircuit structure. We have implemented our scheme and evaluated it on\nvarious circuits constructed by independent researchers. Our experimental\nresults show that, in practice, the garbled-circuit size reduction can\nreach roughly 98%.", "date_submitted": "2025-04-30T14:31:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T14:15:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/887", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/887", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T06:34:03Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/887", "title": "Adaptively Secure Blockchain-Aided Decentralized Storage Networks: Formalization and Generic Construction", "creators": ["Xiangyu Su", "Yuma Tamagawa", "Mario Larangeira", "Zengpeng Li", "Keisuke Tanaka"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Blockchain-aided decentralized storage networks (DSNs) use public audits to verify outsourced storage and smart contracts to govern payments and collateral.\nPublished audit evidence, however, remains available to servers and may let them reduce local storage while continuing to pass audits.\nRetrieval must also remain fair across adaptively selected sessions.\nWe formalize DSN protocols across delegation, preservation, and retrieval, accounting for evolving server state and externally available proofs.\nTo support adaptive replication soundness, we reformulate rational replication for proofs of replication (PoRep) as an extractor-based notion.\nWe then give a generic construction combining PoRep, verifiable delay functions, and simulation-extractable zkSNARKs, with encrypted delivery and conditional authorization for retrieval.\nOur analysis identifies roles for succinctness and simulation-extractability beyond privacy and efficiency.\nUnder the knowledge of strong compression assumption and the stated primitive and timing assumptions, we establish adaptive replication soundness subject to bounds on extraction resources and the cumulative public transcript.\nWe also establish contract unforgeability and retrieval fairness.\nControlled experiments illustrate storage offloading through public audit evidence, while a separate Merkle-PLONK prototype measures proving and verification costs through Cardano's Plutus interface.", "date_submitted": "2025-05-19T03:36:59Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T06:34:03Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/925", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/925", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T07:09:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/925", "title": "SCMAC and LOL2.0: An AEAD Design Framework  and A New Version of LOL  Stream Cipher Design Framework", "creators": ["Dengguo Feng", "Lin Jiao", "Yonglin Hao", "Tian Tian", "Wenling Wu", "Wenfeng Qi", "Lei Zhang", "Liting Zhang", "Siwei Sun", "Qunxiong Zheng"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "In this paper, we introduce SCMAC, a general framework that transforms large-memory stream ciphers into AEAD schemes. It represents an intermediate design paradigm between Encrypt-then-MAC and dedicated single-pass AEAD, partially integrating encryption and authentication mechanisms while mitigating the risk of state leakage associated with immediate absorption and squeezing. Consequently, this approach harmonizes high performance with enhanced security. Additionally, we propose LOL2.0, an enhanced version of the blockwise stream cipher design framework LOL. This new framework improves security through modifications to the FSM update and output functions, and increases flexibility in constructing LFSR components. Based on SCMAC}$ and LOL2.0, we present two AEAD ciphers, LOL2.0-Mini and LOL2.0-Double, which support both stream cipher and AEAD modes. These ciphers are tailored to Beyond 5G/6G environments, offering 256-bit key length and resistance to known cryptanalysis methods, including differential, linear, and integral attacks. They also provide 128-bit security against forgery attacks in the nonce-respecting setting. Due to their compatibility with AES-NI and SIMD instructions, LOL2.0-Mini and LOL2.0-Double achieve software performance of 90 Gbps and 144 Gbps in stream cipher mode, respectively. In AEAD mode, they perform at 59 Gbps and 110 Gbps, significantly faster than their predecessor's Encrypt-then-MAC versions.", "date_submitted": "2025-05-22T06:51:02Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T07:09:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/965", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/965", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T11:37:29Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/965", "title": "An Efficient Framework for Collusion Resistant Multiparty FHE", "creators": ["Robin Jadoul", "Barry van Leeuwen", "Oliver Zajonc"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Multiparty fully homomorphic encryption (MPFHE) is a generalization\nof (multi-key) fully homomorphic encryption ((MK)FHE) that lives on the\ncusp between multiparty computation (MPC) and FHE, enabling a computation over encrypted data using multiple keys. However, contrary to MKFHE, it seeks to reduce the noise inflation based on the number of parties by allowing the parties to first compute shared data in MPC before executing the computation in FHE. However, many works use specific constructions, e.g. Chang-Li, Koirala et. al., and Ma et. al.,\nreliant on the behaviour of a particular scheme and do not consider security against colluding servers and parties, e.g. Passelègue-Stehlé, Okada-Takagi, and Mouchet et. al. In this work we present a new framework that is secure against collusion between servers and parties and allows the use of a broad spectrum of MPC and FHE protocols, while eliminating the noise inflation based on the participating number of parties. We then show a case study of this using the FINAL scheme and show that we reduce the required key material by 60­–99.9% compared to the MKFHE FINAL scheme, FINALLY, and 65–70% compared to the Park-Rovira scheme in all cases, and by up to 71% compared to the AKÖ scheme when there are 4 or more parties. Moreover, we reduce the bootstrapping time for the AKÖ, Park-Rovira, and KMS schemes by 75–99.7%.", "date_submitted": "2025-05-27T12:26:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T11:37:29Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1176", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1176", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T15:17:03Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1176", "title": "A Practical Randomized Nearest-Colattice Framework for Arbitrary Norms", "creators": ["Wenwen Xia", "Wessel van Woerden", "Geng Wang", "Dawu Gu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The approximate Closest Vector Problem $\\mathsf{CVP}$ with large approximation factors, such as a polynomial approximation, arises in the concrete cryptanalysis of lattice-based signatures, yet it is commonly estimated indirectly through $\\mathsf{SVP}$ after Kannan's embedding (Wang et al, PQC2025). Such reductions may return short vectors that\ndo not encode valid $\\mathsf{CVP}$ solutions and are less suited to reusable preprocessing, batched targets, and list output.\n\nWe give, to our knowledge, the first practical instantiation of the Nearest-Colattice framework (Espitau et al, ANTS2020). Our $\\texttt{RandNColattice}$ algorithm realizes quotient-lattice $\\mathsf{CVP}$ calls on explicitly projected basis blocks using randomized slicer oracles (Ducas et al, PKC2020), and therefore naturally propagates multiple candidate branches for batches of targets. We further extend the randomized slicer with dimensions for free for both $\\mathsf{BDD}$ and approximate $\\mathsf{CVP}$/$\\mathsf{ListCVP}$, and introduce $\\texttt{HybridRandNColattice}$, which replaces the oracle on the final block with Klein's sampler to generate diverse randomized residual targets efficiently.\n\nThe final candidate-filtering interface is norm-generic, while our concrete analysis focuses on the Euclidean and infinity norms. We derive blockwise distance and runtime models and construct an estimator over 4 strategy models:  $\\mathsf{D4f}\\text{-}{CVP}$, $\\mathsf{Prob}\\text{-}\\mathsf{BDD}$, $\\mathsf{CVP}_{\\gamma_2}$, and $\\mathsf{Flexd4f}\\text{-}\\mathsf{CVP}_{\\gamma_2}$ with $1\\leq \\gamma_2\\leq \\sqrt{4/3}$. The estimator instantiates costs under a theoretical model and the AGPS20 and MATZOV22 gate-count models, and we apply it to non-amortized forgery estimates for Dilithium, HuFu, and one-more-ISIS.\n\nFinally, we implement $\\texttt{HybridRandNColattice}$ by extending the G6K-CPU based randomized slicer (Alexander et al, AsiaCrypt 2025). Our experiments support the Euclidean distancemodel, while showing that the spherical approximation used for infinity-norm filtering is optimistic because the actual blockwise error distribution is anisotropic. These results provide a concrete foundation for direct approximate-$\\mathsf{CVP}$ cryptanalysis and identify tighter infinity-norm modeling as an important open problem.", "date_submitted": "2025-06-23T01:10:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T15:17:03Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1216", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1216", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T19:06:24Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1216", "title": "Ring-LWR based Commitments and ZK-PoKs with Application to Verifiable Quantum-Safe Searchable Symmetric Encryption", "creators": ["Debadrita Talapatra", "Nimish Mishra", "Debdeep Mukhopadhyay"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Prior research on ensuring trust in delegated computation through lattice-based zero-knowledge proofs mostly rely on Learning-With-Errors (LWE) assumption. In this work, we propose a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge using the Ring Learning with Rounding (RLWR) assumption for an interesting and useful class of statements: linear relations on polynomials. We begin by proposing, to the best of our knowledge, the first efficient commitment scheme in literature based on the hardness of RLWR assumption. We establish two properties on RLWR that aid in the construction of our commitments: (i) closure under addition with double rounding, and (ii) closure under multiplication with a short polynomial. Building upon our RLWR commitment scheme, we consequently design a RLWR based $\\Sigma_2$ protocol for proving knowledge of a single committed message under linear relations with public polynomials.\n\nAs an use-case of our proposed $\\Sigma_2$ protocol, we showcase a construction of a quantum-safe Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) scheme by plugging a prior LWR based SSE scheme from (EuroS&P 2023) with our $\\Sigma_2$ protocol. Concretely, using our $\\Sigma_2$ protocol for linear relations, we prove the correctness of an encrypted search result in a zero-knowledge manner. We implement our verifiable SSE framework and show that the overhead of an extra verification round is negligible ($0.0023$ seconds) and retains the asymptotic query execution time complexity of the original SSE scheme.\n\nOur work establishes results on zero-knowledge proof systems that can be of independent interest. By shifting the setting from RLWE to RLWR, we gain significant (i) efficiency improvements in terms of communication complexity by $O(M)$ (since some prior works on RLWE require rejection sampling by a factor of $M$), as well as (ii) very short proof size ($8.4$ KB) and tighter parameters (since RLWR does not explicitly manipulate error polynomials like RLWE).", "date_submitted": "2025-06-30T06:34:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T19:06:24Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1225", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1225", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T13:25:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1225", "title": "Lattice EPID with Efficient Revocation", "creators": ["Corentin Jeudy", "Olivier Sanders"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Enhanced Privacy Identification (EPID) is one of the anonymous authentication mechanisms that found their way into the industry, being deployed in billions of chips and standardized at ISO. The linchpin of EPID lies in its decentralized revocation procedure that allows to revoke a signer by simply placing one of its signatures on a signature revocation list SRL. Each new signature must then include a proof that it has been generated with a key different from those used to produce the signatures on the SRL. This proof of non-revocation in current post-quantum schemes either relies on general-purpose NIZKs or on regular zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP) but with a witness dimension linear in the size of the SRL, which leads to large size and/or computational complexity. \nIn this paper, we rethink the standard approach of non-revocation so as to avoid its heavy reliance on ZKP. Our construction indeed combines features from different tools (such as Falcon signatures) that are unusual in this context to pull most elements out of the ZKP, leading to significant performance improvements. Providing all these elements unconcealed creates many security challenges for our construction but we yet manage to address all of them and prove security under well-understood lattice assumptions, and in the strong model of Sanders-Traoré (CT-RSA'21) allowing malicious SRLs.", "date_submitted": "2025-07-01T13:08:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T13:25:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1232", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1232", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T21:43:49Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1232", "title": "OMIX: Offline Mixing for Self-Tallying Elections", "creators": ["Sébastien Canard", "Liam Medley", "Duy Nguyen", "Duong Hieu Phan"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "In e-voting, a mix-net is a widely used system for shuffling votes in order to guarantee voter privacy. The core principle is as follows: (1) N voters cast their votes; (2) a sequence of mix-servers shuffles the N encrypted ballots, thereby randomly permuting the underlying votes; and (3) trustees jointly decrypt the shuffled ballots to compute the tally.\n\nThis approach, however, relies heavily on trusted parties after the voting phase and raises serious robustness issues. For example, what happens if the mix-servers disrupt the protocol, or if trustees lose the decryption key during the tallying phase? A recent incident in the IACR board election illustrates this problem: one of the three trustees involuntarily lost their key, requiring the entire community to restart the vote.\n\nWe introduce OMIX, an offline-mixing architecture for self-tallying elections: trustees prepare public functional decryption keys embedding a hidden random permutation before voting, voters then cast encrypted ballots, and anyone can compute the shuffled tally without further trustee participation. Function-hiding inner-product functional encryption supplies the key mechanism, and a voter-assisted correction phase accommodates dropouts.\n\nThe main technical component is a verifiable offline shuffle of a matrix of encrypted functional keys. We extend linearly homomorphic signatures with tag-binding and two-dimensional tags: row tags support hidden row permutations, while column tags bind entries to their respective voters. In the certified-input model, these properties allow trustees to certify matrix transformations, with final proof size and verification cost independent of the number of mix-servers.\n\nTogether, these components enable distributed preparation and public certification of permutation keys within a client-lightweight voting architecture. Each voter registers and casts a ballot with computation and communication independent of N, while preprocessing per trustee, public helper-key size, and tallying work are quadratic. This establishes a foundation for self-tallying elections with offline mixing and opens the way to further improvements in system-wide efficiency.", "date_submitted": "2025-07-02T20:46:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T21:43:49Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1334", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1334", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T13:30:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1334", "title": "On the use of ECDSA with hierarchical public key delegation in identity-based scenarios", "creators": ["Lucas C. Cardoso", "Marcos A. Simplicio Jr"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "In 2009, Galindo and Garcia (Africacrypt) proposed the use of concatenated Schnorr signatures for hierarchical public key delegation, creating an efficient identity-based signature scheme (IBS). Essentially, the scheme builds upon the Schnorr signature scheme to generate a primary signature, part of which is then used as a secret key to produce signatures on subsequent messages. The resulting IBS is proven secure against existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks in the identity-based setting using variants of the Forking Lemma. In this paper, our goal is to answer the following question: would it be feasible to build upon the widely used elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) scheme to obtain a similarly secure and efficient IBS? We answer this affirmatively, opening interesting possibilities not only for identity-based signatures with ECDSA but also for solutions such as secure credential delegation. This latter application is of particular interest considering the wide support for ECDSA in web- and cloud-oriented authentication systems (e.g., those based on JSON Web Tokens). We prove the security of the resulting scheme by combining the Bijective Random Oracle model and the existential unforgeability game in an identity-based setup. Our results also show that, despite its non-linear nature and more convoluted verification process than Schnorr signatures, ECDSA allows one to obtain signatures of roughly the same size as those of Galindo-Garcia's scheme while maintaining efficient performance.", "date_submitted": "2025-07-21T19:05:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T13:30:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1363", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1363", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T15:27:53Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1363", "title": "Universally Composable Adaptor Signatures", "creators": ["Paul Gerhart", "Daniel Rausch", "Dominique Schröder"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Adaptor signatures extend the functionality of digital signatures by enabling the computation of pre-signatures on messages relative to statements in NP relations. Pre-signatures are publicly verifiable objects that simultaneously hide and commit to a standard signature on the same message. Anyone possessing a valid witness for the statement can adapt the pre-signature into a full signature under the underlying signature scheme. Since adaptor signatures are commonly used as building blocks in larger systems, in particular blockchain protocols, it is natural to seek a security definition in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Tairi et al. (CCS'23) recently took a first step in this direction by proposing a UC functionality for adaptor signatures. \n\nThis paper investigates UC-secure adaptor signatures as a primitive, making both negative and positive contributions. On the negative side, we show that the functionality proposed by Tairi et al. suffers from critical limitations:\n- The functionality fails to guarantee extractability and adaptability, which are core security properties of adaptor signatures, to higher-level protocols.\n- No adaptor signature scheme can realize the functionality.\n\nOn the positive side, we propose a new UC functionality that faithfully captures the latest security guarantees of adaptor signatures as formalized via game-based notions by Gerhart et al. (EUROCRYPT'24).\n- Our functionality guarantees extractability and pre-signature adaptability in a way that is composable and meaningful for higher-level protocols.\n- We show that it is realizable by an enhanced Schnorr-based adaptor signature scheme that we construct. Our construction maintains compatibility with existing infrastructure and is efficient enough for practical deployment, particularly in Bitcoin-like environments.", "date_submitted": "2025-07-25T16:00:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T15:27:53Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1416", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1416", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T05:34:12Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1416", "title": "Binding Security of Combined KEMs: An Analysis of Real-World KEM Combiners", "creators": ["Juliane Krämer", "Patrick Struck", "Maximiliane Weishäupl"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "In this work we analyze the various binding properties of combiners for KEMs. We show that several binding properties follow easily for the most general combiner—assuming a collision-resistant hash function—while more performance-oriented combiners require the respective property from one or both of the underlying KEMs. Other binding properties are not obtained as directly and require either more properties of one underlying KEM or the respective property from both KEMs. Additionally, we provide an overview of the binding properties for several combinations of real-world KEMs.", "date_submitted": "2025-08-04T09:24:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T05:34:12Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1419", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1419", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T17:29:12Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1419", "title": "BEAST-MEV: Batched Threshold Encryption with Silent Setup for MEV prevention", "creators": ["Jan Bormet", "Arka Rai Choudhuri", "Sebastian Faust", "Sanjam Garg", "Hussien Othman", "Guru-Vamsi Policharla", "Ziyan Qu", "Mingyuan Wang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Threshold encrypted mempools protect the privacy of transactions up until the point their inclusion on chain is confirmed. They are a promising approach to protection against front-running attacks on decentralized blockchains.\n\nRecent works have introduced two key properties that an encryption scheme must satisfy to operate efficiently on large-scale decentralized blockchains such as Ethereum: Silent Setup, as introduced by Garg et al. (CRYPTO'24), demands that a threshold encryption scheme does not require any interaction during the setup phase and only relies on the existence of Public Key Infrastructure. Batched Decryption, as introduced by Choudhuri et al. (USENIX'24), demands that an entire block containing $B$ encrypted transactions can be decrypted using communication that is independent of (or sublinear in) $B$, without compromising the privacy of transactions that have not yet been confirmed.\n\nWhile existing constructions achieve either Silent Setup or Batched Decryption independently, a truly decentralized and scalable encrypted mempool requires both properties to be satisfied simultaneously. In this work, we present the first \"Batched Threshold Encryption scheme with Silent Setup\" built using bilinear pairings. We provide formal definitions for the primitive and prove security in the Generic Group Model. We provide several optimizations and implement our scheme to evaluate its performance. Our experiments demonstrate its efficiency for deployment in blockchain systems.", "date_submitted": "2025-08-04T19:11:58Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T17:29:12Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1434", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1434", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T09:24:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1434", "title": "TLShare: Private Authenticated MPC and FHE Inputs Over TLS", "creators": ["Manuel B. Santos", "Dimitris Mouris", "Xiang Xie", "Miguel de Vega", "Andrei Lapets"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the backbone of the web, allowing clients to establish secure and private channels with servers. DECO (CCS'20) and follow-up works proposed protocols that enable proving the provenance of a TLS response, i.e., that a payload came from a particular server, without needing server-side modifications. Unfortunately, these works are limited to proving Boolean statements over the payload (e.g., age $\\ge$ 18) and cannot combine payloads from multiple clients.\n\nWe introduce TLShare, a framework that extracts authenticated data from a TLS connection and imports it into secure multiparty computation (MPC) or fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), without requiring server-side changes or exposing client credentials. Unlike prior work, TLShare allows the payload itself, not just a predicate about it, to serve as private input to secure downstream computation. TLShare supports combining verifiable inputs across multiple clients and servers, enabling new applications such as privacy-preserving financial risk assessment and collaborative analytics. We design three protocols for TLShare: one for MPC using verifiable secret sharing, and two for FHE using interactive and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, each ensuring input authenticity, integrity, and end-to-end privacy. We evaluate all three protocols of TLShare over both LAN and WAN settings, comparing their trade-offs and demonstrating their practicality.", "date_submitted": "2025-08-06T21:05:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T09:24:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1478", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1478", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T15:26:51Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1478", "title": "Fully-Adaptive Two-Round Threshold Schnorr Signatures from DDH", "creators": ["Paul Gerhart", "Davide Li Calsi", "Luigi Russo", "Dominique Schröder"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Threshold Schnorr signatures enable $t$-out-of-$n$ parties to collaboratively produce signatures that are indistinguishable from standard Schnorr signatures, ensuring compatibility with existing verification systems. While static-secure constructions are well understood and achieve optimal round complexity, obtaining full adaptive security - withstanding up to $t-1$ dynamic corruptions under standard assumptions has proven elusive: Recent impossibility results (CRYPTO’25) either rule out known proof techniques for widely deployed schemes or require speculative assumptions and idealized models, while positive examples achieving full adaptivity from falsifiable assumptions incur higher round complexity (EUROCRYPT’25, CRYPTO’25).\n\nWe overcome these barriers with the first round-optimal threshold Schnorr signature scheme that, under a slightly relaxed security model, achieves full adaptive security from DDH in the random oracle model. \n\nOur model is relaxed in the sense that the adversary may adaptively corrupt parties at any time, but each signer must refresh part of their public key after a fixed number of signing queries. These updates are executed via lightweight, succinct, stateless tokens, preserving the aggregated signature format. Our construction is enabled by a new proof technique, equivocal deterministic nonce derivation, which may be of independent interest.", "date_submitted": "2025-08-14T19:52:53Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T15:26:51Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1621", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1621", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T14:05:19Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1621", "title": "Page-efficient Encrypted Multi-Maps: New Techniques for Optimal Search Bandwidth", "creators": ["Francesca Falzon", "Zichen Gui", "Michael Reichle"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Encrypted multi-maps (EMMs) allow a client to outsource a multi-map to an untrusted server and then later retrieve the values corresponding to a queried label. They are a core building block for various applications such as encrypted cloud storage and searchable encryption.  One important metric of EMMs is memory-efficiency: most schemes incur many random memory accesses per search query, leading to larger overhead compared to plaintext queries. Memory-efficient EMMs reduce random accesses but, in most known solutions, this comes at the cost of higher query bandwidth.\n\n\nThis work focuses on EMMs run on SSDs and we construct two page-efficient schemes, one static and one dynamic, both with optimal search bandwidth. Our static scheme achieves $\\tilde{O}(\\log N/p)$ page-efficiency and $O(1)$ client storage, where $N$ denotes the size of the EMM and $p$ the SSD's page size. Our dynamic scheme achieves forward and backward privacy with $\\tilde{O}(\\log N/p)$ page-efficiency and $O(M)$ client storage, where $M$ denotes the number of labels. Among schemes with optimal server storage, these are the first to combine optimal bandwidth with good page-efficiency, saving up to $O(p)$ and $\\tilde{O}(p\\log\\log (N/p))$ bandwidth over the state-of-the-art static and dynamic schemes, respectively. Our implementation on real-world data shows strong practical performance.", "date_submitted": "2025-09-09T07:48:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T14:05:19Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1650", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1650", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T09:29:07Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1650", "title": "WISCH: Efficient data signing via correlated signatures", "creators": ["Ariel Futoransky", "Ramses Fernandez", "Emilio Garcia", "Gabriel Larotonda", "Sergio Demian Lerner"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present WISCH, a commit-reveal protocol that combines compact aggregate signatures with hash-based commitments to enable selective disclosure of correlated data in multiparty computation. The protocol separates an on-chain verification core from off chain preparation, so that verification cost depends only on the number of openings, not on the size of the underlying message space. This yields asymptotic efficiency: on-chain cost grows linearly in the number of revealed items and is independent of the ambient domain, while the per-byte overhead decreases with the message granularity. Security is established via a simulation-based proof in a UC framework with an ideal ledger functionality, in the algebraic group and global random-oracle models, under standard assumptions for discrete-log-based signatures and hash-based commitments. Thus WISCH provides selectively verifiable revelation with succinct on-chain checks and provable security guarantees.", "date_submitted": "2025-09-12T06:02:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T09:29:07Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1831", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1831", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T21:36:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1831", "title": "Authenticated Garbling with Tensor Gates", "creators": ["Nakul Khambhati", "Turan Vural", "David Heath", "Rafail Ostrovsky"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Authenticated garbling (Wang et al., CCS'17) is the leading framework for achieving constant-round maliciously secure 2PC, achieving total communication comparable to protocols in the semi-honest setting. In the semi-honest setting, the one-hot garbling scheme of Heath and Kolesnikov (CCS'21) supports tensor gates $\\vec x \\otimes \\vec y$, for $\\vec x \\in \\{0,1\\}^n$ and $\\vec y \\in \\{0,1\\}^m$, in $O(n+m)\\kappa$ bits, versus $O(nm)\\kappa$ for an AND-gate-based garbling. Extending this improvement to the malicious setting has remained open.\n\nWe present two authenticated garbling protocols that efficiently handle tensor gates. Our first protocol minimizes garbled circuit size, matching the size of semi-honest one-hot garbling; all additional overhead is confined to preprocessing. We also design a custom preprocessing protocol for efficiently generating random authenticated tensor triples, proved secure assuming only a circular correlation robust hash function and base OTs.\n\nOur second protocol minimizes total communication via compressed (PCG-style) preprocessing. We construct an authenticated variant of one-hot garbling where the additional overhead in garbled-circuit size as compared to the semi-honest garbling scales with tensor-gate input length rather than output length.\n\nAs in the semi-honest case, tensor gates are restricted to inputs of length $O(\\log \\kappa)$ and arbitrary-length tensor products are handled by tiling multiple short input gates. This yields an $O(\\log \\kappa)$ factor reduction in communication for general tensor products compared to previous state-of-the-art authenticated garbling protocols, with concrete improvements in communication and runtime for practical workloads such as integer and matrix multiplication within an authenticated garbled circuit.", "date_submitted": "2025-10-04T03:43:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T21:36:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1837", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1837", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T08:38:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1837", "title": "Proofs of Quantum Memory", "creators": ["Minki Hhan", "Tomoyuki Morimae", "Yasuaki Okinaka", "Takashi Yamakawa"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "With the rapid advances in quantum computer architectures and the emerging prospect of large-scale quantum memory, it is becoming essential to classically verify that remote devices genuinely allocate the promised quantum memory with a specified number of qubits. In this paper, we introduce a new concept, proofs of quantum memory (PoQM). A PoQM is an interactive protocol between a classical probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) verifier and a quantum polynomial-time (QPT) prover over a classical channel where the verifier can verify that the prover has possessed a quantum memory with a specified number of qubits for a specified period of time. PoQM generalize the well-studied notion of proofs of quantumness (PoQ) [Brakerski, Christiano, Mahadev, Vazirani, and Vidick, JACM 2021] where a classical verifier can verify that the prover is not classical. Our contributions are summarized as follows: We introduce a formal definition of PoQM. We also introduce a variant of PoQM, which we call inefficient-verifier PoQM (IV-PoQM), where the verifier's final computation to make the decision is not necessarily efficient. Clearly, PoQM imply IV-PoQM. We construct PoQM based on the hardness of LWE. Specifically, we give two constructions of PoQM. The first one is of two-round (i.e., four-message) and has negligible soundness error under the subexponential-hardness of LWE. The second one is of polynomial-round and has inverse-polynomial soundness error under the polynomial-hardness of LWE. As a lowerbound of IV-PoQM (and therefore PoQM), we show that IV-PoQM imply one-way puzzles. Moreover, we show that a certain restricted version of PoQM implies quantum computation classical communication (QCCC) key exchange, which suggests the difficulty of black-box constructing PoQM from one-way functions. We show that constant-round PoQ imply PoQM or single-round PoQ (with a quantum verifier). Single-round PoQ are ``trivial'' PoQ in the sense that the verifier asks the prover to solve a classical problem which is quantumly easy but classically hard. The result therefore demonstrates that PoQM capture ``genuinely-interactive'' PoQ. We show that if constant-round IV-PoQ that are black-box constructed from quantumly-secure falsifiable assumptions exist then IV-PoQM exist. This result implies that IV-PoQM can be constructed from quantumly-secure constant-round statistically-hiding commitments (and therefore from quantumly-secure collision-resistant hash functions).", "date_submitted": "2025-10-05T11:34:36Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T08:38:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1869", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1869", "datestamp": "2026-11-01T02:47:29Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1869", "title": "Just How Secure is SRP, Really?", "creators": ["Jiayu Xu", "Zhiyuan Zhao"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "An asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE) protocol allows a client and a server to agree upon a cryptographic key, with the only information shared in advance being a low-entropy password (memorized by the client) and a corresponding password file (stored in the server). The standard security definition for aPAKE is in the Universally Composable (UC) framework. Since aPAKE does not rely on a PKI, such protocols have received much attention in recent years due to their potential of replacing the traditional “password-over-TLS” approach for client-server authentication on the Internet.\n\nOne of the only two aPAKE protocols currently deployed in practice is Secure Remote Password (SRP) (Wu, NDSS 1998), which is used by millions of users on the Internet. A formal security analysis of SRP has long been elusive; the only security proof to date is the one by Dayanikli and Lehmann (CSF 2024) which is in a (somewhat non-standard) variant of UC called UC with angels. This framework allows the simulator access to an additional oracle that solves certain hard cryptographic problems.\n\nIn this work, we present a comprehensive new analysis of SRP, and clarify a number of ambiguities about its security:\n\n1. We formally prove that the SRP is UC-secure if and only if one computational problem in the field is hard and one decisional problem is easy. As the decisional problem is likely hard in the field, this strongly suggests that SRP is not UC-secure and hence justifies the usage of UC with angels in the security analysis;\n\n2. On the other hand, we show that the “angel” given to the simulator in the Dayanikli–Lehmann analysis is stronger than necessary, and can be replaced by a weaker oracle;\n\n3. Finally, we prove that UC-with-angels-security is still stronger than the game-based security for aPAKE, i.e., SRP is still game-based secure under some reasonable assumptions.\n\nOverall, we pinpoint the exact conditions under which SRP can be proven secure, reducing its security to a number of underlying hardness problems. Along the way we also identify and bridge multiple gaps in the Dayanikli–Lehmann analysis — most notably, the concrete security bound — and apply novel proof techniques that might find application in other contexts.", "date_submitted": "2025-10-08T06:58:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-11-01T02:47:29Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1909", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1909", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T10:11:42Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1909", "title": "Weak Instances of the Two Matrix Code Equivalence Problem", "creators": ["Jesús-Javier Chi-Domínguez"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Nowadays, the Matrix Code Equivalence Problem shows potential applicability in constructing efficient and secure advanced digital signatures, focusing on linkable ring signatures, threshold signatures, and blind signatures. Current constructions of these advanced signatures rely on relaxed instantiations of the Matrix Code Equivalence Problem (namely, the 2-MCE problem): given two pairs of equivalent matrix codes, find (if it exists) the secret isometry connecting the pairs. For example, the linkable ring signature construction by Chou et al. (AFRICACRYPT, 2023) builds on top of the Inverse Matrix Code Equivalence Problem: given three equivalent matrix codes, where one pair of the codes is connected by the secret isometry and another by the inverse of that isometry, find the secret isometry. \nThis paper studies the 2-MCE problem, focusing on the family of instances where the secret isometry is (skew) symmetric. Our main contribution is a polynomial-time algorithm for these instances of the 2-MCE problem. We prove that the algorithm returns a valid solution whenever an explicit invertibility condition and two kernel-dimension conditions hold. Our results have a crucial security impact on the recent blind signature construction proposed by Kuchta, LeGrow, and Persichetti (Cryptography and Communications, 2026), whose security relies on the hardness of solving these kinds of instance of the Inverse Matrix Code Equivalence Problem: we show that this problem reduces to the instances we solve. More precisely, we show that we can recover the secret key of the blind signature construction by Kuchta, LeGrow, and Persichetti (Cryptography and Communications, 2026), with an estimated security of 128 bits, in less than a minute.", "date_submitted": "2025-10-13T12:45:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T10:11:42Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1950", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1950", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T15:28:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1950", "title": "Fully Adaptive FROST with Identifiable Aborts from AOMDL", "creators": ["Ruben Baecker", "Paul Gerhart", "Davide Li Calsi", "Luigi Russo", "Dominique Schröder", "Arkady Yerukhimovich"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present FaFROST+, the first two-round Schnorr threshold signature scheme achieving full adaptive security under the Algebraic One-More Discrete Logarithm (AOMDL) assumption with identifiable aborts. Building on the FROST framework, FaFROST+ preserves its communication efficiency while dispensing with the LDVR assumption introduced at CRYPTO'25. \nOur result demonstrates that round-optimal adaptive security, practical efficiency, and identifiable aborts are simultaneously achievable under the well-studied AOMDL assumption.", "date_submitted": "2025-10-19T00:34:30Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T15:28:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/2271", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/2271", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T12:59:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2271", "title": "ARION: Attention-Optimized Transformer Inference on Encrypted Data", "creators": ["Linhan Yang", "Jingwei Chen", "Wangchen Dai", "Shuai Wang", "Wenyuan Wu", "Yong Feng"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Privacy-preserving Transformer inference (PPTI) is essential for deploying large language models (LLMs) such as BERT and LLaMA in sensitive domains. In these models, the attention mechanism is both the main source of expressiveness and the dominant performance bottleneck under fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), due to large ciphertext matrix multiplications and the softmax nonlinearity. This paper presents Arion, a non-interactive FHE-based PPTI protocol that specifically optimizes the computation of encrypted attention. First, for the three consecutive ciphertext matrix multiplications in multi-head attention, we introduce the double Baby-Step Giant-Step algorithm, which significantly reduces the number of ciphertext rotations. On BERT-Base, Arion achieves an 82.5% reduction in rotations over the state-of-the-art PPTI protocol MOAI (2025), corresponding to a 5.7x reduction in rotation cost. Second, we propose a linear–nonlinear fusion technique tailored to the softmax evaluation in attention. By decomposing softmax into shift-by-maximum, exponentiation, and reciprocal sub-steps and fusing them with the surrounding encrypted matrix operations, Arion enables efficient attention evaluation while remaining compatible with diverse ciphertext packing formats. We implement  Arion using Lattigo and first evaluate attention kernels on popular LLMs including BERT-Tiny, BERT-Base, and LLaMA, confirming the practicality and scalability of the proposed optimizations for encrypted attention computation. For end-to-end applications, on classification tasks for several benchmark datasets, Arion attains accuracy comparable to plaintext inference and yields up to 2.5x end-to-end speedups over MOAI for BERT-Base.", "date_submitted": "2025-12-18T02:06:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T12:59:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/2284", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/2284", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T14:14:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2284", "title": "Meta-PBS: Compact High-Precision Programmable Bootstrapping", "creators": ["Shihe Ma", "Tairong Huang", "Anyu Wang", "Changtong Xu", "Tao Wei", "Xiaoyun Wang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Programmable bootstrapping (PBS) in TFHE is a powerful primitive for homomorphic lookup-table (LUT) evaluation, but its practical precision is limited to $O(\\sqrt{N})$ for RLWE dimension $N$. Existing solutions either enlarge the RLWE dimension or digit-decompose plaintexts before encryption, thus degrading either bootstrapping efficiency or the efficiency of downstream linear combinations.\n\nWe propose Meta-PBS, a single-ciphertext high-precision PBS framework that supports plaintext modulus up to $2N$ without increasing the RLWE dimension. The key idea is to view PBS through a redundancy-perturbation perspective: Meta-PBS starts from an under-redundant LUT and iteratively increases its redundancy by combining blind rotations with LWE-to-RLWE packing. Under this view, classical TFHE PBS becomes the zero-iteration special case of Meta-PBS. Asymptotically, Meta-PBS supports PBS with a plaintext modulus $2N$ with only $O(1)$ blind rotations, leading to an $O(\\sqrt{N})$ speedup compared with PBS. Another key advantage of Meta-PBS is its additive noise growth, which enables more efficient parameters and stronger support for post-bootstrap homomorphic linear combinations. In practice, Meta-PBS evaluates a 12-bit negacyclic LUT in 166 ms, achieving an $81.0\\times$ speedup over EBS. For an arbitrary 8-bit LUT, a high-capacity Meta-WoP-PBS configuration is $2.04\\times$ faster than Refined LHE while supporting post-bootstrap linear combinations of size up to 25,000; a lower-capacity configuration reaches a $2.61\\times$ speedup.", "date_submitted": "2025-12-19T05:26:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T14:14:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/2285", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/2285", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T19:58:00Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2285", "title": "Laminate: Succinct SIMD-Friendly Verifiable FHE", "creators": ["Kabir Peshawaria", "Zeyu Liu", "Ben Fisch", "Eran Tromer"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "In outsourcing computation to untrusted servers, one can cryptographically ensure privacy using Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) or integrity using Verifiable Computation (VC) such as SNARK proofs. While each is practical for some applications in isolation, efficiently composing FHE and VC into Verifiable Computation over Encrypted Data (VCoED) with verification faster than local computation remains a challenge.\n\nWe introduce $\\mathsf{Laminate}$, a family of VCoED protocols for adding integrity to computations delegated using BGV/BFV-style FHE. Our approach combines the blind interactive proof framework with the GKR proof system, which avoids computing commitments to intermediate computation states under FHE. Our client-efficient variant employs novel transcript packing and folding techniques that reduce proof size to $O(\\log^2 n + N)$ words (suppressing security parameters) for bounded-depth size-$n$ circuits, where $N$ is the BGV/BFV ring dimension. Unlike prior FHE-over-SNARK schemes, $\\mathsf{Laminate}$ preserves the SIMD parallelism of FHE for both payload circuit evaluation and proof generation; eliminates the need for witness reductions; is field-agnostic; and adds only constant multiplicative depth on top of payload evaluation while performing $\\widetilde{O}(n_{\\mathsf{FHE}})$ FHE operations, where $n_{\\mathsf{FHE}}$ is the number of payload FHE operations.\n\nWe give an end-to-end concrete integrity analysis, implement the complete protocol, and provide a reproducible methodology for measuring server overhead and per-request client computation. We benchmark $\\mathsf{Laminate}$ on payload circuits with $n=2^{34}$ scalar gates. One scheme variant has an overhead of $21$--$33\\times$ compared to FHE evaluation without integrity, with proofs of $52$--$54\\,\\mathrm{MB}$. Another variant reduces overhead to $10$--$14\\times$, with larger proofs. For both, per-request client computation is much faster than local evaluation, demonstrating concrete outsourced computation with privacy and integrity, a key distinction from prior VCoED work.", "date_submitted": "2025-12-19T06:47:36Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T19:58:00Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/042", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/042", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T19:07:40Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/042", "title": "Fully Secure DKG Protocols for Discrete Logarithm Revisited", "creators": ["Karim Baghery", "Hossein Moghaddas"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "In EUROCRYPT 1999, Gennaro, Jarecki, Krawczyk, and Rabin (GJKR) showed that in the well-known Pedersen robust Distributed Key Generation (DKG) protocol for the Discrete Logarithm (DL), an adversary can bias the distribution of the resulting public key. To address this issue, they proposed a fully secure, statistically unbiased variant of the Pedersen DKG protocol. The GJKR protocol achieves robustness and guarantees a statistically uniform final public key, at the cost of $O(n^2)$ exponentiations per party, where $n$ denotes the number of parties. In this paper, we revisit fully secure robust DKG protocols for the DL setting and propose three more efficient alternatives, each using $O(n)$ exponentiations per party in the happy path while offering different trade-offs in security, efficiency, and round complexity. Our first protocol, like the GJKR scheme, guarantees that the final public key is indistinguishable from a uniformly random group element even to a computationally unbounded distinguisher. The second protocol is concretely more efficient and ensures that the public key distribution is computationally indistinguishable from uniform. In our third construction, we focus on minimizing the worst-case number of rounds in the second protocol and present a variant using three rounds in the happy path and one additional reconstruction round in the unhappy path. Our third scheme can be viewed as a fully secure and round-reduced variant of the biased construction by Atapoor et al. (ASIACRYPT 2023). In comparison with the most recent low-round fully secure DKG protocols by Katz (CRYPTO 2024), Cascudo-David (EUROCRYPT 2024), Kate et al. (CCS 2024), and Boneh et al. (EUROCRYPT 2025)--all of which achieve three rounds via two online rounds and one preprocessing round (or vice versa)--our third DKG protocol requires only $O(n)$ exponentiations per party in the happy path, as opposed to at least $O(n^2)$.", "date_submitted": "2026-01-11T15:40:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T19:07:40Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/149", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/149", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T12:33:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/149", "title": "Private IP Address Inference in NAT Networks via Off-Path TCP Control-Plane Attack", "creators": ["Suraj Sharma", "Adityavir Singh", "Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "NAT is widely assumed to conceal the private IP addresses of internal clients from both off-path attackers within the same LAN and external observers. We show that this assumption does not hold. We present a novel off-path private IP address inference attack against NATed clients engaged in active TCP connections with a remote server. Our attack exploits known NAT behaviors in real-world routers, such as port preservation, insufficient reverse-path validation, and the absence of TCP window tracking, previously shown to enable off-path TCP hijacking. By inferring a NATed client’s private IP address, our attack defeats the address-hiding property commonly attributed to NAT, creating a privacy leak that can lead to deanonymization and user profiling. We validate the attack on 6 NAT routers and 2 real-world Wi-Fi networks on SSH and HTTP/HTTPS traffic, finding that 5 of the 6 routers and both networks are vulnerable.", "date_submitted": "2026-01-30T10:28:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T12:33:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/201", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/201", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T08:31:17Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/201", "title": "On Lifting AGM Security to the AGM with Oblivious Sampling", "creators": ["Juraj Belohorec", "Pavel Hubáček", "Dominik Stejskal"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The Algebraic Group Model (AGM) is widely used to prove the security of cryptographic schemes involving groups and pairings. It requires adversaries to explain how their output group elements are obtained from the elements they have received. The AGM with Oblivious Sampling (AGMOS), introduced by Lipmaa, Parisella, and Siim (TCC 2023), additionally allows adversaries to sample group elements without learning their discrete logarithms. This models capabilities such as hashing to a group, but complicates security proofs: security in the AGM does not always imply security in the AGMOS.\n\nWe give a framework for transferring AGM security proofs to the AGMOS for a broad class of pairing-based security games. Our results separate the existing AGM argument from the additional reasoning needed to handle obliviously sampled elements. Under the Find Polynomial Representation (FPR) and Tensor Oracle Find Representation (TOFR) assumptions, this additional reasoning can be handled by general reductions. Games with further requirements, such as extractability, also require a lifting condition that ensures these requirements are preserved.\n\nWe first establish a lifting theorem for non-interactive games and apply it to KZG extractability, the multivariate Adaptive Rational Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the special-soundness of the Polymath SNARK. We then extend the framework to interactive games that use random oracles and other oracles that depend on the trapdoor. In the interactive setting, we apply the theorem to the existential\nunforgeability of BLS signatures and strong unforgeability of BBS signatures under FPR/PDL and TOFR assumptions. For BLS, we also provide an AGM security proof for Type-3 pairings, adapting the original Type-1 analysis.\n\nOur framework allows existing AGM proofs to be reused in the AGMOS.\nTo apply the framework, it is enough to check its requirements, including oracle simulation and, where needed, the lifting condition, without repeating the full security proof.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-08T13:44:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T08:31:17Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/218", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/218", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T08:35:13Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/218", "title": "Isochronous Fixed-Weight Sampling in Hardware", "creators": ["Adrian Marotzke"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "We present hardware implementations of the recently proposed isochronous fixed-weight sampling algorithm by Décio Luiz Gazzoni Filho, Tomás S. R. Silva, Julio López\n(CiC vol. 1, 2024) and apply them to the post-quantum cryptographic algorithms NTRU-HPS, Streamlined NTRU Prime and Classic McEliece. We offer multiple implementations, optimized for different targets: A high-area high-performance implementation, a lightweight low-area implementation, as well as a side-channel secure implementation using gadget-based masking. We verify the security of our masked implementation using the PROLEAD leakage detection tool. We show that the sampling algorithm results in highly efficient and effective implementations for the NTRU-like schemes, outperforming existing hardware implementations for fixed-weight sampling.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-10T09:21:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T08:35:13Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/229", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/229", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T12:17:01Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/229", "title": "ANIMAGUS: A Provably Secure Tweakable Wide-Block Mode", "creators": ["Gülnihal Öztürk", "Onur Koçak", "Oğuz Yayla"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Motivated by the accordion mode approach, we propose a length preserving tweakable wide block mode based on the hash-encrypt-hash paradigm. The construction uses AES and HMAC-SHA3-256 with five purpose separated working keys derived from a single master key, replacing algebraic universal hashing with a cryptographic keyed hash. An encrypted internal seed couples two separately keyed head branches and determines the counter mode keystream. The head layers permit parallel evaluation, while inter-branch dependence is retained even when the tail is empty. The mode supports every bit length within its specified range, starting from $2n$ bits without padding, where $n$ is the block size. Variable length external information is incorporated into a fixed length core tweak through application specific preprocessing. We establish birthday bound tweakable variable-input-length strong pseudorandom permutation security under the stated block cipher, keyed hash, and key derivation assumptions. The analysis covers adaptive encryption and decryption queries, varying message lengths, repeated tweaks, and reused internal values. We also describe derived interfaces for authenticated encryption with associated data, tweakable encryption, and deterministic authenticated encryption, distinguishing their additional security requirements from the core guarantee.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-11T13:13:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T12:17:01Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/246", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/246", "datestamp": "2026-11-01T03:47:56Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/246", "title": "Highly Efficient and Round-Optimal Asymmetric PAKE", "creators": ["Zachary Barbanell", "Jiayu Xu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "An asymmetric Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (aPAKE) protocol allows a client, who holds a raw password, and a server, who holds a one-way mapping of the password, to jointly establish a cryptographically strong session key, without an authenticated channel. The standard security definition for aPAKE is in the Universal Composability (UC) framework. Despite its great potential of being used in practice, existing aPAKE protocols are either not round-optimal, computationally inefficient, or not proven secure.\n\nIn this work, we present two aPAKE protocols that are 1 simultaneous round, UC-secure, have reasonable computational costs, and rely on mild cryptographic assumptions. Our first protocol is in the Random Oracle Model and the Algebraic Group Model (ROM+AGM), secure under the CDH assumption, and has computational cost comparable to the most efficient aPAKE protocols in the literature (1 simultaneous round or not). Our second protocol is in the ROM only and secure under the DDH assumption, and also has significantly lower computational cost than the only other UC-secure 1 simultaneous round aPAKE protocol. Interestingly, even our second protocol does not rely on the gap Diffie-Hellman assumption, which requires creative application of the forking lemma.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-13T08:44:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-11-01T03:47:56Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/284", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/284", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T06:55:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/284", "title": "Knowledge Soundness of Polynomial Commitments in the Algebraic Group Model Does Not Guarantee Extractability", "creators": ["Petr Chmel", "Pavel Hubáček", "Dominik Stejskal"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The Algebraic Group Model (AGM) has become a standard framework for analyzing the knowledge soundness of group-based polynomial commitment schemes. In this work, we formally establish inherent limitations of this methodology. For many PCSs analyzed in the AGM, the algebraic explanation directly determines a polynomial and any required randomness that together reproduce the commitment. We call this structural property AGM-clarity. The extraction proof then only needs to show that the accepted evaluation agrees with this polynomial. For AGM-clear schemes, evaluation binding alone implies knowledge soundness in the AGM. If the commitment algorithm is itself algebraic, knowledge soundness in the AGM is in fact equivalent to weak evaluation binding, a relaxation of evaluation binding introduced by Catalano, Fiore, and Tucker (ASIACRYPT 2022).\n\nWe then show that this guarantee implies neither standard-model extraction nor evaluation binding. Under the discrete-logarithm and SBDH assumptions, we give a succinct modification of the KZG polynomial commitment that is evaluation binding and, hence, knowledge-sound in the AGM. It admits a prover that is accepted on every evaluation point, yet no efficient extractor recovers an opening of its commitment, even given the prover's code and state. For a non-succinct variant, no polynomial consistent with the transcript exists at all, so extraction fails even for unbounded extractors. A minor modification of those PCSs destroys evaluation binding while leaving knowledge soundness in the AGM intact, so the AGM notion lies strictly below evaluation binding. Finally, we show that the common formulation, which also requires algebraic explanations of evaluation proofs, is strictly weaker than the variant characterized by weak evaluation binding. Our separating schemes satisfy even the stronger variant, so no property implied by either formulation guarantees extraction in the standard model.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-17T06:38:28Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T06:55:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/312", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/312", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T13:20:05Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/312", "title": "RISQrypt: Fast, Secure and Agile Hardware-Software Co-Design for Post-Quantum Cryptography", "creators": ["Tolun Tosun", "Atıl Utku Ay", "Quinten Norga", "Suparna Kundu", "Melik Yazıcı", "Erkay Savaş", "Ingrid Verbauwhede"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "In this paper, we present RISQrypt, the first unified architecture in the literature that implements ML-KEM (f.k.a. CRYSTALS-Kyber) and ML-DSA (f.k.a. CRYSTALS-Dilithium), two standardized lattice-based post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms, with masking. RISQrypt is a hardware–software co-design framework that integrates dedicated cryptographic accelerators to speed up polynomial arithmetic, hashing, and mask-conversion operations, the latter being one of the primary bottlenecks in masked implementations of lattice-based PQC. Our design achieves low latency while providing both theoretical and practical side-channel security through formal proofs in the $t$-probing model and practical experiments. Specifically, the masked decapsulation of ML-KEM-768 requires $\\mathbf{109K}$ clock cycles, while masked signing of ML-DSA-65 requires $\\mathbf{1230K}$ clock cycles on average. These results demonstrate $\\mathbf{11.3\\times}$ time-performance improvement over existing masked implementations. Our time performance results for unprotected functions also outperform the existing work; achieving speed-ups of $\\mathbf{10.64\\times}$ and $\\mathbf{8.94\\times}$ for ML-KEM's encapsulation and decapsulation algorithms, respectively, and $\\mathbf{1.14\\times}$ and $\\mathbf{2.23\\times}$ for ML-DSA’s signature generation and verification algorithms, respectively, when compared to existing designs with similar resource usage. In addition, prior designs are more limited in scope, generally supporting only a single scheme and lacking either the side-channel protection or the unified, crypto-agile framework that enables support for both ML-KEM and ML-DSA as in our architecture. Leveraging the HW/SW co-design approach, the proposed architecture can be reprogrammed through firmware to support other (and future) PQC standards and algorithms sharing similar computational building blocks. As proof of concept, we demonstrate this capability by implementing FN-DSA (f.k.a. Falcon) and SLH-DSA (f.k.a. SPHINCS+).", "date_submitted": "2026-02-18T16:40:12Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T13:20:05Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/320", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/320", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T14:39:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/320", "title": "Statistically Secure Asynchronous MPC with Linear Communication and $\\mathcal{O}(n^5)$ Additive Overhead", "creators": ["Xiaoyu Ji", "Yifan Song"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows distrusted parties to jointly evaluate a common function while keeping their inputs private. In this work, we focus on improving the communication complexity of information-theoretic asynchronous MPC with optimal resilience ($t < n/3$). The current state-of-the-art work in this setting by Goyal, Liu-Zhang, and Song [Crypto’24] achieves amortized linear communication per gate with $\\Omega(n^{14})$ elements additive overhead. In comparison, the best-known result in the synchronous setting by Goyal, Song, and Zhu [Crypto’20] achieves the amortized linear communication per gate with only $\\mathcal{O}(n^{6})$ elements additive overhead, revealing a significant gap that we aim to close.\n\n    This work closes this gap and goes further. We present the first statistically secure asynchronous MPC protocol achieving amortized linear communication per gate with only $\\mathcal{O}(n^{5})$ elements additive overhead assuming a functionality for Agreement on Common Set (ACS). With the best-known instantiation for ACS, we obtain an asynchronous MPC protocol in the plain model with additive overhead $\\mathcal{O}((\\kappa+n)n^4\\log\\kappa)$ elements in expectation, where $\\kappa$ is the security parameter. In the setting of statistical security with optimal resilience, this even surpasses the best synchronous result when $n\\geq\\sqrt{\\kappa\\log\\kappa}$.\n    \n    Technically, our contributions include (i) a new protocol for generating Beaver triples with linear communication per triple and $\\mathcal{O}(n^3)$ elements additive overhead assuming functionalities for generating random degree-$t$ Shamir sharings and ACS, and (ii) a new protocol for generating random degree-$t$ Shamir sharings with linear communication per sharing and $\\mathcal{O}(n^{5})$ elements additive overhead assuming a functionality for ACS.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-19T03:31:58Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T14:39:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/395", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/395", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T15:38:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/395", "title": "How To Make Delegated Payments on Bitcoin: A Question for the AI Agentic Future", "creators": ["Jay Taylor", "Paul Gerhart", "Sri AravindaKrishnan Thyagarajan"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "AI agents and custodial services are increasingly being entrusted as intermediaries to conduct transactions on behalf of institutions. The stakes are high: The digital asset market is projected to exceed \\$16 trillion by 2030, where exchanges often involve proprietary, time-sensitive goods. Although industry efforts like Google’s Agent-to-Payments (AP2) protocol standardize how agents authorize payments, they leave open the core challenge of fair exchange: ensuring that a buyer obtains the asset if and only if the seller is compensated without exposing sensitive information.\n\nWe introduce proxy adaptor signatures (PAS), a new cryptographic primitive that enables fair exchange through delegation without sacrificing atomicity or privacy. A stateless buyer issues a single request and does not need to manage long-term cryptographic secrets while proxies complete the exchange with a seller. The seller is guaranteed payment if the buyer can later reconstruct the purchased witness; meanwhile, the proxies remain oblivious to the witness throughout the protocol. We formalize PAS under a threshold model that tolerates the collusion of up to $t-1$ proxies. We also present an efficient construction from standard primitives that is compatible with Bitcoin, Cardano, and Ethereum. Finally, we evaluate a Rust implementation that supports up to 30 proxies. Our prototype is concretely efficient: buyer and seller computations take place in microseconds, proxy operations in milliseconds, and on-chain costs are equivalent to those of a standard transaction without fair exchange.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-26T11:13:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T15:38:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/444", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/444", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T09:46:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/444", "title": "Leakage-Diagrams, Importance Sampling, and Composition  in the Random Probing Model", "creators": ["Vahid Jahandideh", "Bart Mennink", "Lejla Batina"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Security evaluation of masking in low-noise regimes remains poorly understood: increasing the masking order does not automatically translate into higher concrete resistance once many correlated intermediates are processed by a full implementation.\nA common approach is to reduce noisy side-channel leakage to the random probing model (RPM), but existing reductions can be too loose to yield meaningful leakage rates in practice, and current RPM analyses often rely on costly simulations or numerically propagated bounds.\n\nThis work develops analytic and algorithmic tools for estimating and upper-bounding RPM security of masked gadgets and their compositions.\nFirst, for noisy Hamming-weight leakage over $\\mathbb{F}_{2^u}$ we compute concrete RPM leakage-rate parameters for a tighter $\\mathbb{F}_2$-linear reduction based on binary inner products, providing a tangible link between SNR and probing rate.\nSecond, for $\\mathbb{F}_q$-linear circuits we leverage a vector-space representation to characterize RPM leakage as an erasure event, yielding a direct connection to local metrics such as advantage and implying global simulability for refreshed, block-separated executions.\nThird, we improve Monte Carlo estimation of rare leakage events using importance sampling, enabling evaluation in low-rate/high-order regimes that are infeasible with naive sampling.\nFinally, we revisit the leakage-diagram technique and derive explicit bounds for refresh gadgets, and we apply the same viewpoint to composition through \\emph{bridges}, showing that SNI—while sufficient for threshold probing model (TPM)—does not capture the RPM phenomenon governing refresh boundaries.\n\nWe implement our methods in \\textsf{LAPSE}, a tool that compiles gadget descriptions into linear-algebraic representations and supports exact computation as well as Monte Carlo/importance-sampling estimation of RPM security parameters.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-04T11:10:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T09:46:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/476", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/476", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T21:30:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/476", "title": "Duty-Free Bits: Projectivizing Garbling Schemes", "creators": ["Nakul Khambhati", "Anwesh Bhattacharya", "David Heath"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Garbling schemes are powerful primitives that enable secure computation between a mutually untrusting garbler and evaluator. A projective garbling scheme is one that encodes the evaluator's input in a simple bit-by-bit manner. Projective schemes, such as the seminal scheme of Yao, are versatile, as they are naturally compatible with other simple tools, such as $1$-out-of-$2$ oblivious transfer (OT). There exist garbling schemes that naturally operate over large finite fields, some of which require only efficient information-theoretic (IT) techniques. However, here the evaluator's input is encoded via an affine function over a large field, so these schemes are not naturally projective, reducing their versatility.\n\nWe provide a transformation that efficiently projectivizes such schemes.\nConsider an arithmetic garbling scheme where the evaluator's input consists of elements from a large prime field. Our symmetric-key-based garbling techniques give a mechanism to translate from Yao-style garbled labels to IT-style garbled labels at cost proportional to the input and output labels: crossing the border is duty-free!\n\nWe apply our technique to two problems.\n(1) Recent works show that projective garbling schemes solve a problem central to trust-minimized bridges for the Bitcoin blockchain. BABE (Garg et al., 2026) and Argo MAC (Eagen and Lai, 2026) give two different approaches. Both works implicitly construct an efficient IT garbling scheme, then use naive bit-decomposition to achieve projectivity. We construct and implement drop-in replacements for both; we improve BABE's encoding size by $51\\times$, and Argo MAC's by $23\\times$.\n(2) Our technique implies a non-interactive reduction from vector oblivious linear evaluations (VOLEs) over $\\mathbb{F}_p$ to $1$-out-of-$2$ OTs. To our knowledge, ours is the state-of-the-art Minicrypt (plus base OTs) protocol for large field VOLE secure against a malicious receiver. It costs only $O((\\lambda + n) \\lg p)$ bits.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-08T00:27:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T21:30:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/536", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/536", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T05:17:14Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/536", "title": "Balancing Exploration and Exploitation: Discriminative-Model-based Fault Injection Parameter Search", "creators": ["Ju-Hwan Kim", "Dong-Guk Han"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Fault Injection (FI) attacks are physical attacks that deliberately induce malfunctions in a target device. Inducing the intended fault requires precise tuning of the FI parameters, for which automated search strategies have been proposed. Most favor either exploration or exploitation: the former covers a broad region of the parameter space, while the latter discovers many successful parameters. An effective search, however, should find parameters that are both numerous and broadly spread. We propose a search framework that achieves this with two complementary discriminative models: an exploration model that learns the boundary where faults are likely, and an exploitation model that concentrates on the neighborhoods of discovered faults. We further introduce the Refinement-Oriented Successive Halving Algorithm (RSHA), which selects a highly reliable parameter from the discovered ones, using an evaluation budget derived from a target estimation precision. Across four scenarios---voltage glitching and electromagnetic fault injection on two off-the-shelf microcontrollers, the 8-bit ATXmega and the 32-bit SAM4S---our method finds up to 26.7x as many distinct successful parameters as state-of-the-art methods and attains up to 5.8x their parameter space coverage. At the full budget of 100,000 injections, the parameter that RSHA selects from our discovered set achieves a success rate up to 7.6 percentage points higher than the one it selects from the best baseline's set.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-17T09:47:32Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T05:17:14Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/537", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/537", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T13:59:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/537", "title": "On Phase Decompositions with Applications to Digit Decomposition", "creators": ["Leonard Schild", "Aysajan Abidin", "Bart Preneel"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Fully homomorphic encryption schemes enable arbitrary computation on encrypted data. Although the first candidate were considered too computationally inefficient, modern cryptosystems are now featured in practical deployments. Yet, despite a plethora of advances, many non-polynomial operations remain computationally challenging.\nIn this work, we investigate radix decomposition, i.e., the homomorphic conversion of an LWE ciphertext with a large plaintext message into encryptions of its digits. Such decompositions are a core building block for large-precision computation in FHEW/TFHE-like schemes, for instance for sign evaluation, comparisons, and large lookup tables. To this end, we introduce phase decomposition: decomposing the coefficients of an LWE ciphertext itself in a radix $\\alpha$ yields small pseudo-LWE samples whose phases recombine linearly to the phase of the original ciphertext. For keys of bounded Hamming weight, these phases are small and can be made non-negative, and the base-$\\alpha$ digits of the original phase follow from them through a simple carry recurrence. We evaluate this recurrence entirely in the exponent of an RLWE accumulator, using a new exact homomorphic truncation in the exponent based on automorphisms. The resulting digit decomposition requires a single blind rotation per digit, asymptotically half as many as the state of the art, introduces no modulus-switching error between iterations, and supports input moduli larger than the ring modulus. The same tools yield functional bootstrapping over the full ring $\\mathbb{Z}_{2N}$, the evaluation of arbitrary, not necessarily negacyclic, functions on small plaintext spaces, and a scheme-independent digit decomposition for SIMD schemes based on parallel-prefix addition.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-17T12:39:47Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T13:59:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/556", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/556", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T15:06:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/556", "title": "TP-NTT: Batch NTT Hardware with Application to Relinearization", "creators": ["Emre Koçer", "Tolun Tosun", "Beren Aydoğan", "Erkay Savaş", "Furkan Turan", "Ingrid Verbauwhede"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables arbitrary computation on encrypted data without decryption, providing strong privacy guarantees for secure cloud computing, encrypted analytics, and privacy-preserving machine learning. However, practical deployment of FHE remains limited by the high computational cost of polynomial arithmetic over large modular rings. In particular, Number Theoretic Transform (NTT)–based polynomial multiplication dominates the execution time of modern lattice-based FHE schemes. In this work, we present TP-NTT, a scalable, throughput-optimized NTT architecture supporting a wide range of ring dimensions used in FHE, from $2^{10}$ to $2^{16}$. Our design applies optimizations at multiple levels, from modular arithmetic to the NTT algorithm itself, including multi-dimensional decomposition without requiring additional multiplication blocks. The decomposition dimensionality is configurable at design time, supporting 2-D, 3-D, and 4-D decompositions, each advantageous in specific scenarios. Furthermore, TP-NTT provides design-time-configurable throughput. Combined with its scalable architecture, this enables significant advantages for batch NTT operations compared to other works in the literature. At $n=2^{16}$, it outperforms the best-performing prior design by $1.33\\times$ in average latency while achieving $1.24\\times$ better area–time-product (ATP). To demonstrate its efficiency, we present a case study on FHE relinearization, focusing on the BFV scheme. We propose a relinearization accelerator that leverages the fast batch NTT capability of TP-NTT, achieving $67.34\\times$ speedup  over state-of-the-art software implementations and highlighting TP-NTT’s effectiveness in real-world FHE applications.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-20T11:06:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T15:06:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/629", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/629", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T06:09:48Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/629", "title": "Towards Formal Security Proofs of MQOM", "creators": ["Haruhisa Kosuge", "Keita Xagawa"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Recent MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) signatures increasingly rely on aggressive GGM-tree optimizations to reduce signature size and computational cost, culminating in __secret-key-root correlated GGM trees__ as used in SBC (Huth and Joux, CRYPTO 2024), MQOM (NIST PQC Standardization for Additional Signature Round-2, 2024), and rBN++ (Kim, Lee, and Son, EUROCRYPT 2025). While this technique yields substantial compression, it introduces a dependency loop in the proof (Kosuge and Xagawa, CiC 2026(3)). \n\nWe analyze MQOM and resolve this circularity by providing EUF-CMA security proofs for a slightly modified variant. The modifications consist of incorporating a salt into the input of a hash function and modifying the evaluation domain to ensure that all evaluation points are nonzero. \n\nFor the resulting variant of MQOM, we prove EUF-CMA security for the GF(2) parameter sets in the random-oracle plus ideal-cipher model, assuming EUF-NMA security, standard one-wayness, and a heuristic conjecture on matrices. Our proof combines the H-coefficient technique with one-wayness, which may be of independent interest.\n\nWe also prove EUF-CMA security in the (quantum) random-oracle model, where block-cipher-based hash functions are modeled as random oracles. The proof relies on EUF-NMA security and partial-guessing one-wayness (Feneuil and Rivain, ASIACRYPT 2026), which can be reduced classically to partial-domain one-wayness.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-31T12:45:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T06:09:48Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/714", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/714", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T12:45:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/714", "title": "$\\mathsf{Veloz}$: Efficient and Flexible Distribution Framework for Interleaved-Code-Based Polynomial Commitment Scheme", "creators": ["Yuanzhuo Yu", "Shi-Feng Sun", "Yuncong Zhang", "Chenhua Fan", "Tianyi Ma", "Dawu Gu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) are a fundamental cryptographic primitive that allows a prover to reveal evaluations for a committed polynomial. Motivated by the inefficiency of proof generation for large-scale computations as well as the concerns regarding third-party reliance and quantum threats, a line of recent works has focused on distributing code-based PCS, where the proving workload is distributed among multiple sub-provers to accelerate proof generation, while preserving transparent setup and plausible quantum resilience. However, for $M$ sub-provers generating an evaluation proof for a polynomial of  size $N$, existing solutions either require $O(N)$ total communication among sub-provers, or incur an $O(M)$ overhead in proof size.\n  \nIn this paper, we introduce $\\mathsf{Veloz}$, a novel distribution framework for interleaved-code-based multilinear PCS, which for the first time achieves communication cost sublinear in $N$, and eliminates the dependence of proof size on the number of sub-provers, without compromising proving speed or security. At its core is a customized proof aggregation method from interleaved code that efficiently combines sub-proofs via minimum communication. We further present two instantiations of $\\mathsf{Veloz}$: one based on Reed-Solomon code, $\\mathsf{Veloz}_{\\text{RS}}$, achieves $O(\\frac{N}{M}\\log{\\frac{N}{\\log{N}}})$ proving time, $O(\\lambda \\cdot \\frac{\\log^{2}{N}}{\\log\\log{N}} + M\\cdot\\frac{N}{\\log{N}})$ communication, and $O(\\lambda \\cdot \\frac{\\log^{2}{N}}{\\log\\log{N}})$ proof size; the other based on the fast linear code from Brakedown (Golovnev et al., CRYPTO 2023), $\\mathsf{Veloz}_{\\text{Lin}}$, features $O(\\frac{N}{M})$ proving time, $O(\\lambda \\cdot K + M\\cdot\\frac{N}{K})$ communication, and $O(\\lambda \\cdot K)$ proof size for $K \\in [\\sqrt[3]{N}, \\sqrt{N}]$, while enjoying field agnosticism.\n  \nWe also implement both schemes in Rust and conduct a comprehensive performance evaluation. The experimental results demonstrate their efficient scalability with increasing $M$. More specifically, for $N = 2^{30}$ and $M = 8$, $\\mathsf{Veloz}_{\\text{RS}}$ takes 61.8s for proof generation, achieving a 6.46$\\times$ speedup compared to running a single prover, while $\\mathsf{Veloz}_{\\text{Lin}}$ generates a proof in 26.9s and achieves a 7.03$\\times$ speedup.", "date_submitted": "2026-04-12T13:06:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T12:45:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/723", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/723", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T14:08:58Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/723", "title": "Hint-Free Multi-Signatures", "creators": ["Dennis Hofheinz", "Michael Reichle", "Benedikt Wagner"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "In a (non-interactive) multi-signature scheme, parties independently generate keys and produce signatures on a common message, which can be aggregated into a single signature verifiable with respect to the set of public keys. Existing multi-signature constructions, however, suffer from at least one of two limitations: either (1) aggregate signatures cannot be further aggregated, or (2) verification requires auxiliary information beyond the set of public keys, such as the aggregation topology.\n\nWe argue that these limitations significantly restrict the applicability of multi-signatures in large-scale distributed systems, such as proof-of-stake blockchains. To address this gap, we initiate the formal study of hint-free multi-signatures, which support multi-hop aggregation while allowing verification using only the set of public keys.\n\nTo the best of our knowledge, the only previously known (folklore) construction that is fully hint-free relies on recursive SNARKs, which introduces unclear heuristics for security (e.g., proving statements about random oracle relations) or inherently limits the depth of the aggregation topology.\n\nWe show that hint-free multi-signatures can be realized without proof recursion, in the standard model. At a high level, we show how to publicly normalize BLS multi-signatures so that verification depends only on the set of public keys rather than a multi-set. While our scheme is not practical (it uses indistinguishability obfuscation), it establishes the feasibility of the primitive provides a foundation for future work on practical constructions.", "date_submitted": "2026-04-14T09:15:15Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T14:08:58Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/732", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/732", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T22:11:39Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/732", "title": "Faster Logical Operations from Discrete CKKS", "creators": ["Jaehyung Kim"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We study non-arithmetic operations for BFV with arbitrary plaintext moduli and for large-modulus GBFV. Existing approaches either rely on interpolation over large plaintext spaces or use digit representations that are efficient for logic but poorly matched to native arithmetic. We build conversions between BFV/GBFV and Discrete CKKS, so that radix-based integer computation in Discrete CKKS can be used as a reusable backend. For fixed radix base, comparison uses $O(\\log p \\log\\log p)$ bootstrappings for BFV with plaintext modulus $p$ and $O(\\log\\log p)$ bootstrappings for GBFV with associated modulus $p=b^\\ell+1$.", "date_submitted": "2026-04-14T21:22:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T22:11:39Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/735", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/735", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T11:10:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/735", "title": "CLAASP-MP: An Automated MILP Framework for Monomial Prediction", "creators": ["Emanuele Bellini", "Mohamed Rachidi", "Sharwan K. Tiwari"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "As AI increasingly automates cryptanalytic programming, transparent and reproducible frameworks are essential for making generated results human-verifiable. We present CLAASP-MP, a monomial-prediction tool integrated into CLAASP and based on the three-subset division property without unknown subset (3SDP-woU). CLAASP-MP generates a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) model directly from the CLAASP component graph, supporting S-boxes, linear layers, Boolean operations, modular addition and multiplication, and linear and nonlinear feedback shift registers.\n\nFor selected output bits, CLAASP-MP computes the algebraic normal form (ANF) for small numbers of rounds, derives superpolies for a chosen cube, and bounds the algebraic degree with respect to plaintext, key, or IV variables. It detects absent monomials through vanishing ANF coefficients, zero superpolies, or degree bounds, thereby identifying balanced outputs and integral distinguishers.\n\nWe evaluate CLAASP-MP on block ciphers, permutations, and stream-cipher update functions. For block ciphers, we reproduce known distinguishers, find new cubes, and report the first integral distinguishers for SAECHAM. For Splight, we reach rounds 10 and 11, despite a previous two-subset division-property search reporting no 10-round distinguisher. On MSX-128, a $96$-dimensional cube leaves $64$ of $128$ output bits balanced after 7 rounds. For permutations, we extend the best-known division-property distinguishers for ChaCha and Salsa from 6 and 5 rounds, respectively, to 6.75 rounds; give the first such distinguishers for Forr\\'o; and reduce the data complexity for Chaskey-Pi from $2^{64}$ to $2^{23}$ at round 3 and from $2^{127}$ to $2^{122}$ at round 4. For stream ciphers, we find new 36-dimensional cubes for Bivium, extend the tight degree bounds for Trivium to later initialization clocks, and reproduce published superpolies.\n\nThese results establish CLAASP-MP as a unified, practical, and human-verifiable framework for monomial prediction across symmetric primitives.", "date_submitted": "2026-04-15T06:11:59Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T11:10:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/853", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/853", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T02:43:27Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/853", "title": "Faster Bootstrapping for Fully Homomorphic Encryption over Mixed-Radix Cyclotomic Ring", "creators": ["Jung Hee Cheon", "Seungwan Hong", "Minsik Kang", "Jonghyun Kim", "Taeseong Kim", "Changmin Lee", "Junho Lee"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Homomorphic matrix arithmetic is central to many data-intensive fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) applications, including privacy-preserving machine learning. Standard CKKS over power-of-two cyclotomic rings provides only a one-dimensional slot structure, forcing encrypted matrix operations to rely heavily on cyclic slot rotations and the associated key-switching overhead. Although the multivariate cyclotomic ring introduced by Jang et al. (AsiaCCS 2022) and later leveraged by Gentry--Lee (Crypto 2026) naturally supports matrix-structured computations, existing implementations still rely on Number-Theoretic Transforms (NTTs) based on Rader's algorithm for the non-power-of-two dimensions, making homomorphic arithmetic inefficient. Moreover, they lack an efficient bootstrapping algorithm.\n\nWe instantiate CKKS over a mixed-radix cyclotomic ring whose order has \\(2\\) and \\(3\\) as prime factors, yielding a bivariate slot structure with independent row and column rotations. By realizing efficient NTT-based polynomial arithmetic over this ring and developing homomorphic radix-\\(3\\) FFT algorithms for the slot-to-coefficient (StC) and coefficient-to-slot (CtS) transformations in bootstrapping, we obtain the first practical end-to-end implementation of CKKS over this mixed-radix ring, thereby broadening the parameter space of CKKS beyond conventional power-of-two ring degrees.\n\nBased on this foundation, we further present an efficient bootstrapping algorithm for Gentry--Lee. Our mixed-radix decomposition factors the Discrete Fourier Transform and its inverse underlying StC and CtS into their radix-\\(2\\) and radix-\\(3\\) local counterparts.  Exploiting the inherent batch structure of Gentry--Lee, we evaluate these components as batch plaintext--ciphertext matrix multiplications. This formulation replaces rotation-heavy linear transformations with matrix multiplications over cleartexts that can be accelerated by high-performance libraries such as BLAS and FLINT. \n\nOur proof-of-concept implementation achieves up to $5.31\\times$ and $2.96\\times$ speedups in amortized runtime for CtS and for full bootstrapping, respectively, over our optimized single bootstrapping, and is up to $1.87\\times$ and $1.39\\times$ faster than the construction of Crockett et al. (Crypto 2026).", "date_submitted": "2026-05-01T04:00:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T02:43:27Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/880", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/880", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T22:19:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/880", "title": "On the Common Bias of Majorities: Poly-Time Attacks on THR-XOR PRGs", "creators": ["Antonio Giulio D’Antona", "Pierrick Méaux", "Akin Ünal"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Pseudorandom Generators (PRGs) based on Threshold-XOR predicates with large locality and high stretches have recently gained traction, since they lend themselves as shallow weak Pseudorandom Functions (PRFs) to fast multiparty computation protocols. In this work, we present novel fast attacks on such PRGs that achieve substantial advantages. Concretely, we break the security levels of most parameters collected by Boura, Couteau, Perrin and Rotella (ToSC'25), as well as those proposed by Fu, Li, Lyu and Liu (EC'26). On the asymptotic side, we prove that our attacks achieve an advantage of $n^{-n/a}$ where $n$ denotes the seed length and $a$ the locality of threshold predicates. As a consequence, when $a \\in \\Theta(n)$, we get poly-time attacks with noticeable advantage. These results close current gaps on the theoretical study of THR-XOR based Goldreich PRGs.\n\nAdditionally, we demonstrate how the attack advantage can be amplified for PRGs with large output lengths (which are common in the context of weak PRFs). Finally, we discuss alternative predicates for Goldreich PRGs that resist all currently known attacks.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-05T15:29:37Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T22:19:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/922", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/922", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T02:10:06Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/922", "title": "Generic Construction of CCA-Secure PKE from Key-Insulated and Privacy-Preserving Signatures with Publicly Derived Public Key", "creators": ["Ryo Mizuno", "Keita Emura"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "To enhance the security of stealth addresses and protect user privacy, Liu et al. (EuroS&P 2019) proposed a Key-Insulated and Privacy-Preserving Signature Scheme with Publicly Derived Public Keys (PDPKS). In this scheme, the payee generates a master public/secret key pair, and the payer derives a public key from the payee's master public key and binds the cryptocurrency asset to the resulting derived public key. The payee then verifies, using the master secret key, whether the derived public key has been correctly generated from the master public key. In this paper, we show that a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA) can be generically constructed from PDPKS. Specifically, we utilize unlinkability, which hides the master public key from which a derived public key originates, to conceal plaintext information from ciphertexts. We also simulate the decryption oracle by leveraging the derived public key checking algorithm. In addition, to guarantee the correctness of the proposed PKE scheme, we rely on the consistency of PDPKS introduced by Emura (IACR CiC 2025). Given the motivation behind PDPKS, namely the construction of stealth addresses in a provably secure manner, unlinkability is regarded as the core security property of PDPKS. Our result shows that achieving this core security property essentially requires CCA-secure PKE, or cryptographic primitives of equivalent strength, and that such primitives are indispensable for constructing PDPKS.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-10T23:56:40Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T02:10:06Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/933", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/933", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T19:51:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/933", "title": "BitVM3: Efficient Bitcoin Bridges via Garbled Circuits", "creators": ["Robin Linus Woll", "Ioannis Alexopoulos", "Lukas Aumayr", "Zeta Avarikioti", "Matteo Maffei", "David Tse"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Bitcoin bridges, protocols that lock BTC on Bitcoin and represent it on a secondary system, underpin much of Bitcoin's application layer, yet remain poorly secured. Deployed bridges rely on federated custody with honest-majority assumptions, while BitVM2, the state of the art in trust-minimized bridging, incurs worst-case dispute costs of approximately \\$16,000, requiring large operator bonds and deposits that restrict participation to well-capitalized parties.\n\nWe present BitVM3-BRIDGE, a trust-minimized bridge architecture from Bitcoin to (i) chains with finality certificates, such as Ethereum, and (ii) Bitcoin rollups. Our main contribution is an end-to-end bridge construction that makes trust-minimized Bitcoin bridging practical at scale. The bridge is powered by BitVM3-CORE, a modular abstraction for permissionless off-chain computation on Bitcoin using garbled circuits. In BitVM3-CORE, a challenger evaluates a garbled circuit entirely off-chain and obtains a fraud-proof witness if and only if the operator's claim is incorrect. This paradigm reduces total on-chain costs to approximately \\$9, with the challenge transaction itself costing just \\$0.20. This nearly 1000× cost reduction enables smaller bonds, broader operator participation, and smaller deposit sizes.\n\nBeyond the bridge itself, we make two additional contributions. First, we formalize BitVM3-CORE as a sound and complete on-chain proof system under standard cryptographic assumptions. Prior GC-based proposals typically provide either informal security arguments or construction-specific formalizations. By contrast, our framework captures existing constructions within a uniform model and gives a generic treatment based on axiomatized security and functional assumptions. Second, we introduce an on-chain Bitcoin light client secure in the variable-difficulty setting, enabling permissionless chain introspection on Bitcoin and thereby the rollup variant of BitVM3-BRIDGE.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-11T17:30:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T19:51:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/935", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/935", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T19:36:37Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/935", "title": "SoK: Private LLM Inference using Approximate Homomorphic Encryption", "creators": ["Ahmad Al Badawi", "Andreea Alexandru", "Yuriy Polyakov", "Vinod Vaikuntanathan"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Although recent surveys on privacy-enhancing technologies concluded that FHE cannot feasibly evaluate non-linear activation functions in modern ML architectures, 21 CKKS-based frameworks have since demonstrated end-to-end private inference of LLMs with up to 8B parameters. However, as the field grows rapidly, the literature has become fragmented. Frameworks differ in ciphertext packing layouts, model fidelity, software and hardware stacks, and reported metrics, that hinder direct comparison and reproducibility. This paper presents the first systematization of knowledge for non-interactive, CKKS-based private LLM inference. We categorize the design space across two axes: a model-level axis (packing layout for linear blocks and model preservation for non-linear blocks) and a system-level axis (covering hardware, compilers, bootstrapping management, and hybrid execution). To standardize reporting framework configurations and results among researchers, we propose a Private LLM Card System (PLCS). Furthermore, we introduce POLARIS, a model-preserving reference framework for CKKS-based private LLM inference and provide it as an open-source proof-of-concept. POLARIS evaluates encrypted inference for the entire BERT family, from BERT-Tiny to BERT-Base, on CPU and GPU backends, the first framework to demonstrate this.\n\nOur analysis shows that only 5 out of the 21 surveyed frameworks are model-preserving, that is, they evaluate standard, unmodified LLMs without retraining or architectural substitutions while keeping the entire prompt encrypted. We also show that model-preserving CKKS approximations maintain high downstream task accuracy from BERT-Tiny up to Llama-3-8B. We identify a runtime gap of roughly four orders of magnitude between the best encrypted and plaintext inference as the primary barrier to practical use. While our analysis confirms that CKKS-based inference is now algorithmically feasible for non-linear functions and large models, we conclude that it remains operationally impractical for many human-facing applications until the efficiency gap is narrowed. We outline promising research directions to close this gap.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-12T01:14:45Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T19:36:37Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/965", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/965", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T16:26:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/965", "title": "Device Binding for Anonymous Credentials on Legacy Phones", "creators": ["Sofía Celi", "Anja Lehmann", "Shai Levin", "Alexandros Zacharakis"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Digital identity systems are being deployed worldwide to enable secure, privacy-preserving authentication. In this regards, Europe's EUDI Wallet mandates selective attribute disclosure and unlinkable authentication, effectively requiring anonymous credentials. Yet current proposed solutions omit them because they lack device binding: tying a credential to a secure hardware element on the user's device to prevent cloning or sharing. Device binding encodes a device public key in the credential and, at presentation time, produces a fresh signature under the hardware-protected secret key -- a proof-of-possession (PoP). While academic solutions for device binding exist, they require pairing-friendly curves, whereas consumer phones are restricted to ECDSA over P-256.\n\nIn this work, we bridge this gap by enabling device binding of pairing-based credentials using the device's standard ECDSA signature as the PoP. To explore the efficiency–complexity trade-off of such solution, we present three constructions. Our most efficient solution generates unlinkable binding proofs of size ~1.5kB in under ~400ms using a simple arithmetic circuit, whereas the most conservative circuit-free approach matches this proving time at ~122kB. All solutions follow a common blueprint expressed in the reductions of knowledge framework (Crypto 2023), which enables modular composition of zero-knowledge proofs and eases both security analysis and implementation. This framework has previously been mainly used in a theoretical context, and our work demonstrates that it is a powerful tool to design, analyze and implement advanced real-world systems.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-15T15:28:02Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T16:26:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/970", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/970", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T23:12:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/970", "title": "Security Analysis on a Blockchain-based Public-Key Authenticated Searchable Encryption Scheme", "creators": ["Hinata Nishino", "Keita Emura"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Du et al. (Security and Communication Networks, 2022) proposed a public-key authenticated searchable encryption scheme that employs Bloom filters and blockchain. In their scheme, Bloom filters are used to search encrypted keywords, while blockchain is used to guarantee the correctness of search results. In this paper, we demonstrate that Du et al.'s scheme leaks keyword information from ciphertexts. Our analysis focuses on the fact that the Bloom filter embedded in a ciphertext is uniquely determined by the Diffie-Hallman key and the keyword to be encrypted and is directly included in the ciphertext. We show that the success probability of the proposed attack is lower bounded by the probability that no false positives occur in the Bloom filter, and we evaluate this probability to confirm that the attack achieves a sufficiently high success rate. Furthermore, we examine Du et al.'s security model and their assumed usage scenarios, and discuss the validity of our attack under those conditions. We also consider a simple modification intended to prevent our attack and demonstrate that a slightly adapted version of the attack remains effective against the modified scheme. In addition, we show that previously generated ciphertexts can still pass verification even when the search results differ, indicating that the blockchain-based integrity verification mechanism is insufficient.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-16T02:40:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T23:12:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1015", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1015", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T00:05:51Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1015", "title": "Comments on \"Server-Aided Public Key Authenticated Searchable Encryption With Constant Ciphertext and Constant Trapdoor\"", "creators": ["Takeshi Yoshida", "Keita Emura"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Cheng and Meng (IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 2024) introduced server-aided public key authenticated encryption with keyword search (SA-PAEKS). In this short note,  without a public-key infrastructure, we show that a cloud server (tester) can obtain keyword information from both a ciphertext and a trapdoor.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-21T00:39:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T00:05:51Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1090", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1090", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T15:51:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1090", "title": "How To Track Qubits Through Space and Time (Or: Sailing in a Quantum Boat)", "creators": ["James Bartusek", "Zikuan Huang", "Leo Orshansky", "Henry Yuen"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "While quantum position verification aims to certify a prover's location using quantum information, existing security definitions only guarantee that part of the successful adversarial party is in the claimed location. This leaves open the possibility that a distributed team of adversaries can jointly simulate a prover in a way that defeats the intended meaning of ``being at a location'' in position-based cryptography.\n\nWe introduce stronger notions of position verification that we call quantum localization, which requires that there is a specified, unclonable state at the verified spacetime point -- and that this state can be found nowhere else. We show that quantum localization leads naturally to a meaningful notion of trajectory verification, in which quantum information is verifiably tracked through space and time. We construct quantum localization and trajectory verification protocols using quantum anchor states, which generalize coset states from unclonable cryptography. The security of our schemes is proven in the classical oracle (i.e. ideal obfuscation) model, which can be heuristically instantiated in the plain model using post-quantum indistinguishability obfuscation.\n\nWe also introduce and instantiate the concept of functionality localization, which guarantees that the adversary has the ability to compute a secret function at the verified spacetime point, and this function cannot be computed anywhere else. This raises the intriguing possibility of localizing computational capabilities in space and time. \n\nMore broadly, we believe our notions of quantum localization and subsequent feasibility results provide stronger foundations for position-based cryptography. At a conceptual level, our results also explore the tight link between two fundamental notions in physics -- location and information -- thus serving as a natural foundation for cryptographic capabilities tied to physical spacetime.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-29T03:05:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T15:51:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1098", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1098", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T08:08:21Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1098", "title": "A gentle introduction to lattice-based cryptography", "creators": ["Alfred Menezes"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We present four quantum-safe schemes: the Kyber (ML-KEM) and FrodoKEM key encapsulation mechanisms, and the Dilithium (ML-DSA) and Falcon (FN-DSA) signature schemes. We also develop the mathematical background on lattices needed to understand why Kyber, FrodoKEM, Dilithium and Falcon are regarded as lattice-based cryptosystems, and we provide insight into the computational hardness of the underlying lattice problems. The exposition is intended to be accessible to senior undergraduate students and beginning graduate students.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-29T13:08:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T08:08:21Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1139", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1139", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T11:41:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1139", "title": "Exploiting the complexity of Lattice Isomorphism Problem via Irreducible Decomposition", "creators": ["Kaijie Jiang", "Yinchen Liu"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The Lattice Isomorphism Problem (LIP) is a computational problem that has recently been introduced into cryptography and is believed to be hard. Its search version, Search Lattice Isomorphism Problem (SLIP), is considered even harder than the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP), yet its complexity is still not well understood. Haviv and Regev (SODA 2014) showed that the decisional version (DLIP) lies in a statistical zero-knowledge class and is therefore unlikely to be NP-hard. This result does not apply to the search version, which motivates the question of whether NP can reduce to SLIP.\n\nOur main result answers this question negatively. We show that every language reducible to SLIP lies in AM and coAM, by analyzing the direct-sum structure of irreducible lattices. Consequently, NP cannot reduce to SLIP unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, and there is no reduction from SVP to SLIP unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses.\n\nWe also study several problems closely related to LIP and establish reductions between its search, counting, and decisional variants. These connections mirror known relationships for graph isomorphism. Finally, we propose a new algorithm that uses a KZ basis to compute an orthogonal decomposition of a lattice.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-02T12:23:27Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T11:41:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1141", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1141", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T19:14:32Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1141", "title": "DASTE: Decentralized Ad-Hoc Access-Structured Threshold Encryption with Dynamic Policy Evolution", "creators": ["Anil Kumar Pradhan", "Abhraneel Dutta"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We introduce DASTE, a decentralized encryption primitive for auditable access control in settings where users independently generate public keys, register them on an immutable ledger, and decrypt only through collaboration.\nIn DASTE, a sender encrypts under an access structure (e.g., an access tree / LSSS) whose leaves are concrete registered public keys selected at encryption time.\nA ciphertext can therefore be opened only by a qualifying coalition of registered key holders that jointly reconstructs the masking secret.\n\nDASTE is designed for dynamic policy-governed environments in which access conditions may need to change after encryption.\nTo support this, we provide ciphertext-only policy evolution operations, including semantically neutral insertion, threshold escalation, subtree revocation, and ciphertext rerandomization, that update ciphertexts without reissuing user secret keys and without requiring plaintext access.\nWe give two instantiations: a classical discrete-log-based construction, included as a conceptual baseline, and a post-quantum construction based on decisional Ring-LWE. For the RLWE construction, we prove coalition-bounded IND-CPA security via a standard hybrid argument.\nTogether, these results yield a ledger-anchored, access-structured, post-quantum threshold encryption framework suitable for decentralized key management and governance-oriented decryption workflows.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-02T14:41:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T19:14:32Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1171", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1171", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T12:30:40Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1171", "title": "Forensic categories: a framework for SQIsign-like primitives", "creators": ["Andrea Basso", "Luca De Feo", "Sikhar Patranabis", "Ilinca Radulescu", "Benjamin Wesolowski"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Using the language of categories, we introduce a novel framework abstracting the key algorithmic features of the Deuring correspondence between supersingular elliptic curves and quaternion orders and of the post-quantum signature scheme SQIsign based on it. We then show how to construct an interactive identification scheme and digital signature within this framework, and also instantiate more advanced primitives, such as a chameleon hash function. We present two distinct instantiations of the framework based on isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves: the first recovers (one-dimensional) SQIsign, while the second leads to the recently published SQInstructor.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-04T13:52:59Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T12:30:40Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1188", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1188", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T11:15:30Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1188", "title": "Rank Ceiling for Twiddle-Perturbation Faults on the Forward NTT", "creators": ["Chakshu Gupta"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "NIST standardised ML-KEM and ML-DSA in 2024 for post-quantum key establishment and digital signatures. Both compute forward number-theoretic transforms on secret polynomials. Their fixed multipliers, called twiddles, are a documented fault-attack target. Published attacks zero every twiddle during Kyber key generation with a single fault, or individual twiddles in one Dilithium signing variant. Nonzero replacements preserve transform invertibility, raising the question of what the difference between correct and faulted outputs reveals without transform collapse. This paper characterises the linear map from a secret polynomial to that transform difference under static twiddle replacements. Each selected twiddle takes a fixed changed field value at every use during one call; zero and nonzero replacements, including qualifying bit flips, are covered. For one replacement, rank equals the number of butterflies sharing its twiddle, halving by layer from 128 to 2 for ML-KEM and to 1 for ML-DSA. Known positions and replacement values specify the linear equations, while a known transform difference supplies their values. With one replacement per layer, these equations determine every coefficient except the constant and linear coefficients for ML-KEM, or the constant for ML-DSA. Lean 4 certifies this result for both 256-coefficient network shapes over fields of characteristic other than two, with nonzero original twiddles. Those coefficients cancel from the difference for every allowed fault set and choice of replacement values. NIST permits seed storage, motivating comparison of a known correct public key with a released faulty key from the same seed. If replacements affect only one ML-KEM secret-polynomial transform and all other computations are unchanged, the decoded key difference is a known matrix column times the transform difference. An invertible column entry reconstructs the latter. For ML-DSA, neither reconstruction nor the number of secret-polynomial candidates from the paired compressed keys is established.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-06T19:43:13Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T11:15:30Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1190", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1190", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T00:26:37Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1190", "title": "CMoSS: Composable Modular Security Specifications Framework", "creators": ["Sara Wrótniak", "Hemi Leibowitz", "Ewa Syta", "Amir Herzberg"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "CMoSS facilitates modular specifications, design and analysis of cryptographic protocols. Modular design and analysis is achieved by supporting provably-secure compositions of protocols; typically, a protocol uses a blackbox subprotocol, and is proven secure when composed with any subprotocol meeting the blackbox specifications. For modularity of specifications, CMoSS extends the approach of the MoSS framework: protocol specifications are defined modularly, by a set of independent predicates (games) for each model (assumption) and requirement (goal). CMoSS makes it feasible to rigorously specify, develop and analyze realistic applied cryptographic protocols, supporting real-time concurrency and involving different attacker capabilities, delays, faults and synchronization challenges. CMoSS specifications provide a precise formalization of the informal specifications used by practitioners, facilitating provable security for practical protocols.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-07T00:27:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T00:26:37Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1202", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1202", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T06:20:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1202", "title": "Morphic Accumulators and Applications: Optimal Range Proofs, Polynomial Commitments, and Ring Signatures", "creators": ["Dimitrios Papadopoulos", "Qiang Tang", "Jiajun Xin"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Cryptographic accumulators based on groups of unknown order (GUO) provide constant-size set membership proofs. For security purposes, existing works require first encoding set elements via division-intractable (DI) hash functions, typically instantiated as random oracles that destroy any algebraic structure.\nThis confines GUO-based accumulators to a purely set-membership role, making them \"incompatible\" with various existing cryptographic proof techniques over committed integers in the same groups as the GUO, such as constant-size proofs of exponentiation and modular exponent relations. We introduce the notion of morphic accumulators, which replaces the DI hash with a discrete logarithm encoding $H_g(x) = g^x$, mapping set elements to a group before accumulation. We prove, under a variant of the subset product assumption in the generic group model, that this encoding is inherently division intractable, achieving the same security guarantee as random-oracle DI hashes, while simultaneously being a group homomorphism: accumulated elements retain their group-algebraic relationships. This resolves a fundamental tension between compact representation and algebraic structure: the accumulator serves simultaneously as a binding commitment to a set and as a substrate for homomorphic computation over its elements.\n\nMorphic accumulators yield asymptotically optimal constructions across multiple domains: range proofs with $O(n)$ prover time, $O(1)$ proof size, $O(1)$ verification with transparent setups (the first scheme to simultaneously achieve these optimal bounds); polynomial commitments with $O(n)$ prover and $O(1)$ proof size, resolving the cubic bottleneck in prior constant-proof-size GUO-based schemes; and the first linkable ring signatures with $O(1)$ signature size, transparent setup, $O(n)$ offline signing and $O(1)$ online signing.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-08T11:54:51Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T06:20:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1267", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1267", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T19:20:30Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1267", "title": "Efficient Private Set Intersection and Searchable Encryption using Homomorphic Bloom Filters", "creators": ["Anil Kumar Pradhan", "Killari Nandini", "Harsh Kasyap", "Sayantan Mukherjee"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Existing encrypted search and private set intersection (PSI) protocols struggle to reconcile post-quantum security with practical efficiency, often leaking search and access patterns or requiring prohibitively deep fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) circuits. We address these limitations by introducing a new Homomorphic Bloom Filters (HBF) framework, a quantum-resilient framework that embeds length-$m$ Bloom filters directly into the plaintext space of an RLWE-based FHE scheme, enabling shallow homomorphic evaluation and matching without structural leakage. \nBuilding on HBF, we construct a searchable encryption (SE) scheme and a private set intersection (PSI) protocol, both based on a depth-1 homomorphic missing-bit circuit. The SE scheme requires no rotations or bootstrapping at server side and incurs no additional computational cost as the number of query keywords increases. \nThe PSI protocol reduces each packed Bloom-filter comparison to a single ciphertext--plaintext multiplication, with cost depending on the Bloom-filter length rather than direct element-wise comparisons with the responder's set.\nThis framework confines leakage to benign dataset dimensions, tunable false-positive rates, and other public metadata, thereby eliminating explicit pattern leakage.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-16T14:24:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T19:20:30Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1334", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1334", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T08:53:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1334", "title": "Principles for pRHL Proofs of Cryptographic Protocols: How to Convince EasyCrypt that your Protocol is Secure", "creators": ["Manuel Barbosa", "François Dupressoir", "Cameron Low", "Charlotte Mylog", "Sabine Oechsner", "Théo Vignon"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The EasyCrypt proof assistant has been used to successfully formalize security proofs for a wide variety of cryptographic primitives. However, attempts at formalizing objects with interactivity, such as protocols, have fared much worse. In this paper, we investigate (some of) the reasons for this difficulty. To identify which proof features contribute most to the complexity of formalization in a tool based on probabilistic relational Hoare logic (pRHL) such as EasyCrypt, we formalize a simple interactive key agreement protocol in three different ways. From these proof efforts, we then extract our insights. In particular, we argue that difficulties in formalizing the security of interactive protocols in the computational model arise from the fact that such proofs rely on both state and temporal invariants—the former to support cryptographic reasoning, and the latter to support reasoning about the protocol’s structure. At the same time, EasyCrypt and similar pRHL-based approaches offer no\nnative notion of events, traces or timestamps, forcing a user to find their own encoding of temporal properties. We discuss two possible encodings, state-first and trace-first, and their impact on the proof effort. More generally, we believe that this observation can help build new reasoning tools that can bridge the gap that currently exists between primitive-focused tools and protocol-focused tools.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-29T08:03:15Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T08:53:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1402", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1402", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T09:07:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1402", "title": "On Extending Integral Distinguishers", "creators": ["Dachao Wang", "Hosein Hadipour", "Simon Gerhalter"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Integral cryptanalysis analyzes block ciphers using input structures for which the sum of a chosen function of the output bits becomes key-independent.  However, most methods still test one output expression at a time, so they can miss distinguishers that emerge when several outputs are combined, either linearly or nonlinearly. They are also not designed to capture key-dependent integral combinations, which may hold deterministically on part of the key space. \nIn this work, we develop Split-and-Cancel, a method that combines exact expansion in a short final part with an oracle on the preceding rounds to determine which suffix monomials can survive from the chosen structure and records them in a binary matrix. Key-independent combinations are then extracted from the left kernel of this matrix. We first apply the method in a reduced model with omitted boundary key additions, where linear dependencies in this matrix yield certified sum combinations independent of keys among output bits and higher-degree output products. When the omitted round key in the combination is restored, the same combinations yield deterministic weak-key distinguishers. In connection with the weak-key distinguishers, we further investigate their probabilistic behaviour and show that the probability-estimation formula used in Zhang et al.’s EUROCRYPT 2026 work is invalid.  The found flaw is supported by our experiments.\nWe apply the method to SIMON, SIMECK, SPECK, PRESENT, and GIFT. Our strongest deterministic results improve the best integral distinguishers for SIMON, SIMECK, and SPECK by one round at every standard block size. For PRESENT and GIFT, we improve deterministic weak-key integral distinguishers by one round. In each case, the exact weak-key class covers at least a quarter of the key space: $2^{78}$ of $2^{80}$ keys for PRESENT-80, $2^{126}$ of $2^{128}$ keys for PRESENT-128, GIFT-64 and GIFT-128. These results show that exact modeling of a short final part can reveal key-independent and weak-key integral behavior missed by analysis using single observables.", "date_submitted": "2026-07-09T14:37:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T09:07:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1465", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1465", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T14:24:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1465", "title": "On Reduction Probability Models in Lattice Sieving", "creators": ["Marc Stevens", "Michael Yonli"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "In lattice sieving, the sphere model assumes that sieving elements are distributed close to or on a sphere with uniformly distributed direction.\nIt is extensively used to predict how lattice sieving behaves.\nIn the sphere model the probability that a random pair of vectors reduces is asymptotically $p_n={(3/4)}^{n/2}/\\sqrt{3\\pi n/8}$.\nIn practice sieving algorithms have been observed to perform better than predicted by the sphere model.\nIt is an open question how this gap behaves asymptotically: does the gap vanish or grow as the dimension grows?\n\nOur work answers this question by showing that it is asymptotically constant.\nWe generalise the sphere model to uniform ball and non-uniform ball models and analyse reduction probability distributions. The reduction probability advantages of our models over the sphere model range from $\\times 1.5$ up to $\\times 8$.\n\nMoreover, we examine scaled depth distributions (defined for dimension $n$ as $w=-n \\ln \\|x\\|$) in the asymptotic setting.\nUnder global reductions the output scaled depth distribution converges to $\\text{Exp}(2/3)$ for any converging family of scaled depth distributions that is dominated by a suitable integrable function.\nThe input scaled depth distribution only affects the total reduction probability.\nCompared to (the scaled depth distribution $\\text{Exp}(1)$ induced by) the uniform ball as input distribution, using this stable limit distribution as input distribution results in an increased reduction probability ($\\times 4.5$ versus $\\times 8$).", "date_submitted": "2026-07-17T19:19:56Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T14:24:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1484", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1484", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T11:47:40Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1484", "title": "The SecureDrop Protocol: End-to-End Encrypted Whistleblowing for All", "creators": ["Giulio Berra", "Felix Linker", "Luca Maier", "Cory Francis Myers", "Kenneth G. Paterson", "Rowen Shane", "Shannon Veitch"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Confidential sources are vital for investigative journalism and thus for holding those in power to account. However, sources often face great risks to their privacy and safety. SecureDrop is a system that enables sources to anonymously contact journalists, including at major news organisations around the world. Despite its widespread use, the current design requires physical servers hosted on premises. While cloud-based deployment would alleviate this burdensome requirement and improve SecureDrop's usability and accessibility, it would also introduce new threats to security that are not addressed by the current design. In particular, a lack of end-to-end encryption presents serious risks in the event that a cloud service provider is coerced into revealing information.\n\nIn this work, we present and formally analyse a new protocol for SecureDrop which addresses the challenges of off-premises deployment. Our protocol composes an encryption scheme with hybrid post-quantum guarantees and an identity-hiding message-fetching mechanism to provide strong anonymity guarantees. In contrast to existing systems, we minimise incriminating evidence against whistleblowers by providing message-level deniability and by having sources remain stateless. Our formal security analysis combines the Tamarin prover for symbolic analysis and game-based proofs for computational analysis. Finally, our benchmarks demonstrate that the protocol achieves practical levels of performance in a browser context. The Freedom of the Press Foundation plans to deploy the new protocol, with integration efforts beginning in 2026.", "date_submitted": "2026-07-20T19:09:40Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T11:47:40Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1523", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1523", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T18:51:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1523", "title": "Catching Many Traitors in Threshold Traitor Tracing: Lower Bounds and Constructions", "creators": ["Dan Boneh", "Aditi Partap", "Mark Zhandry"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "A $t$-out-of-$n$ threshold decryption scheme distributes decryption key shares among $n$ parties so that any $t$ of them can jointly decrypt a ciphertext, while fewer than $t$ learn nothing about the plaintext. Traditional threshold schemes provide no accountability: a coalition of $t$ or more parties can combine their key shares and construct a pirate decoder that decrypts arbitrary well-formed ciphertexts, without any risk of being traced. To address this, Boneh, Partap, and Rotem [CRYPTO '24] introduced the notion of threshold traitor tracing (TTT), where a tracing algorithm that is given black-box access to the pirate decoder can identify at least one of the colluding parties. Many subsequent threshold traitor tracing schemes similarly find only a single traitor, even though the decoder must have been constructed using at least $t$ keys. While some constructions can find multiple traitors, they do so at the cost of large ciphertexts or only achieving a weak form of correctness.\n\nIn this work, we make the following contributions:\n\n- Lower bounds: We show that for all existing traitor tracing techniques, the ciphertext must be large to allow tracing close to $t$ traitors. In particular, to trace $t-O(1)$ traitors, the ciphertext size must be at least $\\Omega(t)$. To trace $a \\leq t- \\omega(1)$ traitors, the ciphertext size must scale with $\\Omega(\\frac{a-1}{t-a+1})$. For schemes that rely on fingerprinting codes, we show an even stronger lower bound.\n\n- Upper bounds: We present two generic compilers that construct traitor tracing for general access structures (beyond threshold) from two building blocks: attribute based encryption for general access structures and sufficiently-expressive policies and mixed functional-encryption. We also present two concrete instantiations. Under exponential security assumptions, we construct a pairings-based threshold traitor tracing scheme that can trace $t$ traitors with ciphertext size $O(t^2)$. We also construct an LWE-based traitor tracing scheme for a DNF access structure, that can trace an authorized subset of traitors with ciphertext size $O(\\hat{t}^2)$, where $\\hat{t}$ denotes the size of the largest unauthorized subset in the access structure.\n\n-  A Candidate Theoretical Instantiation: We present a new tracing mechanism that can trace $t(1-1/\\lambda^c)$ traitors with $\\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda)$ size ciphertext, public key, and secret keys. We prove security assuming ideal (black box) obfuscation.\n\nOur work raises several open questions in the context of tracing multiple parties in a threshold traitor tracing scheme.", "date_submitted": "2026-07-24T21:40:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T18:51:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1553", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1553", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T10:11:05Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1553", "title": "Amortized Multi-Verifier Proofs from Reductions of Knowledge", "creators": ["Nikitas Paslis", "Carla Ràfols", "Alexandros Zacharakis"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We study amortization of prover work in the multi-verifier setting, motivated\nby proof-as-a-service deployments in which a shared prover serves $K$\nindependent clients holding distinct statements. Each verifier checks only its\nown statement and proof, with no inter-verifier communication. The challenge is\ntherefore to amortize prover work across many proofs while preserving local\nverification.\n\nWe consider polynomial relations arising naturally in IOP-based proof systems,\nwhere verification reduces to polynomial identities and polynomial openings at\nverifier-chosen random points. Existing amortization techniques rely on shared\nverifier randomness, for example, to batch openings at a common evaluation\npoint. However, under the standard Fiat--Shamir transform, independently\nverifiable proofs derive challenges from separate transcripts, preventing such\namortization.\n\nWe address this obstacle through a multi-verifier Fiat--Shamir transform\nthat correlates verifier challenges across independently verifiable proofs while\npreserving locality. We further introduce promise local folding schemes,\nwhich defer polynomial-constraint checks generated during folding and amortize\nthem later. Together, these techniques provide a generic framework for\namortization under local verification.\n\nWe apply this framework to the witness-independent component\narising in R1CS- and CCS-based SNARK provers, which reduces to bivariate polynomial evaluation claims over the public constraint matrices. This component accounts for a substantial portion of the concrete proving cost. Applying our techniques to these claims reduces the server's cryptographic cost for this component from $O(K\\cdot s)$ to $O(K\\log K+s)$ group operations, where $s$ denotes\nthe sparsity of the public constraint matrices, with each verifier performing\nonly $O(\\log K)$ cryptographic work and requiring no inter-verifier communication. Because the amortized component depends only on the public circuit description, our framework composes cleanly with collaborative zk-SNARK protocols, which target the complementary witness-dependent component.", "date_submitted": "2026-07-29T17:13:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T10:11:05Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1633", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1633", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T07:00:13Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1633", "title": "Rotational-Quasidifferential Framework - A Geometric Approach to Rotational-XOR Cryptanalysis", "creators": ["Myungkyu Lee", "Byoungjin Seok", "Dongjae Lee", "Deukjo Hong", "Jaechul Sung", "Seokhie Hong"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Rotational-XOR (RX) cryptanalysis extends rotational cryptanalysis by combining rotational relations with XOR translations, enabling the analysis of symmetric-key primitives even in the presence of symmetry-breaking constants.\nExisting analyses of RX characteristics, however, typically rely on independence assumptions when estimating characteristic probabilities, which may lead to inaccurate probability evaluations and even incompatible characteristics.\n\nIn this paper, we introduce the first application of the geometric approach to RX cryptanalysis.\nInspired by the quasidifferential framework of Beyne and Rijmen, we define rotational-quasidifferential trails and derive exact expressions for fixed-key RX characteristic probabilities without relying on round-independence assumptions.\nWe also derive explicit rotational-quasidifferential transition matrices for bitwise AND and modular addition.\nBy incorporating the key schedule into the state space, we further obtain an exact expression for the Expected Rotational-XOR Probability (ERXP), the RX analogue of the Expected Differential Probability (EDP).\n\nWe apply the framework to the ARX cipher SPECK, the ARX permutation Alzette, and the AND-RX ciphers SIMON and SIMECK.\nFor SPECK, we repair an incompatible 12-round characteristic and show that the longest published RX characteristics for SPECK64/128, SPECK96/144, and SPECK128/256 are incompatible.\nFor Alzette, we show that signed nonzero-mask contributions explain the discrepancy between independent-ADD estimates and experimentally observed full-data-path probabilities.\nFor SIMECK, we experimentally verify a fixed-key probability distribution, explain incompatible characteristics, and correct the weak-key class estimates of rotational-XOR differential rectangle attacks.\nThese results extend the geometric approach to both ARX and AND-RX designs and demonstrate its usefulness for exact characteristic-level analysis.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-07T10:31:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T07:00:13Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1635", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1635", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T21:12:05Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1635", "title": "Limber: Low Overhead SNARKs for Integers from Any PCS", "creators": ["Jessica Chen", "Lucas Xia", "Wilson Nguyen", "Benedikt Bünz"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "In real-world applications of SNARKs, non-native arithmetic, the emulation of computation outside of the specified SNARK field, is a key bottleneck. It introduces large overheads, and proof system designers often resort to non-standard SNARK-friendly hash-functions or other means like elliptic curve cycles to mitigate its costs. Besides performance concerns, non-native circuit arithmetization is also a major cause of implementation errors. In a collection of 27 critical bugs in real world ZK systems (0xPARC/zkbugtracker), 9 were related to non-native arithmetization.\n\nWe tackle these challenges by constructing a minimal overhead SNARK for integer computation that generically handles non-native arithmetic. We follow the recipe of Zaratan (PKC 26), which proves an integer relation such as $a\\cdot b = c + u\\cdot m$ by fingerprinting---reducing it to the same relation but over a randomly sampled prime field. Realizing this recipe requires an integer mod-PCS that commits to integer polynomials and opens their evaluations modulo a random prime, which is crucially chosen after the underlying PCS's setup and commitment phases.\n\nOur central contribution is Limber, the first practical integer mod-PCS construction that asymptotically has $o(1)$ multiplicative commitment overhead and can be instantiated with any standard field polynomial commitment scheme, including ones over small fields. Combining Limber with a PIOP for integer R1CS over the random prime yields our SNARK. We demonstrate its practicality by implementing our scheme and showing that we can prove an RSA accumulator benchmark $15$-$30\\times$ faster than circuit-based approaches, and non-native Poseidon2 hashing $24\\times$ faster.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-07T22:11:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T21:12:05Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1654", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1654", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T07:41:26Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1654", "title": "From Toy to Instrument: Seven Years of Verifpal", "creators": ["Nadim Kobeissi"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Verifpal is a symbolic protocol analyzer introduced in 2019 to make formal analysis accessible during protocol design. It provides a small modeling language, built-in cryptographic primitives, and attack reports that use the model's names. This paper describes the analysis engine of Verifpal 1.6.7. A backward solver proposes attacker actions, which an executor checks by running all sessions and peer configurations together. An injected value is delivered only when the attacker can derive it from information already available in that execution. A separate query evaluator, or judge, records the result.\n\nWe define the model, its five query predicates, and a reference semantics, and prove that every judged execution is a history of that semantics. Executions terminate; search termination is conditional on the solver calls terminating. Evaluation covers 885 secrecy queries across 189 configurations of the fifteen fundamental Noise patterns, varying static-key compromise and protocol checks. At one and two sessions, a separate executor reproduces every reported disclosure, and ProVerif proves all 290 passing counterparts for unbounded sessions. The protocol computations also match 90 external cryptographic test-vector messages. These results support the implementation on the tested models; a Verifpal pass remains the outcome of bounded, incomplete search.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-11T01:18:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T07:41:26Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1657", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1657", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T14:03:57Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1657", "title": "Ideal Pseudorandom Code, Revisited", "creators": ["Ganyuan Cao"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Pseudorandom error-correcting codes (PRCs), introduced by Christ and Gunn at CRYPTO’24, combine pseudorandomness with error correction, providing a natural abstraction for robust watermarking and\nsteganography on generative AI models. Subsequent standalone notions, which are ideal security for secret-key PRCs and CCA-style security for public-key PRCs, are oracle-based and do not capture composable use with explicit parties, sessions, and corruption.\n\nWe give a UC treatment of PRCs via corruption-aware ideal functionalities for both settings. Under non-adaptive corruption, the UC notions recover the standalone ones. Under adaptive corruption, we identify a common obstruction: dummy codewords sampled before corruption, together with their neighborhoods, must later be opened as valid PRC codewords. We formalize this as a decoder-non-committing code (NC-PRC), which any adaptively UC-secure realization must induce. We then capture failures of such openings via targeted low opening capacity, show it rules out robust NC-PRCs, and prove that LDPC-based PRCs have this property hence do not admit a NC-PRC.\n\nOn the positive side, we sketch two compilers to lift error-correcting codes to admit NC-PRCs: a secret-key one from a puncturable PRF and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), and a public-key one from a smooth projective hash function (SPHF), both evading the barrier via programmable acceptance.\n\nFinally, we identify a fresh-codeword explanation barrier for public-key PRCs: accepted unseen codewords cannot be explained from public information without violating pseudorandomness, hence public-key UC realizations require a trapdoor or an idealized setup, and PRC-based watermark detection is inherently designated-verifier.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-11T12:03:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T14:03:57Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1674", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1674", "datestamp": "2026-10-31T14:30:19Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1674", "title": "MinMandate: Task-Hiding Payment Authorization for Web Agents", "creators": ["Ge Gao", "Haining Yu", "Zhichao Liu", "Dongyang Zhan", "Yuanxiao Zhu", "Zhongyun Hua"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "AI agents increasingly pay for Web services on behalf of their users to complete complex tasks. Such a task needs many payments, and the user usually must approve each one, forcing the agent to stop at every payment. Mechanisms such as the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2) therefore enable the user to sign one payment mandate in advance that bounds the agent's payments for the task. However, whoever checks the mandate can learn the task, which is often sensitive. Specifically, (1) the user's wallet can see the full mandate when it checks each payment, so it can trace every payment to the task; and (2) although each merchant sees only the payment it receives, it verifies that payment under a signing key that repeats across the task, so colluding merchants can link the payments and reconstruct the task. We present MinMandate, a task-hiding payment authorization system for AI agents in which the user approves a task-bounded payment mandate once. In MinMandate, the wallet checks each payment through a constant-size keyed-verification policy credential, which reveals neither what the mandate allows nor which mandate the payment comes from. Each merchant then accepts the wallet's one-time ticket as proof of payment and never sees the mandate or its signing key. Formally, we prove authorization soundness and unlinkability in our threat model. Our experiments show that the overhead of MinMandate is practical, with a payment taking 197 ms and under half of AP2's bytes. Notably, MinMandate cuts wallet-side tracing from every payment under AP2 to the level of random guessing. Moreover, from their own payment-request records alone, colluding merchants can reconstruct the user's task in 47% of the cases under AP2 but in only 8% under MinMandate.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-13T08:30:10Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-31T14:30:19Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1779", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1779", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T08:13:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1779", "title": "Bootstrapping via Ring Switching without Slot Recovery: Independent Leaf Evaluation for SIMD-Packed Ciphertexts", "creators": ["Zhaoyang Liang", "Dan Ding"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Ring switching provides a natural way to reduce bootstrapping cost in ring-based fully homomorphic encryption by moving computation to smaller rings. For SIMD-packed ciphertexts, however, ring switching changes the slot layout, so conventional approaches apply slot recovery to ensure correct computation on the original slot values, consuming capacity and requiring synchronization across ciphertexts. \n\nIn this paper, we show that slot recovery is not indispensable: CKKS and BGV/BFV bootstrapping can proceed directly after ring switching. We further prove that a continuous slotwise function admits independent leaf evaluation for unrestricted real CKKS inputs exactly when it is affine. \n\nOur construction provides an extra layer of parallelism, enables cheaper arithmetic in smaller rings, and can further simplify bootstrapping by exploiting the leaf structure. For CKKS with \\(N=2^{17}\\) and \\(n=2^{16}\\), we achieve a \\(1.13\\times\\) serial speedup; evaluating two leaves in parallel yields a \\(2.03\\times\\)--\\(2.18\\times\\) speedup and \\(2.00\\times\\)--\\(2.14\\times\\) the throughput of direct bootstrapping. For BGV with \\(p=65537\\), \\(N=2^{16}\\), and \\(n=2^{15}\\), we achieve a \\(1.30\\times\\) serial speedup and \\(1.63\\times\\) the throughput of direct general bootstrapping under matched transform settings, while reducing key-generation time by \\(50.6\\%\\) and server-key size by \\(48.6\\%\\).", "date_submitted": "2026-08-23T08:53:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T08:13:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1784", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1784", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T17:43:38Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1784", "title": "Faster Post-Quantum zkSNARK Provers Using the LCH Polynomial Basis", "creators": ["Mohammadtaghi Badakhshan", "Susanta Samanta", "Guang Gong"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "An important class of plausibly post-quantum zkSNARKs uses univariate-polynomial interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) over binary extension fields $\\mathbb{F}_{2^k}$, relying on the Fast Reed--Solomon (RS) Interactive Oracle Proof of Proximity (FRI) for low-degree testing. Their provers fold RS codewords in FRI and perform polynomial arithmetic, notably division and multiplication by subspace vanishing polynomials. Constraint polynomials and RS codewords are in evaluation form, but existing implementations perform this arithmetic in the monomial basis, requiring inverse additive fast Fourier transforms (FFTs) for coefficient recovery and forward FFTs for evaluation. On a general basis, Gao--Mateer and Lin--Chung--Han (LCH) additive FFTs incur $O(n(\\log n)^2)$ field additions and $O(n\\log n)$ field multiplications for basis conversion per $n$-point transform, and Lagrange-based FRI folding performs a field inversion per coset.\n\nWe carry out this arithmetic directly in the LCH polynomial basis for arbitrary $\\mathbb{F}_2$-bases. We introduce a divide-and-conquer algorithm for division by subspace vanishing polynomials directly in the LCH basis. For $n$ input coefficients, it requires $O(n)$ field operations, and on a Cantor basis it requires no field multiplications. We also show that the multiples of vanishing polynomials used for zero-knowledge blinding can be sampled directly through their LCH coefficients. Together, these remove the basis-conversion stage of the LCH additive FFT, leaving only its butterfly. We further express the FRI fold in the LCH basis: on each coset, it is an LCH inverse butterfly followed by an evaluation at the verifier challenge, and for higher-arity folds, the challenge of each stage is the value of a normalized subspace vanishing polynomial at the verifier challenge. Given constants that depend only on the domain, this yields a fold without field inversions whose folding loop performs $n(1-1/\\kappa)$ field multiplications for a length-$n$ codeword and arity $\\kappa$; for every input word, it outputs the same next codeword as the classical fold.\n\nWe integrate these algorithms into the Aurora prover without changing the proof or the verifier. At $2^{19}$ constraints over $\\mathbb{F}_{2^{256}}$, when all configurations use our FRI fold, the LCH-basis arithmetic speeds up the prover by $2.80\\times$ over \\texttt{libiop} on a general basis and by $1.24\\times$ over a Cantor-basis prover that uses the LCH additive FFT. Against these baselines with their Lagrange-based FRI fold, the speedups are $3.63\\times$ and $2.05\\times$.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-23T19:00:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T17:43:38Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1821", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1821", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T22:46:37Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1821", "title": "Complexity Analysis and Security Implications of the New Isogeny-Path Algorithm", "creators": ["Maher Mamah"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Very recently, Wesolowski (ePrint 2026/1486) proposed a novel heuristic algorithm for solving the supersingular isogeny-path problem in time and memory \\(p^{1/3+o(1)}\\), where \\(p\\) is the characteristic of the underlying field. Although this improves asymptotically on the previous \\(p^{1/2}\\log^{O(1)}(p)\\) complexity, its concrete impact on isogeny-based schemes, particularly SQIsign, remains unclear because of the superpolynomial overhead hidden in \\(p^{o(1)}\\) and the exponential memory requirement.\nIn this work, we assess the cost of Wesolowski's attack, study its time--memory tradeoffs, and investigate optimizations based on the van Oorschot -- Wiener (vOW) technique. Our analysis shows that, over the practical memory ranges considered, Wesolowski's algorithm is expected to improve on the state of the art only at NIST Level I. At higher security levels, its prohibitive memory requirements offset the asymptotic advantage over accelerated Delfs--Galbraith methods. With high parallelization, however, the vOW variant can recover this advantage.\nWe further study quantum claw-finding improvements. While Grover search can essentially eliminate the large memory requirement, it offers little improvement in running time, whereas Tani's algorithm provides a stronger gate--memory tradeoff at the cost of substantial coherent quantum memory. Finally, we provide an optimized SageMath implementation and compare the theoretical time and space complexities against their empirical counterparts.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-27T15:45:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T22:46:37Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1852", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1852", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T13:58:27Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1852", "title": "Jacobian Diagnostics for Under-Constrained Zero-Knowledge Circuits", "creators": ["Vijaykumar Singh"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Under-constrained arithmetic circuits are a recurring source of soundness failures in zero-knowledge applications: after fixing the public statement, a malicious prover may be able to assign a security-relevant wire in more than one way while still satisfying the circuit. Existing tools attack this uniqueness question with solver-based checking, direct polynomial solving, abstract interpretation, or fuzzing. We study a complementary algebraic diagnostic based on exact Jacobian linear algebra.\n\nThe method separates three notions that are often conflated: first-order rigidity at a sampled witness, finite algebraic dependence on an irreducible component, and uniqueness over the circuit field. At a satisfying assignment, the kernel of the constraint Jacobian augmented with rows fixing the statement coordinates is the Zariski tangent space of the corresponding fibre scheme, so motion of a target coordinate in this kernel certifies infinitesimal freedom at that witness. Under suitable separability hypotheses, the associated differential representation also recovers component-wise algebraic dependence, while a certified triangular degree calculus provides multiplicity bounds for locally rigid targets. An exact sparse implementation classifies public benchmarks (chain, tree, Merkle-path, and EdDSA topologies, up to 66,000 constraints) in at most a second per instance on commodity hardware, has been exercised on industrial gnark circuits in the 6k-60k-constraint range, and carries over to PLONKish standard-gate systems in a measured end-to-end check (lookup arguments remain future work); a checkable degree budget (m < log2 p quadratic constraints) discharges the separability hypothesis at gadget scale. Conversely, when the rank computation itself certifies a smooth witness (full row rank, or full rank after vacuous guard rows are discharged by explicit local-redundancy identities), effective Lang-Weil bounds convert infinitesimal freedom into at least p/(2·deg C) distinct finite-field values of the target among genuine satisfying assignments, so in that regime the local diagnostic becomes a sound non-uniqueness certificate.\n\nFor quadratic constraints, an additional affine-line certificate converts a tangent vector into p explicit satisfying assignments whenever every quadratic directional coefficient vanishes; its checker uses sparse field evaluations and needs no smoothness assumption. A second-order parabola variant extends the construction to curved families through one further linear solve together with a quadratic condition on its solution space, certifying targets that first order cannot move. Projected tangent dimension distinguishes the number of free target wires from their independent degrees of freedom.\n\nWhere witnesses come from is treated as part of the method. In the studied gadgets, the circuit's own generator computes advice by division and refuses at exactly the compatible exceptional inputs that expose the defects. Three separate experiments measure construction from the constraint system instead. On five defective circuits, propagation, one-input symbolic solving, and rational-function propagation with resultant elimination supply compatible exceptional inputs for all five with no solver in the loop, including a Pedersen point distinct from the solver's own counterexample. On the fifty-one circuits the solver reports safe, an algebraic and symbolic construction sweep finds no output-moving certificate under stated budgets, with 86 of 102 circuit-method combinations producing a witness. A bounded 108-trial pilot compares honest generation, uniform and structural mutation, and the relational solver under identical queries and a shared eight-second end-to-end wall cap, showing complementary coverage on the tested instances.\n\nThe principal limitation is witness locality, and we state it as a theorem rather than an observation: an explicit 20-constraint instance admits two satisfying assignments agreeing on the statement such that every target is first-order rigid at one while all five targets are infinitesimally free, indeed p-fold free, at the other. The same separation occurs in deployed code: in a measured 2,396-constraint gnark 0.14.0 scalar-multiplication gadget, an honest witness exposes no free target wires, a degenerate adversarial witness exposes five, and an explicit second satisfying witness confirms the freedom. We therefore position Jacobian analysis as a scalable candidate detector and localisation tool, paired with witness construction and solver- or certificate-based confirmation, with the witness-construction stage itself measured rather than assumed.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-01T10:30:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T13:58:27Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1876", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1876", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T05:09:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1876", "title": "AH-BKZ: A Lattice Reduction Algorithm with Asynchronous Hybrid Processing", "creators": ["Renya Hashimoto", "Junji Shikata", "Atsushi Takayasu", "Yuntao Wang"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Evaluating the hardness of the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is essential for selecting secure parameters in lattice-based cryptography. The fastest current SVP solvers are based on variants of G6K, but their large memory consumption remains a major bottleneck, making high-dimensional executions difficult. A common strategy for alleviating this memory bottleneck is strong basis reduction preprocessing before a sieve-based algorithm. This strategy can solve SVP instances in higher dimensions than standalone G6K under the same memory constraints, but the time required for basis reduction becomes a major issue. ProPnjBKZ, a fast basis reduction algorithm optimized by Wang et al., is currently used as a promising preprocessing method for solving high-dimensional SVP instances. In this paper, we identify that, in the ProPnjBKZ-based SVP-solving pipeline, memory resources can remain underutilized during the preprocessing phase, since ProPnjBKZ requires less memory than the subsequent high-dimensional sieving process. Based on this observation, we propose AH-BKZ, which exploits such unused computational resources by asynchronously running multiple SVP oracles, thereby accelerating basis reduction. Our experiments show that, compared with ProPnjBKZ-based preprocessing, AH-BKZ reduces the overall runtime by up to 23.1% and by 18.6% on average among successful runs for dimensions 124-148 under comparable peak memory constraints. Moreover, in a supplementary experiment conducted in a larger computational environment, AH-BKZ set new solving records for dimension 163 in the TU Darmstadt SVP Challenge and for dimension 164 in the Ideal Lattice Challenge.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-03T03:49:28Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T05:09:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1877", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1877", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T04:22:39Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1877", "title": "Otter: A Provably MEV-Resilient Automated Market Maker via Surplus Redistribution", "creators": ["Elaine Shi", "Mengqian Zhang", "Hao Chung", "Yuhao Li"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Miner extractable value (MEV) in automated market makers allows block builders to profit from transaction ordering and injected trades, imposing costs on users and contributing to builder centralization. We introduce Otter (Optimal Truthful Trading with Excess Redistribution), a two-asset batch AMM that achieves provable MEV resilience when the consensus layer provides censorship resilience and block space is uncongested. In particular, Otter makes truthful behavior a dominant strategy for both users and builders. Consequently, a builder cannot profit from strategic deviations, including reordering bids or injecting sybil bids. These guarantees continue to hold even when the builder is itself a trader with intrinsic value. Moreover, we show that our mechanism maximizes social welfare, in a strong sense, within a natural class of mechanisms satisfying the desired game-theoretic properties.\n\nTo achieve these guarantees, we introduce a new paradigm called surplus redistribution, which provably prevents residual surplus from being captured as MEV by redirecting it to the broader community. Specifically, the pool's output tokens need not be distributed entirely among the users in the current batch. Instead, any residual surplus may be transferred, for example, to a smart contract governed by the decentralized community. The accumulated surplus can subsequently be used to benefit community members in ways that preserve the mechanism's game-theoretic guarantees --- for example, by subsidizing traders' transaction fees, rewarding liquidity providers, or returning assets to the pool to reduce price impact and slippage for future traders.\n\nOur approach relies on the underlying consensus layer to provide censorship resilience. We motivate the necessity of this assumption through an impossibility result showing that the desired game-theoretic guarantees become unattainable when the builder is additionally allowed to censor transactions. Thus, our results also provide a mathematically formal demonstration of how consensus-level security guarantees can fundamentally expand what is achievable at the application (i.e., smart-contract) layer. Finally, we establish additional results characterizing the builder fee structures compatible with our desired incentive guarantees.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-03T05:01:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T04:22:39Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1957", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1957", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T06:39:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1957", "title": "More Efficient Secret-Shared Joins with Multiplicity via  Oblivious Sort Expansion", "creators": ["Xiaoxin Du", "Xiaojie Guo", "Pinzhi Chen", "Tong Li", "Zheli Liu"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Secret-shared SQL-style join is a fundamental building block in secure collaborative data analysis. In practice, join operations frequently involve duplicate keys, giving rise to one-to-many (Join-OM) and many-to-many (Join-MM) relationships. Supporting such joins requires obliviously materializing all matching row pairs. Existing protocols achieve this in two costly ways: they either perform oblivious sorting over a larger expanded input or rely on multiple aggregation trees that incur additional logarithmic rounds.\n\nIn this work, we present highly efficient protocols for Join-OM and Join-MM over secret-shared databases in the standard semi-honest setting. Our core contribution is Oblivious Sort Expansion (OSE), a novel constant-round protocol that may be of independent interest. Rather than obliviously sorting the expanded input from scratch, we sort only the original input and use OSE to derive the sorted order after expansion. For Join-OM, OSE eliminates the redundant sorting overhead introduced by input expansion in the state-of-the-art protocol by Asharov et al. (CCS 2023). For Join-MM, we combine OSE with local linear operations to obtain an aggregation-tree-free Join-MM protocol.  Experimental results show that our protocols consistently outperform prior protocols, reducing both runtime and communication costs by approximately $27\\%$ and $65\\%$ for Join-OM and Join-MM, respectively.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-10T03:28:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T06:39:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2062", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2062", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T09:22:37Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2062", "title": "Hamming Ideals and Grobner Bases for ISD-like Syndrome Decoding", "creators": ["Roberto La Scala", "Marco Marchesin", "Sharwan K. Tiwari"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We investigate an algebraic approach to the Syndrome Decoding Problem, based on a reformulation of the Hamming weight constraint and its integration with the Information Set Decoding paradigm. We begin with a systematic analysis of the Hamming variety, deriving its defining equations in terms of elementary symmetric functions. Since these equations may have high degree, we exploit convolution identities for elementary symmetric functions, together with factorizations based on Lucas' identity, to derive an equivalent formulation with auxiliary variables and equations of bounded degree.\n\nBuilding on this modeling, we generalize the ISD paradigm through an ISD-like decoding strategy, implemented by the GBDecode algorithm, in which only a subset of an information set is fixed. This approach reduces the size of the combinatorial search space at the cost of solving the associated multivariate nonlinear systems. To handle this algebraic component, we employ the MultiSolve algorithm, which replaces a single Grobner basis computation with a collection of computations on simpler systems, obtained by exhaustively assigning a varying number of indeterminates over the finite field. This provides a tunable balance between combinatorial search and algebraic solving.\n\nWe evaluate the resulting approach experimentally on instances of the Syndrome Decoding Problem for random binary linear codes, using parameters corresponding to the NIST Security Category 1 parameter set of the Classic McEliece cryptosystem. The experiments assess the feasibility of this combinatorial-algebraic approach and provide insights into the practical behavior of Grobner basis techniques within an ISD-like decoding framework.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-16T15:30:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T09:22:37Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2147", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2147", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T08:43:58Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2147", "title": "ReedWeave: Faster Reed-Solomon Polynomial Commitments from Interleaving and Folding", "creators": ["Yuhao Jia", "Zhe Li", "Chaoping Xing", "Yizhou Yao", "Chen Yuan", "Jielong Zhang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) allow a prover to commit to a polynomial and later prove its evaluations succinctly. Among hash-based constructions, FRI (Ben-Sasson et al., ICALP 2018) and its follow-up works achieve polylogarithmic proofs by recursively ``folding'' Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. However, their concrete evaluation costs remain relatively high, as the first few folding rounds operate on the largest codewords and dominate the prover work.\nWe present \\emph{ReedWeave}, a Reed-Solomon PCS that successfully incorporates interleaving with folding, achieving the best of the two worlds. ReedWeave decomposes a degree-$d$ polynomial into $m$ smaller components and commits to their RS encodings over a common domain. Under our novel decomposition, a random linear combination of these codewords is exactly an $m$-ary folding. At a high level, ReedWeave starts with an $m$-ary folding, followed by standard binary folding as in FRI. The prover costs are substantially reduced in the sense that at the very beginning it suffices to do interleaved-RS encoding rather than standard RS encoding. That is, we reduce prover costs from $\\mathcal{O}(d \\log d)$ to $\\mathcal{O}(d\\log(d/m))$ for constant code rate while maintaining efficient polylogarithmic verification. Moreover, our approach essentially works for arbitrary $m$, relaxing the smoothness requirements of the underlying fields by a multiplicative factor of $m$.\nWe benchmark our Rust implementation over Goldilocks using\n32 threads and targeting 100-bit security. At $d=2^{24}$, $\\rho=1/4$, and $m=64$, the DEEP variant commits in $475.0$ ms, opens in $111.6$ ms, verifies in $2.07$ ms, and produces a $594.7$ KiB proof. Compared with FRI (ICALP 2018), commitment, opening, and verification are $6.9\\times$, $51.5\\times$, and $4.2\\times$ faster, respectively. Against STIR (CRYPTO 2024), the corresponding speedups are $2.9\\times$, $68.5\\times$, and $2.1\\times$. Its proof is only $0.69\\times$ the size of FRI's and $2.31\\times$ that of STIR's.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-22T04:13:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T08:43:58Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2165", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2165", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T20:33:38Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2165", "title": "Argo: Leaking a Secret from an Invalid Groth16 Proof", "creators": ["Liam Eagen", "Ying Tong Lai"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "We present Argo, a randomized encoding scheme for the invalidity of pairing-based SNARKs like Groth16. Argo allows an encoder\nto encode a proof such that a decoder can derive a secret if the proof\nis invalid. We prove the selective security of invalidity Argo, as well as\nthe adaptive security of validity Argo, under DDH in one source group\nof a bilinear pairing in the standard model, a standard assumption that\nholds in the generic group model used to analyze Groth16.\nWe show how to couple invalidity Argo with a projective garbling scheme\nlike Argo MAC or Duty-Free Bits to construct a garbled circuit for\nGroth16 invalidity as a function of the proof bits, and how to use it\nwith BitVM to construct a permissionless, optimistic Groth16 verifier\nfor Bitcoin: a decoder proves a proof invalid by publishing a secret, and\nthe decoder can be anyone, not necessarily known in advance.\nWhen instantiated with BN254, Argo has an offline encoding size of\nabout 21 kB, a thousand times smaller than the projective garbling\nscheme, and an end-to-end protocol size more than three orders of magnitude smaller than existing Yao-based approaches. Generating an Argo + Argo MAC garbled circuit takes tens of milliseconds on a laptop, compared to minutes for a Yao GC. Argo is the first protocol that makes\npermissionless, optimistic SNARK verification on Bitcoin practical.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-23T02:22:56Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T20:33:38Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2179", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2179", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T10:17:14Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2179", "title": "Capacity-Approaching Pseudorandom Code for Stochastic Edit Channels", "creators": ["Leshui Wang", "Kenji Yasunaga"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Pseudorandom codes (PRCs) are error-correcting codes whose codewords are\ncomputationally indistinguishable from uniformly random strings to any\nefficient adversary. We study public-key multi-bit PRCs over the stochastic\nmemoryless binary substitution-insertion-deletion channel\nand its $q$-ary generalization. Here $P_i,P_d$ are the insertion and deletion\nprobabilities, and $P_s$ is the substitution probability conditional on\ntransmission.\n\nWe first show that the majority-based construction of Christ and\nGunn yields a binary PRC with vanishing rate that recovers the\ntransmitted message with overwhelming probability whenever\n$P_i+P_d<1$ and $P_s<1/2$.\n\nWe then use this binary PRC to protect control information in a high-rate,\nuniquely decodable PRC over an unbounded family of constant-size alphabets.\nFor fixed channel parameters satisfying $P_i+P_d<1$ and $P_s<1$, its decoder\nrecovers the transmitted message with overwhelming probability.\nThe alphabet size may depend on the channel parameters and desired rate\ngap, but not on the security parameter. As the gap tends to zero and the\nalphabet grows through the supported sizes, the rate approaches the\ncapacity upper bound obtained by revealing insertion and deletion\nlocations to the receiver.\nThe constructions use the assumptions underlying the Christ--Gunn\npublic-key PRC and secure pseudorandom generators.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-23T13:11:54Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T10:17:14Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2183", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2183", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T13:45:40Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2183", "title": "Vespa: Efficient Secure Aggregation with Integrity Defense under Server Privacy", "creators": ["Jia Hu", "Hongwei Li", "Meng Hao", "Hanxiao Chen", "Pengzhi Xing", "Wenbo Jiang", "Dongxiao Liu", "Haiyang Xue", "Robert H. Deng"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Secure aggregation with input validation enables a server to securely compute the summation of private data from multiple clients while verifying that the inputs satisfy specific constraints. However, the practical deployment of this paradigm at scale is hindered by two primary limitations. First, existing schemes suffer from severe efficiency bottlenecks due to their reliance on generic, computationally expensive zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs). Second, the scope of input validation is currently restricted to norm checks (e.g., $L_2$ and $L_\\infty$) against public bounds.\n\nThis paper presents \\textsf{Vespa}, a single-server secure aggregation scheme that simultaneously achieves practical efficiency and expands validation capabilities to support both \\textit{norm checks against public bounds} and \\textit{similarity checks against private server inputs}. Specifically, we design a novel validity-weighted secure aggregation protocol over committed inputs, built upon highly efficient vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE). To efficiently realize input validation, we introduce customized $L_2$ and $L_\\infty$ norm checks based on VOLE-based ZKPs, centered around optimized range proofs with reduced range sizes. Furthermore, we extend our framework to support advanced similarity-based checks against private server inputs, instantiated with widely used Euclidean and cosine similarities. This allows \\textsf{Vespa} to first filter out invalid inputs using norm checks, followed by performing fine-grained validation via similarity metrics.\nWe compare our scheme with the state-of-the-art secure aggregation works, including RoFL (S\\&P 2023), ACORN (USENIX Security 2023), and Armadillo (CCS 2025), and extensive evaluation shows that our $L_2$ and $L_\\infty$ norm checks achieve runtime improvements of up to $2\\sim 3$ and $1\\sim 3$ orders of magnitude, respectively.\nOur similarity checks also achieve practical performance, consuming only around $94$ seconds for an $818$k-entry vector.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-23T14:43:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T13:45:40Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2190", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2190", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T14:34:15Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2190", "title": "Stay in Your Lane: Scalable Large-Integer Arithmetic in CKKS", "creators": ["Hyeongmin Choe", "Robin Köstler", "Tim Seuré"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Recent work has shown that the approximate homomorphic encryption scheme CKKS can perform exact modular arithmetic with large moduli. This enables high-precision integer computation: given bounds on the outputs of an arithmetic circuit, we can recover the exact integer results from the modular outputs using any sufficiently large modulus. The particular choice of modulus does not affect correctness. Long computations require periodic bootstrapping, which refreshes ciphertexts so that further operations remain possible. However, in Gao and Zheng's construction (Crypto '26) and its extensions by Wei et al. and Liu et al. (both ePrint '26), converting between the representations used for arithmetic and bootstrapping, which is required at every refresh, becomes increasingly expensive as the integers grow.\n\nWe reduce this overhead by choosing message spaces that fit the representations already used inside standard CKKS bootstrapping. Building on GBFV (Geelen and Vercauteren; Eurocrypt '25) and its interpretation within CKKS (Kim; Asiacrypt '26), we organize encrypted data into independent polynomial “lanes” (namely, the factors of $(\\mathbb{R}[X]/(X^n+1))^{N/n}$) that already appear as intermediate representations during bootstrapping (as intermediate stages of CoeffToSlot and SlotToCoeff). This avoids additional conversions specific to the message encoding. Supported message spaces include integers modulo $\\beta^n+1$, where $n$ is a power of two and $\\beta\\geq2$ is a small integer, selected prime fields of up to $1\\,024$ bits, and extension fields. For integer messages, we also give conversions in both directions between an arithmetic representation (for operations on whole integers) and a digit representation (for operations on their encrypted base-$\\beta$ digits).\n\nWe evaluate our construction and our port of Gao and Zheng in Lattigo on the same AWS Graviton5 hardware, using one thread at $N=2^{16}$ and targeting $128$-bit security. Our bootstrapping latency remains nearly constant for $8\\leq n\\leq2^{14}$ and stays below $8$ seconds across all tested message spaces, including $24\\,577$-bit moduli ($n=4\\,096$, $\\beta=64$). For $8\\leq n\\leq1\\,024$, this gives a speedup of $2.1\\times$ to $6.8\\times$ over the port, comparing arithmetic modulo $2^n+1$ with their arithmetic modulo $2^n$. These gains carry over to sustained computation: including bootstrapping to support arbitrary evaluation depth, we estimate amortized multiplication speedups of $3.2\\times$ to $12.8\\times$ over the port for $8\\leq n\\leq512$. As one concrete example, arithmetic bootstrapping takes $6.44$ seconds per ciphertext packing $16$ integers modulo $2^{4\\,096}+1$. In sustained computation, the amortized cost is $0.22$ seconds per integer multiplication at over $4\\,000$ bits of precision, including refreshing. Our arithmetic-to-digit conversion has per-call timings comparable to our implementation of Wei et al.'s conversion for $64\\leq n\\leq1\\,024$ and $\\beta=2$, and our analysis indicates better scaling for larger integers.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-23T20:05:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T14:34:15Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2202", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2202", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T14:35:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2202", "title": "Fully Anonymous Perfect Threshold Secret Sharing: Explicit One-Bit Construction and Rate Amplification", "creators": ["Chongxu Ren", "Hongbo Yu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Secret sharing distributes a secret among participants so that only sufficiently large groups can recover it. Fully anonymous secret sharing also allows recovery from share values alone, without participant identities. Below the reconstruction threshold, the shares must look exactly like independent uniform random values, revealing neither the secret nor their holders' identities. Con, Li, and Mazor established that such schemes with error-free recovery exist for every threshold, leaving an efficient general construction open.\n\nWe give efficient constructions for every threshold 2 ≤ t ≤ n among n participants. For an L-bit secret, each share has L + O(t² log² n) bits. Sharing runs in expected polynomial time, and reconstruction runs in deterministic polynomial time. Our approach combines an efficient one-bit construction with a general transformation that uses it to protect a short message needed for anonymous reconstruction of a long secret. The additional share length has an upper bound depending only on the number of participants and the threshold. For a fixed participant count and threshold, the rate approaches one as secrets grow longer, while anonymity remains exact and recovery never errs.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T12:38:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T14:35:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2256", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2256", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T11:55:40Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2256", "title": "Affine-Padding Rabin-Oracle Factoring in $L_n\\left(\\frac{1}{3},\\sqrt[3]{\\frac{32}{9}}\\right)$", "creators": ["Alexandra-Ioana Buzățoiu", "Diana Maimuț", "David Naccache"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The 2007 algorithm of Joux, Naccache, and Thomé (JNT) shows that, with subexponential access to an $e$-th root oracle, one can forge RSA signatures for odd $e$ in time close to the special number field sieve, without factoring the modulus; a recent JNT implementation by Shea et al. [2] carried that attack to $1024$-bit RSA. We revisit the JNT construction at $e=2$, the Rabin case, where an $e$-th root oracle is a\nsquare-root oracle. A raw square-root oracle factors $n=pq$ in one query, so it is of no interest; the interesting object is a redundancy-constrained (affine-padded) Rabin oracle that returns a single canonical root and thereby resists the one-query attack. We show that a one-sided number field sieve against such an oracle produces a congruence of squares $X^2\\equiv Y^2\\pmod n$ with $X\\not\\equiv\\pm Y$ with probability $\\tfrac12$ per dependency, and hence factors $n$ in special-number-field-sieve time\n\\[\nL_n \\left(\\frac{1}{3},{\\sqrt[3]{\\frac{32}{9}}}\\right)\\simeq L_n(1/3,{1.526\\ldots}),\n\\]\nstrictly below the general number field sieve's\n\\[\nL_n \\left(\\frac{1}{3},{\\sqrt[3]{\\frac{64}{9}}}\\right)\\simeq L_n(1/3,{1.923\\ldots}).\n\\]\nThe mechanism is a pleasant inversion: the sign ambiguity that the odd-$e$ algorithm must suppress becomes, at $e=2$, the very quantity that leaks the factorization. We give the algorithm in full --- LLL polynomial selection for a quadratic field, a line sieve producing\nprime-ideal relations, quadratic characters, $\\mathbb F_2$ linear algebra, and an exact number-field square root --- prove the half-rate splitting, and analyse the complexity, including the precise reason the attack collapses when the padding is a hash rather than an affine function of an attacker-chosen message. An open-source implementation realises every step. A small toy example run of it, from the padded modulus to the recovered factors, is given in Appendix A. Our implementation confirms a\nclear performance improvement in factoring speed.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T06:53:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T11:55:40Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2269", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2269", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T16:42:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2269", "title": "Consensus in One Shot: Fast Agreement Beyond Classical Limits", "creators": ["Omri Shmueli", "Ilan Tennenhouse"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Good-case latency, studied in early fast-consensus protocols (Martin and Alvisi, DSN 2005) and formalized by Abraham, Nayak, Ren, and Xiang (DISC 2020), captures a natural efficiency goal: when the sender is honest, agreement should be reached quickly for the honest parties. In the standard classical model, however, there exists a barrier for any $f\\geq n/3$ corrupted parties. Specifically, synchronous broadcast requires good-case latency at least $\\Delta+\\delta$ for $f\\geq n/3$, where $\\delta$ is the actual, unknown message-delay bound and $\\Delta \\gg \\delta$ is its known, conservative upper bound. Under partial synchrony, consistency and liveness cannot even both hold for $f \\geq n/3$ (Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer, JACM 1988).\n\nIn this work we study the use of quantum information to get past these classical barriers, specifically using one-shot signatures (OSS) (Amos et al., STOC 2020, Shmueli and Zhandry, CRYPTO 2025). OSS prevents even a corrupt signer from issuing signatures on different messages under the same verification key, which provides cryptographic non-equivocation without trusted hardware assumptions. \n\nAssuming OSS and a public-key infrastructure, we obtain two main results against quantum polynomial-time static corruptions. First, under synchrony, we construct a state-machine replication (SMR) protocol without clients, with optimal $\\delta$ good-case latency, tolerating any $f<n$ corruptions among $n$ parties. Second, under partial synchrony, we obtain SMR with $2\\cdot \\delta$ good-case latency which is consistent under any number of corruptions and live assuming $f<\\frac{n}{2}$. Specifically, a corrupt majority may cause progress to stop, but cannot create conflicting histories. Such an always consistent protocol is impossible classically (without assumptions like trusted hardware) even if liveness is only required to hold against a single corrupt party. In both our SMR protocols, communication is entirely classical, with only local quantum computation.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T22:34:28Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T16:42:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2304", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2304", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T11:40:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2304", "title": "Gram Moments and Pairwise Mixing of AES", "creators": ["Chongxu Ren", "Hongbo Yu"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Almost pairwise independence asks how closely a block cipher reproduces the joint output distribution of a random permutation on two distinct plaintexts. Existing analyses of AES with independent round keys combine bounds on the distribution after the first few rounds with contraction over later rounds. Diffusion makes local output differences dependent, and estimating local responses or successive transitions separately can lose useful information. We preserve these dependencies in two ways. First, Gram-moment estimates sum the squared overlaps between local responses whose inputs are linked by diffusion. Second, we estimate two consecutive transitions together. The compatible intermediate differences form affine fibers; summing over these fibers inside the composed operator retains the constraints shared by the two diffusion layers.\n\nWe prove $\\varepsilon_{8+2k}<2^{-92.19-41k}$ for every integer $k\\ge0$, where $\\varepsilon_r$ is the largest total variation distance, over distinct plaintext pairs, between the ciphertext-pair law and the corresponding random-permutation law. The round keys are independent and uniform, sampled once and reused across evaluations. Consequently, 10, 14, and 16 rounds suffice for statistical accuracy $2^{-128}$, $2^{-192}$, and $2^{-256}$. The same bound controls the complete view of an algorithm making at most two adaptive classical forward queries with an independent finite private seed. The resulting family gives 41 additional bits of pairwise accuracy for every two additional rounds, starting at eight rounds.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-01T22:45:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T11:40:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2362", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2362", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T14:18:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2362", "title": "The Structure of Witness-Update Tradeoffs in Additive Positive Accumulators", "creators": ["Wei Qi"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "An additive positive accumulator maintains a short public digest of a growing set while each accumulated element carries a membership witness. As new elements are inserted, old witnesses may need to be refreshed, creating a tradeoff between succinct public state and witness-maintenance cost. Previous lower bounds capture this tradeoff through particular scalar measures, such as the maximum lifetime update frequency [Qi, IACR Communications in Cryptology 2026] or the total number of witness updates [Bonneau--Chen--Christ--Karantaidou, CRYPTO 2025]. We instead characterize the structure of the entire labeled witness-update pattern.\n\nOur main result reduces witness-update tradeoffs to optimization over bounded-right-depth ordered binary trees. Except with negligible probability, every execution of a sound, NeedUpd-complete accumulator admits such a tree whose prescribed updates can be matched injectively to genuine updates of the same witnesses occurring no earlier. Conversely, every feasible tree profile is realized exactly by a bounded-width online merger [Mahmoody--Qi, ITC 2023], and efficiently generated merger schedules admit Merkle-forest implementations. Thus the same family of trees governs both the security lower bound and the constructive side of the tradeoff.\n\nBecause the tree certificate is independent of the maintenance objective, the same structural event simultaneously controls every nonnegative coordinatewise nondecreasing function of the lifetime update vector. This recovers the known maximum- and total-update bounds as special cases and yields heterogeneous weighted, cohort, threshold, top-$k$, and nonlinear bounds from the same theorem. Heterogeneous costs model settings in which different witness holders face different computational, communication, availability, or delegated-maintenance costs. For efficiently specified weights, an optimal tree can be computed in polynomial time and realized by the corresponding merger schedule.\n\nThe framework also extends beyond lifetime update counts. For per-witness update prices that are nondecreasing in time, the same tree optimization remains exact and yields matching lower bounds and merger realizations, together with an efficient dynamic program. More generally, arbitrary nonnegative time-dependent prices admit structural lower bounds. Our results therefore give a structure-first framework in which cryptographic security first forces a common combinatorial constraint on the update process, and different maintenance objectives are optimized only afterwards.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-05T11:51:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T14:18:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2368", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2368", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T12:18:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2368", "title": "Low-Latency Parallel Digit Decomposition and Sign Evaluation for CKKS", "creators": ["Jung Hee Cheon", "Kyungah Cho", "Junyoung Jung", "Junho Lim"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "In CKKS, the sign is commonly evaluated by polynomial approximation, and nonlinear functions such as comparison, ReLU, and max are computed through the sign. However, the discontinuity of the sign makes it harder to approximate with a polynomial as the required input bit precision $p$ grows. Alternatively, the sign can be computed by first decomposing the input into radix-$B$ digits. Existing methods extract the $u \\approx p/\\log B$ digits one at a time, taking $u$ sequential bootstrappings. Instead, we approximately round $u$ copies of the input to each digit's grid and obtain all $u$ digits in parallel, up to carries, with a single bootstrapping. The carries are then corrected in $O(\\log u)$ depth. For the sign, a scan of the same form returns the sign directly, without recovering the exact digits.\n\nWe show that our method distinguishes inputs separated by about $2^{-p}$ with $\\Theta(p)$ modulus bits, at the cost of $\\Theta(u)$ slots per input. Neither the digits nor the carries need to be computed to high precision, so our circuit, including its bootstrapping, runs at low precision. We also analyze polynomial approximation under an explicit noise and scale model, and show that, in contrast, its modulus consumption grows to $\\Omega(p^2)$ bits.\n\nBenchmarks show a 2.04$\\times$ speedup over [AKP25] for coefficient-encoded integer digit decomposition at ten radix-64 digits and speedups of 5.37$\\times$ over [LLNK22] and 7.83$\\times$ over [CKK20] for sign evaluation on real input pairs at $2^{-60}$ separation. In the tested settings, the method of [AKP25] is faster for $u \\leq 4$ and that of [LLNK22] for $p \\leq 36$, while our method is faster at the larger tested settings.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-05T23:52:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T12:18:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2399", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2399", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T11:59:32Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2399", "title": "A Note on Extractable Witness Encryption in Generic Groups", "creators": ["Matteo Campanelli"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Hair and Sahai (arXiv:2609.18275v1) have recently proposed a construction of witness encryption for NP satisfying semantic security. In this  note we observe that this recent witness-encryption construction is unconditionally extractable in the generic group model.  This yields a construction of extractable witness encryption without assuming subexponential soundness of SNARGs, in contrast to the recent work of Jin (ePrint 2026/2063), which requires this assumption. The result in this note, moreover, complements the concurrent work of Chen and Vaikuntanathan (ePrint 2026/2346), who show the same construction to be public-coin extractable under a knowledge-style assumption; our argument is unconditional in the GGM.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-07T14:36:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T11:59:32Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2406", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2406", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T16:06:21Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2406", "title": "Time-Space Tradeoffs For Probabilistic Proofs", "creators": ["Alessandro Chiesa", "Ziyi Guan", "Omer Paneth", "Nicholas Spooner"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Many recent constructions of probabilistic proofs achieve fast proving times but have high space complexity (much higher than that of the computation being proved). Empirically this arises due to the fact that error-correcting codes, a key ingredient of such constructions, suffer from limiting time-space tradeoffs. It remained open, however, whether such time-space tradeoffs exist for proofs themselves.\n\nWe establish time-space tradeoffs for probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) as well as for their multi-round extension, interactive oracle proofs (IOPs), with straightline knowledge soundness. Our results hold for machine computations that have sequential input access, the same model for which similar tradeoffs hold for error-correcting codes. We complement this result by describing an IOP for R1CS that avoids the tradeoff but requires random access to the R1CS witness.\n\nOur techniques build on and extend results for codes of Cook and Moshkovitz (CCC~2024). A key difficulty that we encounter in establishing our tradeoff is that distance of the code plays a key role in prior results, while for probabilistic proofs there is no natural notion of distance. Nevertheless, we show that, assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions, we can establish time-space tradeoffs by carefully relating a small-space machine's information flow to the proof system's properties.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-07T23:52:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T16:06:21Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2462", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2462", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T12:11:42Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2462", "title": "Hybrid Quantum–Computational Key Distribution with Reduced Assumptions (Short Paper)", "creators": ["Jean Snyman", "Ioana Boureanu", "Daniel Gardham"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The HM-QCT protocol, presented by Mazzoncini et al. in 2025, uses a unique feature of quantum information to achieve quantum key distribution (QKD) with secret-key rates beyond standard constructions. The protocol has been designed in the hybrid quantum–computational time-lock (QCT) security model which imposes two independent (but related) restrictions on the attacker: (1) a computationally secure encryption scheme which a successful attacker must break within a narrow timeframe and (2) an assumption that the attacker can only store quantum information with low fidelity.\n\nWe first review the protocol and its two-assumption model by presenting, in explicit form, the two natural “harvest now, decrypt later” strategies against it, one using quantum memory and one using classical memory. We show how each is excluded by exactly one of the two assumptions, so that harvesting resistance rests on their conjunction and on the presumed existence of a technological gap: the adversary's quantum memory must decohere much faster than the time it takes to break the short-term encryption.\n\nFinally, we introduce HM-PRF, a variant that replaces the short-term encryption with a pseudorandom function (PRF), evaluated locally. By eliminating the transmission of enciphered classical information, the adversary does not need to race an impending expiry event. We compare the security of our construction against the original and argue that our PRF-based assumption yields a more realistic adversary. It simply requires the existence of one-way functions rather than a predicted lasting limitation of quantum computation and memory technology.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-13T14:49:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T12:11:42Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2465", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2465", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T13:04:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2465", "title": "Snapshots of TEE-Based Encrypted Databases Leak Plaintext Histograms via Dendrochronology", "creators": ["Zachary Espiritu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Arborists use dendrochronology, or the study of tree \"growth rings\" (as in, the plant), to infer past environmental events. We identify an analogous, exploitable phenomenon in the indexes used by several encrypted databases (EDBs) based on trusted execution environments (TEEs). Such EDBs have been shown to leak the order of indexed values, but not the histogram (or frequency of each value), with respect to a weaker class of snapshot adversaries. This order-only leakage substantially reduces the impact of possible inference attacks.\n\nWe show, in fact, frequency is recoverable in the snapshot model from many TEE-based EDBs, even if the TEE itself is \"secure\". Our insight is simple: practical storage engines impose a strict total order on indexed keys by augmenting each key with a unique tie-breaker. If the adversary learns information about the tie-breakers, they can recover the frequencies of plaintext keys. We show this enables stronger inference attacks on several TEE-based EDBs (including Microsoft SQL Server’s Always Encrypted, StealthDB, and HeDB) to demonstrate this vulnerability’s ubiquity and point to broader lessons for TEE applications designed around legacy code.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-13T23:42:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T13:04:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2500", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2500", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T10:57:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2500", "title": "Threshold Post-Quantum E-Voting from Lattice Commitments", "creators": ["Jalal Alizadeh"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Lattice-based homomorphic e-voting protocols built on commitments, such as EVOLVE, keep ballots private against all but one authority and the tally verifiable even if all authorities collude, but need every authority to tally. We present T-EVOLVE, in which votes are Shamir-shared over the commitment message space: any t of n authorities that took part in the checking phase complete the tally, privacy holds against t-1 colluding authorities and verifiability against all. The voter proves that her committed shares form a Reed-Solomon codeword whose value at zero is a valid vote; the parity checks cost no communication, and tallying interpolates public column sums without norm growth. Complaints of authorities, including about ciphertexts that do not decrypt, are publicly verifiable given encryption with publicly verifiable opening, which we define and instantiate under LWE. We prove privacy, verifiability, individual verifiability and robustness in the classical random oracle model; the verifiability reduction is not tight and the parameters rest on classical hardness estimates. In our C implementation, a yes/no ballot for four authorities takes 109 KB without signatures, or 147 KB with the computed seed ciphertexts of our instantiation, and an authority aggregates 10^4 ballots in about three minutes per successful tally round on one core.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-15T06:55:07Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T10:57:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2505", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2505", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T13:19:57Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2505", "title": "AVX-512 Acceleration of SQIsign 3.0 Verification", "creators": ["Yunqi Wen", "Xuzhe Liu", "Zhi Hu", "Saiyu Wang", "Chang-An Zhao"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "SQIsign is a compact isogeny-based signature scheme.\nWe present a low-latency AVX-512 implementation of complete SQIsign 3.0 verification at security levels I, III, and V.  Our implementation provides vectorized curve-side verification, including the Superglue transition, and introduces dynamic-programming strategies for the degree-$2^\\ell$ and theta-model $(2,2)$-isogeny chains.  The strategies account for batched point evaluation and the preparation of SIMD data.  On an Intel Core i7-11800H running native Ubuntu 24.04, the complete verifiers achieve $2.14\\times$,  $2.08\\times$, and $2.34\\times$ speedups, respectively, over the SQIsign 3.0 Broadwell reference verifiers (the optimized 64-bit assembly implementation).", "date_submitted": "2026-10-16T07:43:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T13:19:57Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2513", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2513", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T06:58:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2513", "title": "Fully Homomorphic Encryption for Small Batches of Complex Numbers", "creators": ["Jules Dumezy"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We propose a new approximate homomorphic encryption scheme to process small batches of complex numbers. Leveled operations are based on a new shaped rounding, whose error is a multiple of a fixed public ring element $g$, small on the data slots and larger on the others. The unused slots form a guard band that is computed on but never decoded, and the polynomial scaling factor $g^{-1}\\Delta$ generalizes the CKKS scaling factor, with $g=1$ recovering CKKS. Guard-domain bounds determine the scaling factor needed for stability, while a norm bound limits the precision gain for a given guard amplification. A replicated layout uses a unit from a small cyclotomic subring to preserve shaping under admissible rotations and traces. We give a native bootstrapping algorithm whose forward transform reads only data slots, and conversions to and from CKKS with shared keys. Security reduces to Ring-LWE with the same parameters as CKKS. In poulpy, at ring degree $2^{15}$ and parameters targeting 128-bit security, bootstrapping a ciphertext holding 16 or 64 values restores 21 levels and retains at least 22.6 bits of minimum precision after 21 sequential products by fresh operands, while sparse CKKS supports only four levels at that degree and comparable precision. For these batch sizes, bootstrapping to restore 16 levels is about 5 times faster on one thread than sparse CKKS, which requires ring degree $2^{16}$.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-16T15:11:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T06:58:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2523", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2523", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T19:32:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2523", "title": "GKS Fully Homomorphic Encryption: Security Analysis", "creators": ["John Graham", "Soundes Marzougui", "Milos Pavlovic", "Vladimir Shpilrain"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "All traditional encryption schemes share a fundamental operational vulnerability: encrypted data must be decrypted before it can be used. Fully homomorphic encryption eliminates this vulnerability by enabling computation directly on encrypted data, but existing FHE schemes impose substantial practical constraints that limit deployment.\nThis paper presents a formal security analysis of the Gribov-Kahrobaei-Shpilrain (GKS) private-key FHE scheme. GKS requires no bootstrapping or de-linearization, produces bit-exact decryption, supports native encrypted search, and scales to unbounded depth.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-18T00:47:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T19:32:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2524", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2524", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T15:09:23Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2524", "title": "Homomorphic Encryption for High-precision Arithmetic of Approximate Numbers", "creators": ["Shihe Ma", "Jiaming Liu", "Anyu Wang", "Xiaoyun Wang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme enables efficient arithmetic over complex numbers, but each homomorphic multiplication consumes a large modulus to ensure enough precision, limiting both the circuit depth and precision supported by CKKS.\nThis work addresses this problem by proposing Generalized CKKS (GCKKS), a CKKS analogue of the GBFV scheme (EUROCRYPT 2025) that trades the number of slots for reduced modulus consumption.\n\nDespite its high-level similarity to GBFV, GCKKS faces new challenges caused by the different encoding and encryption structures of CKKS. We address these challenges with novel techniques not present in GBFV.\nOur plaintext encoding starts with an improved and SIMD version of Costache, Smart, and Vivek's encoding in 2017.\nNamely, it rounds complex values to cyclotomic integers instead of Gaussian integers, and reduces the rounding problem to solving CVP instances.\nThis encoding allows storing high-precision complex values in polynomials with small canonical norms.\nAs an important observation, the encoding can be simplified to a sparse CKKS encoding followed by multiplication with a polynomial constructed from a short vector in the encoding lattice.\nWe show that by integrating this encoding format into GCKKS decryption, most GCKKS homomorphic operations and the corresponding noise analyses reduce to their CKKS counterparts.\nThis relieves GCKKS from any heavy computational or noise overhead.\n\nIn experiments, GCKKS provides 7 levels with 1000-bit precision at ring dimension $2^{14}$, where each multiplication takes less than 30 ms.\nTo our knowledge, this precision has never been achieved before.\nIt can be used to preserve enough precision after noise flooding, a necessary ingredient for CKKS circuit privacy and a common approach to secure threshold CKKS and to provide IND-CPA$^\\text{D}$ security.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-18T02:25:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T15:09:23Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2529", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2529", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T14:48:56Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2529", "title": "The Covering Radius of $\\text{RM}(1,9)$ is Precisely $242$", "creators": ["Xiang-dong Hou", "Evelyn Sabo", "Freeman Slaughter"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Let $\\text{RM}(r,n)$ be the $r$th order Reed-Muller code of length $2^n$, and let $\\rho(r,n)$ denote its covering radius, so that $\\rho(1,n)$ is the largest possible nonlinearity of a Boolean function in $n$ variables. For odd $n$, the value of $\\rho(1,n)$ was previously known only for $n\\le 7$. It is known that $242\\le\\rho(1,9)\\le 244$, but the exact determination of $\\rho(1,9)$ has been a long-standing open question. We give a computer-assisted proof that $\\rho(1,9)=242$. We first show that a function of nonlinearity $243$ would yield one of nonlinearity $244$, so it suffices to exclude $244$. Divisibility properties of the Walsh spectrum then attach to any function of nonlinearity $244$ a cubic $p$ whose spectrum attains the sharp bound $\\sum\\limits_a|W_p(a)|\\le 10240$, and the cases of equality take one of two forms. One form is eliminated directly. The other is eliminated by an exhaustive computation that leverages the classification of the $349$ orbits in $\\text{RM}(3,9)/\\text{RM}(2,9)$ under $\\text{GL}(9,2)$, using Langevin's catalog of representatives together with an audit of its completeness, and the enumeration is carried out twice with independent implementations. The notebook to verify the computer search portion, $\\texttt{Verify_RM(1,9).ipynb}$, contains all data and recomputes each check, and may be found in the repository $\\texttt{https://github.com/FreemanSlaughter/Covering-Radius}$.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-18T14:48:53Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T14:48:56Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2531", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2531", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T15:51:37Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2531", "title": "High-Precision CKKS with Focal Units", "creators": ["Jung Hee Cheon", "Junho Lee"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "In CKKS, higher precision requires a larger scaling factor, increasing modulus consumption during homomorphic arithmetic and leaving less modulus available after bootstrapping under the same modulus budget. We introduce Focused CKKS, which trades unused SIMD slots for precision through focused rescaling and key-switching based on cyclotomic units. These units reduce error in selected focus slots while allowing larger error in the background slots. Using only a $1/k$ fraction of the slots provides approximately $k$ times as many bits of precision at the same scaling factor and CKKS parameter setting. Such a high-precision multiplication costs the same as an ordinary CKKS multiplication, with each focus slot supported by $(k-1)$ background slots. More generally, the construction supports different precision requirements across slots.\n\nWe also construct a bootstrapping procedure tailored to Focused CKKS. Only the base modulus at the bottom level needs to grow with the target precision; the remaining bootstrapping computation maintains approximately the same modulus consumption by using fewer slots. By adapting the high-precision bootstrapping based on discrete CKKS and performing its error-cleaning step in Focused CKKS, we further reduce this base modulus by approximately the same factor $k$.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-18T19:14:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T15:51:37Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2533", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2533", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T00:33:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2533", "title": "Off-Key: Inconsistent MAC Keys Compromise Privacy in SPDZ-Family MPC", "creators": ["Marcel Keller", "Sela Navot", "Nirvan Tyagi"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "SPDZ-family protocols for maliciously secure multi-party computation protect secret-shared values with message authentication codes (MACs) under a secret-shared global key. Their security requires that all values and preprocessing used together be authenticated under the same key. We present Off-Key, a privacy attack that exploits violations of this requirement. Depending on which specific MAC check protocol is used, a corrupted party can either recover the value of a shared secret from a single authentication check or test a guess through selective failure by modifying a MAC share and observing whether a masked check succeeds. While this attack does not compromise the theoretical security guarantees of the protocols, we demonstrate this key-consistency vulnerability in evaluated versions of MP-SPDZ, SCALE-MAMBA, and FANNG-MPC, which allow a corrupted party to use different keys across batches, threads, or process runs. To help implementations avoid this class of attacks, we identify the state that enforces key consistency in representative preprocessing protocols and show how preserving and reusing it prevents the attack.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T00:33:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T00:33:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2534", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2534", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T01:19:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2534", "title": "Circular Dragon: $\\widetilde{{O}}$ptimal Adaptively Secure Distributed Randomness/Key Generation and Parallel Broadcast", "creators": ["Hanwen Feng", "Yuan Lu", "Tiancheng Mai", "Qiang Tang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present the first strongly adaptive common coin protocol, under the PKI setup (in the random oracle model and the algebraic group model, yet with no trusted dealer), that (i) achieves the optimal resilience $t< n/2$ in synchronous networks, and (ii) attains near-optimal asymptotics: near-quadratic communication $O(\\kappa \\lambda n^2\\log n)$ and logarithmic rounds $O(\\kappa\\log n)$, with failure probability $\\textsf{negl}(\\lambda)+2^{-\\kappa}$, where $\\lambda$ (resp. $\\kappa$) is the computational (resp. statistical) security parameter. Furthermore, the coin protocol assumes no memory erasure. At its core is a ``special-purpose'' distributed key generation (DKG) protocol that produces a secret in an elliptic-curve group. \nOur common coin immediately implies the first strongly adaptive and optimally resilient Byzantine Agreement with subcubic communication and sublinear rounds in the absence of a trusted dealer. Furthermore, we give two non-trivial applications of independent interest: (i) a strongly adaptive Parallel Broadcast (PBC) under standard PKI with near-quadratic communication and logarithmic rounds, whereas all existing subcubic solutions (Gelles et al. CRYPTO'25, Civit et al. PODC'24) require at least linear rounds; (ii) a strongly adaptive ``general-purpose'' DKG for field-element secrets with $O(\\lambda\\kappa n^2\\log n)$ communication and $O(\\kappa\\log n)$ rounds (assuming memory erasures), fully compatible with legacy threshold schemes (BLS, Schnorr, ElGamal), improving upon (Feng et al. PODC'24), which requires $O(\\lambda\\kappa n^{2.5} \\log n)$ communication and $O(n)$ rounds.\nOur core is a new design methodology, which we call \\emph{Circular Dragon}. This extends the Dragon method (PODC'24) that was originally developed for sub-cubic communication DKG protocols but with linear rounds, by further reducing the round complexity.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T01:19:47Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T01:19:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2535", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2535", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T15:01:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2535", "title": "Quantum State Search with Classical Interactive Advice", "creators": ["Mohammed Barhoush"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We study whether a quantum verifier can find a hidden quantum state by exchanging classical messages with an unbounded prover who knows the state. The verifier has access to a reflection oracle about the target. For a Haar-random $n$-qubit target, we prove that achieving constant average fidelity with the target requires $(q+1)^2(B+1)=\\Omega(2^n)$, where $q$ is the number of verifier queries and $B$ is the total prover-to-verifier communication. The bound allows arbitrary classical interaction and unrestricted computation between queries. Our proof extends the lower bound of Aaronson and Kuperberg (ToC'07) from a single classical proof to an arbitrary classical interaction.\n\nAs a result, we obtain a quantum-oracle separation of QMA from QCIP. In particular, we give a unitary oracle $\\mathcal{U}$ such that there exists a language $L\\in\\mathrm{QMA}^{\\mathcal{U}}$ but $L\\notin\\mathrm{QCIP}^{\\mathcal{U}}$. Our separation holds even for UniqueQMA, the restriction of QMA to verification with a unique quantum witness, which is known to be strictly weaker than QMA in the quantum black-box setting.\n\nWe further give an oracle construction for a notion known as QMA--QCIP[2] gap problem. This gives average case hardness for a QMA language under classical access to a QCIP[2] decision oracle and is used in establishing negative results on witness encryption and quantum indistinguishability obfuscation.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T02:08:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T15:01:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2536", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2536", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T12:24:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2536", "title": "IISFA: Ineffective Instruction-Skip Fault Attacks on Bitslice Implementations", "creators": ["Hanbeom Shin", "Dongwoo Kang", "Donggeun Kwon", "Seokhie Hong", "HeeSeok Kim"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Redundancy countermeasures prevent differential fault analysis by withholding faulty ciphertexts. Ineffective fault analysis and statistical ineffective fault attacks exploit executions in which an injected fault leaves the result unchanged, using constraints on intermediate values or statistical bias to recover keys. In this paper, we present an Ineffective Instruction-Skip Fault Attack (IISFA) on bitsliced implementations protected by redundancy. A bitsliced instruction processes $m$ S-boxes simultaneously. Skipping it leaves the group unchanged exactly when all $m$ S-box inputs belong to its ineffective set, which we compute from the implementation. Each ciphertext output by the device therefore restricts all $m$ $n$-bit subkeys to candidates whose S-box inputs belong to that set. The ineffective probability specifies how often a uniformly random S-box input makes the skip ineffective, and its $m$-th power gives the ciphertext output probability for independent inputs. We determine which key candidates remain indistinguishable under a single target instruction. We give key-recovery procedures for both known and chosen plaintexts and combine different target instructions across queries, with one instruction skipped per execution. We calculate expected injection counts or enclosing intervals for the known- and chosen-plaintext procedures from the ineffective sets and use them to reduce the search for efficient target sequences. We evaluate five bitsliced implementations of GIFT, SKINNY and PIPO on an 8-bit AVR microcontroller under a redundancy countermeasure using clock glitches. All measured key-recovery campaigns succeed in every trial.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T02:50:40Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T12:24:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2537", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2537", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T12:25:32Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2537", "title": "SAT and Neural Network Filters for Misinjections in Fault Attacks", "creators": ["Hanbeom Shin", "Dongwoo Kang", "Donggeun Kwon", "Seokhie Hong", "HeeSeok Kim"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "A misinjection, an injection that misses the fault form an attack assumes, can make an elimination fault attack discard the correct key. They occur when the attacker has not determined the timing of the device, and a random-delay countermeasure wider than the S-box layer can force them even on one who has. This paper presents a SAT filter that removes misinjections without the secret key, one injection at a time. It models the differential propagation from the injected round to the end of the cipher in SAT and rejects an injection when the model has no solution for the assumed fault and the observed ciphertext difference. The paper also presents a neural network filter, which passes an injection when the score of a network trained for the same decision is at least 0.5, and a combined filter, which passes it only when the SAT model of the injection also has a solution. We measure the filters on faults injected by clock glitching into GIFT-64, GIFT-128 and BAKSHEESH on a microcontroller, in three settings, a non-profiling attacker without and with a random-delay countermeasure and a profiling attacker with it. The SAT filter rejected none of the 14669 intended faults and, for the non-profiling attacker without the random-delay countermeasure, at least 0.940 of the misinjections at the full-diffusion round, over at least 385 each. For the same attacker it raises the success probability of ToFA on BAKSHEESH, which recovers the master key, from 5.2% to 61.2%, and the combined filter raises it to 96.2%, each over 2000 trials.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T03:04:36Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T12:25:32Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2538", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2538", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T04:41:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2538", "title": "Optimizing HQC with Enhanced Parallel Binary Polynomial Multiplication on GPUs", "creators": ["DongCheon Kim", "JunHyeok Choi", "Wai Kong Lee", "Seog Chung Seo"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Graphics processing units (GPUs) are widely employed as accelerators in modern servers to handle key-establishment requests in bulk. Such deployments require the GPU implementation to sustain high throughput while keeping each request within its latency bound. In this work, we present a high-performance, end-to-end GPU implementation of Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC), a code-based key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). We propose two novel techniques to accelerate the dominant cost of HQC, which is binary polynomial multiplication over Galois Field GF(2). The first is a parallelization of the Frobenius additive fast Fourier transform (FAFFT), and the second is a mapping of the cyclic product, viewed as a Toeplitz matrix–vector product, onto one-bit integer (INT1) tensor cores. We further explore the design space of these multipliers, measuring them directly on the GPU to derive the best combination for the architecture. We further propose a GPU-resident computation strategy that keeps the entire KEM on the GPU, thereby reducing costly memory traffic. Beyond multiplication, we introduce warp-level parallelization strategies to accelerate the remaining stages, hashing, Reed–Muller/Reed–Solomon (RM/RS) coding, and fixed-weight sampling, which become the performance bottleneck once multiplication is optimized. By varying the mapping of KEM instances to GPU threads, we derive five variants spanning the trade-off between throughput and latency and organize them into a thread-to-KEM mapping taxonomy. On an RTX 4090, the Coarse-Grained (CG) variant maximizes batch throughput. Our multiplier reaches 3,828k polymul/s for standalone multiplication, about 2.9× the latest GPU HQC implementation HIGH, and for the full KEM the CG variant achieves 1.56×, 1.55×, and 2.03× higher end-to-end throughput than HIGH for keygen, encaps, and decaps. For single-shot latency the tensor-core-based BMMAw variant achieves a latency as low as 254 µs. The proposed warp-parallel FGmw variant still attains a latency of 354 µs, demonstrating that our approach remains effective on GPU architectures lacking INT1 tensor-core support. All five variants are further evaluated on an RTX 3090 and an embedded Jetson AGX Orin to confirm cross-platform portability.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T04:41:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T04:41:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2539", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2539", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T16:46:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2539", "title": "Implementing Predicate Encryption for Branching Programs: Private Computation over Key-Homomorphic Encodings Without FHE", "creators": ["Sora Suegami"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Predicate encryption (PE) encrypts a message under an attribute that the ciphertext hides, allowing a secret key for a predicate to recover the message only when the attribute satisfies the predicate. Existing public-key implementations support useful specialized predicates, but enforcing heterogeneous conditions with one key requires an attribute representation fixed before encryption, which grows with the supported types of conditions and cannot express types it does not anticipate, such as regular expressions. Lattice-based PE for general circuits is far more expressive, but existing constructions rely on fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), typically evaluated as a Boolean circuit over key-homomorphic encodings, which expands the computation and amplifies noise growth and leads to impractically large parameters. Existing PE thus offers either practicality for restricted predicates or expressiveness at an impractical cost.\n\nWe present a lattice-based PE scheme for branching programs that avoids FHE entirely and combines heterogeneous conditions in a single predicate over a common attribute representation. It rests on two techniques: asymmetric multiplication, which multiplies a hidden program state by an encrypted attribute symbol through decryption inside an encoding, and lookup tables over exponents, which evaluate arbitrary state transitions on a single encoding by ring automorphisms. Under circular Ring-LWE, the scheme is selectively weakly attribute-hiding against polynomially many colluding unauthorized keys.\n\nWe give, to our knowledge, the first implementation of PE for a predicate class as expressive as branching programs. On a single NVIDIA A100 GPU, for a predicate that combines a range check and a regular-expression check on a $10$-bit attribute, with parameters targeting $128$-bit security against known Ring-LWE attacks, encryption takes $4.06$ hours, key generation $4.70$ hours, and decryption $4.23$ hours, with $342.25$ GB ciphertexts. These costs remain large, but compared with a single FHE multiplication evaluated as a Boolean circuit over encodings, the basic step of PE that evaluates FHE over encodings, whose ciphertexts alone occupy tens of exabytes per attribute bit, our ciphertexts are at least $2\\times10^9$ times smaller per attribute bit, and our decryption needs at least $2\\times10^{16}$ times fewer $64$-bit integer multiplications.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T05:00:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T16:46:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2540", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2540", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T01:52:49Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2540", "title": "Efficient and Compact High-order Masking Raccoon on Memory Constrained Devices", "creators": ["Junhao Huang", "Yiteng Sun", "Jipeng Zhang", "Weijia Wang", "Donglong Chen", "Haiyang Xue", "Guomin Yang"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Raccoon, presented at CRYPTO 2024, is a provably secure lattice-based signature scheme featuring an $O(d \\log{d})$ masking overhead. Although it did not advance beyond the first-round of NIST's additional call for post-quantum digital signatures, Raccoon remains a promising candidate due to its low masking overhead and strong provable side-channel resistance. \n    \nThis paper proposes the first efficient and compact implementation of high-order Raccoon on the ARM Cortex-M4, with a focus on optimizing its polynomial multiplication, sampling, and memory consumption.\n1) For polynomial multiplication, we present a consecutive 32-bit NTT/INTT implementation for the two moduli in Raccoon, enabling optimal 3+3+3 layer merging to reduce memory-access overhead, together with extensive lazy reduction to minimize modular reductions. As a side contribution, we propose a novel negative double Montgomery reduction technique to accelerate double modular reductions in multi-moduli NTT. \n2) For polynomial sampling, we identify and resolve a previously overlooked performance bottleneck caused by frequent incremental SHAKE256 invocations for small data chunks on ARM Cortex-M4. By transitioning to the one-shot approach, we achieve speedups of at least $1.80\\times$ across all sampling routines in Raccoon.\n3) Finally, we explore memory-saving techniques to enable the practical deployment of high-order masked Raccoon (up to 32 orders) on resource-constrained IoT devices.\n    \nThe proposed implementations outperform the Raccoon reference implementation by $1.85\\times$-$2.25\\times$. Notably, high-order masked Raccoon-192 outperforms masked Dilithium3 by $3.12\\times, 8.07\\times$, and $2.71\\times$ at masking orders $d=2$, $4$, and $8$, respectively. Finally, the leakage evaluations confirm that the second-order Raccoon implementation provides strong resistance to differential power analysis (DPA) once micro-architectural transitional leakages are mitigated.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T06:40:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T01:52:49Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2541", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2541", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T07:56:37Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2541", "title": "Provable Lattice Reduction in Nearly the Time of QR Factorization", "creators": ["Yang Zhou", "Zhedong Wang", "Mingsheng Wang"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We propose a deterministic lattice-reduction algorithm with bit complexity matching QR factorization up to logarithmic factors, and an implementation that uses fewer instructions than \\texttt{flatter} (CRYPTO 2023) in our benchmarks. The key technical innovations are iterative precision management, a finer-grained potential analysis, and a new representation for bases and transformations, all integrated into a recursive framework.\nWe analyze the asymptotic behavior of our algorithm, and show\nthat, for fixed reduction and output accuracy,\nthe running time is $\\widetilde O\\!\\left(\n n^\\omega\\bigl(1+\\log\\kappa_{\\rm col}(\\mathbf B)\\bigr)\\right)$,\nwhere $\\mathbf B\\in\\mathbb Z^{n\\times n}$ is a nonsingular lattice basis and\n$\\kappa_{\\rm col}$ is the optimally column-scaled spectral condition number.\nThis gives a finer complexity than prior art, by allowing a tighter condition number $\\kappa_{\\rm col}$. Besides, through a new observation on the recursive structure, we demonstrate that the algorithm is free from heuristic assumptions. We compare our implementation with \\texttt{flatter} on q-ary, NTRU-like, scaled q-ary, and Coppersmith inputs. Our implementation uses fewer instructions in all 153 executions. The median ratios of \\texttt{flatter}'s instruction count to ours are 1.55 for ordinary q-ary inputs and 1.86 for NTRU-like inputs.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T07:56:37Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T07:56:37Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2542", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2542", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T07:56:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2542", "title": "From if to Oops: Turning a conditional into a key-recovery oracle", "creators": ["Gustavo Banegas", "Nia Dimitrova", "Monika Trimoska"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Deterministic variants of CSIDH remove randomness from the group action, either through implementation techniques or, as in Houben's deterministic CSIDH and OSIDH-LD, by design. Since earlier fault attacks on CSIDH mostly target random point sampling, determinism seems to close that avenue. We show that it opens another: every secret-dependent step occurs at a fixed, public point of every execution, so an attacker can fault the same step repeatedly. Our attack forces the mask that selects which of two lanes computes the next isogeny to zero, for example by skipping one instruction. Whether the output changes reveals whether a secret exponent reaches a chosen threshold, and a binary search over these thresholds recovers the full key with one fault per execution: at most 297 oracle queries for OSIDH-LD and 222 for deterministic CSIDH with CSIDH-512-sized keys. We recover full OSIDH-LD keys in a software fault simulation of the reference implementation, and show on a ChipWhisperer-Lite that the targeted instruction is skipped with probability at least $0.94$ at an isolated fault position. Finally, we argue that fault resistance requires giving up determinism, and propose countermeasures relying on randomization.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T07:56:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T07:56:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2543", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2543", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T08:05:25Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2543", "title": "A Key-Recovery Attack on the GTLN Knapsack Cryptosystem via Continued Fractions", "creators": ["Shiyi zhou", "Yingpu Deng", "Shi Ying"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We present a continued-fraction key-recovery attack on the knapsack-based public-key cryptosystem proposed by Gómez-Torrecillas, Lobillo, and Navarro (GTLN). The key observation is that ratios of public-key differences closely approximate rational numbers with small denominators, enabling their exact recovery by continued fractions. Divisibility relations in the recovered fractions yield multiples of two private-key integers through greatest common divisor computations. Once these two integers are identified by a bounded cofactor search, all remaining private-key integers except the modulus and the shift are uniquely determined. Further greatest common divisor computations, cofactor enumeration, and modular inversion then recover the secret modulus and shift. The above process of key recovery uses only public keys. For fixed cofactor bounds, the algorithm runs in polynomial time in the public-key bit length, while a heuristic analysis predicts a high probability of recovering the original key. In experiments with prime-based key generation, our Python implementation recovered the complete private key in all 2,400 trials across the 24 recommended parameter sets, with each attack taking less than 0.05 seconds.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T08:05:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T08:05:25Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2544", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2544", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T09:16:21Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2544", "title": "Blind-DLPA: An End-to-End Framework for Profiled Blind Side-Channel Analysis", "creators": ["Pei Cao", "Chi Zhang", "Dawu Gu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Conventional profiled side-channel analysis generally assumes that the plaintexts or ciphertexts associated with target traces are available during key recovery. We consider a profiled blind setting in which the attacker can obtain labeled traces from a profiling device using known inputs and keys, but observes only leakage traces from the target device. Under this setting, we propose Blind-DLPA, an end-to-end multi-task framework for {profiled blind side-channel analysis (profiled BSCA) that processes complete preprocessed trace windows} and jointly estimates the soft Hamming-weight posteriors of an input variable and a key-dependent intermediate variable. These posteriors are combined with pre-computed theoretical joint distributions to rank the key hypotheses, avoiding both manual {point of interest} (PoI) selection and a parameter-sensitive Gaussian label-error model. Evaluations on unprotected AES and Kyber demonstrate successful key recovery, while experiments on protected AES implementations show robustness to desynchronization and Boolean masking. To the best of our knowledge, Blind-DLPA provides the first reported profiled blind key recovery on the ASCAD dataset, reaching a guessing entropy of zero with 39 attack traces. Complementing these results, we revisit the Ascon Hamming-weight joint-distribution model adopted in prior work and identify previously overlooked collisions between key-dependent theoretical distributions that prevent unique key recovery under this model.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T09:16:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T09:16:21Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2545", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2545", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T10:30:25Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2545", "title": "A Note on the Security of ECDSA with Presignatures or Biased Nonces", "creators": ["Geoffroy Couteau", "Nikolaos Makriyannis"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Over the years, several ECDSA security experiments have been proposed to enable faster distributed ECDSA signing. These experiments are not known to reduce to the standard ECDSA game, and recent work (Groth and Shoup, Eurocrypt 2022) shows that some are vulnerable, especially when combined with raw signing (signing hash digests directly, rather than pre-hashed messages) and additive key derivation. Furthermore, several of these variants are implemented in public libraries and used by companies, sometimes in commercially deployed products, yet lack sound security foundations.\n\nIn this note, we revisit the security landscape of these alternative modes of operation for ECDSA. As our main result, we show that the security of some of these variants, which are used in the wild, is equivalent in the generic group and random oracle model to a standard conjecture from fine-grained complexity on the average-case hardness of the $k$-SUM problem. We complement our study by proving lower bounds, conditioned on fine-grained complexity conjectures, on the running time of generic group model attacks against other standard modes of operation analyzed in (Groth and Shoup, Eurocrypt 2022). Overall, our results provide a complete picture of the security landscape of ECDSA variants, and reveal an elegant connection with (old and new) conjectures from the field of fine-grained complexity.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T10:30:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T10:30:25Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2546", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2546", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T15:39:30Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2546", "title": "New IND-CPA-D Attacks on BFV and BGV", "creators": ["Hyeongmin CHOE", "Minsik Kang", "Damien Stehlé"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "IND-CPA-D security is an extension of IND-CPA security introduced in the context of Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). It captures the situation where the computation result is known to the adversary; it is in particular necessary for FHE with threshold decryption. This work presents three new attacks in this situation on the BFV and BGV FHE schemes, when their parameters are instantiated with heuristic assumptions commonly used to enable correctness.\n\nWe first extend the \\emph{bootstrapping failure attacks} from Cheon \\emph{et al.} [CCS'24] on the DM/CGGI and CKKS schemes, to both BFV and BGV. We focus on BGV when instantiated with the so-called powerful-basis representation of ring elements. The second attack relies on \\emph{skewing the ciphertext noise} in BFV, making it outpace the heuristic noise bounds for plaintext-ciphertext multiplications. This is achieved by crafting plaintexts, for which the noise bounds do not hold. The third and last attack focuses on outpacing the noise growth in BFV ciphertext-ciphertext multiplications. For this purpose, we \\emph{skew the mask} part of the ciphertext by selecting a random encryption of zero, whose addition yields a ciphertext with a sufficiently large mask norm. While the first two attacks successfully recover the secret key, the last attack instead breaks the IND-CPA-D indistinguishability game.\n\nWe report experiments on all these attacks, based on the HElib and OpenFHE libraries, respectively, for BGV and BFV. Notably, the second attack implemented in OpenFHE fully recovers the secret key in a few minutes to a few hours, depending on the parameters.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T10:55:17Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T15:39:30Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2547", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2547", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T11:13:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2547", "title": "$\\mathcal{iO}$ from LWE with Structured Preimage", "creators": ["Shweta Agrawal", "Anuja Modi", "Anshu Yadav", "Shota Yamada"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Constructing $\\mathcal{iO}$ from simple, safe assumptions in the post-quantum regime is an important problem with wide-ranging applications. In this work, we make progress towards this goal. We formulate a new, arguably simple assumption called LWE with Structured Preimage that suffices to build $\\mathcal{iO}$. Our assumption is instance-independent, falsifiable and non-interactive. Our assumption posits that a set of LWE (Learning With Errors) samples is indistinguishable from random given a short Gaussian matrix which is carefully chosen to satisfy the required functionality while avoiding problematic leakage. \n\nWe provide a thorough cryptanalysis of our assumption, using the extensive cryptanalytic effort against the related evasive LWE assumption (Wee, Eurocrypt 2022 and Tsabary, Crypto 2022) to gain confidence. We emphasize that our assumption is superficially similar but fundamentally different from evasive LWE. Thus, we obtain $\\mathcal{iO}$ from a simple lattice assumption whose hardness is somewhat better understood as compared to brand new assumptions.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T11:13:41Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T11:13:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2548", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2548", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T11:15:00Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2548", "title": "Evasive Inner Product Functional Encryption Is Broken Too", "creators": ["Shweta Agrawal", "Anuja Modi", "Anshu Yadav", "Shota Yamada"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We show that the Evasive Inner Product Functional Encryption assumption introduced by Hsieh, Lin and Luo (Eurocrypt 2024) is false in its full generality. Our counterexample adds to a long sequence of works that have attacked different variants of Evasive LWE, taking down another instance that has been considered ``public coin'' (and hence safe) in the literature.\n\nOur attack extends the counterexample against pseudorandom functional encryption ($\\mathsf{PRFE}$), developed by Agrawal, Modi, Yadav and Yamada (TCC 2025) to encompass the notion of Evasive Inner Product Functional Encryption ($\\mathsf{evIPFE}$) proposed by Hsieh, Lin and Luo (Eurocrypt 2024). The original attack relied crucially on the underlying functional encryption scheme being powerful enough to compute pseudorandom functions; our attack shows, perhaps surprisingly, that the much weaker ``evasive''  inner product functionality suffices to mount the attack.\n\nWe interpret our attack as showing that even the slightest power given to the adversary in choosing unrestricted private coins in the evasive LWE family of assumptions, renders it insecure.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T11:15:00Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T11:15:00Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2549", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2549", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T11:16:26Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2549", "title": "Firebolt: Fast, Lightweight, Malicious Non-Interactive Vector-OLE", "creators": ["Michael Adjedj", "Geoffroy Couteau", "Nikolaos Makriyannis"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We introduce a new maliciously-secure vector oblivious linear evaluation (VOLE), building upon a recent construction of (semi-honest) Paillier-based non-interactive VOLE. Our protocol is non-interactive (the sender can adaptively reveal entries of the VOLE using a single message to the receiver) and enjoys low communication (535 bytes for each VOLE entry) and low computation (around 5ms per party, single-threaded). Our protocol can be used as a drop-in replacement for less efficient VOLEs used in a variety of threshold schemes. We exemplify it by devising a new concurrently-secure two-round two-party ECDSA protocol that significantly improves over the state of the art. Along the way, we introduce several new strategies for proving shortness of plaintexts in Paillier ciphertexts or integer commitments, and we devise a modular framework for building threshold-ECDSA in a VOLE-hybrid model with concurrent security without requiring the use of (typically less efficient) UC-secure VOLE. All of these contributions are of independent interest.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T11:16:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T11:16:26Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2550", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2550", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T11:24:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2550", "title": "PPGA: A Framework for Privacy-Preserving Graph Algorithms using the Prepare/Propagate/Gather/Apply Paradigm", "creators": ["Andreas Brüggemann", "Simon Brunnauer", "Thomas Schneider"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Privacy-preserving graph computation enables the secure analysis of graphs modeling social interactions and networks, financial transactions, etc., while keeping the graph private. One approach is to use secure multiparty computation (MPC), allowing different clients to contribute parts of a graph without need of disclosure, and multiple MPC protocols have been proposed for running message-passing-based graph analysis. Yet, existing public implementations are prototypes for fixed analysis functions that require substantial MPC expertise to modify and extend. We present PPGA, a practical framework based on the MultiCent protocol (PETS'25). PPGA lets users define their custom message-passing graph algorithms with a high-level interface, clients input parts of the graph, and then runs the algorithm in MPC. It significantly improves performance compared to MultiCent's implementation, running BFS on a graph of size |V|+|E|=30 million in 23 minutes without leaking the graph topology.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T11:24:50Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T11:24:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2551", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2551", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T11:28:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2551", "title": "Privacy with Leakage from Falsifiable Assumptions", "creators": ["Francesco Berti", "Itamar Levi"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "An inherent challenge in cryptography is finding realistic\nand meaningful models and assumptions. Such assumptions must be fal-\nsifiable. For symmetric-key cryptography in the standard model (i.e.,\nblack-box without leakage), it is conjectured that we have identified\nthe right assumptions: pseudorandom functions and permutations (PRFs\nand PRPs). However, when considering side-channel attacks (SCAs) that\nexploit physical side-channel leakage, the answer is less clear. Moreover,\nthe requirements for integrity and privacy may differ in the leakage-aware\nSCA setting. For integrity: due to advances in the so-called unbounded\nleakage model, it is sufficient to claim integrity based only on black-box\nproperties by instantiating a single strongly unpredictable-with-leakage\n(tweakable) block cipher. For privacy: one approach relied on simulatabil-\nity, proposed by Yu and Standaert at CRYPTO 2013. That is, it should\nbe possible to simulate leakage traces without access to the underlying\nsecret key. Unfortunately, simulating the leakage behavior of a complex\nelectronic system and arguing that distinguishing simulation from reality\nis hard has proved highly challenging (e.g., Galea et al., ASIACRYPT\n2014, and Deperz et al., Cascade 2026).\nIn this paper, we propose a new model and assumption. We isolate a key\ncomponent, namely the key-refreshing process, and provide a security\ndefinition for it that is both falsifiable in practice and usable in security\nproofs: secure refreshing. Like simulatability, this assumption is designed\nto capture the security of the key-refreshing process. Rather than re-\nlying on a simulator, however, we formalize security through a direct\nrefreshing experiment that can be practically falsified by evaluation lab-\noratories. Therefore, our approach avoids many of the concrete problems\nand challenges associated with previous models. Furthermore, inspired\nby this new assumption (and its accompanying model), and to provide\nan additional security assumption for the strongly SCA-protected leak-\nfree component, we introduce strongly protected secure refreshing. As one\nconcrete example, using these assumptions, we prove the privacy of the\nwell-known PSV encryption scheme. We provide the first privacy proof\nbased only on falsifiable assumptions and, importantly, without assuming\nthat the strongly protected component is leak-free which can effectively\ntranslate to significant computational cost reduction.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T11:28:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T11:28:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2552", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2552", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T12:10:19Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2552", "title": "CHARRM - Characterizing Hardware Leakage in the Robust Random Probing Model", "creators": ["Armand Schinkel", "Pascal Sasdrich"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Masking is a prevalent countermeasure against passive physical implementation attacks such as Side-Channel Analysis (SCA). Despite its theoretical soundness, the practical application of masking is often fraught with complexity and prone to errors, underscoring the necessity for automated security verification. This paper presents a comprehensive methodology for efficient security verification in the $(g, t, c)$-robust $(p, \\epsilon)$-random probing model. In particular, we advance the state-of-the-art concept of leakage characteristics to account for robust probe extension schemes across arbitrary circuit structures, enabling efficient leakage probability bound computation for glitch-extended and transition-extended robust probing scenarios. By further linking the leakage characteristic to the Set of Input Shares (SIS) function, we extend our verification methodology to established composability notions. Our automated reasoning framework demonstrates practicality and superior performance and accuracy for larger circuits in comparative evaluations with \\ironmask as state-of-the-art competitor. For the first time, our method allows for the exact verification of larger, composed circuit structures, validated by corresponding case studies. Consequently, this work advances the state-of-the-art in automated hardware security verification, providing a versatile tool for evaluating the security of masked cryptographic implementations against SCA in the presence of transient physical effects.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T12:10:19Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T12:10:19Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2553", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2553", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T13:11:06Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2553", "title": "Near-Optimal Early Stopping with Optimal Communication", "creators": ["Fatima Elsheimy", "Simon Holmgaard Kamp", "Julian Loss", "Charalampos Papamanthou"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Minimizing both the round and communication complexity of Byzantine agreement (BA) is a longstanding problem.\nIn the synchronous setting, early stopping protocols aim to terminate in number of rounds that is proportional to the actual number $f\\leq t$ of corruptions in an execution, rather than on the worst case threshold $t$.\nThe lower bound on the round complexity for such protocols is known to be $\\min\\{f+2, t+1\\}$ rounds.\nExisting protocols, however, achieve either round complexity close to the optimal bound or low communication complexity, but not both simultaneously.\nElsheimy, Loss, and Papamanthou (ASIACRYPT 2024) obtain $(1+\\epsilon)f+O(1)$ rounds for any $1> \\epsilon>0$, with $O(n^4f \\kappa)$ communication. In contrast, Lenzen and Sheikholeslami (PODC 2022) achieve asymptotically optimal $O(n \\cdot t)$ communication for $t<n/3$, but with a $25f+13$ number of rounds.\n\nIn this work, we present deterministic synchronous Byzantine agreement protocols that achieve new tradeoffs between early stopping round complexity and communication. For $t<n/3$, without cryptographic setup, we obtain $f+O(\\sqrt{f\\log f})$ termination rounds with optimal $O(n\\cdot t)$ communication (here and throughout, $\\sqrt{f}$ denotes $\\sqrt{f+1}$ and $\\log f$ denotes $\\log(f+2)$, so that the bounds are well defined when $f=0$). Thus, our round complexity has the optimal leading coefficient of one, with a sublinear additive overhead. By allowing slightly higher communication, we reduce this overhead to $O(\\sqrt f)$, obtaining $f+O(\\sqrt f)$ rounds with $O(n\\cdot t+f^2\\log f)$ communication. Finally, for $t<n/2$, assuming a public key infrastructure and threshold signatures, we obtain $f+O(\\sqrt f)$ rounds with $O(n\\cdot t\\cdot\\kappa)$ bits of communication, where $\\kappa$ is the signature length.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T13:11:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T13:11:06Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2554", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2554", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T13:19:54Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2554", "title": "Concrete LDVR Attacks with Fewer Signers", "creators": ["Renas Bacho"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We improve the concrete parameters of the attacks on the low-dimensional vector representation (LDVR) problem by Rodríguez García and Tessaro (ePrint 2026/2126), whose attack on canonical evaluation points uses $5{,}020$ signers. By combining their Chinese remainder theorem construction with a generalized birthday search over many challenges, we obtain a concrete attack with $488$ signers and $173$ corruptions over the Curve25519 scalar field. In $64$ batches of $2^{25}$ challenges, the search finds solutions for six distinct challenges. We compare the counts measured at each stage of the search with predictions from an explicit heuristic model. For adversarially chosen evaluation points, we build on the binary attacks of Rodríguez García and Tessaro and give a construction that attains the optimal LDVR success probability for every oracle query budget when $2\\le n\\le253$ and $t_c=t$ in the uniform oracle model. At $228$ signers and $114$ corruptions, our implementation finds a successful subset using SHA-512 challenges after a cumulative total of $360.13$ million queries across two runs, taking $168.60$ seconds in total. We also give an explicit set of $256$ evaluation points for which an efficient subset search attack using $128$ corruptions succeeds with probability at least $51.92\\%$ per uniform challenge. For both canonical and adversarially chosen evaluation points, we analyze the query complexity and report measured and estimated running times.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T13:19:54Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T13:19:54Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2555", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2555", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T17:08:49Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2555", "title": "Post-quantum commutative group actions from oriented superspecial abelian varieties", "creators": ["Wouter Castryck", "Bogdan Adrian Dina", "Péter Kutas", "Gioella Lorenzon"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We study the cryptographic use of Shimura class group actions on superspecial principally polarized abelian varieties  equipped with a CM orientation, within the context of post-quantum cryptography. Besides giving an accessible introduction to the topic, illustrated with many examples, we provide tools for representing CM orientations through higher-dimensional isogenies and for computing the Shimura class group action in the restricted effective group action model. Here, key auxiliary results are a version of Kani's lemma \"with CM\" and a trick that often allows to halve the ambient dimension. We also give a method for finding superspecial principally polarized abelian surfaces that are oriented by a given CM order, which is extracted from an algebraic framework for studying CM orientations using the Ibukiyama-Katsura-Oort correspondence. We also analyze obstructions to transitivity of the Shimura class group action, related to the characteristic-zero notion of CM type.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T17:08:49Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T17:08:49Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2556", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2556", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T17:32:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2556", "title": "Analysis of an AI based code distinguisher", "creators": ["Quentin Lavit", "Julien Seinturier", "Pascal Véron"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Recently, DeepDistinguisher demonstrated the capability of transformer-like architectures to accurately distinguish Goppa codes from linear codes randomly generated, outperforming traditional distinguishers in certain settings.  The purpose of our research is to examine the working mechanism of the mentioned machine learning algorithm. In particular, we explore the performance of the distinguisher using saliency maps and attention visualization techniques. We first identify a low-weight-row artifact present in the random instances used during training and show that the model partially relies on this feature. \nAfter removing this artifact, the distinguisher still achieves significant accuracy, suggesting the use of more structural properties. Inspired by the constraints induced by the minimum distance of Goppa codes, we proposed a rule based on pairwise XOR operation between the rows of the generator matrix. Our experiments have shown that the predictions made by DeepDistinguisher and XOR-based rule are highly correlated especially for high-rate codes. Furthermore, when evaluated on random matrices satisfying both the minimum distance and XOR constraints, the neural distinguisher loses most of its predictive power. This suggests that transformer-based architectures exploit general combinatorial properties of a code rather than some hidden underlying algebraic structure.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T17:32:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T17:32:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2557", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2557", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T10:55:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2557", "title": "Energy Consumption of Post-Quantum Cryptography on Constrained and General-Purpose Architectures", "creators": ["Olivier Gillot", "William J. Buchanan", "Madjid G. Tehrani"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "With Q-day approaching, the transition to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) has begun, with governments across the US, UK and EU mandating migration to quantum-resistant standards. This paper benchmarks the three NIST-standardised PQC algorithms—FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA)—across key generation, signing and verification operations, measuring both computational performance and energy consumption on a range of constrained IoT-class devices, from the 32-bit Raspberry Pi 1 and Zero to the 64-bit Raspberry Pi 4, as well as commodity laptop hardware. Using the FNIRSI FNB58 USB power meter and OpenSSL 3.5, results show that ML-KEM and ML-DSA achieve energy and speed efficiency comparable to classical elliptic-curve cryptography across all tested architectures. However, SLH-DSA signing is inadvisable on constrained hardware: energy costs for SLH-DSA signing on 32-bit devices were up to 243% higher than on equivalent 64-bit hardware, making it impractical for resource-limited IoT deployments. These findings have direct implications for IoT security practitioners planning PQC migration.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T18:25:51Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T10:55:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2558", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2558", "datestamp": "2026-10-19T17:53:01Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2558", "title": "Registered ABE via Predicate Encodings, Revisited", "creators": ["Junichi Tomida"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Predicate encodings, proposed by Wee (TCC'14), are a simple framework that abstracts a variety of attribute-based encryption (ABE) schemes.\nZhu et al. showed how to apply predicate encodings to registered ABE (Reg-ABE) using the same definition as in vanilla ABE (Asiacrypt'23).\nWe provide a new definition of predicate encodings that is more suitable for registered ABE and allows us to  obtain more efficient Reg-ABE schemes than those by Zhu et al. for predicates captured by predicate encodings.\nNotably, we obtain\n\\begin{itemize}\n  \\item the first Reg-ABE scheme for (non-)zero inner product with $ O(\\log L) $-size ciphertexts,\n  \\item the first Reg-ABE scheme for conjunctions/disjunctions with $ O(\\log L) $-size ciphertexts,\n  \\item the first registered broadcast encryption scheme with $ O(\\log L) $-size ciphertexts,\n\\end{itemize}\nunder the standard $ k $-Lin assumption, where $ L $ denotes the maximum number of users.\nPrior to our work, Reg-ABE schemes for (non-)zero inner product, conjunctions, and disjunctions require $ O(\\ell\\log L) $-size ciphertexts where $ \\ell $ is the vector length or the policy size, and registered broadcast encryption schemes rely on the generic group model.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-19T17:53:01Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-19T17:53:01Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2559", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2559", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T02:50:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2559", "title": "FN-DSA on Arm Cortex-M55: Revisiting a Floating-Point Lattice Signature with Native FP64 and Helium", "creators": ["Seung-Won Lee", "Min-Joo Sim", "Min-Seo Kim", "Hwa-Jeong Seo"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "FN-DSA has the shortest signatures among NIST's post-quantum signature standards, but on microcontrollers its signing is slow because the binary64 arithmetic it specifies is emulated with integer instructions.\nPrevious speedups either change the arithmetic or the order of random sampling, so their signatures no longer match the known-answer tests (KATs) of the reference implementation, or rely on double-precision SIMD\ninstructions that microcontrollers lack.\nThe Arm Cortex-M55 has both a double-precision FPU and the M-Profile Vector Extension (MVE).\nOn this core, we present the first FN-DSA implementation that, unlike these approaches, reproduces the KATs of the reference and runs in constant time, yet is faster than the reference.\nOn MVE, we vectorize the NTTs with layer merging and the fixed-point FFT of\nkey generation with split-word Q32 arithmetic on 32-bit lanes.\nOn the FPU, bit-exact FP64 computes the FFT, LDL decomposition, split, merge and sampler of signing without changing any result, and exponent-normalized division turns the bit-by-bit divisions of key generation into a single VDIV.F64 with operand-independent latency.\nFor Keccak, vectorized bit interleaving speeds up every permutation, and request-level batching processes four independent verification requests at once; SLOTHY then reschedules our MVE and Keccak assembly.\nKey generation, signing and verification become up to 1.23x, 1.93x and 1.30x faster than the reference on the same core, and batch verification of four signatures up to 1.75x faster.\nOverall, the FPU pays off where the reference emulates an operation with many integer instructions, and MVE where it already computes with integers or fixed point.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T02:50:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T02:50:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2560", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2560", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T08:49:29Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2560", "title": "Graphs and cycles in curve-based collision walks", "creators": ["Sebastiano Boscardin", "Jolijn Cottaar", "Monika Trimoska"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "In this work, we look at collision-based attacks both for elliptic curve and isogeny problems. Our main focus is on attacks in the multi-user setting, i.e., where one tries to recover all secret keys of a large set of $L$ public keys simultaneously, in a faster way than the total time required to attack each key individually. We consider three different problems: (1) the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves, (2) the isogeny pathfinding problem on supersingular $\\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$-curves, (3) the isogeny pathfinding problem on supersingular $\\mathbb{F}_p$-curves. We first survey the existing van Oorschot and Wiener style attacks on these three problems. Then we propose versions of the pseudorandom walks that are better suited for isogeny pathfinding problems without additional restrictions. We then apply these new walks to the multi-user setting and analyse which properties we can achieve compared to the discrete logarithm case where we show that we can extract all $L$ public keys with $L$ useful collisions and without an infiltrator (a user for which we know the secret key). Specifically, for (2) we can extract $L$ public keys with approximately $L + \\log(L)$ useful collisions and no infiltrator needed. Our analysis shows however that heuristic and infiltrator-aided strategies are more efficient while enjoying practically similar gains. For (3) we can extract approximately $0.75L$ public keys with $L$ useful collisions, but with an infiltrator.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T10:49:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T08:49:29Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2561", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2561", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T11:42:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2561", "title": "SALUS: Large-Scale Homomorphic Circuit Synthesis via Logic-Aware LUT Optimization", "creators": ["Ran Mao", "Zhou Zhang", "Zian Zhao", "Zhenyu Guan", "Peng Yin", "Song Bian"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Recently, growing interests are developed in optimizing fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) circuits to enable Boolean function evaluations over ciphertexts. While existing works utilize functional bootstrapping (FBS) to efficiently evaluate logic gates, the evaluation efficiency for large-scale circuits remains limited. Recent advances introduce a fast ciphertext conversion method, making it feasible to evaluate look-up tables (LUTs) over homomorphic multiplexer operation. In this work, we propose a new circuit synthesis framework, SALUS, which automatically generates and evaluates gate-level graphs over homomorphic LUTs given an input Boolean circuit. We apply the binary decision diagram (BDD) reordering method and multi-value refresh techniques to efficiently evaluate complex LUTs. Additionally, we propose a heuristic algorithm to merge LUTs in a given circuit into multi-output LUTs. In the experiments, we examine the efficiency of SALUS using a wide range of benchmark suites, including the EPFL and ISCAS benchmark circuits. We show that SALUS achieves a maximum reduction of up to 26× in computational latency compared to state-of-the-art homomorphic circuit synthesis method. Furthermore, we evaluate real-world applications, e.g., image filtering and matrix multiplication, and achieve an average speedup of 8.6× (with a maximum speedup of 24×) compared to the FBS-based method.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T11:42:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T11:42:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2562", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2562", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T02:31:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2562", "title": "A New Approach to Reducing Modulus Requirements in Homomorphic Computation: Precision Allocation in CKKS", "creators": ["Zhaoyang Liang", "Runkun Liu", "Jingwei Fang", "Dan Ding"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) enables  computation over encrypted data subject to the prescribed security and precision requirements (allowable deviations from ideal results). Among all FHE schemes, CKKS is a representative scheme for approximate arithmetic, allowing the same operation on multiple values packed into a single RLWE ciphertext.\n\nReducing ciphertext modulus \\(Q\\) for given output precision requirements under RLWE security constraints is a central challenge in homomorphic computation. However, despite advances in plaintext and  ciphertext representations, algorithmic optimizations, and modulus management, the budget in most existing approaches remains dependent on the highest required precision and cannot reduce the baseline modulus cost to overcome encryption noise.\n\nIn this work, we make average rather than maximum precision requirements govern the modulus budget and achieve savings in the baseline cost. Under decryption correctness constraints, we make these possible by allocating arbitrary output precision among independent values and quantify the modulus savings arising from differences in their precision requirements.\n\nAs a bonus, our construction preserves the standard CKKS ciphertext format, which helps maintain compatibility with existing optimizations. And the construction inherits the IND-CPA security of CKKS without additional cryptographic assumptions. In a repeated squaring experiment, we use 67% fewer initial modulus bits and one quarter of the ring dimension of standard CKKS, while meeting the same precision and security requirements.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T12:56:59Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T02:31:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2563", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2563", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T12:59:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2563", "title": "Regular Syndrome Decoding Is Easier Than Previously Estimated", "creators": ["Jiseung Kim", "Minkyu Kim", "Changmin Lee", "Hochang Lee"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The Regular Syndrome Decoding (RSD) problem is a structured variant of classical Syndrome Decoding and underlies a growing number of efficient cryptographic constructions, including zero-knowledge protocols, pseudorandom correlation generators, and MPC-in-the-Head signatures. Although RSD is generally believed to be computationally hard, recent works have shown that algebraic attacks can outperform information-set decoding on important RSD parameter regimes.\n\nBuilding on this line of work, we revisit the concrete hardness of RSD and show that many widely used parameter sets are substantially easier to solve than previously estimated. \nThis improvement stems from a refined hybrid-algebraic attack that exposes and removes\na previously overlooked source of concrete complexity: the joint blockwise placement of zero-coordinate guesses and syndrome-based variable\neliminations. Rather than treating the two guessing stages and linear\nelimination as largely separate choices, our method coordinates them\nacross all regular blocks so that the guessing penalty is balanced while\nsufficient equations are retained for linearization. This gives a systematic\nblock-balancing principle for the entire guess–reduce–solve pipeline. \n\nWe reassess several RSD-based applications, including Ferret (CCS~2020), Wolverine (IEEE S\\&P~2021), and committed VOLE (CCS~2025). Our estimates place at least one parameter set per application below its 128-bit target, with losses approaching 67~bits. On PCG benchmarks, we improve previous best attack costs by up to 29.77 and 25.91~bits over non-binary and binary fields, respectively. Moreover, for the revised 128-bit PCG parameter sets of Liu et al. (EUROCRYPT~2024) evaluated here, estimated attack costs are all below $2^{111}$ field operations.\nThese results substantially revise the concrete-security landscape of RSD and indicate that several existing parameter choices overestimate the hardness of their underlying RSD instances.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T12:59:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T12:59:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2564", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2564", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T13:03:13Z", "status": "deleted", "url": null, "title": null, "creators": [], "subjects": [], "abstract": null, "date_submitted": null, "date_last_revised": null, "rights": null}
{"id": "2026/2565", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2565", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T13:34:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2565", "title": "Further Elaborations on the Provable Dual Attack", "creators": ["Kaveh Bashiri"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The dual attack is one of the main strategies for attacking the learning-with-errors (LWE) problem. A recent line of work aims at provable analyses of dual attacks that rely on as few heuristic assumptions as possible.\n\nWe present a provable dual attack that recovers a subvector $\\boldsymbol{s}_{\\mathrm{guess}}$ of the LWE secret, and we derive an explicit lower bound on its success probability without any heuristic assumption. Our analysis unifies the provable approaches of Pouly and Shen (EUROCRYPT 2024) and Bashiri and Wiemers (J. Math. Cryptol. 2025), and removes the very few informal assumptions left in the previous works. Inspired by Qu, Tian, Wang, and Xu (ePrint 2026/2117), the dual vectors are sampled from the sublattice spanned by the first vectors of a reduced basis. Our key ingredient is a first-moment estimate for the wrong candidates, which is based on the exact uniform distribution of some appearing cosets. This leads us to discard certain typical assumptions on shortest vectors from previous works. \n\nWe apply our results to ML-KEM, under one heuristic on its structured matrix, and improve on the first provable dual attack by $22$ to $52$ bits without any assumption on the rank of the sublattice, and by $47$ to $100$ bits ($21$ to $56$ bits compared with Qu, Tian, Wang, and Xu (ePrint 2026/2117)) if this rank is bounded as in Qu, Tian, Wang, and Xu (ePrint 2026/2117). We also apply our results to ML-DSA, and demonstrate the attack experimentally on small instances.\n\nOur results do not threaten the security of ML-KEM or ML-DSA.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T13:34:41Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T13:34:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2566", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2566", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T14:48:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2566", "title": "Fault-Induced Nonce Repetition in Threshold Lattice Signatures: A Reveal-Structure Criterion, Cross-Scheme Analysis, and Detection Boundaries", "creators": ["Yulong Meng"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Threshold ML-DSA is regarded as a deployment model that eliminates single-point key risk, and the NIST threshold call (IR 8214C) has likewise attracted many proposals. Existing security analyses, however, generally assume malicious or compromised protocol participants. For the threat of \"physical faults in the devices of honest participants,\" single-party lattice signatures have been studied systematically for over a decade, whereas threshold schemes, to our knowledge, have not yet been systematically evaluated. We show that fault-induced cross-session sample replay by one party leaks that party's share, and that mechanisms such as RNG state rollback can trigger it. In a t-of-n deployment, the attacker need only fault t devices to recover the complete signing secret, while every signature is fully valid when examined individually; the hedged nonce, commitment/session binding, and fail-closed final verification all remain untriggered. We verify the attack end to end on Mithril (ePrint 2026/013, USENIX Security 2026): two implementation versions, six (t,n) configurations, and 96/96 statistical scan groups all achieve exact recovery, with residual error identically 0 and no lattice reduction. The secret recovered solely from the coordinator-visible transcript can be used to forge a signature on the spot that passes the implementation's FIPS 204 verifier. We further elevate the attack to a class-level criterion. The attack surface is determined by the reveal structure, that is, by whether the scheme reveals per-party responses to a party visible to the attacker, rather than by the distributional properties of the nonce. Quorus's structural immunity thus comes from non-reveal and is unrelated to uniformity. TALUS can be broken via a double-spend path in which \"one-time consumption of preprocessing is skipped\". Trilithium's signing algorithm hands the Server's response share to the Client in plaintext, and [TALUS] classifies it as internally uniform (\\(I = 0\\)), making it an instance of the \"statistically immune and fault-fragile\" quadrant; the attack requires only 1 device fault. The simulator message \"(ss, sid, [z']_S)\" in the original proof, together with [Jarv26]'s verbatim copy of this algorithm, is the evidence for this determination; see Appendix D for the evidence tier. This yields two independent evaluation dimensions: the statistical axis \\(I\\) and the reproducibility axis (reveal structure). Different design levers allow the two axes to take values independently. All three quadrants already have instances: (reveal, \\(I > 0\\)), (non-reveal, \\(I = 0\\)), and (reveal, \\(I = 0\\)). Two cases lie on the anti-diagonal, [Trilithium] and [Kao26]. We design detection as two layers of transcript-level checks. The early-warning surface alarms on reveal-hash liveness and achieves 305/305 exact hits over the full corpus with zero false positives. The full-coverage surface runs the identification computation shared with the attack; within the feasible range of identification, there is no window in which the attack is usable but undetectable. §6.1 explains the difference in alarm timing. For imperfect faults, we prove the threshold law for full-key recovery \\(m^* = (\\ell-1)N+\\lceil N/K \\rceil\\) and verify it coordinate by coordinate; for ML-DSA-44 the law gives \\(768+\\lceil 256/K \\rceil\\), namely 896 at K=2 and 787 at K=14. This reveals the trade-off nature of K. All claims have undergone a tool-assisted verification workflow with three analysis paths that are independent of one another. The authors direct the workflow; §8.2 describes its execution mode and artifact disclosure.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T14:48:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T14:48:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2567", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2567", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T14:53:39Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2567", "title": "A Systematic Evaluation of Fault Attacks and Countermeasures on ML-DSA Rejection Sampling", "creators": ["Yulong Meng"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "This paper presents a systematic evaluation of fault attacks on the rejection sampling of ML-DSA (FIPS 204) and of the countermeasures proposed against them. Using the identity \\(\\mathbf{Az} - ct = \\mathbf{Ay} - c\\cdot\\mathbf{s}_2 = \\mathbf{r}\\), we prove that the quantity compared by the \"third rejection test\" of patent WO2025261784A1 is exactly \\(\\mathbf{r}_1\\), which is already produced during signing, while check 2 passing is what implies \\(\\mathbf{r}_1 = \\mathbf{w}_1\\). The third check therefore re-verifies a condition that check 2 guarantees, rather than being an independent test. We further show that the six embodiments claimed by the patent reduce to only two independent conditions, both covering only skips of the second check. An experiment with 30,000 fault injections confirms that all six embodiments detect the skip of the \\(\\mathbf{z}\\)-norm check — the route that directly recovers the signing key \\(\\mathbf{s}_1\\) — at a rate of zero. Building on this blind spot, we fully recover \\(\\mathbf{s}_1\\) against a third-check-protected implementation (all 1024 coefficients of the four polynomials) under randomized signing, the default form in FIPS 204. We then report a complete evaluation matrix over three fault models and two implementation variants, and show that the third check and sign-then-verify are complementary with neither being sufficient on its own: the latter fails entirely against the second-check skip on the reference implementation (all faulty signatures pass verification), while the cheapest embodiment of the former detects every exploitable signature, whereas against the \\(\\mathbf{z}\\)-check skip only sign-then-verify is effective. Their union covers every attack path we evaluate, and deploying either one alone leaves a complete attack path open. Overhead measurements show that this embodiment costs 0.04–0.05% of a signing on x86-64 and 0.83% on Cortex-M4, about 460–590 and 48 times less than sign-then-verify on the same platforms (22–24% and 40.0%, respectively). We therefore recommend deploying both, at a combined cost that is almost entirely sign-then-verify's.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T14:53:39Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T14:53:39Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2568", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2568", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T14:55:38Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2568", "title": "Efficient NTRU+ Implementations on Cortex-M", "creators": ["Subeen Cho", "Minjoo Sim", "Seungwon Lee", "Anupam Chattopadhyay", "Wai Kong Lee", "Hwajeong Seo"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Post-quantum cryptography on embedded devices requires implementations that perform cryptographic operations efficiently within limited computation and memory. Most lattice-based KEMs use 2-way NTTs over power-of-two cyclotomic rings, and their embedded implementations have been studied extensively. In contrast, implementations of schemes based on 3-way NTTs, which combine radix-3 and radix-2 layers, remain scarce. This work therefore presents efficient implementations of NTRU+, a KEM built on 3-way NTTs, on Arm Cortex-M0+, M3, M4, and M7. We configure the layer fusion, modular arithmetic, and instruction scheduling of the 3-way NTT for each parameter set and core. We also introduce ω-folded front layers, which compute the first two layers of the forward NTT on ternary inputs without modular reduction. Based on these techniques, we present two implementations. The speed-optimized implementation keeps operands as full polynomial arrays to prioritize execution time. The memory-optimized implementation reuses a single polynomial workspace and regenerates the required operands in pieces aligned with radix-3 blocks. On physical boards, the speed-optimized implementation reduces execution time by up to 52.43% compared with the official optimized C implementation. The memory-optimized implementation reduces peak stack usage by up to 82.60% while running faster than the official optimized C implementation in every KEM operation. A controlled NTT-replacement experiment and per-technique comparisons show that the same technique can have different effects depending on the instruction set and pipeline of each core.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T14:55:38Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T14:55:38Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2569", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2569", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T15:30:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2569", "title": "Optimal Proofs of Sequential Work", "creators": ["Krzysztof Pietrzak", "Leonid Reyzin"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "In a proof of sequential work (PoSW), introduced by Mahmoody, Moran and Vadhan [MMV'13], a verifier can be convinced that a prover performed a computation of $T$ sequential steps. Such a proof is $(\\delta, \\lambda)$-sound if a malicious prover making at most $(1-\\delta)T$ sequential steps can produce a valid proof only with  probability $2^{-\\lambda}$, even when using massive parallelism. \n\nBesides time-lock puzzles (TLPs) and verifiable delay functions (VDFs), PoSW are one of the central primitives in timed cryptography.  Unlike TLPs or VDFs, PoSW can be constructed just from hash functions, with a security proof in the random oracle model.  Existing PoSW are based on graph labeling: the prover must sequentially compute a labeling of a graph of $T$ nodes, where each node's label is the hash of  its parents' labels.\n\nThe [MMV'13] construction uses node-depth-robust graphs. A simple and much more efficient construction was later given by Cohen and Pietrzak [CP'18]. In the [CP'18] PoSW, getting $(\\delta, \\lambda)$ soundness requires transmitting $\\Omega((\\lambda\\log T)/\\delta)$ hash outputs. The underlying graph has average in-degree  $\\Theta(\\log T)$, so labeling takes $\\Theta(T\\log T)$ total hash inputs.\n\nOur first result is a lower bound: any efficient graph-labeling-based PoSW that is $(\\delta, \\lambda)$-sound requires the prover to send $\\Omega((\\lambda\\log T)/\\delta)$ labels. To prove this result, we relate PoSW soundness to a cut-depth game and bound this game using a refinement of Valiant's depth-reduction argument. This shows that [CP'18] achieves asymptotically optimal communication and verifier hash-input complexity, while leaving open whether its $\\Theta(\\log T)$ average indegree (and thus $\\Theta(T\\log T)$ prover hash-input complexity) is necessary.\n\nOur second result is a new PoSW that matches these lower bounds up to constant factors and has maximum indegree two. In particular, it reduces the honest prover's total hash-input complexity from $\\Theta(T\\log T)$ to $\\Theta(T)$ while retaining $O((\\lambda\\log T)/\\delta)$ communication and verifier hash-input complexity.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T15:30:02Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T15:30:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2570", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2570", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T16:17:23Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2570", "title": "Membership Inference in Privacy-Preserving Vector Search", "creators": ["Georg Fuchsbauer", "Carter Luck", "Adam O'Neill", "Ian Rapko"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Vector retrieval increasingly runs over sensitive embedding databases. Backend-compatible protections are desirable in such settings in that they transform the plaintext vectors while leaving the search algorithm itself unchanged. However, the protected database then leaks some geometry, that is, information about the distances between the stored vectors. We study membership-inference attacks on such leakage given a single database snapshot and known plaintexts. Our central finding is that membership privacy depends on how much geometry is revealed and on whether known plaintexts can be linked to positions in the snapshot, and that the effect of each of these depends on the other.\n\nWe first break the prior Scale-and-Perturb (SAP) scheme of Fuchsbauer et al. (FGHO, SCN 2022) with no known plaintexts. Empirically, our attack achieves advantage 0.997 on MS-MARCO. We then introduce Rotate-and-Perturb (RAP), a special case of a scheme FGHO call SAP-I and leave unanalyzed. For uniform data on the sphere, we prove perfect membership privacy with no known plaintexts. For fixed noise parameter β ∈ (0, 2], achieving constant advantage requires a number of known plaintext-ciphertext pairs at least logarithmic in the database size, provided that number is below the embedding dimension. Empirically, our attack reaches advantage 0.5 with 3 such pairs at database size 100 and 7 at 100,000 on text embeddings.\n\nWe also study two more approaches, namely ideal distance-comparison-revealing encryption (DCRE) and an encrypted HNSW index using function-hiding inner-product functional encryption. Ideal DCRE remains vulnerable to known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. On the tested MS-MARCO databases, our attack on the encrypted HNSW index requires knowing 19–32% of the database and their corresponding index vertices to reach advantage 0.5.\n\nFinally, we study augmentations to these schemes to mitigate our attacks, shuffling and secret projection. Together, they substantially increase the number of known plaintexts needed by our tested attacks on RAP and comparison-only leakage.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T16:17:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T16:17:23Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2571", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2571", "datestamp": "2026-10-30T05:41:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2571", "title": "A Spectral Theory of Local-to-Global Leakage", "creators": ["Rei Ueno"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "This paper studies how local leakages characterize the global leakage in additive secret sharing over a finite abelian group, which is a special case of linear secret sharing and side-channel masking. Our main finding is structural: local-to-global leakage is governed by two disjoint components---the magnitude of local leakage and its spectral alignment across shares, while existing literature attempted to characterize the global leakage only by local mutual information (MI). We first give an exact decomposition of leakage in additive secret sharing. The decomposition reveals a structural parameter invisible to MI, while previous literature conjectured that the local MI alone suffices to characterize global leakage. We then show that this missing parameter is indispensable: two leakage channels with identical local MI can induce exponentially different global leakage. Our exact decomposition identifies the missing structural quantity and completely characterizes this phenomenon.\n\nWe then show the separation theorem with its realizability---local MI, despite governing the classical leakage bounds, does not even determine the exponential rate at which leakage vanishes under homomorphic composition. More strongly, we establish a universal separation theorem: even when all permutation-invariant scalar measures of local leakage agree, the global leakage can exhibit exponentially different decay rates.\n\nWe further provide the characterization of the spectral alignment factor and derive its lower bound through character-order multiplicity and Möbius inversion. We then extend the framework to automorphism-weighted sharing. We establish that automorphism-weighted sharing can achieve perfect leakage cancellation with finitely many shares, even for non-trivial full-support local leakage channels. In sharp contrast, such perfect cancellation is impossible for ordinary additive sharing with non-trivial i.i.d local leakage channels and finitely many shares.\n\nConsequently, local leakage magnitudes correctly measure the average amount of local leakage, but discard the compatibility structure needed for composition. Magnitude-only bounds must optimize over structural alignments that the actual leakage channel does not realize.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T17:27:24Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-30T05:41:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2572", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2572", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T18:28:38Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2572", "title": "DISCO*: DIstributed and SCalable Oblivious Joins and Oblivious Primitives", "creators": ["Apostolos Mavrogiannakis", "Xian Wang", "Ioannis Demertzis", "Dimitrios Papadopoulos", "Minos Garofalakis"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) let clients outsource computation to untrusted clouds, but they remain vulnerable to side-channel and leakage-abuse attacks. Recent work closes this gap by combining hardware enclaves with oblivious computation, which offers strong security guarantees yet struggles to meet the performance and scalability demands of real-world deployments. In this work, we present DISCO, the first scalable, distributed, and fully oblivious database system that seamlessly combines hardware enclaves with cutting-edge oblivious primitives and novel optimizations that significantly reduce inter-server communication overheads. What distinguishes DISCO from prior work is a suite of distributed frameworks that unlock parallel computation and fundamentally shift the design paradigm of distributed oblivious systems, enabling practical deployment at scales that were unattainable with previous solutions. We provide a thorough evaluation of the performance of our system on both synthetic and real-world datasets. Our evaluation demonstrates that our design significantly reduces the gap between theory and practice, achieving 88× speedup over Jodes and 180× over SODA on non-foreign key joins with N = 2²⁵ elements. Most importantly, we report, for the first time, results for computations at the terabyte scale.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T18:28:38Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T18:28:38Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2573", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2573", "datestamp": "2026-10-20T22:18:56Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2573", "title": "Hidden parabolic subgroups of $\\mathrm{GL}_n$ over finite chain rings", "creators": ["Muhammad Imran"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We give a bounded-error quantum polynomial-time algorithm for finding hidden parabolic subgroups of $\\mathrm{GL}_n(R)$ over any effectively presented finite chain ring $R$.  We call auxiliary group elements or subgroups used to extract information through oracle queries \\emph{probes}. For chain length at least two, elementary abelian socle probes first recover the complete flag modulo the maximal ideal. When the residue field has size $q\\ge3$, we reconstruct the flag recursively, lifting rank-one terminal members one digit at a time. The intermediate digits reduce to abelian hidden subgroup problems, while the final digit is a finite-field multiple-shift problem solved using learning from subset and Fourier sampling. For $q=2$, where distinct flags can have the same stabilizer, we instead lift the conjugate parabolic subgroup through the congruence filtration. A final linear system determines it modulo normalizer directions. The algorithm outputs generators with probability at least $1-\\epsilon$ in time $\\mathrm{poly}(n,\\log|R|,\\log(1/\\epsilon))$. Consequences include $\\mathrm{GL}_n(\\mathbb{Z}/N\\mathbb{Z})$ for every $N\\ge2$ and, with an explicit maximal-order presentation, $\\mathrm{GL}_n(\\mathcal{O}_K/N\\mathcal{O}_K)$ for number fields $K$.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-20T22:18:56Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-20T22:18:56Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2574", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2574", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T02:01:19Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2574", "title": "Broadcast and Trace from Lattices: Collusion-Resistant and Publicly Traceable", "creators": ["Jeffrey Champion"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "A broadcast and trace scheme combines broadcast encryption with accountability. Specifically, broadcast encryption is augmented with an algorithm for tracing traitors within a specified set, even if the given pirate decoder is created by an arbitrary collusion of users. As in broadcast encryption, the size of the ciphertext should be sublinear in the total number of users $N$.\n\nIn this work, we generically construct collusion-resistant broadcast and trace that supports public tracing from attribute-based encryption with succinct ciphertexts and lockable obfuscation, both of which are known from the decomposed LWE assumption. Our scheme has ciphertext size $\\sqrt{N}\\cdot\\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda, \\log N)$, while the master public key and secret keys have size $\\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda, \\log N)$. Previously, collusion-resistant broadcast and trace with public tracing required pairing-based assumptions, positional witness encryption, or indistinguishability obfuscation. In particular, we provide the first construction that relies on a simple and instance-independent lattice assumption.\n\nAt the heart of our construction is a novel way to use nested lockable obfuscations, taking inspiration from the recent work of Nassar, Waters, and Wu that constructs positional witness encryption from indistinguishability obfuscation for null programs.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T02:01:19Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T02:01:19Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2575", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2575", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T07:49:57Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2575", "title": "RDK-CKKS: A Framework for Rigorous Error Analysis of CKKS Computation", "creators": ["Taeyeong Noh", "Aimad Chabounia", "Guillaume Hanrot", "Alain Passelègue"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The CKKS scheme allows approximate arithmetic on encrypted data, and has found widespread use in privacy-preserving computation. A rigorous control of its homomorphic error is critical for both precision and security guarantees. In particular, in some settings such as IND-CPA^D or threshold settings, the latter computation error should be hidden at the time of decryption. This is achieved by noise flooding techniques, which require a precise upper bound on the computational error magnitude. When dealing with discrete data and a single decryptor, this is addressed by ensuring statistical correctness, which also requires a precise error management. Yet, current approaches to CKKS error analysis provide either rigorous worst-case bounds that are far off empirical measures, or average-case bounds that rely on various heuristics and do not provide strong enough guarantees for security. \n\nIn this work, we develop a framework based on so-called randomization keys (RDKs), which are encryptions of zero injected at key-switching and rescaling steps to render the homomorphic error amenable to rigorous probabilistic analysis. Combined with tail bounds, this yields, to our knowledge, the first fully rigorous error analysis framework for CKKS computations. Our framework is modular: RDKs make the error of each elementary operation amenable to rigorous bounds, after which the error of a circuit follows by standard numerical error propagation. \n\nOur rigorous bounds are comparable to heuristic ones and closely match empirical measures, but cost additional evaluation material (RDKs) generated by the secret key holder. In the context of rigorous bootstrapping, this induces a communication overhead of 27% over the bootstrapping keys for a single evaluation, and of a further 8% for each additional evaluation. We show that, when a circuit is evaluated repeatedly, most of these keys can be reused across evaluations.\n\nAs our main application, we derive a complete and rigorous analysis of binary CKKS bootstrapping, and a full, rigorous, parameter set for the bootstrap-and-clean technique. Compared to a standard Gaussian-type heuristic approach, our parameters only require a modulus increase for bootstrapping of $\\approx 3\\%$, while providing rigorous precision estimates.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T02:14:58Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T07:49:57Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2576", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2576", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T02:37:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2576", "title": "Reverse Engineering IVXV: A Specification and Security Analysis of Estonia’s Internet Voting System", "creators": ["Tingfeng Yu", "Thomas Haines"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Estonia’s IVXV system is one of the world’s longest-running and largest-scale deployments of internet voting, yet it lacks a precise public specification of the protocol as implemented or security claims, which has left it difficult to audit independently. We address this as follows:\n\nFirst, we reverse engineer a detailed specification of IVXV as implemented—covering the setup, voting, tallying, and audit phases—comprising protocol-flow diagrams, pseudocode algorithms, and the core data structures, reconstructed from the public source code, official documentation, and configuration examples.\n\nSecond, we complement the specification with an executable TLA+ model of the setup, voting, and tally phases, which we check with TLC for basic executability and correctness and\nwhich serves as an extensible basis for modelling concrete attack scenarios.\n\nThird, using the reconstructed specification, we carry out a systematic security analysis under a broad range of threat models spanning individual verifiability, universal verifiability,\nprivacy, coercion resistance, and eligibility verifiability, and we reassess previously known attacks against the current protocol.\n\nFourth, we compare IVXV against two of the most extensively studied deployed systems, Belenios and Swiss Post, across these properties in order to situate its guarantees.\n\nFifth, we discover numerous previously unknown, vulnerabilities—spanning ballot privacy, individual verifiability, and universal verifiability, many of them arising from inconsistent validation logic across components, encoding discrepancies, and unchecked cryptographic parameters—and validate selected findings with proof-of-concept tests that exercise the real implementation.\n\nFinally, we propose concrete mitigations for the attacks we identify.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T02:37:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T02:37:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2577", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2577", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T02:48:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2577", "title": "Back to the Bits: Revisiting MAYO’s Data Representation for GPU and Tensor-Core Acceleration", "creators": ["JunHyeok Choi", "DongCheon Kim", "Seog Chung Seo"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "MAYO, a multivariate quadratic signature scheme with small public keys and signatures, is a third-round candidate in the additional signature standardization process of the National Institute of Standards and Technology. Cloud and application servers receiving many independent signing requests need to batch them on Graphics Processing Units (GPUs). MAYO's nibble-sliced representation suits CPU shuffle instructions or multiplication tables, but on GPUs it costs a memory access or several instructions per $\\mathbb{F}_{16}$ multiplication. The existing GPU implementation cuMAYO (CHES 2026) uses the second-round nibble-sliced representation and looks up a shared-memory table per $\\mathbb{F}_{16}$ multiplication. Our GPU implementation keeps all keys and intermediate values in the bitsliced representation yet matches the official Known Answer Test vectors. Its bitsliced multiply-accumulate circuit computes matrix products $32$ coefficients at a time with only word-wide AND and XOR. One thread block handles one instance; KeyGen, Sign, and Verify each run as a single kernel from the expansion of the compact key to the output; and representation conversion is confined to reading and writing specification-defined byte strings. For same-key batches, an additional tensor path decomposes $\\mathbb{F}_{16}$ matrix products into binary ones and computes the large Sign and Verify matrix products on Tensor Cores. To our knowledge, the tensor path is the first use of Tensor Cores for MAYO, and ours is the first GPU implementation of the third-round specification. On an RTX 4090, the bitsliced implementation achieves $2.75\\times$ to $6.73\\times$ higher throughput and $6.99\\times$ to $34.35\\times$ lower single-shot latency than cuMAYO for all three operations of the four parameter sets. In same-key batches, the tensor path, including key preparation, reaches $13.75\\times$ to $30.62\\times$ the throughput of cuMAYO on distinct-key batches.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T02:48:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T02:48:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2578", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2578", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T06:55:19Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2578", "title": "HAETAE on a Diet: Less Stack, Less Time on Low-End Microcontrollers", "creators": ["MinGi Kim", "YoungBeom Kim", "DongHyun Shin", "Seog Chung Seo"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "HAETAE has shorter public keys and signatures than ML-DSA, but the signing stack of its reference implementation reaches $158\\, \\mathrm{KiB}$ on Cortex-M4. The Low-Stack HAETAE implementation presented at CHES'26 brings the signing stack down to $5.7$-$5.9\\,\\mathrm{KiB}$; yet even HAETAE-2 still needs $8,718\\,\\mathrm{B}$ in a realistic IoT scenario, where the secret key and the signature buffer share the same SRAM. Gaussian regeneration further increases signing time by up to a factor 2.6 relative to the C reference. Although HAETAE's modulus $q = 64\\,513$ fits in 16 bits, signing and verification also need values modulo $2q$, so existing implementations keep 32-bit working polynomials. We store them in 16 bits and lift each coefficient to modulo $2q$ in a register only when it is consumed, and let objects with disjoint lifetimes share buffers, which lowers peak stack usage without any additional Gaussian regeneration. Exact Gaussian replay and caching method then record the acceptance decisions and partial CDT ranks of the first generation in the unused space of the signature buffer, so that the original samples are restored from the same random stream with less recomputation. For Cortex-M4, Cortex-M3, MSP430, and AVR, we further design NTT modular multiplication and butterflies that preserve 16-bit storage, and optimize the arithmetic of the FFT and the Gaussian sampler. We validate our implementation on $8\\,\\mathrm{KiB}$ hardware: a single C firmware image on the ATmega2560 runs HAETAE-2 key generation, signing with the generated key, and verification, and uses a total of $8,070\\,\\mathrm{B}$ of SRAM, including the secret key, the signature buffer, static data, and the stack. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first standardization-track PQC-DSA implementation that signs within $8\\,\\mathrm{KiB}$ of total SRAM on physical hardware. Compared with Low-Stack HAETAE on Cortex-M4, Cortex-M3, MSP430, and AVR, our implementation reduces stack usage by up to 34% and runs key generation and signing 1.18-2.51$\\times$ faster wherever Low-Stack can run them.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T03:19:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T06:55:19Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2579", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2579", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T04:55:34Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2579", "title": "Active and Passive Attacks against TPM 2.0-based Full Disk Encryption", "creators": ["Sven Freud", "Lennart Hein", "Dominik Klein"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Trusted Platform Module (TPM) 2.0-based full-disk encryption (FDE) has gained renewed importance with the rise of bring-your-own-device environments. Aside from Windows Bitlocker, which uses the TPM since the days of Windows Vista, FDE has also been recently adopted by several Linux distributions. We revisit tamper attacks against TPM 2.0-based FDE systems and analyze the security of current Windows and Linux implementations. We examine TPM 2.0 sealing mechanisms and demonstrate passive and active attacks against systems using discrete TPMs (dTPMs) connected via SPI, using a mini PC and a notebook platform as case studies. While dTPMs are highly tamper-resistant, they remain vulnerable to attacks on the communication bus. We further show that active attacks are not limited to dTPM bus interception but can also affect firmware TPMs (fTPMs). Specifically, we present a prototype attack in a virtualized QEMU environment targeting UEFI firmware rather than bus communication, impacting both Windows and modern Linux systems. These attacks enable us to break not only BitLocker-based full-disk encryption on Windows, but also all current Linux implementations, including those that utilize parameter encryption to secure the bus communication. Our findings expose weaknesses in current TPM 2.0 FDE implementations and motivate stronger specification-level protections.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T04:55:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T04:55:34Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2580", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2580", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T06:34:34Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2580", "title": "Table-Free Constant-Work BCH Decoding by Algebraic Index Elimination", "creators": ["Vincent Cheng", "Zhaohui Cheng", "Junfeng Fan", "Kaixin Xiong"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Algebraic error-correcting codes such as BCH let lattice-based key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) reduce bandwidth and the decryption-failure rate. The decoder’s input is determined jointly by the long-term secret and a ciphertext that an adversary may choose. Variable work or table accesses that reveal error positions can enable key recovery even when the KEM uses implicit rejection. Walters and Sinha Roy (WSR) gave a constant-work BCH decoder whose fixed-address realization scans the entire field per protected lookup. \n\nWe introduce algebraic index elimination, a table-free realization of WSR’s paired Berlekamp–Massey schedule in which received-word-dependent selections become fixed circuits over public addresses. We prove bounded-distance correctness through radius t and source-level trace regularity for the parameterized decoder. We instantiate the construction with length-511 subcodes of dimension k , using ( k,t ) = (384 , 14) and (320 , 22). Their implementations eliminate, respectively, 5.2 and 7.2 KiB of received-word-selected field and encoder tables required by matched fixed-address WSR baselines. On WSR’s published parameter sets, an Intel i7-13700 runs the deterministic cores 35.7–82.4 × faster than the fixed-address WSR baselines. In the identity-based lattice KEMs ANSA-IBKEM1 and ANSA-IBKEM2, decapsulation is 25.5 × and 10.9 × faster than with fixed-address WSR baselines for the same 384-dimensional subcode. Index elimination does not equalize operands. Ordinary C masks compiled to received-word-dependent branches under Apple Clang 21; a compiler-opaque primitive prevented this transformation in the audited builds. At the measured radii, scalar binaries of both codes pass the x86-64, Cortex-A76 and Cortex-M4 mean-timing screens, and the Apple M5 screens with Data Independent Timing (DIT) enabled.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T06:34:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T06:34:34Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2581", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2581", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T06:35:51Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2581", "title": "Post-Quantum Sublinear Lookup Arguments from Polynomial Preprocessing", "creators": ["Adarsh Basumata", "Chaya Ganesh", "Varun Narayanan", "Sikhar Patranabis", "Surbhi Shaw", "Nitin Singh"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Lookup arguments with sublinear prover time typically rely on bilinear pairings. The only exception is the recent work of Campanelli, Carrillo, Cascudo, Fiore, Francati, and Gennaro (ePrint 2025/238); however, they rely on general-purpose SNARKs to certify expensive preprocessing, which requires non-black-box usage of cryptographic primitives. Thus practical realizations of sublinear lookups with post-quantum security remain challenging. We develop the first plausibly post-quantum sublinear lookup arguments that avoid general-purpose SNARKs via polynomial preprocessing and a novel adaptation of proximity testing for Reed-Muller codes into the Interactive Oracle Proof (IOP) framework.\n\nOur starting point is a knowledge-sound polynomial commitment scheme (PCS) with prover-side preprocessing based on the Kedlaya-Umans framework. Rather than proving the expensive preprocessing computation inside a general-purpose SNARK, we directly certify its output using Reed-Muller proximity testing and an associated evaluation protocol. For polynomials of size $N$, our approach yields multivariate and univariate PCS with $N^{1+\\epsilon}\\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ preprocessing and only $\\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ online prover time, while retaining $\\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ proof size and verification.\n\nWe leverage this PCS to obtain a lookup argument for \\textit{static} tables of size $N$ and $k\\ll N$ lookups with $k\\cdot\\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ online prover time and $\\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ verification and proof size. We further extend the approach to \\textit{updatable} tables, obtaining $O(k(N^\\epsilon+\\mathsf{polylog}(N)))$ amortized prover time for a $k$-sized batch of reads and writes, where $\\epsilon \\in (0,1)$. We retain $\\mathsf{polylog}(N)$ proof size and verification. The IOPs underlying our lookup arguments satisfy round-by-round (knowledge) soundness, which can be compiled into plausibly post-quantum arguments in the (quantum) random oracle model with transparent setup.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T06:35:51Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T06:35:51Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2582", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2582", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T07:09:56Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2582", "title": "SoK: Design-Level Backdoors in Block Ciphers Constructions, Detection, and Key Recovery", "creators": ["Shah Fahd"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "A block cipher is trusted once it resists every published attack and its\nS-boxes pass the standard tests. A design-level backdoor turns this trust\nagainst its users. Its designer hides a structure that only they can\nexploit, and that the usual tests miss.\n\nFour such backdoors have been published, by Rijmen and Preneel, Paterson,\nBannier and Filiol, and Peyrin and Wang. Each paper shows what the hidden\nstructure gives its designer. Everyone else needs answers to two other\nquestions. Does the structure also weaken the cipher against ordinary\ncryptanalysis? Can an evaluator who holds only the specification find it?\nNeither has been answered for all four designs, so an S-box that passes\nthe usual tests is trusted by default.\n\nIn this paper we answer both questions. We place the four designs in one\ntaxonomy and in Beyne's correlation-matrix framework. We give an algorithm\nthat recovers a partition trapdoor from the S-box tables, and prove that it\nnever reports a false one and, below an explicit cap, never misses one. We\nshow that inversion and affine equivalence preserve a trapdoor, while\nextended affine and CCZ equivalence can erase it. We then attack KG-DES\n(Paterson's S-boxes in DES), BEA-1 and LowMC-M.\n\nThe answer to the first question depends on the rest of the cipher. In\nKG-DES the trapdoor makes ordinary attacks far stronger. The best\n$16$-round differential characteristic has probability $2^{-21.23}$,\nagainst $2^{-61.97}$ for DES, and a two-stage attack recovers the $56$-bit\nkey in minutes. In BEA-1 the trapdoor opens no useful trail. However, for\nevery key both ciphers act as an exact smaller cipher on the cosets, and\nfall to known-plaintext distinguishers from about $2^{16.5}$ and\n$2^{20.5}$ texts. An independent MILP model confirms every optimum it can\nprove, and shows that single characteristics put the KG-DES boomerang at\n$2^{-36.79}$ when it returns with probability $1$.\n\nThe answer to the second question depends on where the backdoor sits. Our\nalgorithm finds Paterson's trapdoor and BEA-1's four in the S-boxes that\ncarry them. Rijmen and Preneel's trapdoor needs unbalanced S-boxes, which\nlinear algebra exposes. LowMC-M's MALICIOUS backdoor sits in the linear\nlayers instead. With an ideal XOF a backdoored instance is distributed as\nan honest one, so no test of the primitive finds it. Its holder recovered\nthe key from $35$ to $409$ queries in seven full-size measurements.\n\nA deterministic trapdoor in the S-boxes therefore leaves a trace that a\nsound algorithm finds. A trapdoor in unexplained linear layers leaves none,\nand only constants derived verifiably from a public seed rule it out. We\nrecommend both as routine checks. Probabilistic trapdoors and trapdoors in\nonly some S-boxes remain open.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T07:09:56Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T07:09:56Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2583", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2583", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T07:22:27Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2583", "title": "Rounded Gaussians are Discrete Gaussians", "creators": ["Corentin Jeudy"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Many lattice-based cryptographic schemes still require sampling integers following a Gaussian-like distribution. Depending on the application, this sampling should be generic to tackle variable (and possibly large) standard deviations and centers, with a low memory footprint, easily implementable in constant-time, and with the highest throughput. Combining all these features is very challenging, as shown by the numerous works on optimizing discrete Gaussian samplers. In contrast, the rounded Gaussian (and associated samplers), formalized by Hülsing, Lange and Smeets (PKC'18), seems to satisfy these criteria, but its formal definition makes security analyses of the schemes using it more complex, thus explaining why they are rarely used in practice.\nIn this paper, we show that a small correction on the parameter $\\sigma$ of the rounded Gaussian yields a distribution that is close to a discrete Gaussian of parameter $s$. More formally, defining $\\sigma = s - 1/(24s)$ yields a Rényi divergence between the two distributions evolving as $1 + O(1/s^8)$. As a result, for mild to large parameters $s$, one can use the corrected rounded Gaussian sampler, while still analyzing security with an ideal discrete Gaussian at a very mild loss. It then readily gives a discrete Gaussian sampler that benefits from all the features of rounded Gaussian samplers.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T07:22:27Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T07:22:27Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2584", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2584", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T09:05:49Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2584", "title": "SHAKEing SLH-DSA with Non-profiled SCAs", "creators": ["Rafael Carrera Rodriguez", "Jad Zahreddine", "André Monthieu", "Aurélien Vasselle", "Pierre-Yvan Liardet"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "SLH-DSA is a hash-based digital signature algorithm, standardised by NIST as a post-quantum signature scheme. While prior work has analysed the vulnerability of its pseudorandom function (PRF) to differential side-channel analysis (SCA), no prior work has thoroughly examined this vulnerability under SHAKE as the PRF, nor recovered a full secret seed in practice. In this work, we address this gap by first analysing the differential SCA vulnerability of SLH-DSA-SHAKE, examining the inputs to the PRF and the possible selection functions for an attack. Then, based on this analysis, we propose a methodology to efficiently apply correlation power analysis (CPA) on every parameter set of SLH-DSA-SHAKE with three main steps: a strategy of averaging subtraces of the same signature to increase the signal-to-noise ratio; a partial-then-total CPA approach to reduce the complexity; and an efficient algorithm for the remaining exhaustive search to recover a full secret seed, which enables universal forgery. We then provide experimental results in simulation and on a 32-bit microcontroller. Our attack requires on average from $280$ to $559$ signatures, and in our experiments the exhaustive search completes within $45$ minutes on $72$ cores.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T09:05:49Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T09:05:49Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2585", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2585", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T10:08:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2585", "title": "Verifiable Post-Quantum TLS Handshake: Recognizing Implementation Errors of Cryptographic Verification Steps", "creators": ["Runze Zhao", "Siqi Lu", "Yijian Liu", "Zhaoxuan Li", "Kaibo Liu", "Hongbo Liu", "Qingjun Yuan", "Yongjuan Wang", "Xianhui Lu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The migration to post-quantum cryptography is becoming unavoidable for security protocols. Yet as the historical \"goto fail\" incident illustrates, deploying new primitives is not sufficient: subtle implementation bugs, especially in verification logic, can yield systems that remain fully interoperable while compromising security silently. Existing confirmation code techniques make certain errors observable, but they do not cover post-quantum signatures and provide limited protection in multi-stage handshakes.\n\nTherefore, we present a migration-oriented solution that spans both the algorithm and protocol layers. At the algorithm layer, we develop two generic confirmation-code construction frameworks for Fiat–Shamir signatures and GPV-style Hash-and-Sign signatures, instantiated with ML-DSA and Falcon. For KEMs, we further propose a protocol-friendly, KEM-level confirmation-code method, instantiated with ML-KEM, HQC, and DAWN (NTRU-based KEM). We then prove confirmation-code unpredictability for each instantiation. At the protocol layer, we design PQCD-TLS, a post-quantum TLS handshake that binds confirmation codes into chained key derivation, ensuring that any verification fault induces key mismatch and causes handshake failure. We then extend a multi-stage authenticated key-exchange model with error-injection capabilities to formalize matching correctness with implementation errors, and prove that PQCD-TLS exposes such internal errors without compromising protocol security. Our implementation evaluates 48 configurations combining confirmation code-enhanced PQC algorithms and authentication modes. Results show that handshake latency overhead remains below 1% across all tests, while turning silent verification bugs into observable handshake failures.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T10:08:45Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T10:08:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2586", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2586", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T10:19:10Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2586", "title": "Modeling Modular Multiplication for Monomial Prediction and Impossible Differentials, with Application to MSX", "creators": ["Emanuele Bellini", "Mohamed Rachidi", "Sharwan K. Tiwari"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "MSX is a recent family of lightweight block ciphers for microcontrollers, and its round function draws nonlinearity from modular addition and modular multiplication on $32$-bit words. The multiplication is the distinctive part of the design because it turns the round function into a strongly universal hash function, and from this, the designers prove ideal strong differential and linear properties. The same operation also kept MSX out of reach of automated cryptanalysis, since no exact bit-level model of a modular multiplication was available.\n\nWe give two such models for $z=(x\\cdot y)\\bmod 2^n$. Both work at the bit level and, to the best of our knowledge, both are new. The first is for monomial prediction under the three-subset division property without an unknown subset (3SDP-woU), and it assigns an exact parity to every monomial without using a truth table. The second is a deterministic truncated model for impossible differential search, and we prove that it is not merely sound but exact for two independent operands, so every incompatibility a miss-in-the-middle search reports through a multiplication is genuine.\n\nBoth properties are deterministic, so our results are exact, whereas the designers' own analysis provides bounds and estimates, with no explicit trail. Using the two models, we analyze MSX. As far as we know, this is its first independent cryptanalysis. For MSX-128 we obtain a $7$-round deterministic integral distinguisher of data complexity $2^{96}$, where a $96$-bit cube leaves $64$ of the $128$ output bits balanced, and we extend it to key recoveries on $8$ and $9$ of the $18$ rounds that recover the $256$-bit master key in about $2^{228}$ operations, improving over the MSX designers' generic yoyo key recovery attack on seven rounds. \nSearching all $16,384$ single-bit pairs at each round count, we also find $1,984$ impossible differentials at seven rounds and none at eight. Both models are implemented in the CLAASP library, so they can be used on any included primitive that uses modular multiplication.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T10:19:10Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T10:19:10Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2587", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2587", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T10:30:00Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2587", "title": "RingTrace: Model-Free Spatio-Temporal Detection and Core Attribution for Cache Side-Channels", "creators": ["Zhaoxue Zhang", "Yiwen Gao", "Yuejun Liu", "Wei Cheng", "Yongbin Zhou", "Sylvain Guilley"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "The widespread adoption of shared last-level caches in modern multi-core processors improves memory efficiency but introduces timing channels between untrusted programs. In particular, Flush+Reload serves as a high-resolution cache side channel and a fundamental data leakage mechanism in transient-execution attacks. Existing detection approaches predominantly rely on aggregate hardware performance counters, which discard spatial context, fail to locate the malicious core, and often confuse stealthy attacks with benign cache-intensive workloads. This paper addresses these gaps by proposing RingTrace, a system-level monitoring framework that synergizes core-local and uncore telemetry. We capture and normalize per-core cache misses alongside distributed slice activity across uncore CBoxes. Through Joint Spatio-Temporal Attribution (JSTA), we formulate an interpretable joint-activity matrix that captures spatial concentration and co-activity without requiring model training. In the hierarchical response, the largest entry of this matrix serves as the initial screening score, while its row sums identify a candidate core. Our approach reliably identifies victim-independent flush activity prior to secret leakage, effectively suppresses false alarms under severe concurrent memory pressure, and achieves rapid process confirmation with negligible application runtime overhead on commodity processors. This work introduces an interpretable and tamper-resilient hardware-assisted defense model, bridging local CPU execution with physical uncore traffic to provide robust protection against cache side channels.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T10:30:00Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T10:30:00Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2588", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2588", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T11:25:42Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2588", "title": "Eras MPC: Granular Preprocessing and Abort Recovery with Dynamic Committees", "creators": ["Ivan Damgard", "Bernardo David", "Rahul Satish"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "MPC with dynamic committees achieves scalability by having small committees execute each round of the computation, instead of involving all parties in the entire execution. However, achieving Guaranteed Output Delivery in efficient information theoretical protocols requires larger honest majority committees, limiting scalability. Moreover, using preprocessed correlated randomness to speed up the computation is prohibitively expensive due to the cost of transferring such randomness to parties that have not yet joined the execution.\n\nWe propose Eras MPC, a model where small dishonest majority computation committees execute one or more rounds of the computation with the help of honest majority preprocessing and checkpointing committees. The computation is carried out in \"Eras\", which are sets of shorter epochs. In the beginning of each Era's first epoch, a preprocessing committee generates correlated randomness for the computation epochs to be executed by different computation committees. In the end of an Era, checkpoint committees verify the current state of the computation, save this state if it is valid and provide the latest valid state to the next Era.\n\nWe show an Eras MPC protocol where the preprocessing is carried out using an honest majority MPC protocol to generate authenticated Beaver triples, requiring only enough rounds of interaction to perform two subsequent batches of multiplications. The computation is done via the SPDZ online phase executed in each epoch by a small dishonest majority committee. Finally, intermediate state is checkpointed by verifying the validity of wire shares and saving  wire values in $4$ rounds, each executed by a different honest majority checkpoint committee.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T11:25:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T11:25:42Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2589", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2589", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T11:50:20Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2589", "title": "Cyclic isogeny walks on genus-zero modular curves", "creators": ["Aleksei Udovenko"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Isogeny-based cryptography implementations have to navigate a large space of options for representing elliptic curves and isogenies and for the corresponding arithmetic. This work collects, completes, and organizes the set of algebraic maps and relations available when working with genus-zero modular curves $X_0(N)$, which parametrize cyclic $N$-isogenies of elliptic curves and can be represented by a single field element. This abstract notion covers many single-parameter curve models, such as Montgomery, Edwards, Jacobi quartic, Hessian curve, Deuring normal form. Such single-parameter models for the same modular curve are related by degree-1 rational maps, which limits the remaining options for improving the expressions. This representation is universal in the sense that it can be obtained from any other algebraic parametrization of such isogenies, or simply from the $j$-invariants through which the isogeny passes, away from singularities. We propose a method to derive rational maps for computing such lifting from the $j$-line to $X_0(N)$.\n\nOur main technical contribution is the definition, analysis, and computation of non-backtracking modular polynomials over these curves obtained using an extended method of Elkies. In addition to characterizing cyclic extensions of isogenies, they have many other useful properties, such as having lower degree and being sparser than other typical modular polynomials, smoother walk models (being better at distinguishing different isogenies), carrying additional isogeny of different degree along the walk. We also propose radical representations of the same relation, which sheds new light on a few existing radical isogeny formulas.\n\nWe illustrate the use of the framework by achieving more compact R1CS encodings for isogeny proofs of knowledge.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T11:50:20Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T11:50:20Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2590", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2590", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T14:14:13Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2590", "title": "Rerandomizable Garbling for Arithmetic Circuits", "creators": ["Anasuya Acharya", "Pierre Meyer", "Claudio Orlandi", "Lawrence Roy"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Rerandomizable garbling is a powerful extension of Yao’s garbled circuits that allows a garbled circuit to be refreshed without changing its functionality, while preserving privacy as long as at least one rerandomization step is honest. Existing constructions, however, are limited to Boolean circuits and incur significant communication overhead. \nIn this work, we initiate the study of rerandomizable garbling for arithmetic circuits. We present the first rerandomizable arithmetic garbling scheme, based on techniques inspired by recent advances in garbling from homomorphic secret sharing. Our construction departs fundamentally from previous approaches and achieves communication complexity $O(|\\mathbf{C}|\\log B)$ for circuits $\\mathbf{C}$ with $B$-bounded computation. Concretely, our scheme requires 17 group elements per multiplication gate, while addition gates are free. Our scheme can be instantiated under standard subgroup-indistinguishability assumptions, including the Decisional Composite Residuosity (DCR) assumption and assumptions over class groups.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T14:14:13Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T14:14:13Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2591", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2591", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T15:42:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2591", "title": "Sotto Maschera: Masking the Sota-Voce Fixed-Weight Vector Sampling", "creators": ["Ben Brooksnieder", "Dina Hesse", "Markus Krausz", "Tim Güneysu"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Sparse fixed-weight vector sampling is a highly critical primitive in several post-quantum cryptography schemes. It has also been the target of multiple side-channel attacks, demonstrating the need for robust implementations. While such implementations do exist, they are not necessarily practical in terms of runtime, and some have already been shown to be insecure. At CHES 2026, Filho et al. presented a runtime-optimized, but not side-channel protected, sparse fixed-weight vector sampling algorithm named Sota Voce. It consists of the Sota support sampler and MWSupport support-to-vector conversion, where the latter is planned to be included in the next HQC implementation. This work explores how both parts of Sota Voce can be transformed into a power side-channel protected implementation using masking gadgets for embedded devices. At the same time, we aim to preserve its competitive performance advantage over other masked implementations. By bitslicing core components of the algorithm, including sorting, merging, and compaction, we achieve high parallelism of the computation, improving the overall runtime. Moreover, we avoid slow masking conversions by masking exclusively in the Boolean domain. Thereby, our masked implementation is orders of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art, while showing no power side-channel leakage in TVLA evaluations. For instance, for HQC, we achieve a speedup of up to 45x in comparison to previous work.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T15:42:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T15:42:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2592", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2592", "datestamp": "2026-10-21T17:29:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2592", "title": "A Post Quantum Vector Commitment Scheme with Efficient Insertions and Deletions", "creators": ["Vir Pathak", "Sushmita Ruj"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Vector Commitments (VCs) are a cryptographic primitive that allows users to commit to a tuple and later provide proofs about entries of the committed tuple. Literature on VCs provides many secure constructions with properties attractive for decentralized applications. These include fast commitment/proof update algorithms after a value in the committed vector changes, algorithms to aggregate position proofs, generating proofs for subvectors, commitment hiding, and many more. However, these works assume a static setting, where only vector values change and the length of the committed vector never changes. We initiate the study of designing VCs which support efficient updates to commitments and proofs after a change in vector length occurs (i.e. an insertion or a deletion of a vector value at an \\textit{arbitrary} position). In order to construct such a primitive, we formalize a VC framework implicitly considered in VC based verifiable decentralized storage constructions. Parties control a subset of positions in the committed vector. A proof for an inserted vector value at a given position may only be generated via participation from enough honest parties. We call such primitives \\textit{Multiparty Dynamic Vector Commitments}. Our work provides formal definitions for multiparty dynamic VC functionality and security. In particular, standard VC binding does not extend to our dynamic setting. This motivates us to define the \\textit{dynamic multiparty binding} security notion. We also comment on how multiparty dynamic VCs can be applied to extend existing VC based instantiations of verifiable storage. Finally, we provide a vector commitment construction and show that it possesses multiparty dynamic binding under standard lattice assumptions.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-21T17:29:02Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-21T17:29:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2593", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2593", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T04:22:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2593", "title": "Efficient Laconic Oblivious Transfer with Malicious Security", "creators": ["Yijian Zhang", "Zuoxia Yu", "Rupeng Yang", "Willy Susilo"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Laconic Oblivious Transfer (OT) enables a receiver to compress a large database into a short digest, allowing a sender to generate a succinct ciphertext that reveals only a single indexed message. While prior works achieve efficient constructions in the semi-honest model, known solutions for malicious security rely on inherently heavy non-black-box techniques, such as garbled circuits or succinct arguments, resulting in impractical schemes.\n\nIn this work, we present the first construction of maliciously secure laconic OT that makes fully black-box use of its underlying primitives. Our construction is based on a simple and widely used paradigm combining vector commitments with witness encryption, previously known to yield efficient semi-honest protocols. We show that this approach can in fact achieve malicious security by introducing two minimal yet powerful enhancements: equivocal vector commitments and maliciously secure witness encryption. We prove that these properties suffice to obtain laconic OT with security against malicious senders in the universal composability model and against malicious receivers in the context model.\n\nWe instantiate our framework from standard assumptions, including LWE and bilinear Diffie-Hellman variants, obtaining schemes in the standard model. Notably, our constructions avoid heavy non-black-box tools mentioned before, and therefore achieve efficiency comparable to the state-of-the-art black-box constructions with merely semi-honest security. In particular, in certain settings, we obtain malicious security at essentially no additional asymptotic cost.\n\nOur results resolve a central question on the feasibility of practical, maliciously secure laconic OT, and provide a unifying pathway for efficiently achieving malicious security in laconic cryptography.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T04:22:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T04:22:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2594", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2594", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T04:27:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2594", "title": "Registered Functional Encryption for Circuits with Dynamic Bounded Collusion", "creators": ["Yijian Zhang", "Rupeng Yang", "Zuoxia Yu", "Willy Susilo"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Registered Functional Encryption (Reg-FE) eliminates the key escrow issue in traditional functional encryption by allowing users to generate their own public/secret keys without the help of a central authority. The public key is then registered to the system along with a function, and all the registered public keys will be aggregated to a compact master public key by a transparent key curator. Messages are encrypted under the master public key, and users can learn functions of encrypted data from the ciphertext using their own secret keys.\n\nPrior constructions of Reg-FE either become insecure when more than one malicious users collude or require the heavy machinery of indistinguishability obfuscation. In this work, we construct the first collusion-resistant Reg-FE without obfuscations. The schemes are secure if the number of colluded users is bounded, and the collusion bound can be either a global parameter or specified by the encryption algorithm dynamically. In both settings, we provide generic constructions of Reg-FE from registered attribute-based encryption and instantiate them from either the standard $k$-Lin assumption or the succinct LWE assumption.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T04:27:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T04:27:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2595", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2595", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T05:48:01Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2595", "title": "Getting to the right root: radical isogenies of every degree", "creators": ["Thomas Decru"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Class group actions on supersingular elliptic curves over $\\mathbb F_p$ as in CSIDH are typically evaluated as long chains of isogenies of small prime degree. Radical isogeny formulae compute such chains using a single $N$th root per step, without sampling torsion points. Compact formulae of linear size had been conjectured for all odd $N$. We prove a corrected version of these formulae for every $N\\ge4$, odd and even, over every field of characteristic coprime to $2N$. In our formulation, every building block is a twisted sum of a discrete Kronecker function over $\\mathbb Z/N\\mathbb Z$, and the formulae follow from a distribution relation for the Kronecker theta function.\n\nFor even $N$, the $N$th root is only determined up to sign over $\\mathbb F_p$, and the sign decides whether the walk stays on the surface of the $2$-isogeny volcano. We show that the radical times a $2$-torsion coordinate of the next curve is a square, which yields the horizontal choice for all even $N$; previously this was only known for $N\\le14$. Algorithmically, one radical step costs about $12.5N$ multiplications and one exponentiation, without inversions. For horizontal $2$-isogeny walks, radical $2^m$-isogenies with $m\\in\\{5,6,7\\}$ are optimal for primes of $512$ to $4096$ bits. Finally, we show how to evaluate radical isogenies on points. As a consequence, a class group action can be computed from two given points, one on the curve and one on its quadratic twist, without ever sampling torsion points.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T05:48:01Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T05:48:01Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2596", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2596", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T09:14:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2596", "title": "ANNULAR: Post-Quantum Private Transactions from Isogenies with Recursive Batch Verification", "creators": ["Dustin Ray"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "ANNULAR is a shielded pool built on isogeny-based primitives. Notes are committed in a Merkle tree and spent by nullifier with hidden amounts, following the structure of Zcash's Sapling, but every primitive is post-quantum: spends are authorised by the prime-degree PRISM signature of Basso et al., note ciphertexts are keyed by the MIKE non-interactive key exchange, and each transaction carries a STARK proved natively over the isogeny field. The transaction proofs of a block are then folded into a single recursive proof. A ledger need record and verify only this one proof, 426 KB in 15 ms, whatever the batch holds, and check each transaction's two signatures alongside it. A transaction's body is the size of Sapling's at the same memo length (2,685 bytes against 2,756 with a 512-byte memo); its share of the batch proof adds under 500 bytes.\n\nA move to post-quantum primitives is generally expected to raise a pool's operating cost. We argue that the post-quantum change and the scaling change are complementary: with a STARK as the proof system, proofs fold, and with isogeny keys, the per-transaction data remains small. The cost moves to the sender, whose proof takes 1.4 s on sixteen cores, and to one aggregator per batch, which we measure: 1,248 transactions in 99 s on one GPU. Each proof in the tree carries 100 bits of round-by-round soundness and the batch about 90 under a union bound; under Fiat–Shamir that is the work an adversary needs. The constraints of the leaf circuit are proven in Lean 4 to encode the spend statement, while the soundness of the STARK itself rests on a paper argument. The scheme's claims rest on the signature's existential unforgeability; its strong unforgeability, argued by the construction's authors and not yet proved, is not relied on.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T09:14:45Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T09:14:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2597", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2597", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T10:58:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2597", "title": "The Good, the Bad, and the Noisy: A Systematic Analysis of Ring-Oscillator-Based Noise Generators", "creators": ["Florian Stolz", "Dina Hesse", "Julius Hermelink", "Tim Güneysu", "Elisabeth Oswald"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Hiding countermeasures, alongside masking, play an important role in modern hardware security for protecting against side-channel attacks.  Additive noise generators are one such hiding countermeasure.  They increase the noise, thereby lowering the signal-to-noise ratio and, simultaneously, amplifying the effectiveness of masking countermeasures.  Among the different design options for additive noise generators, ring-oscillator-based designs feature regularly in scientific publications.  These existing works not only differ in their designs, but also in their evaluation methods; therefore, they do not permit fair comparisons or enable systematic evaluations.  Thus, it is currently not possible to design ring-oscillators for noise generation in an informed and tailored way.\n\nIn this paper, we address this lack of systematic comparisons of existing designs, and discuss the possibility of filtering out the generated noise and further limitations of ring-oscillator-based noise generators. We find that many existing designs do not consider the need to amplify the output signal or the risk of filtering. As a consequence, the existing designs do not sufficiently lower the signal-to-noise ratio in our experiments.  However, using these results, we provide a guideline for tailoring and configuring ring-oscillators so that they efficiently add noise in the desired frequency spectrum.  This includes deciding on the inverter chain length, the amplification of the output, and the randomization of the output frequency.   Finally, we apply this methodology to build a tailored ring-oscillator-based noise generator for an exemplary AES implementation and find that it significantly outperforms existing ring-oscillator-based designs.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T10:58:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T10:58:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2598", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2598", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T11:37:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2598", "title": "The Distributed Producer-Consumer Model Is All You Need: A Compiler for Asynchronous BFT", "creators": ["Liang Zhang", "Binyang Hou", "Zhengxuan Guo", "Xiaohai Dai", "Haibin Kan", "Jiheng Zhang", "Moti Yung"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Building an Asynchronous Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) protocol requires establishing payload availability with total order despite Byzantine faults and arbitrarily delayed messages. Although many BFT systems separate payload dissemination from agreement, they often couple their composition to protocol-specific selection or scheduling mechanisms. We present the Distributed Producer-Consumer Model (DPCM), an event-driven abstraction that separates payload-specific certified availability from payload-oblivious binary finalization. We prove that DPCM compiles any producer–consumer pair satisfying interfaces specified herein into an asynchronous BFT object log. DPCM batch-finalizes certified heights, deterministically refining failed batches until each height yields a normal or evidence-backed dummy entry. We instantiate DPCM as Octopus, which combines parallel consistent broadcast producers with batched asynchronous binary agreement (ABA).  To achieve performance advantages, Octopus lets producers certify blocks without waiting for consumer decisions and keeps payload recovery off the agreement path. One ABA optimistically finalizes multiple consecutive producer columns, while failures trigger parallel row-wise refinement with logarithmic bisection depth. Across an eight-region WAN with $n\\in\\{8,16,32\\}$ and 2200-transaction blocks, Octopus remains within 6.5% of Dumbo-NG's (ACM CCS'22) fault-free throughput. With the maximum tested number of silent faulty parties, it outperforms Dumbo-NG by 25.9% and 18.7% at $n=8$ and $n=16$, respectively, and remains within 1% at $n=32$. At $n=16$ and $n=32$, Dumbo-NG's latency is 1.9--2.5$\\times$ that of Octopus. Across all evaluated settings, Octopus achieves 2.9--16.8$\\times$ the throughput of Alea-BFT (USENIX NSDI'24), whose latency is 2.4--15.2$\\times$ that of Octopus.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T11:37:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T11:37:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2599", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2599", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T15:40:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2599", "title": "Linear Cryptanalysis of TFHE-Friendly Cipher FRAST in the Average Key Setting", "creators": ["Xingwei Ren", "Zhenyu Xiong", "Bo Xu", "Yongqiang Li", "Mingsheng Wang"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "In the average key setting, a linear attack of Bak et al. on the TFHE-friendly stream cipher FRAST let wrong guesses pass, which they left as an open problem. The S-boxes of FRAST are public and random for every keystream block. For the mask on the least significant bit, we show that key differences fall into five indistinguishable classes per round. The filter of Bak et al. gives some wrong classes of the right parity a nonzero expected score. We compute the trail correlation exactly through the real cipher and bound the success of our statistic for every fixed master key. We bound its false alarms for a fixed master key with the last round kept and no filter, and for every attack against an ideal keystream.\n\nWith known XOF inputs, our algorithm Contract recovered the classes of a branch pair of 15 rounds and the master key of ten rounds. A cost model gives class recovery for every sampled key at 26 rounds with known inputs and for a third at 38 rounds with chosen inputs. In the accounting of Bak et al., it reaches full FRAST on weak master keys of density $2^{-11.8}$ to $2^{-5.4}$ within the claimed security. A distinguisher of full FRAST has a proved advantage on these keys, and its time over the advantage stays below the claimed security as well. Independent branch S-boxes remove the cheap classes at a cost in TFHE.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T15:40:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T15:40:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2600", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2600", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T16:09:48Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2600", "title": "High-Precision Bootstrapping for GCKKS", "creators": ["Shihe Ma", "Jiaming Liu", "Anyu Wang", "Xiaoyun Wang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Generalized CKKS (GCKKS) trades slot count for reduced modulus consumption in high-precision approximate arithmetic. \nHowever, designing a GCKKS bootstrapping algorithm with reduced modulus consumption throughout its computation remains a challenging problem.\nWe construct high-precision bootstrapping for GCKKS using low-precision overflow extraction followed by iterative precision enhancement. \nOur main ingredient is a ciphertext-conversion framework for changing the decryption factor and slot count without requiring the factors to be units. \nA slot-aware analysis bounds unused-slot magnitudes proportionally to the corresponding evaluations of the decryption factor, which is essential to ensure the unused-slot values remain well-bounded after conversion. \nWe combine precision doubling with ciphertext splitting and develop a joint evaluation procedure that produces two error-cleaned outputs at the cost of only one evaluation of the cleaning polynomial. \nWe also give a useful-slot-preserving conversion from CKKS to GCKKS that simultaneously resets unused slots through component-wise re-encoding. \nUnderlying these constructions, we also improve the construction of the decryption factors by searching directly in the canonical embedding and obtain depth-free conjugation with non-unit factors. For target encoding precision $p$ and $2N/k$ useful slots in a ring of dimension $N$, the precision-dependent stages of the bootstrapping use $O(k)$ homomorphic operations and consume $O((p/k)\\log k)$ modulus bits.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T16:09:48Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T16:09:48Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2601", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2601", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T16:48:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2601", "title": "Integer Coordinate Families and Threshold RSA Signatures for Any Prime Exponent", "creators": ["Shivansh Jaiswal", "Somitra Sanadhya"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "At CT-RSA 2026, Ng and Lau introduced $(t,n)$-integer coordinate families for threshold RSA signatures with $e=3$, and found some families by heuristic search for $2\\le t \\le n \\le 9$. They asked whether such families always exist and, if so, can they be constructed efficiently. We answer both of these questions positively. We prove that a $(t,n)$-integer coordinate family is also a $(t+1,n)$-integer coordinate family. We construct such families for $t=2$, and $2\\le n  < 19$, using a polynomial time algorithm in $n$ and its output bit length. Answering another question raised in the Ng-Lau work, we prove super-polynomial lower bounds on coordinates of pairwise families. We also find the minimum families for $n \\le 9$. \n\nNg and Lau proposed a threshold signature scheme based on integer coordinate families. We show that the Ng-Lau scheme admits trivial forgeries, and has a flawed proof. We give a repaired scheme $\\mathrm{PiIC}$ which does not suffer from these issues. Finally, we propose an integer secret-sharing scheme $\\mathrm{PiZ}$ that works for every prime $e$ and every $(t,n)$, without relying on any special coordinate family. We prove that both the schemes $\\mathrm{PiIC}$ and $\\mathrm{PiZ}$ are TS-UF-CMA secure under the standard RSA assumption.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T16:48:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T16:48:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2602", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2602", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T18:20:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2602", "title": "A Probabilistic Extension of the Division Property: Integral Distinguishers with Key-Independent Bounds", "creators": ["Jules Baudrin", "Christina Boura", "Patrick Derbez", "Gregor Leander", "Yevhen Perehuda"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Classical integral cryptanalysis relies on zero-sum properties that, for every key, hold with probability one. Existing arguments against such deterministic integrals, based on the division property and its algebraic variants, only exclude this extreme case: once the zero-sum probability falls below one, they say nothing about its actual value, nor about a probabilistic bias that could still be exploited. We develop a tool combining MILP-based trail search with a recursive evaluation of assignments to the constant inputs. It estimates the probability that no valid trail remains and uses an additional heuristic to predict the zero-sum probability. Applying this tool to PRESENT and GIFT, we obtain probabilistic integral distinguishers for 6 to 9 rounds, including 6- and 7-round PRESENT distinguishers using $2^4$ and $2^{12}$ plaintexts per structure, respectively. For the ASCON permutation, we obtain 4- and 5-round distinguishers using as few as $2$ and $2^{12}$ inputs per structure. We further explain algebraically the large bias of the 6-round PRESENT distinguisher, showing how the S-box and bit permutation restrict the way active variables combine. Finally, we show how these distinguishers can be used for key recovery, reducing both the data and time complexities compared to their deterministic variants for PRESENT and GIFT-64.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T18:20:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T18:20:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2603", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2603", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T18:51:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2603", "title": "PPAD Hardness from SIS", "creators": ["Arka Rai Choudhuri"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Understanding the hardness of the complexity class PPAD is an important question in complexity theory given that it contains problems such as computing a Nash equilibrium. Evidence of hardness, however, has come primarily from cryptography, through a long line of work. Most recently, Chen, Freitag, Jin and Wichs (STOC 2025) based the hardness of PPAD on the polynomial hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem, together with a fine-grained average-case hardness assumption.\n\nIn this work, we base the hardness of PPAD on a different lattice problem, the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem, which, unlike the assumptions underlying prior work, is not known to imply public-key encryption. Specifically, we show that PPAD is hard on average assuming either:\n\n(i) polynomially hard SIS with a quasi-polynomial norm bound and a fine-grained average-case hardness assumption; or\n\n(ii) subexponentially hard SIS alone.\n\nOur main technical contribution is a succinct, incrementally updatable proof system for a class of exponentially large circuits with short descriptions. Building on the work of Wee (CRYPTO 2025) for succinct proof systems for circuits from SIS, we show how to make such proof systems satisfy these properties while preserving the unambiguity guarantee of the underlying scheme: it is hard to find two distinct accepted states for the same computation and time. Together, these are crucial for our PPAD hardness reductions.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T18:51:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T18:51:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2604", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2604", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T19:25:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2604", "title": "Balsamic: One-round Threshold UOV from GPU-Accelerated FHE", "creators": ["Jaehyung Kim", "Charles Gouert", "Jean-Luc Watson", "G. Edward Suh"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Universal thresholdizers offer one-round threshold signatures, but require evaluating an entire signer under fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). We present Balsamic, a complete homomorphic Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar (UOV) signer and its application to one-round threshold UOV signature. UOV's short salted target hash shifts the encrypted workload to finite-field linear solving, which we integrate with coin derivation and hashing in a packed discrete-CKKS circuit. Our paired-pivot solver selects both pivots before first-pivot normalization, then applies their coupled update with one inversion stage per pair and cubic field work. Pivot-success certificates enable encrypted retry selection without residual evaluation. In 2-out-of-3 semihonest threshold UOV signing, each partial signing (online) takes $10.7$ seconds on NVIDIA RTX 6000 Ada and $7.77$ seconds on NVIDIA GB300, with $5.25$ MB per response. These measurements demonstrate that complete homomorphic signing can provide the computational core of one-round threshold signatures without intermediate openings or per-signature interactive preprocessing.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T19:25:41Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T19:25:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2605", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2605", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T20:49:23Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2605", "title": "Mímir: A Stateless Private Search Engine", "creators": ["Gökberk Erdoğan", "Emma Munisamy", "Kamil Kluczniak"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Private search engines allow a user to retrieve documents from a public database that are similar to a text query. \nOur cryptographic protocol Mímir employs state-of-the-art homomorphic ciphertext switching techniques to realize the first stateless semantic private search engine for highly dynamic databases. \nThe security of Mímir relies on (Ring) Learning with Errors.\nMímir requires no offline communication, and it trades higher but highly parallelizable server computation for low per-query communication.\nWhen the database may change between queries, Mímir matches Tiptoe's search quality with 84$\\times$ less per-query communication (0.24 MiB).\nAt Tiptoe's per-query communication, it reaches 64$\\%$ instead of 36$\\%$ of non-private search quality and is 4.2$\\times$ faster (0.87s on a single multithreaded machine).\nAgainst PACMANN, Mímir improves search quality from 76$\\%$ to 81$\\%$ of non-private with 72$\\%$ of its per-query communication and a 9.54 MiB instead of 2.68 GiB one-time cost, but is 2.1$\\times$ slower.\nMímir can achieve 59$\\%$ of the non-private search quality with 8.13 MiB of per-query communication and 0.77s of total latency. This matches PACMANN's latency at a 7.6$\\times$ smaller per-query communication, and outperforms Tiptoe in all three metrics.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T20:49:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T20:49:23Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2606", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2606", "datestamp": "2026-10-22T21:16:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2606", "title": "On the $s$-projected Goppa Codes and their Application to the Interactive Oracle Proofs of Proximity", "creators": ["Abhraneel Dutta", "Veronika Kuchta", "Edoardo Persichetti"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Error-correcting codes are a useful tool in cryptography, being used both to design schemes whose hardness relies on coding theory problems (the area typically known as code-based cryptography) and as a building block in other contexts, such as proof systems and associated cryptographic argument systems. Among all codes used in cryptography, Goppa codes stand out, notably in the well-known McEliece encryption scheme, where they have withstood the test of time as one of very few classes of codes to be considered secure for over 40 years.\n\nTherefore, a natural question is whether Goppa codes can also be used in the construction of proof systems or cryptographic argument systems.\n\nIn the context of probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs), codes are used to transform proofs into a format that requires only a constant number of queries for verification. This efficiency is often achieved using low-degree polynomial codes, which enable the verifier to check consistency through interpolation, ensuring correctness with minimal effort. This application underscores the importance of good codes in enhancing the robustness and verifiability of proof systems.\n\nGiven their critical role, we take a closer look at how error-correcting codes are used in proof systems to find a new way of obtaining an interactive oracle proof system of proximity (IOPP) from Goppa codes.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-22T21:16:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-22T21:16:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2607", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2607", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T17:38:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2607", "title": "Quantum Cryptomania with Classical Communication without One-Way Functions", "creators": ["Mohammed Barhoush", "Amit Behera"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "In classical cryptography, one-way functions are necessary for most of cryptography. In the quantum world, however, Kretschmer at TQC'21 and subsequent works have demonstrated that quantum versions of various primitives in minicrypt, such as signatures and private-key encryption, do not require quantum-computable one-way functions (qOWFs). However, the question of the necessity of qOWFs for primitives in Cryptomania like public-key encryption with classical public-keys and ciphertexts (qPKE) has remained open.\n\nWe provide a comprehensive picture of the relationship between qPKE and qOWF. First, our main result is a black-box separation between qOWFs and qPKE. In particular, we show that relative to a unitary, real, and self-inverse oracle, there exists a qPKE scheme (with classical keys and ciphertexts), but qOWFs do not exist. Further, our oracles admit a point-function obfuscation construction, thus ruling out black-box construction of qOWF from point function obfuscations.\n\nOn the positive side, we construct qPKE from quantum indistinguishability obfuscation for quantum circuits with classical obfuscated descriptions and efficiently verifiable one-way puzzles, which is known to be a potentially weaker assumption than qOWFs, due to an existing black-box separation. Our construction is the quantum analog of the classical construction of PKE from one-way functions and indistinguishability obfuscation in the quantum computation with classical communication (QCCC) setting.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T02:06:40Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T17:38:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2608", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2608", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T02:31:25Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2608", "title": "Pairwise Independence of Ten-Round AES", "creators": ["Zhongfeng Niu", "Kai Hu"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We prove that ten rounds of \\AES{} with independent and uniform random round keys are $\\varepsilon_{10}$-close to pairwise independent, with\n\\[\n \\varepsilon_{10}\\leq\\frac{3017}{2^{141}}<2^{-129}.\n\\]\nFor every two distinct plaintexts, the joint ciphertext distribution is therefore within this statistical distance of the uniform distribution on ordered pairs of distinct ciphertexts. The same sampled key tuple is used for both encryptions. The construction retains the \\AES{} round transformations, including the omission of MixColumns in the final round, with input and output whitening. Let $E_{10}$ denote this random permutation and $\\Omega$ the set of nonzero differences. We establish the result through the induced one-norm bound $\\norm{\\Dten-U}_1\\leq3017/2^{140}$ on its averaged difference-distribution matrix restricted to $\\Omega$, where $U$ projects onto the uniform distribution on $\\Omega$. The proof groups the ten rounds into five superbox layers and decomposes the deviation from uniformity into fourteen orthogonal subspaces according to the number of active words and residual factors. Local Gram moments and MDS code constraints control the dependencies between word differences. Bounds for the distributions produced by the first rounds preserve their common source variables, while joint estimates for the last four rounds retain the constraints across two linear layers. The final conversion to statistical distance uses the support size of each component. Exact rational evaluation of the resulting finite recurrence establishes the stated bound.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T02:31:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T02:31:25Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2609", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2609", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T03:44:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2609", "title": "SoK: Optimization Tools for the Hydra Multiplayer Channel", "creators": ["Maxim Jourenko", "Mario Larangeira"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Blockchain technology allows parties to use a consensus protocol to add transactions and data to a decentralized ledger that are immutable. However, the amount of transactions that can be processed within a consensus protocol and thus added to the ledger within a given time frame is limited. This is a scalability issue. Layer-2 protocols are a class of approaches that process transactions off-chain, i.e. without involvement of the consensus protocol, but allow usage of the consensus protocol as a backup for security. This potentially reduces the processing of $n\\in\\mathbb{N}$ transactions to only $\\mathcal{O}(1)$ transactions being committed to the ledger. The basic building blocks of Layer 2 protocols are Payment Channels, whereas newer protocols as Hydra (FC'21) allow for multi-party channels that are not limited to payments but can execute smart contracts, i.e. program code. There has been substantial research proposing tools and improvements to Layer 2 protocols, but most assume the original two party Payment Channel design. This makes it unclear to what degree existing techniques can be utilized with Hydra style multi-party channels. This work (1) presents a survey of such such existing two party channel protocols and tools built on top of them. We use a didactic approach with a focus on explaining their core ideas. (2) This work identifies uses cases for which novel protocols for Hydra should be developed. (3) This work analyzes open problems for Hydra, lists relevant related work and proposes which existing tools can be used to address them or serve as a starting point for further research.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T03:44:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T03:44:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2610", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2610", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T09:37:27Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2610", "title": "A Crypto-Agile Mixed-Radix NTT Accelerator for Negacyclic and Trinomial Rings", "creators": ["JaeSeok Lee", "DongHyun Shin", "YoungBeom Kim", "Seog Chung Seo"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Hardware accelerators for lattice-based post-quantum cryptography (PQC) have largely converged on the radix-2 number-theoretic transform (NTT). The spectrum of standards that crypto-agility must accommodate, however, extends beyond NIST. In response to advances in cryptanalysis and to reduce the attack surface, national authorities are standardizing or recommending lattice-based algorithms with alternative algebraic structures, as well as schemes built on entirely different primitives. For instance, NTRU+, selected in the Korean PQC competition and currently undergoing standardization, is defined over a trinomial ring whose degree is divisible by three and thus requires a mixed-radix NTT comprising both radix-2 and radix-3 layers, whereas SMAUG-T employs an NTT-unfriendly modulus. Support for heterogeneous algebraic structures is therefore no longer optional but a prerequisite for crypto-agile design; existing radix-2-centric accelerators, however, fail to meet this requirement. In this paper, we present a crypto-agile mixed-radix NTT accelerator that performs transforms over both negacyclic and trinomial rings on a single datapath. Our contributions are threefold. First, we design a unified butterfly unit that integrates two parallel radix-2 butterflies, one radix-3 butterfly, and the trinomial transform on shared arithmetic resources, in which a generic 17-bit Montgomery path and an ML-DSA-specific 23-bit reduction path share the same two DSPs. Second, we propose a conflict-free memory mapping that guarantees in-place parallel access across all mixed-radix layers with a single 1-bit bank-selection function, namely address parity for radix-2 and a fixed address bit for radix-3, and requires neither mapping tables, nor coefficient reordering, nor additional BRAMs. Third, we introduce a generalized modular constant division that combines the multiple alignment of Montgomery reduction with the quotient estimation of Barrett reduction to perform the $3^{-1}$ scaling of the radix-3 inverse NTT without any DSP. Implemented on an Artix-7 FPGA, the proposed core supports all security levels of ML-KEM, ML-DSA, HAETAE, SMAUG-T, and NTRU+ using 5,279 LUTs, 4 DSPs, and 9 BRAMs at 141.5~MHz. For NTRU+, it achieves a $4.1$--$13.0\\times$ improvement in area-time product (ATP) over approaches that resort to radix-2-only cores via degree lifting, and new moduli of up to 17 bits can be integrated at the cost of fewer than 20 LUTs.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T09:37:27Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T09:37:27Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2611", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2611", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T00:13:00Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2611", "title": "For Thirty Pieces of Silver: Overcoming Non-IID via ZKP Sample-Level Auditing and Forcing Attackers into Traitors in Federated Learning", "creators": ["Jinghao Zhao", "Hongwei Yang", "Bobo Wang", "Meng Hao", "Hui He", "Weizhe Zhang"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "As a privacy-preserving distributed learning paradigm, federated learning faces severe security threats, especially data poisoning, gradient tampering, distributed attacks, and adaptive attacks. Existing gradient-based detection methods encounter three major bottlenecks in practical applications. First, they cannot distinguish between benign and malicious gradients under distributed attacks in non-IID scenarios. Second, defenders lack prior knowledge of trigger patterns. Third, attackers can launch adaptive attacks against these defense mechanisms. To address these challenges, we propose a novel defense paradigm. This paradigm shifts away from gradient detection, instead leveraging zero-knowledge proofs to conduct sample-level inspections on the local datasets of clients, eliminating the defense degradation caused by distributed attacks under non-IID settings. Then, through a staking mechanism, attackers are forced to train on discovered malicious samples with flipped labels, generating counter-gradients to neutralize hidden malicious samples, achieving targeted backdoor removal without requiring any prior knowledge of backdoor features. Furthermore, through zero-knowledge proof commitments, training gradients must be generated based on the same locked data. This prevents dynamic adaptive attacks based on reference model parameters and precludes gradient tampering. Experimental results demonstrate that under the highly non-IID setting of $\\text{Dir}(0.1)$, our proposed scheme successfully defends against distributed backdoor attacks and edge-case attacks on CIFAR-10, suppressing the attack success rate to below $6\\%$. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework to achieve such defense results.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T10:29:01Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T00:13:00Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2612", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2612", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T10:49:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2612", "title": "Tritone: Pairwise Garbled Disputes for Multi-Party Proof Verification on Bitcoin", "creators": ["Oleksii Avramenko", "Alessandro Baccarini", "Torben Poguntke"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Bitcoin Script lacks native pairing operations for efficient direct verification of Groth16 proofs. Conventional federated bridges instead authorize withdrawals through a signing quorum, whose collusion can release funds without valid evidence. We present the Tritone protocol, which lets Bitcoin enforce the outcome of verifying a Groth16 proof for an NP relation fixed in a one-time trusted setup, with the locked funds secure as long as one of a fixed set of $N$ operators is honest. Verification is optimistic and off-chain, and every transaction is standard under current relay policy, so Tritone runs on Bitcoin today without consensus changes.\n\nTritone generalizes the two-party BABE protocol to a fixed committee of $N$ operators, with one dispute instance per ordered pair. Cut-and-choose protects against malicious garblers, while Feldman verifiable secret sharing correlates input keys across candidates. Our new Lamport-adaptor gadget forces a challenging verifier to disclose the shares selected by the prover's committed proof element, providing the transaction-level binding left unspecified by BABE. A single set of disclosed shares then unlocks all retained candidates. We formalize the multi-party primitive, prove the protocol secure against up to $N-1$ statically corrupted operators, and specify its complete pre-signed transaction graph. We implement Tritone in Rust. On Bitcoin mainnet, when one verifier disputes a claim at every stage, the prover-candidate posts 9,607 vB and the verifier 18,160 vB of protocol transactions. In local benchmarks at 40-bit statistical security, the prover-candidate of each dispute instance retains as little as 112.83 MiB. Tritone thus replaces trust in a signing quorum with a single-honest-operator assumption wherever locked bitcoin is released to an operator against a Groth16 proof, with Bitcoin bridges as our showcase.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T10:49:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T10:49:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2613", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2613", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T11:01:13Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2613", "title": "Learning with Quantization and Worst Case Lattice Problems", "creators": ["Ziwei Hong", "Zhongqiu Fang"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Motivated by the MAMBA proposals, we study the worst case hardness of\nlearning with quantization (LWQ) with public dither. We allow any\nefficiently computable dither function and efficiently samplable seed\ndistribution; the matrix is uniform and independent of the secret and\nthe seed.\n\nUsing the randomized polar lattice quantizer of Lyu et al., we construct\nexplicit families with polynomial power of two moduli. For the search\nfamily, polynomial time recovery of the uniformly chosen secret with\ninverse polynomial probability yields quantum polynomial time algorithms\nfor the gap shortest vector problem (GapSVP) and the shortest independent\nvectors problem (SIVP) on arbitrary \\(n\\) dimensional lattices, with\napproximation factors \\(O(n\\log n)\\) and \\(O(n(\\log n)^2)\\), respectively.\nUnder stronger parameter conditions, a second family admits a decision\nreduction: a polynomial time algorithm with inverse polynomial\ndistinguishing advantage yields quantum polynomial time algorithms for\nthe same lattice problems with factors \\(O(n(\\log n)^3)\\) and\n\\(O(n(\\log n)^4)\\), respectively. Conditional on the public seed, the\ncomparison output is uniform in the prescribed dither coset and\nindependent of the matrix.\n\nWe also examine extensions to learning with errors (LWE) with interval uniform errors, as\narising in MAMBA Frost. We identify obstacles caused by deterministic\nquantization boundaries and give a local perturbation bound with\nexplicit dependence on the number of observations. This analysis does\nnot establish a complete worst case reduction for these errors or\nhardness at the concrete MAMBA parameters.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T11:01:13Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T11:01:13Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2614", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2614", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T11:55:06Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2614", "title": "Tight Post-Quantum Multi-Key Security of the FX Construction", "creators": ["Rentaro Shiba", "Tetsu Iwata"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The FX construction (FX) is one of the simplest key-length extension schemes for block ciphers, introduced by Kilian and Rogaway as a generalization of DESX. By extending the key length without modifying the underlying block cipher, FX can improve security against adversaries that perform quantum computation but are restricted to classical queries to the keyed construction. Recently, Shiba and Iwata showed in their ToSC 2026 paper that FX with an $n$-bit block and a $\\kappa$-bit internal key is secure up to approximately $2^{(n+\\kappa-\\log_2\\mu)/3}$ total classical and quantum oracle queries in the quantum ideal cipher model, where $\\mu\\leq2^\\kappa$ is the number of independently keyed instances. In this paper, we improve this bound to approximately $2^{(n+\\kappa)/3}$ total oracle queries in the same model against fully adaptive adversaries, for every $\\mu\\geq1$ and $1\\leq\\kappa\\leq2n$. The known attack based on the offline Simon's algorithm can target a single keyed instance and matches our bound in the exponent. Thus, the exponent of the total query complexity required to break FX is independent of the number of keyed instances in this parameter regime.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T11:55:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T11:55:06Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2615", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2615", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T23:31:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2615", "title": "Faster and Smaller Anonymous Credentials from Standardized Signatures", "creators": ["Chad Sharp", "Paul Grubbs"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present GordieHowe, a system comprising a language, a certifying compiler, and a zero-knowledge proof protocol. GordieHowe is especially suitable for building anonymous credentials on top of standardized signature schemes like ECDSA, RSA, and ML-DSA.\n\nGordieHowe is the first system to achieve the following three properties simultaneously: provable security against quantum attackers, efficiency for statements spanning multiple fields—including proving and verifying in parallel—and automatic batching of structured computations.\n\nGordieHowe is high-assurance by design. The language is designed to enable static checking of bounds safety, preventing integer overflows. Its compiler emits a Lean certificate that its optimization decisions are semantics-preserving for the input program. The proof system's security theorems are machine-checked in Lean.\n\nGordieHowe is faster and has smaller proofs than comparable prior work. It proves, in parallel on four cores, an ECDSA-signed mobile driving license presentation in 64.8 ms with a 276 KiB proof, 10.1× faster and 22% smaller than Google's Longfellow. With at least 101 bits of knowledge soundness in the random oracle model, GordieHowe proves knowledge of a 1 KiB SHA3-256 preimage in 5.0 ms with a 60 KiB proof, and of an RSA-2048 signature on a private 2 KiB message in 25.9 ms with a 210 KiB proof. With at least 116 bits against quantum adversaries, GordieHowe proves knowledge of an ML-DSA-44 signature on a private message in 87.3 ms with a 549 KiB proof, 70.2× faster and 29% smaller than an optimized Longfellow circuit.\n\nIn building GordieHowe we make a number of contributions of independent interest. We define a new notion of an interactive oracle proof (IOP) whose messages are partially ordered, which we call a series-parallel IOP. We extend the BCS transformation to series-parallel IOPs, and give knowledge soundness and ZK proofs in the QROM. We also show our BCS extension satisfies a form of simulation extractability in the QROM; we believe this is the first simulation extractability result of any kind for BCS in the QROM.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T13:11:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T23:31:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2616", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2616", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T13:49:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2616", "title": "Descent-PBS: Programmable Bootstrapping beyond the Ring Dimension", "creators": ["Zhenyu Xiong", "Mingsheng Wang", "Han Wang", "Zhedong Wang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Programmable bootstrapping (PBS) in FHEW/TFHE evaluates a lookup table (LUT) while refreshing a ciphertext, but a t-entry negacyclic table must fit, with redundancy, into the 2N signed rotation positions of a ring accumulator. Module bootstrappings, namely extended bootstrapping (PKC'23), monomial-matrix bootstrapping (TCC'25) and their successors, rotate a redundant table once in a module of rank tau, at a cost linear in both the rank and the redundancy. Meta-PBS (CCS'26) removes the redundancy by iterating the rotation in the ring, but supports plaintext moduli only up to 2N, and running it inside the module pays the rank in every rotation.\n\nWe present Descent-PBS, which pays the module rank of a large table only in its first rotation. We prove that for a module secret embedded from the subring, truncation commutes with the secret, so one public functional key switch with merged columns repacks all tau_0 components of a module accumulator into the ring and removes the per-component factor tau_0 of repacking. The bootstrapping then continues with Meta-PBS refinements in the ring, at tau_0 + K instead of (K'+1) tau_0 external products per key. For block one-hot secrets, the first-rotation exponents are multiples of tau_0, so every combined key is a scalar matrix: the tau_0 components share one key per block, and since all exponents are public in advance, one pass over the bootstrapping key builds the keys of all rotations of a negacyclic table. Ties-to-even gadget rounding removes a refinement bias that we trace to half-up rounding on the FFT grid.\n\nIn a TFHE-rs-based engine, Descent-PBS evaluates a 16-bit negacyclic LUT in 196 ms on one thread at 128-bit security and a model-predicted failure probability below 2^-64. With the same keys and failure budget, the descent alone makes it 1.44-2.40x faster than Meta-PBS run inside the module for dense secrets; for block one-hot secrets, the descent and the shared keys together make it 1.51-3.32x faster, and 1.37-3.57x against the same baseline re-planned for more conservative 131-bit parameters. General 13-16-bit LUTs take 179-368 ms, 3.8-6.6x faster than WoP-PBS in its authors' configuration on the same single-ciphertext interface, at about twice its memory. The failure probabilities are predictions of a model that we validate where failures are observable, and the 16-bit keys take 1,208 MB.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T13:49:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T13:49:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2617", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2617", "datestamp": "2026-10-23T15:49:56Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2617", "title": "Mutual Correlated Agreement and List-Decoding: Improvements and Separations", "creators": ["Ignacio Manzur"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "At a high level our contribution is threefold: we improve the quantitative MCA error bound for polynomial generators, we prove a refinement of the implication from list-decodability to MCA, and we clarify that in general, these two notions are distinct.\n\nWe show that, for every finite field $\\mathbb{F}$, every nonempty seed set $S\\subseteq\\mathbb{F}$, every linear code $\\mathcal{C} \\subseteq \\mathbb{F}^{n}$ of relative minimum distance $\\delta_{\\mathcal{C}}$ and every degree $d \\geq 1$, the univariate powers generator $G_{d}(x) := (1,x,\\dots,x^{d})$ has mutual correlated agreement for $\\mathcal{C}$ at relative proximity parameter $\\gamma$ with error $O(d\\max\\{1,n\\gamma\\}/|S|)$ below the smaller of the unique decoding radius and the generalized Johnson radius $J_{d+2}(\\delta_{\\mathcal{C}}) := 1-(1-\\delta_{\\mathcal{C}})^{1/(d+2)}$, with a one-coordinate margin below the latter when it is smaller.\n\nThen, we show that list-decodability at radius $p$ with list size $L$ implies MCA slightly above $1-\\sqrt{1-p}$ (the improvement on the radius is dependent on the list size). The previous state-of-the-art result of Gao, Cai, Xu and Kan showed that list-decodability at radius $p<\\delta_{\\mathcal{C}}$ with list size $L$ implies mutual correlated agreement at every proximity parameter strictly below $1-\\sqrt{1-p}$.\n\nFinally we construct two families of codes that show obstructions to any improvement of the $1-\\sqrt{1-p}$ bound, or to strong converse statements. Informally, a bound of the form $\\epsilon_{\\mathsf{MCA}}(1-(1-p)^\\alpha)\\leq Q(n, L)/|\\mathbb{F}|$ for some polynomial $Q$ and $\\alpha > 1/2$ cannot hold for all linear codes $\\mathcal{C}$ under the sole hypothesis that $\\mathcal{C}$ is $(p,L)$-list-decodable. Similarly, for any distance $0<\\delta<1$ and any $1-\\sqrt{1-\\delta}<p<\\gamma<1$, there exists a family of linear codes with fixed positive rate and relative distance tending to $\\delta$ such that $|\\mathbb{F}|\\epsilon_{\\mathsf{MCA}}(\\gamma)\\leq \\mathrm{poly}(n)$ but the list size at radius $p$ is $n^{\\omega(1)}$. Both counterexample families exist over fields of any characteristic. Both MCA errors are for the line generator.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T15:49:56Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-23T15:49:56Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2618", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2618", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T08:47:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2618", "title": "Efficient (Functional) Bootstrapping for CKKS over the Conjugate-Invariant Ring", "creators": ["Jiaming Liu", "Shihe Ma", "Anyu Wang", "Xiaoyun Wang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The CKKS fully homomorphic encryption scheme enables efficient encrypted computation over complex-valued data.\nIn many real-world cases, however, the computation only involves real data, and storing them inside complex slots wastes the encoding ability.\nThis motivated the design of conjugate-invariant CKKS (CI-CKKS) instantiated over the conjugate-invariant ring (CIR), which provides the same number of real slots while halving the RLWE dimension.\nDespite its better efficiency in handling real data, CI-CKKS cannot be bootstrapped directly in CIR, since the CoeffToSlot and SlotToCoeff linear transformations used in bootstrapping require storing complex values in both plaintexts and ciphertexts.\nExisting methods bootstrap CI-CKKS ciphertexts via conversion to standard CKKS, perform bootstrapping there, and convert back. \nFor example, Lattigo bootstraps two CI-CKKS ciphertexts by combining them into a CKKS ciphertext with doubled ring dimension, while Bae et al. convert a single CI-CKKS ciphertext to a CKKS ciphertext in the same dimension.\nThe former is efficient only for batched inputs and suffers from limited flexibility, while the latter consumes additional layers in packing.\nAnother issue with CI-CKKS is that many existing functional bootstrapping methods encode intermediate values using complex roots of unity, whereas CI-CKKS provides only real-valued slots.\nOur first contribution is a real FFT algorithm over the conjugate-invariant ring, thereby enabling native bootstrapping in CI-CKKS.\nOur second contribution investigates functional bootstrapping over CI-CKKS. We adapt the real-valued AKP interpolant with radial correction and develop a single-cosine Hermite interpolation method using a single real ciphertext.\nWe show existing complex-valued interpolation methods can be implemented using two real ciphertexts to simulate complex arithmetic. We also study the numerical behavior of real-valued interpolation and evaluate the tradeoffs between computational efficiency and precision.\nWe implement our methods in Lattigo.\nOur native CI-CKKS bootstrapping achieves a $1.14$--$12.86\\times$ speedup in single-ciphertext bootstrapping across different baseline methods and total linear transformation depths.\nCompared with state-of-the-art functional bootstrapping methods over standard CKKS, our methods achieve $1.16$--$1.68\\times$ higher throughput.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T16:51:36Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T08:47:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2619", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2619", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T09:49:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2619", "title": "Smaller Share Size for Evolving Secret Sharing: General Thresholds and Threshold Three", "creators": ["Xiaozheng Wang"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Evolving secret sharing allows participants to join indefinitely\nwithout modifying previously distributed shares. We study the share\nsize of perfectly secure evolving threshold secret sharing schemes\nand obtain two improvements.\n\nFor general thresholds, we introduce a polynomial sharing method\nthat shares two secrets with adjacent reconstruction thresholds\nusing one polynomial. Combining this method with the evolving scheme\nof Cheng et al.\\ (ASIACRYPT 2025), we obtain an evolving\n$k$-threshold scheme whose $t$-th share has size\n\\[\n    \\left\\lfloor \\frac{k}{2} \\right\\rfloor \\log_2 t\n    + O_k\\!\\left(\\ell+\\log_2\\log_2 t\\right)\n\\]\nbits for an $\\ell$-bit secret. This reduces the leading coefficient\nof their general construction from $k-1$ to\n$\\lfloor k/2\\rfloor$.\n\nFor threshold three, we give a separate construction that reduces\nthe lower-order terms of the  scheme of Cheng et al.\nWe mask the short shares in all generations with the same random\n$\\ell$-bit value $R$, which is shared through an evolving\n$2$-threshold scheme, we obtain\n\\[\n    \\log_2 t+(2+o(1))\\log_2\\log_2 t\n\\]\nbits per share for fixed $\\ell$.\nBoth constructions satisfy correctness and perfect\ninformation-theoretic security.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-23T20:32:07Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T09:49:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2620", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2620", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T10:22:34Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2620", "title": "When Elliptic-Curve Semiprimality Certificates Reveal Factors", "creators": ["Giuseppe Vitto"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Public certificates of semiprimality could support cryptographic modulus generation by proving that an integer has exactly two prime factors without revealing them. Their usefulness in this setting depends on whether the certificate preserves the difficulty of factoring.\nMotivated by the examples of Reble and Broadhurst, we formalize semiprimality certificates by adapting the Goldwasser-Kilian primality criterion. For certificates with a prime point order, our semiprimality theorem uses public data $(N,S,E,P)$ comprising a composite nonsquare integer $N$, an elliptic curve $E$ over $\\mathbb{Z}/N\\mathbb{Z}$, a certified prime $S>(N^{1/6}+1)^2$, and a point $P\\in E(\\mathbb{Z}/N\\mathbb{Z})$ of order $S$ modulo every prime divisor of $N$. Hasse's bound forces each prime divisor above $N^{1/3}$, proving that $N$ has exactly two prime factors.\nFor such semiprimality certificates constructed using complex multiplication (CM), we show that a norm-lattice reconstruction factors $N$ from $(N,S,D)$ alone in expected polynomial time when the Frobenius at every prime divisor lies in a known imaginary quadratic field of fundamental discriminant $D$ or has trace zero, and $\\gcd(S,2DN)=1$.\nApplying this reconstruction and complementary public-point and quadratic-twist attacks, we factor Reble's 1084-digit and Broadhurst's 5061-digit moduli. These attacks also defeat proposed repairs based on hidden cofactors, withheld CM maps, or private isogeny descent within a known field under the stated hypotheses. We leave open whether one can efficiently produce a public Goldwasser-Kilian-based certificate for a fixed modulus, using its privately known factors, while preserving its factoring difficulty relative to the General Number Field Sieve.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T01:04:28Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T10:22:34Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2621", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2621", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T01:51:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2621", "title": "Bounds on polynomial approximations of the discrete logarithm function", "creators": ["Swastik Kopparty", "Rishabh Kothary", "Ashutosh Shankar"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We revisit a classical result of Coppersmith and Shparlinski [CS00] showing bounds on how well polynomials can approximate the discrete log function. They showed that for any univariate polynomial $f(X) \\in \\mathbb{F}_p[X]$ with $\\deg(f) \\leq D$, we have:\n$$ |\\{ x \\in \\mathbb{F}_p^\\times \\mid f(x) = \\mathsf{dlog}(x) \\}|  \\leq \\sqrt{2 D p}.$$\nWe show two improvements:\n\n(1) For all $D$, we improve the upper bound above to $(1+o(1)) \\cdot \\sqrt{Dp}$. In particular, we give nontrivial upper bounds on the approximation even for $D > p/2$.\nThis new upper bound is the Johnson bound from the theory of list-decoding of error-correcting codes, and in fact our proof uses a connection to that problem, as well as other combinatorial ideas.\n\n(2) For $D = 1$, where both the above bounds are $\\mathcal{O}(\\sqrt{p})$, we give an asymptotically improved upper bound of $\\mathcal{O}(p^{2/5})$. This is based on the sum-product phenomenon of additive combinatorics.\n\nWe also improve the [CS00] bounds on the number of  points of the form $(x, \\mathsf{dlog}(x)) \\in \\mathbb{F}_p^2$  that any bivariate polynomial $Q(X,Y) \\in \\mathbb{F}_p[X,Y]$ with $\\deg(Q) \\leq D$ can vanish on, with our new bounds approaching the analogue of the Johnson bound for this problem.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T01:51:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T01:51:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2622", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2622", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T03:28:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2622", "title": "Faster Matrix Multiplication Leads to Faster Lattice Sieving", "creators": ["Yiming Gao", "Honggang Hu"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Let $\\omega$ denote the matrix multiplication exponent. Very recently, OpenAI showed that $\\omega\\le9/4$. We demonstrate that, for any fixed $\\eta>0$, if $\\omega\\le9/4-\\eta$, then there is a constant $\\delta=\\delta(\\eta)>0$ such that heuristic lattice sieving can be improved to $(3/2-\\delta)^{n/2+o(n)}$ time under the spherical heuristic used in the BDGL analysis. With known matrix multiplication algorithms, our method already yields subquadratic search within BDGL buckets.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T03:28:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T03:28:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2623", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2623", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T03:53:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2623", "title": "The Covering Radius of $\\operatorname{RM}(2,8)$ is Between $88$ and $91$", "creators": ["Xiang-dong Hou", "Evelyn Sabo", "Freeman Slaughter"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Let $\\operatorname{RM}(r,n)$ be the $r$th order Reed--Muller code of length $2^n$, and let $\\rho(r,n)$ denote its covering radius. \nThe values $\\rho(2,6)=18$ and $\\rho(2,7)=40$ are known, whereas the exact value of $\\rho(2,8)$ remains open. \nStarting from the current state of the art bound $88\\leq\\rho(2,8)\\leq96$, we give a computer-assisted reduction of the upper bound $\\rho(2,8)\\leq91$. \nWe first show that every even-weight Boolean function on eight variables is within distance $90$ of a quadratic function. \nChanging one value then gives the bound $91$ for odd-weight functions. \nOur main lemma addresses rank-four seven-variable quintics: when their second-order distance is $36$ and their maximum quadratic-shift first-order distance is $56$, they have at least $60$ minimizing quadratic cosets and at most $12$ cosets of cost $56$. \nThe complete proof covers all $68443$ quartic classes. \nFor every rank-four quintic, the distance-$56$ cosets are enumerated outright, and the $5199$ words are examined individually. \nProfile counts, hyperplane contractions, and support moments then give the even-weight bound.\nWe describe the calculations and enumerations, together with the classification upon which the proof depends. \nInstructions to verify the computer search portion may be found at $\\texttt{https://github.com/EvelynSabo/RM28}$.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T03:53:47Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T03:53:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2624", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2624", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T08:10:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2624", "title": "Provable Security of SHA-256-Based LMS Revisited in the Ideal-Cipher Model", "creators": ["Chun Guo", "Hao Cheng", "Bart Preneel", "Meiqin Wang"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The hash-based Leighton-Micali Signature (LMS) has been standardized by IETF, NIST and ISO. State-of-the-art non-quantum security proofs for LMS have been given by Katz (SSR 2016) and Fluhrer (Eprint 2017/553). However, the actual structure of SHA-256(/192) is the (chopped) Merkle-Damg{\\aa}rd construction using a blockcipher-based Davies-Meyer function, and precise security bounds of SHA-256-based LMS\\_SHA256\\_M32 and SHA-256/192-based LMS\\_SHA256\\_M24 should be derived in the {\\it ideal-cipher model (ICM)}. This was {\\it not} considered in Katz and Fluhrer's proofs. In fact, by leveraging structural properties of (chopped) Merkle-Damg{\\aa}rd, we exhibit forgery attacks against LMS\\_SHA256\\_M32 and LMS\\_SHA256\\_M24 that expose the inapplicability of Katz's and Fluhrer's random-oracle bounds to the concrete SHA-256 constructions. The precise security guarantees of LMS\\_SHA256\\_M32 and LMS\\_SHA256\\_M24 thus remain unknown (and are also missing in the standards).\n\n\nTo bridge the structural gap, we provide ICM-based security proofs for the\nadditive-Davies-Meyer abstractions of LMS\\_SHA256\\_M32 and\nLMS\\_SHA256\\_M24.\nThe security level of LMS\\_SHA256\\_M32 is roughly $256-\\log_2 \\widehat{B}$ bits, where $\\widehat{B}$ is the number of blocks in SHA-256 calls internally made by LMS\\_SHA256\\_M32 and $\\widehat{B}\\ll2^{128}$.\nThe security level of LMS\\_SHA256\\_M24 is roughly $\\min \\{ 192 - \\log_2 \\widehat{\\Gamma}  ,  256-\\log_2 \\widehat{B} \\}$ bits, where $\\widehat{\\Gamma}$ is the number of SHA-256/192 calls internally made by LMS\\_SHA256\\_M24 and $\\widehat{B}$ is the number of blocks in them, and $\\widehat{B}\\ll2^{128}$ and $\\widehat{B} \\widehat{\\Gamma}  \\ll 2^{192}$. In conclusion, LMS\\_SHA256\\_M32 and LMS\\_SHA256\\_M24 ensure a moderate (yet not ``full'') level of security.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T08:10:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T08:10:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2625", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2625", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T09:15:12Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2625", "title": "Faster Polynomial Factorization over Finite Fields via Batched Modular Composition", "creators": ["Zhenyu Xiong", "Mingsheng Wang"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "In the algebraic model, where one counts operations in $\\mathbb{F}_q$ uniformly in the characteristic, the best published algorithm for factoring a polynomial of degree $n$ over $\\mathbb{F}_q$, due to Kaltofen and Shoup with the rectangular products of Huang and Pan, uses $n^{1.80535+o(1)}\\log q$ operations, and its bottleneck is the modular compositions of the giant steps. A new algorithm is presented for these compositions. Like the algorithm of Neiger, Salvy, Schost and Villard, the new method is based on the relation matrices of the argument. Since all compositions at one level of the giant steps share one argument, the relation matrices and a table of remainders are computed only once, and the remaining work consists of rectangular matrix products. For the two-matrix evaluation, we prove that a random change of basis puts every Frobenius image in good position. This reduces the cost of factorization in this model $$\\text{from}\\quad n^{1.80535+o(1)}\\log q\\quad\\text{to}\\quad n^{1.5532+o(1)}\\log q,$$ and to $n^{3/2+o(1)}\\log q$ if $\\omega=2$; with the compositions of Neiger, Salvy, Schost and Villard performed one at a time, the exponent would be $1.7147$. In the bit model, and algebraically in small characteristic, Kedlaya and Umans obtained the exponent $3/2$. For a single composition with an arbitrary argument modulo a separable polynomial, the content of one short relation separates large value fibers, which gives a Las Vegas algorithm for every input at the exponent $(\\omega+3)/4<1.3429$, previously known only for generic inputs, and a fourth evaluation level, with truncated powers obtained by transposition, lowers it to $1.3309$. As applications, we obtain faster algorithms for normal bases, minimal polynomials and irreducibility testing, and, for large $q$, factorization in $O(n^{1.5983})+n^{1+o(1)}\\log q$ operations.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T09:15:12Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T09:15:12Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2626", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2626", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T12:15:15Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2626", "title": "The Exact Bit Security of Hash-Based Signatures", "creators": ["Mikhail Kudinov", "Benedikt Wagner", "Emile Wambsgans"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "In this work, we analyze the security of hash-based signatures in Lean4. We examine how different ways of accounting for an adversary’s work yield different notions of bit security. As our working example, we study two instances of XMSS with $128$ bit digests.\n\nUnder most of the accounting modes we consider, we get $127$ bit security for strong unforgeability. However, under the most conservative convention that counts only the adversary’s direct random oracle queries, we only get $122$ bits of security. We prove these bounds in the random oracle model without computational hardness assumptions and give matching attacks. We also prove a tight bound of $127$ bits of strong unforgeability for SLH-DSA-128s.\n\nOur work is primarily motivated by recent autoresearch competitions, and it demonstrates the concrete impact of resource accounting. We hope that it helps designers of future challenges make an informed decision when choosing a notion of bit security that reflects their needs.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T12:15:15Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T12:15:15Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2627", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2627", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T10:26:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2627", "title": "Strongly Adaptive Asynchronous Byzantine Agreement with Linear Communication and Almost-Everywhere Termination", "creators": ["Renas Bacho", "Simon Holmgaard Kamp", "Julian Loss", "Jesper Buus Nielsen", "Maciej Obremski"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "It is well known that Byzantine agreement requires $\\Omega(t^2)$ messages against a strongly adaptive adversary  that may corrupt $t=\\Theta(n)$ parties and suppress a party's undelivered messages upon corruption. We circumvent this lower bound by relaxing termination: for any constant $0<\\nu<1$, at least a $(1-\\nu)$ fraction of the honest parties terminate, while agreement and validity hold for every honest decision. For every constant corruption gap $\\delta>0$ and every $t\\leq(1-\\delta)n/3$, we construct binary agreement with this guarantee in authenticated asynchronous networks against strongly adaptive corruptions with message takebacks. Except with negligible probability, these guarantees hold and every honest decision carries a transferable justifier. The protocol achieves almost-everywhere termination in expected $O(1)$ rounds, expected total communication $O(n\\kappa^2)$ bits, and expected maximum communication $\\widetilde O(\\kappa^2)$ bits over honest parties before corruption, where $\\kappa$ is the computational security parameter.\n\nOur construction combines a recursively shared BLS signing key with certificate dissemination over a sparse graph. The recursive sharing is used to implement threshold signing with distinct safety and liveness thresholds. Dissemination propagates existing certificates to almost all honest parties. The construction uses a trusted setup and is secure in the random oracle model under the algebraic one-more computational Diffie--Hellman assumption.\n\nWe further obtain full binary agreement with the same asymptotic communication and round complexity against adaptive corruptions without message takebacks. The extension requires neither atomic multi-send nor private communication channels.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T13:18:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T10:26:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2628", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2628", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T13:39:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2628", "title": "Extraction meets Distillation - cryptanalytic techniques to recover parameters from a Deep Neural Network", "creators": ["Biprarshi Biswas", "Arya Anshuman Ojha", "Yubaraj Das", "Devansh Khosla", "Kamran Rais", "Saankhya Samanta", "Subhamoy Maitra", "Pantelimon Stanica"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We study fully connected neural-network reconstruction by combining cryptanalytic weight-direction extraction with learning from predicted labels. We adapt a ReLU extraction implementation to Leaky ReLU, compare sign-search methods, and estimate biases and output layers. We prove conditional bounds for direction recovery with approximate prefixes, preservation of local distance votes, prediction changes from aligned parameter errors, and sign selection with independent scoring data. We also specify exact row restoration and distinguish its guarantee from that of gradient masking. The experiments evaluate assisted extraction, with privileged access to gradients, hidden activations, and victim parameters, followed by label-based reconstruction. Across eight search seeds on the largest synthetic architecture, Leaky ReLU recovers 51--57 neurons in the deepest hidden layer, while ReLU recovers none. This advantage does not hold uniformly across architectures and layers. Removing victim-weight access from the sign walk gives less accurate signs, despite high final prediction agreement. Across 40 seeded runs on the two smallest synthetic victims, agreement on 5,000 inputs excluded from fitting and selection ranges from $0.9890$ to $0.9992$. On two CIFAR-10 victims, the reconstructed models achieve $56.40\\%$ and $58.29\\%$ agreement and exceed the distillation baseline on three functional metrics. We report label requests separately from privileged access and explain why prediction agreement does not identify network parameters.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T13:39:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T13:39:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2629", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2629", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T16:17:29Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2629", "title": "VeilDNS: Post-Quantum DNS Privacy from the First UDP Packet", "creators": ["Aditya Singh Rawat", "Mahabir Prasad Jhanwar", "Rei Safavi-Naini"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "DNS was designed around UDP, and most DNS traffic today still follows that design: one query, one response, and no handshake. This makes DNS fast and scalable, but exposes client queries in cleartext. DoT, DoH, and DoQ provide privacy by encrypting DNS messages with TLS. This works once TLS/TCP or QUIC handshakes complete, but cold sessions spend extra round trips and CPU before the first private query can be sent—a cost that grows with post-quantum cryptography.\n\nWe present VeilDNS, a DNS-native protocol that uses a post-quantum KEM and AEAD to encrypt DNS questions and answers and authenticate the resolver in a single UDP exchange. Given an authenticated resolver KEM key, clients have query privacy from their first UDP packet. VeilDNS supports stateless and stateful modes—the latter reducing recurring computation and bandwidth. An optional mode provides forward secrecy from the second query onward. By preserving the DNS wire format, VeilDNS runs on the standard UDP port 53.\n\nCompared with ML-DSA-authenticated Do(T/H/Q) on the well-provisioned network profile, VeilDNS's stateless and stateful modes achieve up to $3.5\\times$ higher cold-session throughput, $4.8\\times$ lower average latency, $4.7\\times$ lower CPU time, $13.7\\times$ fewer bytes, and $15.8\\times$ fewer packets. On the constrained profile, the throughput gain reaches $12.4\\times$. Tamarin establishes query confidentiality, response authentication, and forward secrecy.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T16:17:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T16:17:29Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2630", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2630", "datestamp": "2026-10-31T05:30:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2630", "title": "Exact Error Bootstrapping and Comb Bootstrapping in FHEW/TFHE", "creators": ["Philippe Chartier", "Mohammed Lemou"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "In FHEW and TFHE, bootstrapping evaluates the decryption function via a blind rotation, whose resolution limits\nthe message space. We propose instead to bootstrap the \\emph{error}. By rounding the ciphertext at a resolution that\nis a multiple of the message modulus, we preserve the message exactly. Reduction modulo a small integer then yields\na noise-free encryption of the error, which a single blind rotation lifts exactly before it is subtracted. The\nmessage modulus is thus constrained solely by the noise and can be much larger than in standard TFHE. Since the\nerror takes far fewer distinct values than the ring degree, a single blind rotation can also refresh several ciphertexts\nsimultaneously. We call this procedure the comb bootstrap. Between refreshes, an integer remains encrypted\nin a single ciphertext, allowing additions modulo the message modulus and multiplications without programmable\nbootstrapping. Built on TFHE-rs, for $8$-bit integers on a single thread, our refresh is $3.5$ times faster than\nthat of TFHE-rs, and $9.1$ times faster with the comb bootstrap; multiplication is $6.5$ times faster. In a residue number system, multiplication of\nintegers modulo $\\widehat P\\ge 2^{32}$ is $19$ times faster than in TFHE-rs. The error bootstrap serves exclusively\nto refresh ciphertexts; evaluating any other function still requires programmable bootstrapping.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T18:05:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-31T05:30:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2631", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2631", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T19:08:13Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2631", "title": "On the Subtleties of Non-Malleability in IVC: Notions, Attacks and Constructions from Falsifiable Assumptions", "creators": ["Matteo Campanelli", "Suvradip Chakraborty", "Chaya Ganesh"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We investigate non-malleable Incrementally Verifiable Computation (IVC), a subject that has received limited attention. We focus on whether and how simulation-sound IVC can be obtained from falsifiable assumptions. We provide additional evidence of the unique aspects of non-malleable incremental proofs, identifying definitional challenges in formalizing simulation-sound IVC, and showing how existing IVC designs from falsifiable assumptions cannot exhibit simulation-soundness \"for free\" (without modifications).\nIn addition to a new family of definitions of simulation-sound IVC, our main results are the following.\n\n- A general negative result: common Valiant-style proofs are malleable. We isolate and formalize a feature shared by the dominant Valiant-style IVC designs (Valiant, TCC 2008) related to the ability to merge proofs together. We show that, assuming one-way functions, natural zero-knowledge versions of Valiant's design are malleable. As an implication of our framework of attacks, we show that the only IVC for NP from falsifiable assumptions (Datta et al., CRYPTO 2025) cannot satisfy any form of simulation-soundness; this is the case even when instantiating this scheme from non-malleable building blocks.\n\n- A positive result: first IVC from falsifiable assumptions with non-malleability features. We construct an IVC satisfying a non-trivial form of simulation-soundness under subexponential iO and either subexponential LWE or subexponential bilinear-map assumptions.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T19:08:13Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T19:08:13Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2632", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2632", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T20:56:57Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2632", "title": "Chosen Commitments and Certified Decoding Regions in the Adaptive Threshold Schnorr Attack", "creators": ["Hüseyin Eren Demirtaş", "Oğuz Yayla"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Crites and Stewart reduce an adaptive forgery attack on threshold Schnorr signatures with $N$ parties and threshold $\\tau$ to one call to a sparse linear search oracle, which they show to be bounded distance decoding of a diagonally scaled Reed–Solomon code and whose sparse answer, a witness, names the parties to corrupt. Their analysis samples the coefficient vector behind the adversary's commitment uniformly at random and leaves open whether a chosen vector does better. We bound the success of an adversary that follows their template with a chosen vector and recovers witnesses only inside regions built from the radii that seven decoding theorems, three for Reed–Solomon and four for folded Reed–Solomon codes, certify under their own setup hypotheses. When the commitment is fixed through a known coefficient vector before a fresh hash challenge, the attack target is, conditional on the history that fixed the vector, a uniform point of a line. For distinct nonzero Shamir points, our main theorem shows that every such line contains at most $M$ targets with a witness in a finite collection of coordinate and block weight regions fixed before the targets, each permitting fewer than $\\tau$ nonzero coordinates, for an explicit integer $M$ depending only on $N$, $\\tau$ and the collection. We call the adversary the wrapper when it makes at most $Q$ fresh challenges and no signing query, chooses each coefficient vector from its history before the challenge and keeps it afterwards, and lets its solvers make no further signature hash queries. It accepts only a witness of the same target and representation that lies in the regions of the collection within its corruption cap, corrupts parties only once it holds such a witness, and then forges from that witness and stops. Hence the wrapper succeeds with probability at most $QM/p$, with $p$ the group order, even if its solvers recover every witness in the regions at no cost. On the six pairs $(N,\\tau)$ of the original attack, fixed collections built from partitions into consecutive blocks contain all seven certified regions and have $M$ below $2^{24}$, so at the field size proxy $p = 2^{252}$ the bound stays below $2^{-100}$ after $2^{128}$ challenges. For uniform targets we prove much smaller bounds on the witness probability in these regions. For the folded Guruswami–Wang and Ashvinkumar–Habib–Srivastava block regions on partitions into consecutive blocks fixed before the target, this probability is negligible for polynomially many parties, exponentially large fields and $\\tau/N$ bounded away from zero. These results also classify the studied decoder theorems. The hardness of the oracle, the success of other strategies and the adaptive security of threshold Schnorr schemes are open.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T20:56:57Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T20:56:57Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2633", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2633", "datestamp": "2026-10-24T23:16:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2633", "title": "On the Inapplicability of Residue-Confined Error Attacks to CRT-FHE with Non-Degenerate Error Distributions", "creators": ["Anil Kumar Pradhan"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "This paper responds to the cryptanalysis presented in “Key Recovery from Residue-\nConfined Errors in the Pradhan CRT-RLWE Construction” (Olejnik and Naskrecki, 2026),\nwhich claims key recovery and plaintext recovery against the CRT-FHE scheme introduced in “A New CRT-based Fully Homomorphic Encryption” (Pradhan et al., 2026).\n\nWe demonstrate that the reported recovery attacks rely entirely on a deliberately con-\nstructed error distribution whose support lies in the kernel of the CRT encoding function.\nConsequently, the effective encryption error is identically zero, reducing the attacked con-\nstruction to a noiseless RLWE instance. The subsequent key-recovery and plaintext-recovery results therefore follow from the deliberate elimination of the encryption noise, rather than from any cryptanalytic method capable of recovering secrets from properly noise-bearing CRT-FHE ciphertexts.\n\nCrucially, the proposed attack neither removes nor estimates errors from normally generated CRT-FHE ciphertexts. Instead, it assumes an artificial error distribution specifically chosen to guarantee their annihilation during encoding. This condition does not hold for the intended centered-binomial error distribution, under which the probability that an entire error polynomial belongs to the encoder’s kernel is negligible at the reported parameters. Thus, the presented recovery procedures do not constitute attacks against the concrete\nCRT-FHE instantiation with its intended non-degenerate error distribution.\n\nWe conclude that the reported key-recovery and plaintext-recovery results concern a\ndeliberately degenerate, effectively zero-error instantiation and do not demonstrate a practical security compromise of CRT-FHE under its intended error sampling.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-24T23:16:33Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-24T23:16:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2634", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2634", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T10:16:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2634", "title": "Nearly Optimal Hardness for CVP and NCP with Preprocessing", "creators": ["Giacomo Fenzi", "Guy Weissenberg"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The closest vector problem(CVP)and the nearest codeword problem (NCP) are fundamental computational problems with connections to learning, coding theory, and cryptography. We study hardness of approximation in the preprocessing model: an algorithm receives the lattice or code in advance, may perform unrestricted computation to produce polynomial-size advice, and must then solve the problem on any target in polynomial time.\nUnless $\\mathsf{NP} \\subseteq \\mathsf{P/poly}$, no such algorithm achieves an approximation factor of\n$\\bullet$ $M^{1−\\varepsilon}$ for NCP over any fixed finite field, or\n$\\bullet$ $M^{1/\\min\\{p,2\\}−\\varepsilon}$ for CVP in any $\\ell_p$ norm,\nfor every fixed $\\varepsilon > 0$, where $M$ denotes the code block length or lattice dimension, respectively.\nWe improve the subpolynomial factors of Khot, Popat, and Vishnoi [KPV14]to polynomial ones, matching the exponents that Song [Son26] proved without preprocessing for binary codes and the $\\ell_2$ norm. We further extend Song’s evaluation tables to every fixed prime characteristic and the lattice reduction to $\\ell_p$ with $p > 2$. Our main technical contribution is an extension of the moment method, introduced in an OpenAI report [Ope26] and improved by Song [Son26], to the preprocessing setting. In addition, we give a direct reduction from probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) whose query locations and families of possible predicates do not depend on the formula. The resulting factor of $M^{\\Omega(1/(\\log \\log M)^2)}$ is already larger than that of [KPV14], and the reduction may be of independent interest.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-25T10:16:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T10:16:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2635", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2635", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T12:05:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2635", "title": "A Kelsey–Kohno Attack Variant against SHA-2 Message Digests in HSS/LMS and XMSS", "creators": ["Falko Strenzke"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We present a multi-target second-preimage attack on the message hashing of the stateful hash-based signature schemes HSS/LMS and XMSS with SHA-256 and with the truncated SHA-256/192. The attack builds on the herding technique of Kelsey and Kohno: the attacker takes the chaining states that follow the per-signature prefixes of many collected signatures and merges them, level by level through state collisions, into a single chaining state. From that state one search serves all collected signatures at once, which defeats the commitment to the key and to the one-time-signature leaf index at the start of the hash input that is meant to rule out multi-target attacks. The search can match the final digests, which is the better choice against SHA-256/192, or, after appending a Kelsey-Schneier expandable message, the internal chaining states of long signed messages, which is effective for full SHA-256. For SHA-256 with NIST's bound of $2^{64}$ signatures, which may be spread over any number of keys, the cost in compression-function calls falls from the nominal $2^{256}$ to about $2^{166}$ for messages of up to 4 GiB and to about $2^{156}$ in the formal limit of maximal message length, a loss of 100 bits. For SHA-256/192, digest matching costs about $2^{153}$ for $2^{64}$ signatures of any length, a loss of 39 bits. Because the attack pools signatures across keys, even the first signature of an individual key contributes to a potential overall exposure of an ecosystem. The attacks exploit the chaining state of SHA-256, which is narrower than twice the targeted security level; the SHAKE256 parameter sets are not affected.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-25T12:05:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T12:05:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2636", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2636", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T12:05:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2636", "title": "Revisiting AES Key Wrap: Forgery Bounds, Structural Observations, and Recommendations for the Revision of NIST SP 800-38F", "creators": ["John Preuß Mattsson"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "NIST is revising SP~800-38F, which specifies the AES Key Wrap modes KW and KWP. This paper is an updated and expanded\nversion of our technical comments to NIST. We show that the forgery probabilities stated in SP~800-38F do not account for adaptive\nattacks, give the resulting forgery probabilities for KW, KWP, and TKW, and show that checking the expected plaintext length can raise\nthe security level of KWP considerably. Revisiting Kelsey's long-message observation, we correct the collision conditions, show that\na successful forgery leaks a plaintext prefix, derive an encryption-only distinguisher, and conclude that KW does not have\nbeyond-birthday-bound security. We explain the role of the step counter, analyse the single-semiblock path of KWP and the trade-off\nbetween the number of passes and the length limit, and give recommendations for the revision, for implementations, and for future\nkey-wrap designs.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-25T12:05:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T12:05:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2637", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2637", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T15:48:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2637", "title": "Maximum-Likelihood Decoding of Gabidulin Codes Is NP-Hard Even in Dimension One", "creators": ["Philippe Gaborit"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Fix a prime power q . We prove that deciding whether a received word y ∈ F^n_qm lies\nat rank distance at most n − 2 from the one-dimensional Gabidulin code {λg : λ in Fqm }\nis NP-complete. Thus maximum-likelihood decoding of Gabidulin codes is NP-hard even\nfor k = 1, an analogue of the Guruswami-Vardy theorem for Reed-Solomon codes. In\nthe Hamming metric, by contrast, hardness at this radius requires the dimension to grow\nwith the length, as in the Guruswami Vardy theorem. The reduction is deterministic;\nconsequently Rank Syndrome Decoding (RSD) and Rank Minimum Distance (RMD) for\nFqm -linear codes are NP-complete under deterministic polynomial reductions, whereas\nthe previously known reduction was randomized. The proof goes through a pivot problem\nthat we introduce, Twisted Square Membership (TSM): given Fq -subspaces U, W in FqN ,\ndecide whether some non-zero a ∈ U satisfies a^(q+1) in W . Quadratic systems in d unknowns\nare encoded into TSM, then TSM into Gabidulin decoding. The last step views the\nreceived word as an Fq -linear map and decoding at radius n − 2 as the search for an\nFq -plane on which it acts as a scalar. With support U + τ W in a cubic extension and\nmap a + τ b → a^(q^2) + τ b^q , two Frobenius twists force solution planes to encode the relation a^(q+1) ∈ W . All constructions are explicit and polynomial, with N = O(qd^2 ), n ≤ N + d,\nand m = 3N .", "date_submitted": "2026-10-25T15:48:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T15:48:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2638", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2638", "datestamp": "2026-10-25T18:12:34Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2638", "title": "Decision Attacks on Known-Covariance Ring-LWE via Public Gram Determinants", "creators": ["Anis Bkakria"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Known-Covariance Ring-LWE (KCov-RLWE) was introduced by Micciancio and Suhl to support simulation-secure threshold encryption.  It strengthens ordinary Ring-LWE by revealing an exact quadratic summary of the hidden secret and errors, and its decisional hardness was left open.\n\nWe give explicit polynomial-time decision attacks for broad families of prime moduli at ring rank one.  Our key observation is that the public sample and the covariance hint together determine a bordered Gram matrix whose determinant exposes a hidden residual with a different distribution for genuine and uniform samples.  After reducing the ring into finite-field components, this residual has one of two forms: a product across reciprocal components, or a Hermitian norm when a component is preserved by conjugation.  The latter case yields a particularly strong distinguishing signal.  Moreover, reduction modulo any divisor preserves the KCov real and random experiments exactly, so every attackable odd prime divisor of a composite modulus transfers the corresponding distinguisher with no loss of advantage.\n\nThe attack covers the one-sample setting globally in the self-reciprocal regime and, under the coefficient-product Gaussian specialization, locally in the completely split regime.  More generally, we obtain a complete classification of how this residual-based attack behaves for odd prime moduli when $m\\ge2$, and extend these guarantees to arbitrary moduli possessing a suitable odd prime divisor.  The classification does not imply insecurity for every parameter family: when the relevant residue fields are sufficiently large, the guaranteed distinguishing advantage in the reciprocal case can become negligible, and pure power-of-two moduli remain outside the divisor-reduction extension.  Accordingly, our results invalidate the KCov pseudorandomness assumption in the quantified families; they do not show that every parameter choice permitted by the motivating Ring-PKE sketch is insecure, nor do they give a direct IND-CPA break of the complete threshold-encryption construction.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-25T18:12:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-25T18:12:34Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2639", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2639", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T02:40:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2639", "title": "Private Information Retrieval with Accountability at Erasure-Optimal Server Redundancy", "creators": ["Myeongjun Kim", "Hyunseok Jeong", "Mincheol Son", "Young-Sik Kim"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Private information retrieval (PIR) hides which database item a client requests. We study PIR that also identifies servers that respond incorrectly. Against a coalition of at most $t$ corrupted servers, the client must retrieve the item and identify every deviating server when at most $d$ deviate. Above that threshold, it must abort and return an empty identification set, with a specified statistical error.\n\nWe present SynTrace, a single-round compiler for linear PIR supporting audit queries whose honest answers belong to a public code. The client combines the retrieval query with $m$ audit queries using secret linear mixing and independent blinding. Audit syndromes identify deviations before reconstruction. We prove perfect query\nprivacy, zero false-identification probability within the deviation threshold, and statistical realization of an accountable PIR functionality.\n\nFor Shamir-based PIR, SynTrace uses $k=t+d+1$ servers. Under the stated privacy and download assumptions, tolerating $d$ missing responses already requires this many servers, so identification adds no server overhead. With this number of servers, $m=d$ audit queries suffice with a suitable field, and are necessary within the specified syndrome-span decoder class. Additional audit queries can reduce communication by allowing a smaller field. For one 32 KiB record from a 1 GiB database, with five servers, privacy and robustness against two corrupted servers, and error at most $2^{-40}$, SynTrace uses 2.25 MiB of communication, compared with 8.96 MiB for the homomorphic-MAC construction of Eriguchi, Kurosawa and Nuida (TCC 2022) under the same workload and thresholds. Batched retrievals can share the audit queries.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T02:11:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T02:40:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2640", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2640", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T04:14:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2640", "title": "Subexponential Algorithms for LWE via Rejection Sampling on Superlattices", "creators": ["Ligeng Fan", "Changpeng Shao", "Hongbo Li", "Dingkang Wang"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Recent superlattice algorithms have improved the provable complexity of lattice problems. Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer used this framework to obtain a subexponential algorithm for infinity-norm short integer solution, while also identifying a key obstacle to extending it to learning with errors (LWE). A similar difficulty arose in the analysis of Kirchner and Fouque, whose claimed subexponential running time with only linearly many LWE samples was not rigorously established. Building on the framework of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer, we develop two refinements based on rejection sampling that solve this open problem.\n\nFirst, we use rejection sampling to cancel the shift-dependent normalization factor that arises when sampling from a shifted, scaled integer lattice. This factor is a product of one-dimensional Gaussian masses and can be evaluated efficiently. This yields a provably subexponential classical search-LWE algorithm for prime $q\\in[n^2,2n^2]$ and constant Gaussian error width. It uses only $m=4n$ independent samples and runs in time and space $\\exp(O(n/\\ln\\ln n))$.\n\nSecond, we use random auxiliary superlattices and apply rejection sampling to the difference of two Gaussian lattice samples, ensuring that the accepted output follows the desired discrete Gaussian distribution up to a small statistical error. For $q=n^{\\kappa+o(1)}$, $m=n+h=O(n)$, and $R=h\\ln q/[m\\ln(2+\\sigma)]\\to\\infty$, the resulting algorithm uses time and space $2^{(1/2+o(1))n/\\ln R}$, where $\\sigma$ is the Gaussian error width. In particular, for $\\sigma=n^{o(1)}$ and any fixed $m/n>1$, our algorithm achieves provable subexponential classical running time, whereas the primal and dual baselines have exponential-time bounds and earlier provable subexponential BKW analyses require $\\Omega(n\\ln n)$ samples.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T04:14:33Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T04:14:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2641", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2641", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T05:00:51Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2641", "title": "A Memory-efficient Implementation of Wiedemann XL", "creators": ["Daniel Cabarcas", "Tung Chou", "Felipe Merino", "Javier Verbel"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The signature schemes MQOM, SNOVA, MAYO, and UOV are third-round candidates in the NIST standardization process for additional post-quantum signatures, and their security relies on the hardness of the multivariate quadratic (MQ) problem.\nXL with block Wiedemann (BW) is one of the most efficient MQ solvers in practice, but its memory demand has led to a debate about its memory access cost: generating the rows of the Macaulay matrix on the fly is widely believed to save memory at a non-negligible computational cost.\n\nIn this work, we evaluate the memory--time trade-off in practice. We provide the first efficient on-the-fly implementation of XL with BW. We build on the state-of-the-art implementation by Cheng, Chou, Niederhagen, and Yang (CCNY), which uses SSE instructions and supports the fields $\\mathbb{F}_2$, $\\mathbb{F}_{16}$ and $\\mathbb{F}_{31}$; we remove its column-index tables and generate the rows on the fly in the first phase of BW (BW1).\nWe amortize the cost of on-the-fly generation with a new algorithm that computes column indices with $O(n^2)$ instead of $O(n^3)$ table look-ups, where $n$ is the number of variables.\nIn our experiments we observe that  our on-the-fly implementation achieves running times comparable to CCNY's with up to five times less memory. We also port both implementations to AVX2 over $\\mathbb{F}_{256}$, the main field of UOV, and observe a similar behavior: comparable BW1 running times with less memory for the on-the-fly variant.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T05:00:51Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T05:00:51Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2642", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2642", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T07:40:03Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2642", "title": "Cryptanalysis and Repair of \"Decentralized Multi-authority ABE for NC$^1$ from BDH\"", "creators": ["Xingwang Wang"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We present a plaintext-recovery attack on both the DBDH-based construction and the CBDH-based variant of Datta, Komargodski, and Waters (Journal of Cryptology, 2023). The attack succeeds with probability one in the claimed static security model using one corrupt authority and two users, each unauthorized even when granted the corrupt authority's attribute. The flaw is an invalid extension of the LSSS matrix-normalization lemma originating with Rouselakis and Waters (FC,~2015): preserving complete-share distributions does not preserve coordinate-wise ciphertext masks, which a corrupt authority can expose to remove identity binding from other users' shares. For both variants, replacing these masks with independent full linear sharings of zero preserves correctness and restores ciphertext-distribution invariance. We prove static security of both repaired variants in the random oracle model under their respective BDH assumptions, using the original hardcore-bit convention for the CBDH variant. Both proofs allow adaptive identity-hash queries. The modification retains the original matrix-width and row-labeling restrictions, keys, decryption, and ciphertext size, requiring only additional encryption randomness and finite-field arithmetic. We also attack both multi-authority attribute-based inner-product functional encryption constructions of Datta and Pal (PKC, 2023) and establish correctness and matrix-substitution invariance of the same repair. We prove static security of the repaired small-universe construction under asymmetric DBDH. For the large-universe construction, we identify a missing source-group encoding in the original reduction and give a complete static security proof under an augmented $L$-DBDH assumption, whose generic bilinear group hardness we establish.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T07:40:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T07:40:03Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2643", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2643", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T07:50:39Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2643", "title": "Non-profiled Single-Trace ML-DSA Secret Key Recovery by Horizontal Distribution Analysis", "creators": ["Linus Backlund", "Elena Dubrova"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "During the last decade, single-trace side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations have largely focused on profiled methods, which typically assume that the attacker has a clone device and implementation knowledge to build a leakage model for the target before launching the attack. In this paper, we demonstrate that a much weaker adversary, without the ability to profile, can also mount powerful single-trace attacks. The presented method compares the observed sample distribution with the expected Hamming weight leakage distribution using a Gaussian mixture model as a distinguisher. The horizontal nature of the attack allows us to obtain multiple observations per execution by partitioning and stacking the trace. We show how to select optimal parameters for trace preprocessing and configure the measurement setup so that the noise floor is lowered, enabling the exploitation of weak leakage. We also prove that  imperfect classifications can be efficiently corrected using information-set decoding algorithms. The new method is evaluated on an optimized implementation of ML-DSA-65 on ARM Cortex-M4 using the secret key unpacking procedure as an attack point. With an enumeration budget of $2^{70}$ operations in $\\mathbb Z_q$, the full secret key is recovered from a single trace in 99% of attacks.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T07:50:39Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T07:50:39Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2644", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2644", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T08:05:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2644", "title": "Iterated-Logarithmic Additive Hardness for Bin Packing", "creators": ["Zhao Song"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The question of obtaining a constant-additive approximation for bin packing was highlighted in the third of ten open problems in Williamson and Shmoys' The Design of Approximation Algorithms [SW11, Chapter~17, Problem~3]. We prove that there is an absolute constant $c>0$ such that, unless $\\mathrm P=\\mathrm{NP}$, no deterministic polynomial-time packing using at most $\\mathrm{OPT}+c\\log^*\\mathrm{OPT}$ bins, where $\\mathrm{OPT}$ is the minimum number of bins. In particular, no such algorithm has additive error $o(\\log^*\\mathrm{OPT})$. \n\nThe best known upper bound, due to Hoberg and Rothvoss [HR17], is $\\mathrm{OPT}+O(\\log\\mathrm{OPT})$, achieved by a randomized algorithm with expected polynomial running time. OpenAI [Ope26] previously showed that, unless $\\mathrm P=\\mathrm{NP}$, no deterministic polynomial-time algorithm guarantees a packing using at most $\\mathrm{OPT}+O(1)$ bins. \n\nWe conjecture that the optimal additive approximation error for bin packing is $\\Theta(\\log \\mathrm{OPT})$.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T08:05:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T08:05:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2645", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2645", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T13:30:48Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2645", "title": "Isotaxis: Optimal Asynchronous Byzantine Consensus with Ordering Linearizability", "creators": ["Vincent Gramoli", "Zhenliang Lu", "Qiang Tang", "Pouriya Zarbafian", "Xinrui Zhang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Despite ensuring both consistency and liveness, state machine replication (SMR) protocols remain vulnerable to adversaries that manipulate transaction order, causing, e.g., MEV attacks. To mitigate this, researchers have proposed new variants augmented with order-fairness. However, existing protocols that employ dependency graphs, such as Aequitas (Crypto 2020), Themis (CCS 2023), and SpeedyFair (NDSS 2024), often suffer from suboptimal performance, limited resilience, or weakened security guarantees. Pompē (OSDI 2020) introduced a novel ordering notion called ordering linearizability (OL) that may circumvent those drawbacks. However, its guarantee holds only under favorable network conditions, making the protocol vulnerable to order fairness violations during network delays and susceptible to performance degradation in the presence of Byzantine faults. Also, implementing SMR under OL remains an open challenge in asynchronous settings, as no known protocol achieves this without sacrificing liveness of SMR.\n\nIn this paper, we present $\\mathsf{Isotaxis}$, a state machine replication with ordering linearizability; moreover, our protocol has communication complexity $\\mathcal{O}(n\\ell+\\lambda n^2)$, where $n$ is the number of processes, $\\ell$ is the input (transaction) size, and $\\lambda$ is the security parameter. This is optimal when $\\ell\\geq \\lambda n$, while previous works have cubic communication. To the best of our knowledge, $\\mathsf{Isotaxis}$ is the first protocol to achieve ordering linearizability in the asynchronous setting, especially one with optimal communication complexity and optimal Byzantine resilience. We implemented $\\mathsf{Isotaxis}$ and conducted extensive experiments using up to 100 EC2 c6a.2xlarge instances. The experimental results show that our protocol robustly outperforms Pompē across all system scales, ranging from 4 to 100 nodes.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T13:30:48Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T13:30:48Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2646", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2646", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T15:05:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2646", "title": "Mikros: Bitwidth-Aware SNARKs over Extensions of Small Fields", "creators": ["Mingshu CONG"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Provers for succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (SNARKs) perform arithmetic over a large field for soundness, even when the witness entries are a few bits wide, which inflates both prover time and memory usage. Recent work makes individual SNARK components bitwidth-aware, so that a lower witness bitwidth means faster proving and lower memory usage, but these techniques cover only part of the prover and exploit the structure of specific fields, typically binary ones.\n\nWe introduce Mikros, a framework for end-to-end bitwidth-aware SNARK construction based on algebraic vector packing. We pack vectors of length \\(N=m\\kappa\\)  over a base field \\(\\mathbb{F}\\) into length-\\(m\\) vectors over a degree-\\(\\kappa\\) extension field \\(\\mathbb{E}\\), which turns length-\\(N\\) relations over \\(\\mathbb{F}\\) into length-\\(m\\) relations over \\(\\mathbb{E}\\) and makes existing linear-time extension-field protocols bitwidth-aware. This technique thus unifies bitwidth-aware inner-product proofs, Hadamard-product proofs, and polynomial commitment schemes, previously obtained by separate constructions, and yields the first bitwidth-aware grand-product proof, hence the first bitwidth-aware permutation argument. Composing them gives bitwidth-aware SNARKs for circuit satisfiability over extensions of arbitrary small fields.\n\nFor a single instance of circuit satisfiability, the prover cost is proportional to the effective bitwidth, the combined bitwidth of the witness entries and the wiring-position encodings; across instances of the same circuit, the position encoding is amortized and the per-instance cost is proportional to the witness bitwidth.\nAlthough Mikros does not rely on binary-field structure, its prover is \\(2.19\\times\\), \\(2.55\\times\\), and \\(1.85\\times\\) faster on batches of \\(256\\) SHA-256 compressions, Keccak permutations, and BLAKE3 compressions than Flock (B\\\"unz \\etal, IACR ePrint 2026), the state-of-the-art bitwidth-aware SNARK over binary-extension fields.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T15:05:59Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T15:05:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2647", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2647", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T15:08:28Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2647", "title": "Revisiting ZMAC+: Birthday-Bound Attacks and a Beyond-Birthday-Bound Repair", "creators": ["Yan Jia", "Peng Wang", "Lei Hu", "Shuping Mao", "Tingting Guo", "Jiadong Han"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "ZMAC+ is a tweakable-block-cipher-based MAC proposed by List and Nandi\nin ToSC 2017 with claimed beyond-birthday-bound security. We show that\na tag-swap mechanism previously observed for a hypothetical two-output\nextension of DoveMAC also applies to the published ZMAC+ construction.\nFor two-block tags, we give a distinguisher with constant advantage and\na fresh-message forgery with constant success probability using\n$O(2^{n/2})$ queries in the ideal-TBC model, where $n$ is the block length.\nAn internal collision between two message families exchanges their tag\nblocks; a common extension preserves this relation and leads to a forgery\nwith one additional authentication query. We identify a counting error\nin the published Lemma~4 and prove a corrected aggregate differential\nbound. The resulting PRF and MAC upper bounds match the birthday query\nthreshold for bounded message lengths and two-block tags, under explicit\nfield-order conditions. The distinguisher extends to every legal fixed\noutput length $d\\ge2$, and the forgery to every legal even $d$.\nWe also retain ZHash and separate the output domains. Under stated\nfield-order, length, and domain-capacity conditions, this modification\nadmits an adaptive PRF bound of order $q^2/2^{n+\\min(n,t)}$ for bounded\nlengths. Finally, a one-query counterexample shows that the ZAE security\ntheorem must retain the per-message length restriction required by its\ncounter-in-tweak encryption component.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T15:08:28Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T15:08:28Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2648", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2648", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T15:34:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2648", "title": "Notes on BulletProofs++ Range Proofs", "creators": ["Philipp Jovanovic", "Arnab Roy"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We review the Bulletproofs++ construction which replaces the bit-decomposition inner-product argument of Bulletproofs with a reciprocal set-membership argument over base-$16$ digits. We present a self-contained specification of the $64$-bit range proof as well as a general batched variant parametric in the batch size $M$ and bit width $b$ and prove honest-verifier zero-knowledge and exact-form knowledge soundness. We describe the evaluation and optimizations of our Rust implementation over Ristretto255, which proves up to $7.8\\times$ and verifies up to $4.5\\times$ faster than regular Bulletproofs. Finally, we correct two formulas of the original paper: the affine $T^3$ term of the scalar polynomial $p_s(T)$ carries a factor of $2$, and the slot-$0$ component of the blinding vector $r_S$ carries the opposite sign.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T15:34:50Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T15:34:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2649", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2649", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T17:23:48Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2649", "title": "LINE-Break: Cryptanalysis and Reverse Engineering of Letter Sealing", "creators": ["Diego F. Aranha", "Adam Blatchley Hansen", "Thomas Kingo T. Mogensen"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present a security analysis of the messaging service known as\nLINE, a popular platform used daily by millions of users in East\nand Southeast Asia – most notably Japan, Taiwan, Thailand, and\nIndonesia. More specifically, we focus on its underlying custom\nend-to-end encryption (E2EE) protocol, known as Letter Sealing v2.\nOur findings show that Letter Sealing allows a TLS Machine-in-the-\nMiddle attacker or malicious server to violate integrity, authenticity,\nand confidentiality of communications. The stateless design of the\nprotocol allows message replay, reordering, and blocking attacks\nwithout the user being notified. The lack of origin authentication\nfacilitates impersonation attacks, in which the authorship of mes-\nsages in one-to-one or group chats can be forged by malicious users\ncolluding with the adversary. Lastly, stickers and URL previews\npresent a notable leakage of plaintext, which leads to a violation\nof confidentiality. To verify the correctness of our findings, we\nmounted a Machine-in-the-Middle attack on an iOS device, yielding\nthe device’s outgoing traffic and the corresponding server responses.\nUtilizing this setup, we experimentally verified our attacks against\nthe authentic LINE application and an independent implementation.\nWe discuss our findings in comparison to the state-of-the-art E2EE\nprotocols, and conclude that Letter Sealing does not satisfy the\nrequirements expected from a modern E2EE messaging protocol.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T17:23:48Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T17:23:48Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2650", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2650", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T17:39:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2650", "title": "On Robust Combiners for Pseudorandom Codes and PKE with Pseudorandom Ciphertexts", "creators": ["Nico Döttling", "Venkata Koppula", "Mahesh Sreekumar Rajasree", "Felix Rohrbach"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Robust combiners are a standard way to hedge cryptographic assumptions: given several candidate constructions, they produce one construction that remains secure as long as one candidate is secure. In favorable cases, such combiners also yield universal constructions. We ask whether this paradigm applies to cryptographic primitives whose public outputs must be both pseudorandom and sparse.\n\nOur first result gives a negative answer for pseudorandom codes (PRCs), i.e., error-correcting codes whose codewords are computationally indistinguishable from uniform strings. We prove that secret-key PRCs admit no black-box robust combiner. The impossibility holds even for the weakest meaningful guarantee, where the combined scheme is required to be secure when all but one candidate\nPRC are secure.\n\nWe then show that the obstruction is not specific to error correction. In the sparse ciphertext regime, public-key encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts also admits no black-box robust combiner. This stands in contrast to ordinary IND-CPA encryption, for which robust combiners are easy to obtain. Thus the requirement that public outputs look uniformly random introduces a genuine barrier to black-box assumption hedging, and rules out the standard combiner route to universal constructions for these primitives.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T17:39:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T17:39:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2651", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2651", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T12:08:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2651", "title": "HELLO, GOODBYE: Concurrent General Composition From Super-Rushing Security", "creators": ["Anirudh Chandramouli"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Kushilevitz, Lindell, and Rabin (STOC `06, SIAM Journal on Computing `10), in their seminal result, showed that any standalone-secure synchronous multiparty computation (MPC) protocol can be compiled into one secure under concurrent general composition, by adding a synchronisation step after every round; thereby, at least doubling the round complexity. We show that for protocols that are secure against super-rushing adversaries, introduced by Asharov, Chandramouli, Cohen, and Ishai (EuroCrypt `25), two synchronisation rounds suffice. Specifically, for an $R$-round protocol that is secure against super-rushing adversaries with a black-box, straight-line simulator, adding a round of start synchronisation (saying ``HELLO'') and a round of end synchronisation (saying ``GOODBYE'') yields security under concurrent general composition with selective abort in $R+2$ rounds. If the end synchronisation is over a broadcast channel, the security is upgraded to unanimous abort. Both compilers incur no loss in the security reduction and preserve the flavour of security (perfect, statistical, or computational) of the underlying synchronous protocol. Moreover, combining with the sufficient conditions of Asharov et al. for perfect security, and the round-preserving super-rushing compilers of Ciampi, Ravi, and Zou (Cryptology ePrint Archive 2026/1745) for statistical and computational security, yields compilers from rushing security to security under concurrent general composition, with an additive overhead of at most $2$ rounds.\n\n  We further extend our compilers to protocols with a trusted setup, such as a common reference string or a public-key infrastructure, which is necessary in the dishonest majority setting. We require two conditions. First, every execution of the protocol uses its own stateless copy of the setup, whose responses to the adversary do not depend on the interactions of the honest parties. In particular, this rules out setups that are shared across executions, such as a global common reference string or a single public-key infrastructure used by every execution. Second, the underlying protocol is secure against super-rushing adversaries with adaptive inputs, that is, even when the inputs are chosen after interacting with the setup. Under these conditions, the same compilers yield security under concurrent general composition. We also show that adaptive inputs cannot be relaxed to the usual notion of security in the setup-hybrid model. Specifically, we give a protocol that is statistically secure against super-rushing adversaries with guaranteed output delivery under the standard hybrid model, but is insecure under concurrent general composition after adding start and end synchronisation, even with selective abort.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T18:23:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T12:08:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2652", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2652", "datestamp": "2026-10-26T20:16:40Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2652", "title": "Reverse Substitution in Secret Sharing: The Critical One-Half Threshold and a Route to Superpolynomial Lower Bounds", "creators": ["Shahram Khazaei"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The contribution vector (convec) of a secret-sharing scheme is the vector of its normalized share sizes. The average and maximum coordinates of a convec give, respectively, the average and maximum information ratios of the scheme. Obtaining superlinear lower bounds on these quantities for unrestricted perfect secret sharing has remained a challenging open problem for about four decades.\n\nIn this paper, we study substitution, a natural way to build complicated access structures from simpler ones: one participant of an outer access structure is replaced by an inner access structure. Given secret-sharing schemes for the two factors, the standard forward construction composes them into a scheme for the composite access structure. We study the converse question. Given an arbitrary scheme for the composite access structure, we ask to what extent its convec admits a reverse factorization into convecs for the outer and inner factors, up to a common multiplicative loss.\n\nExact reversal is false: we give a counterexample whose optimal reverse factor is \\(8/9\\), with a composite scheme that is scalar-linear over every finite field. On the positive side, we prove that a factor \\(1/2\\) is always attainable, and that every fixed instance admits a strictly larger factor.\n\nFor a recursive family built from Csirmaz’s classical access structure \\(\\mathcal C_k\\), whose distinguished set has size \\(k\\), we identify a critical reverse factor that determines when the resulting lower bound becomes superlinear. This critical factor exceeds one half by only an amount of order \\((\\log k)/k\\). Crossing it yields superlinear lower bounds, while any fixed positive excess above one half gives a route to superpolynomial lower bounds. Using only Shannon inequalities, the corresponding recursive factor cannot cross the critical value. Thus any improvement sufficient to pass this threshold must exploit constraints beyond the Shannon inequalities.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T20:16:40Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-26T20:16:40Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2653", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2653", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T09:24:56Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2653", "title": "Analyzing Compiler-induced Constant-time Violations with Compiler at Scale", "creators": ["Jing Liu", "Lucía Martínez Gavier", "Zhiyuan Zhang", "Marcel Böhme", "Gilles Barthe"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "The constant-time programming policy is a de facto standard for cryptographic libraries to prevent timing side-channel attacks. However, compiler optimizations may break constant-time source code during compilation. Systematically preventing this requires understanding where a violation arises, how it is introduced, and which compiler configurations are problematic. Existing approaches analyze a single compilation point, either the final binary or one intermediate representation, and thus only partially answer the three questions.\n\nWe propose CTGREP, a compiler-based framework that answers all three questions by applying differential analysis across the entire compilation chain. We use CTGREP to analyze seven complete cryptographic libraries across three Clang versions, six target platforms, and thousands of compiler configurations. We systematically detect compiler-induced constant-time violations in the wild and collaborate with library developers to address 48 cases. We further identify seven new problematic LLVM passes, bypass and improve the state-of-the-art compiler-flag-based mitigation. Finally, we quantify how the compiler version, target platform, and optimization configuration affect the violations. By covering entire libraries across the full compilation chain, CTGREP effectively detects remaining compiler-induced constant-time violations and complements the community's ongoing hardening efforts.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-26T21:06:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T09:24:56Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2654", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2654", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T02:37:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2654", "title": "When Algebraic Structure Meets Too Many Hints", "creators": ["Dongshu Cai", "Yijian Liu", "Xianhui Lu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The hint framework of Dachman-Soled, Ducas, Gong, and Rossi (CRYPTO 2020), together with the later too-many-hints analyses from May and Nowakowski (ASIACRYPT 2023) and Cao, Jiang, and Cheng (CRYPTO 2025), gives a classification of secret-dependent hints and LLL-breaking hint thresholds for LWE schemes. These values are now frequently adopted as the default benchmark for side-channel security evaluation. We show that applying them as a security metric is problematic.\n\nDDGR categorizes hints based only on their local algebraic form, while the threshold analyses assume uniformly sampled hint vectors. Neither captures how the specific algebraic form of a hint governs the geometry of the resulting sparsified lattice. A hint’s class label and the corresponding uniform threshold therefore cannot, on their own, capture its real cryptanalytic power.\n\nWe illustrate this mismatch with two forms of structured leakage that naturally appear in ring and module lattice implementations, validated via synthetic experiments on Kyber-512. NTT-domain residues qualify formally as mod-$q$ hints, yet they recover the full Kyber-512 secret with roughly half as many hints as the uniform mod-$q$ bound predicts. Finite-precision FFT samples fall into the weaker approximate-hint class, and still only need $25\\%$--$55\\%$ of the hint budget required for uniform perfect hints.\n\nThe gap stems from algebraic structure: these hint families carry additional ring structure that enables tailored lattice recovery strategies, a distinction invisible under the uniform-sampling model.\n\nWe do not propose new attack optimizations. Our findings indicate that DDGR hint classes and too-many-hints thresholds are syntactic descriptions, not standalone security metrics for real leakage traces. Evaluating a side-channel leak requires considering the algebraic structure of the hint vectors, not just their category and quantity.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T02:37:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T02:37:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2655", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2655", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T05:28:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2655", "title": "OblivDGL: Oblivious Deep Graph Learning Made Practical", "creators": ["Yiming Qin", "Xiaoning Liu", "Shangqi Lai", "Joseph K. Liu", "Xingliang Yuan"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "The rapid deployment of Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) within Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) has opened up new privacy concerns. Both sensitive graph data and proprietary GNN models are submitted to and processed in third-party MLaaS platform for training and inference. To alleviate those concerns, recent efforts have been made to design tailored secure computation protocols for GNNs. Unfortunately, existing designs cannot accomplish security, functionality, and scalability simultaneously. They leak a certain degree of graph information, offer limited support on secure training of GNNs, and can hardly scale to large graphs.\n\nIn this paper, we design and implement OblivDGL, an oblivious deep graph learning framework for secure GNN inference and training. Our design is inspired by Deep Graph Library (DGL), an industrial practice for graph learning. At its core, we distill the secure computational patterns of GNNs into a generalized form, and empower both secure GNN training and inference through a novel oblivious message passing paradigm. To realize such a paradigm, we design a new oblivious graph representation, and realize it by function secret sharing (FSS), a lightweight secure computation technique with low latency. Compared to prior secure GNN systems, OblivDGL achieves the most stringent privacy guarantees, i.e., revealing no private information except for the total number of edges and nodes. One standout feature of OblivDGL is the scalability of processing encrypted graphs by carefully tailored parallelization designs. Extensive evaluations on four benchmark graph datasets demonstrate that, compared to state-of-the-art secure GNN frameworks, OblivDGL reduces communication cost by up to 1024x and achieves up to 14.3x speedup in runtime during secure training. For secure inference, OblivDGL achieves up to 754x lower communication and a 4.19x speedup.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T05:28:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T05:28:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2656", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2656", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T06:41:03Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2656", "title": "Falcon Key Recovery from Joint Sampler Leakages", "creators": ["Youngchang Kim", "Yongseong Park", "Jaeho Jeon", "Young-Sik Kim"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Falcon and the forthcoming FN-DSA standard based on it generate signatures via discrete Gaussian sampling, during which power consumption leaks information about secret-dependent intermediate values. While prior attacks exploit sampler leakages individually or in pairs, we present a unified key-recovery framework that fuses three observations from each SamplerZ call: the signed-exponent class e(k) of the integer center, the random-sign bit b, and a multi-class proposal magnitude z0. These fused observations define magnitude-preserving intervals or rays for accepted sampler outputs. Leveraging an exact public linear relation that holds in the absence of modular wraparound, we map these candidate sets directly into slab and halfspace constraints on the secret key. The resulting system is solved via smooth softplus interval regression and bounded integer reconstruction with public-key validation, entirely bypassing computationally intensive lattice reductions such as LLL or BKZ. For PQClean Falcon-512 running at-O3 on an ARM Cortex-M4, our 17-class center classifier achieves 99.34% call-level accuracy on held-out test signatures from the profiling keys. The resulting attack recovers all 50 disjoint evaluation keys using at most 34 signatures (median 11), with a median post-classification key-recovery runtime of 17.54s per key. Furthermore, on c-fn-dsa, where center conversion relies on a single constant-time CLZ instruction, a reduced-resolution 7-class classifier combined with proposal leakage still recovers 38 of 50 keys within 200 signatures. These findings demonstrate that instruction-level normalization alone cannot prevent key recovery, underscoring that side-channel countermeasures for FN-DSA must protect all sampler leakage channels jointly.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T06:41:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T06:41:03Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2657", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2657", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T07:18:23Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2657", "title": "Poly2MsgLeaks: Certified Key Recovery from Polynomial-to-Message Leakage", "creators": ["Yongseong Park", "YoungChang Kim", "Jeongdo Kim", "Young-Sik Kim"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We present Poly2MsgLeaks, a profiled chosen-ciphertext power-analysis attack that recovers the complete 512-coefficient public-key encryption (PKE) secret of SMAUG-T in its TiMER parameter set. Each polynomial-to-message (P2M) decision depends on four ternary secret coefficients and therefore on one of 81 local states. We characterize all admissible P2M predicates and show that our six-query schedule maps the 81 states to 57 binary transcripts; even with both exact polynomial weights, noiseless transcripts leave a mean residual ambiguity of 27.2 bits. Poly2MsgLeaks retains waveform scores for all 81 states, couples the 128 local blocks through the exact weights, and enumerates a calibrated cost region against the public-key relation. Under a uniform-matrix model, we prove that an incorrect key is released with probability at most $2^{-2095.6}$; for exchangeable calibration and evaluation keys, the probability that the true key lies outside the searched region is bounded without a channel model. Using six physical P2M traces recorded on an STM32F415, Poly2MsgLeaks recovers 999 of 1,000 previously unseen secrets, and a verifier-driven policy recovers all 1,000 secrets of a second cohort at a mean cost of 7.021 traces, without false acceptances. With the same decoder and limits, equalizing the scores within each transcript class reduces recovery from 998 to 112 keys. Against single-write message assembly and a two-share masked P2M, the evaluated six-execution attack recovers no complete secret.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T07:18:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T07:18:23Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2658", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2658", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T07:26:12Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2658", "title": "Unshuffling Fisher-Yates: Practical Recovery of Length-128 Permutations and Application to ML-DSA", "creators": ["Jonas Schupp", "Anna Baumeister", "Antonia Wachter-Zeh", "Georg Sigl"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Shuffling is a standard hiding countermeasure against (single-trace) side-channel attacks on the number-theoretic transform (NTT) of lattice-based post-quantum schemes, such as ML-DSA. The Fisher-Yates algorithm can be used to generate the underlying random permutation. Recovering this permutation itself from a single trace has so far only been studied for short sequences. We present a practical attack on a software implementation of Fisher-Yates for sequences of length 128, the number of butterfly operations in one layer of ML-DSA’s NTT. We identify the exploitable leakage of the algorithm, detect and remove the timing variations caused by rejection sampling and extract Hamming weight and identity leakage from a single trace per shuffle. We encode these hints as a constraint-programming problem with a soft objective function and enumerate the most likely permutations in order of descending likelihood. Applied to a shuffled ML-DSA-44 NTT, the recovered permutations are used to re-order the butterfly leakage, and recover the secret polynomial s1 either directly or up to a few coefficients that are enumerated directly. Protecting ML-DSA’s NTT with Fisher-Yates-based shuffling does, therefore, not, by itself, prevent side-channel-assisted key recovery.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T07:26:12Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T07:26:12Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2659", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2659", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T08:39:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2659", "title": "Alg\\{Ossa\\}: Decentralized Secure Aggregation with Rotating Committees and Eventual Delivery", "creators": ["Xiangyu Su", "Yuma Tamagawa", "Mario Larangeira", "Zengpeng Li", "Keisuke Tanaka"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Secure aggregation lets clients reveal only an aggregate of their private contributions, supporting a variety of applications, including privacy-preserving sensing, collaborative analytics, and federated learning.\nBuilding on the single-server, committee-aided model for one-shot clients used by OPA and Willow~(CRYPTO~'25), we present Ossa, a generic construction with a modular security analysis.\nOssa realizes the standard secure aggregation functionality with non-selective abort against a malicious server, but leaves role selection unspecified and provides no delivery guarantee.\nWe therefore present AlgOssa, which integrates Ossa into an Algorand-style consensus backbone in which cryptographic sortition selects fresh potential leaders and verifier committees in each round and refreshes the decryptor committee from finalized chain state at key epochs.\nAlgOssa further selects the server from among the potential leaders, and we establish an explicit lower bound on the probability that the selected server is honest.\nConsequently, the probability that a round delivers a non-empty aggregate is bounded below by a positive constant, yielding an eventual delivery guarantee across repeated rounds.\nThis variable delivery cadence fits delay-tolerant statistical sensing and, with persistent buffering and staleness control, buffered asynchronous federated learning.\nOur generic core supports classical and post-quantum instantiation routes; we evaluate complete local classical rounds and demonstrate the feasibility of the post-quantum route.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T08:39:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T08:39:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2660", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2660", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T13:19:05Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2660", "title": "Towards Quantum Sensing for Side-Channel Analysis", "creators": ["Oliver Butowski", "Paul Haas", "Jonas Hasenkrug", "Niklas Mathes", "Emanuele Strieder", "Michael Kunzer", "Jan Jeske", "Nisha Jacob Kabakci", "Marc Stöttinger"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Side-Channel Analysis is an established field of research to assess implementation vulnerabilities of cryptographic algorithms. One typically exploited side-channel is the electromagnetic (EM) near-field, which is proportional to the data-dependent currents flowing through an Integrated Circuit (IC). The field of Quantum Sensing (QS) based on Nitrogen-Vacancy (NV) centers has shown promising approaches for different measurement configurations like scanning or spatially resolved wide-field imaging. Already today, QS has been used in the analysis of (quasi-)static magnetic fields on ICs in spatially-resolved wide-field magnetometers. In this work, we study the applicability of QS for the analysis of dynamic EM fields of ICs. For the first time, we demonstrate spectral-temporal analysis of the EM-side-channel using an NV-center-based Radio-Frequency spectrometer. Our sensor has a real-time bandwidth of 1.1 GHz with adjustable center frequency and directly probes the frequency spectrum via NV center interactions in the time domain. The approach circumvents any computations like Fourier transforms or performing frequency sweeps, enabling GHz-realtime bandwidths. We use this spectrometer to analyze the EM emanations of an RSA decryption and perform leakage detection of a software implementation of the Number Theoretic Transform - a building block of all current lattice based post-quantum algorithms - running on a Cortex M4 commercial off-the-shelf microcontroller.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T13:19:05Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T13:19:05Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2661", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2661", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T15:41:30Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2661", "title": "Radical isogenies on every model", "creators": ["Thomas Decru"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Radical isogeny formulae compute a cyclic chain of $N$-isogenies with one $N$th root per step and without sampling torsion points, but for general $N$ they were only known in Tate normal form. We give radical steps of every odd degree $N$ directly on short Weierstrass, Montgomery, twisted Edwards, Huff, extended Jacobi quartic, twisted Hessian, Legendre and Jacobi intersection curves, on Kummer lines, and on all curves with a rational point of order~$2$. Our approach is model-independent. The Tate normal form data is obtained from the $x$-coordinate of the kernel generator by a shifted recursion, and the codomain is recovered in the original model by locating the image of a distinguished torsion point, without square roots. In Tate normal form we lower the cost of a step from $12.5N$ to $10N$ multiplications plus one exponentiation, and short Weierstrass curves come close at $10N+35$. Montgomery and twisted Edwards curves cost $10.5N+O(1)$. However, pushing a point through their steps costs only $2N$ multiplications without precomputation, against $2N+16$ plus a shared $2N-7$ in Tate normal form, which makes them the cheapest models for chains that transport torsion points, e.g.\\ for all $N\\ge19$ when two points are pushed. The other models cost between $11.5N+O(\\log N)$ and $15.5N+O(\\log N)$ per step. All algorithms are inversion-free, with exact operation counts.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T15:41:30Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T15:41:30Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2662", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2662", "datestamp": "2026-10-27T18:01:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2662", "title": "Tractable, Not Truncated: Colored-Noise TRNG Security via Fractional Brownian Motion", "creators": ["Maciej Skórski", "Nathalie Bochard", "Licinius Benea"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Oscillator-based true random number generators derive randomness from timing fluctuations driven by thermal and flicker noise, and flicker gains weight as technology advances and transistors shrink.  Its long memory leaks information about past, which existing models either discard or truncate, overstating security.\n\nWe introduce a rigorous and tractable framework for colored noise, including the white and flicker noise of oscillators. We model the oscillator phase by fractional Brownian motion and prove a quasi-renewal property: the phase uncertainty left after conditioning on the entire past depends only on the elapsed time. This yields closed-form worst-case min-entropy and sampling requirements. We also extend spectral and Allan-variance analysis to finite samples, so the noise parameters are estimated consistently from a single timing trace. The pipeline from measurement to sampling requirement is closed-form and needs no simulation.\n\nExperiments across FPGA and ASIC platforms show that flicker dominates: its variance meets white noise within about 100 cycles and accounts for more than 99% of uncertainty behind the targeted 0.99 min-entropy rate. Methods relying exclusively on thermal noise require adjustment or redesign: incorporating flicker noise enables a two-to-three orders of magnitude increase in bitrate.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-27T18:01:36Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-27T18:01:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2663", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2663", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T03:47:29Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2663", "title": "Quantum Multi-Collision Lower Bounds for Arbitrary Bounded Types", "creators": ["Tianci Peng", "Shiqi Hou", "Xiaoyang Dong"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We study quantum collision finding for functions of prescribed\nexact type.\nFor fixed constants $k\\ge r\\ge2$ and $N=kn$, consider functions\n$f:[N]\\to\\mathbb Z_q$ of type $(k^n)$, with exactly $n$\ndistinct output values and $k$ preimages for each value.\nWe prove that the worst-case bounded-error quantum query\ncomplexity of finding $r$-collisions in $\\ell$ distinct\nequality classes is\n\\[\n \\Theta_{k,r}\\!\\left(\n   \\ell^{\\,2^{r-1}/(2^r-1)}\n   N^{(2^{r-1}-1)/(2^r-1)}\n \\right)\n\\]\nfor $1\\le\\ell\\le N^{2^{-r}}$.\nThe result is uniform over all feasible alphabet sizes $q\\ge n$.\n\nOur proof uses the compressed permutation oracle (CPO).\nWe establish a recurrence for intermediate collision counts\nand control its accumulated error to obtain database tails\nexponentially small in $\\ell$.\nThe improved CPO soundness estimate then converts these\ndatabase bounds into function-query lower bounds.\n\nMoreover, we extend the analysis to arbitrary exact types with bounded\nclass sizes, without requiring any particular class size to\noccur linearly often.\nThe resulting lower bounds are tight when forward permutation\naccess is additionally available, although they need not be\ntight for the original function-query problem.\nFinally, a sampling reduction relates our collision bounds\nto sparse $k$-distinctness instances.\nA separate analysis using Belovs's transfer framework recovers\nthe same lower-bound exponent, establishing a concrete\nconnection between the two approaches.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T03:47:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T03:47:29Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2664", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2664", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T08:30:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2664", "title": "Rerandomizable Garbling Beyond BHHO-KMHE and a Construction from LWE", "creators": ["Raphael Heitjohann", "Jonas von der Heyden", "Tibor Jager"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Rerandomizable garbling schemes (RGS) are a fundamental primitive enabling advanced cryptographic constructions such as multi-hop homomorphic encryption (Gentry, Halevi, Vaikuntanathan, CRYPTO 2010), iO-combiners (Ananth, Jain, Naor, Sahai, Yogev, CRYPTO 2016), and YOSO-style MPC (Acharya, Hazay, Kolesnikov, Prabhakaran, TCC 2022 and CRYPTO 2024). All known RGS instantiations rely on discrete-logarithm-type assumptions, concretely via the BHHO scheme (Boneh, Halevi, Hamburg, Ostrovsky, CRYPTO 2008) and its recent pairing-based variant (Heitjohann, von der Heyden, Jager, CRYPTO 2025). This reliance stems from the use of key-and-message homomorphic encryption (KMHE) that supports rerandomization and strong \"key-privacy under leakage\", which hides the applied homomorphic transformations and is currently only achievable using BHHO-style bitwise encryption in combination with permutation-based homomorphisms.\n\n  Our first main contribution is a new garbling technique that shifts the burden of hiding homomorphic transformations from the encryption scheme to the garbling itself. This allows us to construct RGS from KMHE schemes with substantially weaker properties, avoiding the need for bitwise encryption and permutation-based homomorphisms, and enabling the construction of RGS from KMHE with other homomorphisms, such as additively-homomorphic ones. \n\n  As a second contribution, we give a concrete lattice-based instantiation of the required KMHE primitive, based on LWE. This construction is a variant of the GSW FHE scheme (Gentry, Sahai, Waters, CRYPTO 2013), which uses new techniques for rerandomization and is tailored to the requirements of our new garbling scheme by supporting a \"homomorphic\"/\"lossy\" mode. This yields the first RGS construction that does not rely on discrete-logarithm assumptions and may provide post-quantum security.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T08:30:41Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T08:30:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2665", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2665", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T13:08:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2665", "title": "Shor's algorithm compiled on cat qubits: 22 593 qubits for RSA-2048 in 3.14 days", "creators": ["Axel Pappalardo", "Dahmun Goudarzi", "Victor Hertz", "Hugo Jacinto", "Larissa Kroell", "André Schrottenloher", "Peter Shanahan", "Élie Gouzien", "Rémi de La Vieuville", "Vivien Londe"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We present an end-to-end resource estimation of Shor's algorithm on superconducting cat qubits, from its mathematical description to the allocation and scheduling of physical qubits on a chip layout. After proposing a comprehensive view of the modern versions of Shor's algorithm for RSA, ECDLP and FFDLP, we make explicit their logical circuits and the trade-offs they enable. We compile the dominant subroutines down to physical-qubit operations on two architectures: one based on repetition cat codes and one based on LDPC cat codes. We design a parity-Cnot gate for cat qubits, extend a multi-target Cnot gate to the LDPC-cat architecture, and adapt an active injection procedure to cat-qubit architectures. Building on these primitives, we adapt to cat-qubit architectures the adder from Gidney’s 2025 resource estimate for factoring RSA-2048. We combine our adder compilation and a coarser resource estimate for the phaseup with the factory designs and lookup compilation from the FeMoco resource estimation of Kroell et al. Together, these compilations lead to chip layouts and schedules for factoring RSA-2048.\n \nAssuming a 1$\\mu$s error-correction cycle time, a 10$\\mu$s  reaction time, circuit-level phase-flip noise with probability $p_Z = 5 \\times 10^{-4}$ and no bit-flips, factoring RSA-2048, the configuration we compile in full, requires about 23 000 cat qubits and 3.14 days. Reusing the operations compiled for RSA-2048, solving ECDLP on secp256k1 requires at most 30 000 cat qubits and 1 hour, and FFDLP-512, which we propose as an intermediate benchmark, about 6\\,700 cat qubits and 21~minutes. Trading space for time, RSA-2048 runs in 1.25 hours on about 611 000 cat qubits. The requirement on no bit-flips (which corresponds to a bit-flip time of about 100 years) can be relaxed to a bit-flip time of about one hour by using an additional concatenation layer into a distance-3 bit-flip error-correcting code. In that case, we estimate that the cost of RSA-2048 increases to about 45 000 cat qubits.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T13:08:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T13:08:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2666", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2666", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T16:11:14Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2666", "title": "Efficient SIMD SHAKE through Cost-Aware Permutation Scheduling", "creators": ["Hang Zhang", "Ya Shi", "Ying Liu", "Xianhui Lu"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Lattice-based cryptography uses SHAKE to expand seeds into byte strings for matrix generation and sampling. SIMD Keccak implementations process multiple hash streams in parallel. Differences in stream lengths and input dependencies can prevent full SIMD utilization. We present a cost-aware method for scheduling Keccak permutations across hash streams during a single execution of a cryptographic algorithm. The method groups ready streams and divides long streams into segments for regrouping. A model of permutation calls, state movement, initialization, and input preparation guides the selection of stream groups, segment lengths, and state placements. We evaluate ML-KEM and HAETAE on an Apple M5, a Cortex-A72, and an Intel Core i5-11500, using Keccak kernels that process two, four, or eight streams per call. ML-KEM achieves speedups of up to $1.31\\times$ for encapsulation and $1.44\\times$ for decapsulation, while HAETAE achieves up to $1.28\\times$ for signing and $1.26\\times$ for verification.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T16:11:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T16:11:14Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2667", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2667", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T16:41:42Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2667", "title": "Faster complete formulas and their application to curves with efficient endomorphisms", "creators": ["Diego F. Aranha", "Paulo L. Barreto"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "We revisit scalar multiplication on prime curves $y^2 = x^3 + b$ with $p \\equiv 1 \\pmod 3$, the family including secp256k1, BN, and BLS curves. We apply a 15-year-old technique in a novel way to improve the best complete addition from $12$ to $11$ multiplications (or $10$ for mixed coordinates) for the first time in 10 years: its final stage is a 3D cross product, which needs only five multiplications.\nWe implement the new formulas on the \\texttt{libsecp256k1} library, with an improvement of $5.2$\\% in constant-time fixed-base scalar multiplication.\nFurthermore, we propose a complete tripling formula with the same cost as incomplete tripling in Jacobian coordinates, and combine both formulas into an exception-free width-3 $\\tau$-NAF with $\\tau = 1 - \\omega$ and a six-point precomputed table. In an operation-count model it is about 14\\% faster than exception-free GLV-based scalar multiplication at 256 bits and 3--7\\% faster than the fastest incomplete GLV.\nA constant-time implementation in RELIC confirms the model on the BLS families: in $\\mathbb{G}_1$ of BLS12-381, BLS24-509 and BLS48-575 the $\\tau$-NAF is 9--13\\% faster than GLV with the same complete formulas, and the regular variant is 10--12\\% faster than regular GLV with complete formulas and 5--9\\% faster than regular GLV with incomplete Jacobian formulas.\nIn $\\mathbb{G}_2$ of the same curves, where GLS gives the baseline, the $\\tau$-NAF stays 10--11\\% faster than GLS with complete formulas and 7--9\\% faster with Jacobian formulas, while the regular variant gains at most 6\\%.\nWe also develop an `imaginary' version of Toom-Cook that is useful for the $\\mathbb{G}_T$ extension field arithmetic, yielding a 4--6\\% improvement in $\\mathbb{G}_T$ exponentiation for BLS24-509 and BLS48-575. A cyclotomic cube at 0.77 multiplications carries the $\\tau$-adic method over to $\\mathbb{G}_T$, where it makes exponentiation 3\\% faster on BLS24-509 and 11\\% faster on BLS48-575.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T16:41:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T16:41:42Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2668", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2668", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T19:09:34Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2668", "title": "An Algebraic Polynomial Evaluation Datastructure for Fields of Large Characteristic", "creators": ["Hiroki Okada", "Rachel Player", "Simon Pohmann"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "In this work, we study (multivariate) polynomial evaluation datastructures, i.e. algorithms that can evaluate a multivariate polynomial at any input point, using random access to some precomputed encoding of the polynomial. Multiple constructions have been proposed in the literature, with the work by Bhargava, Ghosh, Guo, Kumar and Umans (2024) achieving optimal datastructure size and query complexity, up to polynomial factors. For $n \\in d^{o(1)}$ this is equivalent to having datastructure size $d^{n + o(n)} (d n \\log q)^{O(1)}$ and query complexity $(d n \\log q)^{O(1)}$ for an $n$-variate polynomial of total degree $d$ over $\\mathbb{F}_q$. However, the algorithm of Bhargava et al. is not algebraic, since it requires lifting prime field elements to $\\mathbb{Z}$. An algebraic algorithm would be desirable, as an algebraic model of computation is natural for studying polynomial evaluation and is the standard model in algebraic complexity theory.\n\nOne approach to finding algebraic polynomial evaluation datastructures is to use univariate polynomial interpolation to reconstruct the polynomial along algebraic curves. This approach was first made explicit by Bhargava, Ghosh, Kumar and Mohapatra (2023), who used it to build an essentially optimal algebraic polynomial evaluation datastructure for fields of small characteristic $p = \\mathrm{char}(\\mathbb{F}_q) \\in d^{o(1)}$. Over these fields, their construction refutes a previous conjecture by Miltersen. For fields of larger characteristic, it remains an open problem to find an algebraic algorithm with optimal datastructure size and query complexity.\n\nIn this work, we propose a new way to construct algebraic curves over prime fields that allow polynomial interpolation: by deriving curves from the base-$\\beta$ representation of (lifts of) prime field elements, we are able to recursively reduce the evaluation problem to points in boxes of decreasing size. This leads to a datastructure whose performance scales much more favourably with $p$. Concretely, we improve the dependency of the query complexity on $p$ from $p^{O(1)}$ to $d^{2\\log_2 \\ln\\ln p} \\ln p$, and completely remove the dependency on $p$ from the datastructure size. Its query complexity is still slightly super-polynomial in $d \\log p$. Nevertheless, a variant of our results is enough to disprove Miltersen's conjecture for all finite fields, including prime fields.\n\nWe further show that for a certain class of datastructures, which captures natural generalizations of our approach, the query complexity is lower-bounded by $d^{(1 - o(1))\\log_3\\ln\\ln p}$. Consequently, within this class, our construction is optimal up to a constant in the exponent.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T19:09:34Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T19:09:34Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2669", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2669", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T16:37:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2669", "title": "PIR through the Lens of Probabilistic Inference", "creators": ["Dana Dachman-Soled"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Private Information Retrieval (PIR) allows a client to retrieve an entry of a database while revealing no information about the requested index to the servers. Classic information-theoretic PIR protocols of Chor et al. (FOCS '95, JACM '98) and Ambainis (ICALP '97) achieve sublinear client computation and communication complexity with a constant number of servers, but require each server to perform computation linear in the database size. In this work, we ask for which classes of structured databases the server computation can be substantially reduced while preserving the communication complexity and privacy guarantees of these protocols.\n\nOur main contribution is a new connection between server computation in information-theoretic PIR and probabilistic inference. We show that the computation performed by every server in both the Chor et al. protocol and the recursive protocol of Ambainis can be viewed as computing a marginal probability of a product distribution. Consequently, efficient exact probabilistic inference algorithm immediately yields a faster server algorithm for PIR. We formalize this connection through the notion of inference complexity, which captures the complexity of evaluating these marginals.\n\nUsing this framework, we obtain improved server computation for several broad classes of functions, including read-once arithmetic formulas, graphical models of bounded treewidth (and consequently arithmetic circuits of bounded treewidth), functions with low communication complexity, and functions with sparse Fourier representations. The resulting protocols preserve the communication complexity, client computation, and number of servers of the underlying PIR constructions while substantially reducing server computation for these structured function classes.\n\nFinally, we complement our algorithms with conditional lower bounds. \nAssuming the randomized Circuit Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis (rCSETH), we show that, for every constant \\(\\varepsilon>0\\), there exists a constant \\(c\\) such that no uniform algorithm can compute the first (virtual) server's response in the Chor et al. or Ambainis protocol on all \\(n\\)-input Boolean circuits of size at most \\(n^c\\) in time \\(O(N^{1-\\varepsilon})\\), where \\(N=2^n\\). Thus, under rCSETH, substantially sublinear server computation cannot be achieved uniformly for all polynomial-size Boolean circuits.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T16:37:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T16:37:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2670", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2670", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T13:30:39Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2670", "title": "Barriers to Identity-Based Encryption in Generic Group-Action Models", "creators": ["Sikhar Patranabis"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Identity-based encryption (IBE) is required to support a superpolynomial-size identity space using only polynomial-size public parameters. This compression requirement underlies known barriers to IBE in the generic (pairing-free) group model. Cryptographic group actions, motivated prominently by isogeny-based cryptography, support many advanced primitives beyond public-key encryption. However, no generic construction of IBE from the basic group-action interface is known. Existing generic-group barriers do not resolve this question as they do not translate to generic group-action models.\n\nWe establish the first tight barriers to IBE in two variants of the generic group-action model. In the type-safe generic group-action model, we prove that an IBE scheme with negligible correctness error and $n$ non-origin action-set element-handles in its public parameters can support at most $n$ identities, even for a weak notion of fully selective security. We show that this bound holds irrespective of the number of action-set element-handles in identity secret keys. We further establish that this bound is tight by demonstrating a matching construction.\n\nWe then extend this tight characterization to a natural class of IBE schemes in the random-representation generic group-action model (including against representation-sensitive adversaries) under conditions ensuring that identity keys retain no hidden action-set encodings and discarded private encodings leave no residual information. We give a natural syntactic condition for the latter property. For actions additionally equipped with an inversion-like twist, we obtain a more general upper bound (including the same tight bound for odd-order actions).\n\nOur results provide the first formal evidence that IBE is likely to require additional algebraic structure or non-black-box techniques beyond the generic group-action interface. More broadly, we provide a new framework for proving lower bounds in generic group-action models.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T13:30:39Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T13:30:39Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2671", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2671", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T12:39:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2671", "title": "Beyond the Event Horizon of Keccak, Extending the Observation from 2011 and applications", "creators": ["Danilo Gligoroski"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "In 2011 we observed that a single path in the Keccak sponge from a state whose capacity has all zero bits back to such a state yields an explicit, infinite family of second preimages for every message of at least one full rate block. Finding such a path costs about 2^(c/2), which lies \"beyond the event horizon\" for SHA3-256 (c=512). In this paper we give three novel theorems around that observation. First, the capacity can have any value x: a two-block meet-in-the-middle loop from x back to x, found at heuristic cost about 2*2^(c/2), gives the same unlimited family of second preimages requiring no further search, with connectors to and from x at about the same cost again (Theorem 1). Theorem 2 extends this to k-block loops and to cycles of the capacity map. A single-state bridge, a state S with cap(f(S)) = cap(f^-1(S)), where cap denotes the capacity part of the state, also gives such a family but costs about 2^c. Theorem 3 gives cheap collisions and a bridge-amplified multicollision: one inner collision and one connector yield equal-length Joux-style 2^k-multicollisions for every k, instead of Joux's k collision searches; to our knowledge this is the first such construction for generic sponges with search cost independent of k. We give verified full-round examples on Keccak-f[200] and on Keccak-f[1600] with c=32. The second part of the paper offers novel protocols built on the asymmetry between minting and forging Keccak bridges. They include proof of work with hardness-adaptive capacity, dual-capacity commitments anchored by the real SHA3-256 digest, bridges as zero-knowledge-committed tokens, and a self-enforcing bounty market for reduced-round security. To our knowledge, these are the first unkeyed Keccak-based protocols that deliberately set the capacity so that the generic bridge cost is a feasible, tunable hardness parameter. We prove the three theorems, machine-check the stated algebraic results in Lean 4, and provide reproducible experiments and open-source proof-of-concept code. The applications are design proposals whose end-to-end security remains open.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T12:39:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T12:39:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2672", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2672", "datestamp": "2026-10-28T22:55:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2672", "title": "Nenya: Efficient zkSNARKs for Integer Rings Z/2kZ via Reverse Multiplication-Friendly Embeddings", "creators": ["Tianyu Zhang", "Nikita Borisov", "Yupeng Zhang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Zero-knowledge succinct non-interactive arguments of knowledge (zkSNARKs) are powerful cryptographic tools for certifying the correctness of computations with short proofs, fast verification, and zero-knowledge privacy guarantees. However, most existing zkSNARK schemes support arithmetic only over finite fields defined by large primes or their extensions. This creates substantial overhead when proving computations written in high-level programming languages, which typically operate on fixed-width integer types such as 32-bit and 64-bit integers.\n\nIn this paper, we introduce Nenya, the first practical SNARK scheme that supports native arithmetic over the integer ring $\\mathbb{Z}/2^k\\mathbb{Z}$. At the core of Nenya are new reductions from rank-1 constraint systems (R1CS) over $\\mathbb{Z}/2^k\\mathbb{Z}$ to constraints over Galois rings via reverse multiplication-friendly embeddings (RMFEs). We also design a polynomial commitment scheme based on suitable classes of error-correcting codes, which supports well-formedness checks and packing rotations on committed witnesses essentially for free, resulting in sublinear verifier time. \n\nExperimental results demonstrate that Nenya achieves strong concrete performance. For a rank-1 constraint system of size $2^{25}$ for data-parallel computations over 32-bit integers, Nenya achieves a prover time of only 4.8 seconds. This is four orders of magnitude faster than the state-of-the-art SNARK scheme over $\\mathbb{Z}/2^k\\mathbb{Z}$, and only 1.06$\\times$ slower than a SNARK over a field with the same number of constraints.\nFor general computation, the prover time of Nenya is 34.6 seconds. Moreover, for proving pixel-level image transformations that arise in media-provenance workflows, such as filtering that operates natively modulo $2^8$, Nenya proves the same computation 12$\\times$ faster than a field-based SNARK.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-28T22:55:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-28T22:55:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2673", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2673", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T00:17:51Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2673", "title": "Beyond the Scope of This Paper: Practical Flash-Accelerator and Cache-Collision Timing Attacks on Microcontrollers", "creators": ["Colin O'Flynn"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Cache and cache-collision attacks against AES are well-known since 2005, but their application to small (Cortex-M sized) microcontrollers has been limited in prior work, and in many cases the devices are assumed to be immune when they do not have a cache. However, the flash architecture of almost all microcontrollers introduces the same timing collision required for the well-known attacks and  as a greatly underestimated channel.\n\nRecovery of AES keys using as little as 750 traces will be demonstrated on six popular cryptographic libraries across eight architectures and over twenty devices. Practical recovery on high-level applications is  demonstrated against SPI bootloaders, Ethernet applications, CTAP2 over USB, and 802.15.4. wireless protocols.\n\nIn addition, a new open-source tool called FlashWhisperer is introduced to assist with evaluation of microcontrollers, cryptographic libraries, and applications. Countermeasures already exist in the form of bitsliced implementations, and this work also discusses other countermeasures that existing libraries offer.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T00:17:51Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T00:17:51Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2674", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2674", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T02:53:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2674", "title": "Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design", "creators": ["Chengkai Zhang", "Yuhao Li", "Elaine Shi", "Mengqian Zhang", "Lirong Xia", "Qishen Han"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The adaptive clinching auction of Dobzinski, Lavi, and Nisan (FOCS'08) is a cornerstone of mechanism design with budget-constrained bidders, and it has since inspired a broad range of extensions to substantially richer market settings. Adaptive clinching enjoys compelling guarantees: it is Pareto optimal, and truthful bidding is a dominant strategy whenever budgets cannot be overreported. In many real-world environments, however, identities are cheap to create, making resilience to Sybil attacks an additional requirement. Whether the guarantees of adaptive clinching survive when a bidder can split its budget across fake identities has remained open. We introduce a generalized framework for adaptive clinching and prove that it satisfies Sybil-robust incentive compatibility: a bidder cannot benefit from splitting into any finite number of identities with arbitrary value reports, provided their aggregate reported budget does not exceed the bidder's enforceable true budget. Sybil resilience thus joins the list of ideal properties of adaptive clinching.\n\nOur work is motivated by practical mechanism-design problems in blockchain-based decentralized finance, where two-asset automated market makers (AMMs) are among the most widely used applications. We design a new AMM adaptive clinching mechanism that extends classical adaptive clinching in two ways: it supports a two-sided market and protects against two-sided strategies, and it allows the supply function to depend on the auction state. Its one-sided special case is captured by our generalized adaptive clinching framework, and we further extend our proof techniques to show that the full two-sided mechanism simultaneously satisfies Sybil-robust incentive compatibility and a relaxed notion of Pareto optimality. In light of known impossibility results, together with a new impossibility proved in this paper, we argue that these guarantees are essentially the best possible. More broadly, our work reveals new connections between classical algorithmic game theory and modern decentralized blockchains.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T02:53:33Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T02:53:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2675", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2675", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T03:26:17Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2675", "title": "High Precision Noise Cleaning for CKKS with Application to Asynchronous Threshold CKKS", "creators": ["Zhihao Li", "Cheng Hong", "Tao Wei"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Noise cleaning in discrete CKKS uses Hermite interpolation to reduce the input error while preserving the encrypted discrete message. Cryptographic applications based on noise flooding require the error after cleaning to be sufficiently small for the added noise to provide statistical hiding without preventing exact recovery. This requirement is more stringent than decryption correctness alone, but the achievable noise reduction is limited by errors introduced during homomorphic evaluation. In particular, key switching and rescaling can dominate the output error even when a higher interpolation order substantially reduces the polynomial residual.\n\nWe propose a high precision noise cleaning method for CKKS that preserves encrypted integer messages while attaining a prescribed bound on normalized output noise. We jointly select the cleaning polynomials and evaluation parameters according to a complete error bound that accounts for the input noise and the errors introduced during homomorphic evaluation. By composing Hermite polynomials of lower degree, we can achieve the same output noise bound with a smaller ciphertext modulus and lower evaluation cost than a single higher degree polynomial. In addition, to reduce the ciphertext tensor degree, we construct polynomial representations with noisy auxiliary powers that cancel selected auxiliary error terms. For integer messages, we extract the bits through multi-value functional bootstrapping, then clean and recombine them into a single ciphertext. Finally, we apply high precision noise cleaning to construct an asynchronous threshold CKKS scheme that achieves strong simulation security in the random oracle model.\n\nWe implement binary and integer noise cleaning in OpenFHE. For binary messages and a normalized output noise target of $2^{-300}$, the selected composition reduces cleaning time from $9.63$ to $1.54$ seconds compared with a single Hermite evaluation under the same input error bound and security requirements. The composition also requires a smaller input ciphertext modulus and less evaluation key storage. We also evaluate the complete construction on 8 bit integers packed into all $32{,}768$ slots. The maximum measured normalized output noise is below $2^{-300}$ with either leveled digit extraction or functional bootstrapping.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T03:26:17Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T03:26:17Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2676", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2676", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T06:36:12Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2676", "title": "Optimality and Efficiency of Higher-Order Rank-Based Side-Channel Attacks against Inner Product Masking Schemes", "creators": ["Haitao Zhan", "Wei Cheng", "Yuejun Liu", "Jingdian Ming", "Sylvain Guilley", "Yongbin Zhou"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Higher-Order Spearman Coefficient Analysis (HO-SPA) is of particular interest in non-profiling Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) due to its effectiveness against monotonic nonlinear leakage. However, the optimal form, effective order combinations, and performance of HO-SPA (or its variants) remain underexplored. This work systematically revisits HO-SPA in the presence of Boolean Masking (BM) and Inner Product Masking (IPM). Specifically, we propose a new variant of HO-SPA, called HO-ASPA (Higher-Order Adjusted Spearman Coefficient Analysis), and derive the optimal form of HO-ASPA for two-share BM and IPM across a wide range of order combinations under the Hamming weight (HW) leakage model. We first derive the optimal form of HO-ASPA by extending the Spearman Coefficient Analysis to higher-order moments, while preserving the centered-product combination of the share leakages.  We then establish an upper bound on the maximal correlation induced by the rank transformation and characterize the relationship between the signal-to-noise ratio and the optimal correlation coefficient in the rank-domain, and extend these analyses to IPM. To enable a fair comparison, we also derive the optimal forms of Higher-Order Correlation Power Analysis (HO-CPA) and HO-ASPA for both BM and IPM under the Least-Significant-Bit (LSB) leakage model. Our analysis highlights a key distinction: unlike HO-CPA, where higher orders often outperform the lowest feasible order, HO-ASPA shows no significant performance gap between higher-order and lower-order attacks. Moreover, under the HW leakage model, our HO-ASPA not only aligns with existing results and succeeds in counteracting the security order amplification, but also significantly outperforms Kruskal-Wallis Analysis (KWA)-based attacks at various order combinations. We further validate the effectiveness of the proposed HO-ASPA through simulated and real-world experimental evaluations.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T06:36:12Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T06:36:12Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2677", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2677", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T08:02:39Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2677", "title": "Smoothness of Shortest Isogenies to Frobenius Conjugatess", "creators": ["Yi Ouyang", "Wei Wei", "Zheng Xu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Let \\(E\\) be chosen uniformly from the geometric isomorphism classes of supersingular elliptic curves over \\(\\overline{\\mathbb{F}}_p\\) and \\(\\delta_E\\) be the minimum degree of isogenies from \\(E\\) to its Frobenius conjugate \\(E^{(p)}\\). We establish bounds for the smoothness probability of $\\delta_E$ and hence affirm  Wesolowski's  \\(p^{1/3+o(1)}\\) attack on the supersingular endomorphism ring problem is unconditional. We also establish a uniform asymptotic formula, with a main term expressed in terms of Dirichlet \\(L\\)-values, for the probability that a connection isogeny of degree $n$ exists between $E$ and $E^{(p)}$.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T08:02:39Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T08:02:39Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2678", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2678", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T08:25:24Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2678", "title": "From Quantum Mechanics to the Hidden Subgroup Problem: an Overview from Finite to Infinite Groups", "creators": ["Federico Di Concilio", "Ramón Flores", "Delaram Kahrobaei", "Marialaura Noce"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The Hidden Subgroup Problem (HSP for short) is an important problem in quantum computing and computational group theory, which has connections with several quantum algorithms, including Shor's algorithm for integer factorization and the discrete logarithm problem. The HSP can be stated as follows: given a function on a group that is constant and distinct on cosets of a hidden subgroup, determine the hidden subgroup efficiently. The problem captures the essence of exploiting group structures for computational advantage and provides insights into the power of quantum algorithms over classical approaches. While abelian instances of HSP are well-understood and efficiently solvable using the quantum Fourier transform, non-abelian cases remain challenging and are active areas of research.\nThe goal of this survey is to put together all the basic background needed to understand well the Hidden Subgroup Problem in groups, reviewing recent results and discussing open problems.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T08:25:24Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T08:25:24Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2679", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2679", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T11:19:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2679", "title": "Cryptanalysis and Enhancement of VTBSAE: Provably Secure Verifier-Based PAKE Protocols for the Industrial Internet of Things", "creators": ["Jiahui Gao", "Zhiqiang Zhao", "Xuexian Hu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Verifier‑based password‑authenticated key exchange (PAKE) enables a client and a server to establish high‑entropy session keys from low‑entropy passwords without requiring the server to store plaintext passwords. This asymmetric design reduces the risk that leakage of server‑side credentials directly leads to client impersonation, making verifier‑based PAKE well suited to authentication and session‑key establishment for Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) devices. In this paper, we analyze the recently proposed VTBSAE, a verifier‑based PAKE protocol, and reveal that it fails to provide the claimed resistance against server‑compromise client‑impersonation attacks. To fix this vulnerability, we propose E‑VTBSAEv1. While preserving the lightweight structure of VTBSAE, E‑VTBSAEv1 binds the client‑generated point \\(E_{1}\\) to fresh server‑side randomness. We also briefly discuss E‑VTBSAEv2 as a challenge‑based variant. We provide a formal security proof for E‑VTBSAEv1 in the random‑oracle model under the CDH assumption, covering AKE security, forward secrecy, and resistance to server‑compromise client‑impersonation attacks after server‑side verifier‑file leakage. We evaluate E‑VTBSAEv1 under two practical deployment settings: a Raspberry Pi 4B server with an AutoDL client, and a Raspberry Pi 4B server with a Raspberry Pi 4B client. The experimental results show that E‑VTBSAEv1 preserves the communication and storage overheads of VTBSAE and achieves runtime performance comparable to that of VTBSAE.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T11:19:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T11:19:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2680", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2680", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T11:57:48Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2680", "title": "(Balanced) Boolean Functions on 375 Variables with Nonlinearity Exceeding the Patterson-Wiedemann Direct-Sum Bound", "creators": ["Deng Tang", "Subhamoy Maitra"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Patterson and Wiedemann [IEEE-IT 1983] constructed Boolean functions on 15 variables with nonlinearity 16276, which is strictly greater than the bent concatenation bound.\nTaking their direct sum with a bent function gives nonlinearity $2^{n-1}-27\\cdot2^{(n-11)/2}$ for every odd $n\\ge15$. Much later, Schmidt [JCT-A 2019] proved that the asymptotic maximum nonlinearity is $2^{n-1}-(1+o(1))2^{n/2-1}$ as $n\\to\\infty$. In this work, we construct Boolean functions $f$ on 375 variables such that the nonlinearity is greater than $2^{374}-442367\\cdot2^{168}=2^{374}-2^{187}+81921\\cdot2^{168}$, which exceeds the direct sum of a 15-variable Patterson-Wiedemann function and a bent function on 360 variables. To be specific, the direct sum of a 15-variable Patterson-Wiedemann function and a 360-variable bent function has nonlinearity $2^{374}-2^{187}+20\\cdot2^{180}=2^{374} 2^{187}+81920\\cdot2^{168}$. Thus our construction improves on this direct-sum value by more than $2^{168}$. Our construction idea is as follows. Let $H$ be the multiplicative subgroup of order $(2^{375}-1)/751$ in $\\mathbb F_{2^{375}}^*$. The support of $f$ is the disjoint union of 375 prescribed cosets and a subset $B\\subseteq H$. The evaluation of Gauss sums reduces the contribution of the prescribed cosets to a computation of 751 integers. The conditions on $B$ form a $0$-$1$ linear feasibility problem. Using a potential criterion for simultaneous linear constraints, we prove the existence of a single subset $B\\subseteq H$ satisfying the constraints at all frequencies. Taking direct sums with bent functions extends the result to every odd $n\\ge375$. The support construction does not require balancedness. As a natural follow-up, we also obtain balanced functions with the same strict lower bound by changing the minimum possible number of values, using sampling without replacement. The subsets $B$ and the sets of modified points are obtained by existence proofs.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T11:57:48Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T11:57:48Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2681", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2681", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T12:03:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2681", "title": "Improving Code Rate and Query Complexity for the Ligero-IOP System", "creators": ["Ignacio Cascudo", "Carmit Hazay", "Muthu Venkitasubramaniam"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "This work presents two main contributions to the analysis and design of Ligero-style zero-knowledge proof systems. First, we analyze the original Ligero IOP in the list-decoding regime and show that mutual correlated agreement suffices to obtain improved soundness guarantees and lower query complexity, without modifying the protocol. Second, we propose a new variant of Ligero that incorporates out-of-domain sampling, leading to further soundness improvements and enabling Reed--Solomon code rates above $1/2$. The new protocol preserves the constant-round structure of the Ligero IOP and its compatibility with memory-efficient proving, while achieving perfect honest-verifier zero knowledge.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T12:03:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T12:03:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2682", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2682", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T12:45:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2682", "title": "A Quantitative Evaluation of Constant-Time Analysis Tools", "creators": ["Zhenzhi Lai", "Zhiyuan Zhang", "Tian Qiu", "Van-Thuan Pham", "Udaya Parampalli"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "The constant-time programming policy protects cryptographic code from timing side-channels. However, writing constant-time code remains challenging even for experienced developers. Therefore, over 50 CT analysis tools have been published to help them identify constant-time violations. While several studies have examined those tools, they predominantly rely on qualitative observations and case studies, rather than quantitative assessments.\nTherefore, we present AutoBench-CT, a modular benchmark that manually verified per-violation ground truths across 64 cryptographic tasks and the first unified quantitative metrics to quantify the Operational Performance, Detection Quality, and Usability for seven such tools. With the results, we quantitatively show why CT-grind, the first tool published in 2010, is still the most popular tool in the wild. Based on the quantitative findings, we further provide new insights into recurring limitations across tools and propose a composite pipeline to maximize the security guarantees of constant-timeness in practice.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T12:45:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T12:45:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2683", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2683", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T12:51:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2683", "title": "Stop Calling Them Provers: The Case for Calling ProVerif and Tamarin Symbolic Protocol Analyzers", "creators": ["Nadim Kobeissi"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "A claim that a cryptographic protocol has been proved secure depends on the theory, the analysis software, the protocol model, and the security property being checked. I examine each of these for ProVerif and Tamarin. An audit of their published soundness arguments finds false statements, missing proofs, and gaps between the procedures justified on paper and those the tools run. I also reproduce previously reported bugs that cause Tamarin to accept false claims about the submitted models. ProVerif supplies no certificate for its full analysis, while Tamarin replays its proof tree with its own solver, leaving the correctness of that code to be trusted.\n\nA correct symbolic result can still fall short of the security claim made for a protocol. Models can omit behavior in parsers and state machines; secrecy queries can allow information to leak; and equations for cryptographic primitives need justification before they support computational guarantees. Better models, stronger queries and computational soundness arguments can address these problems, but someone must establish that they apply to the protocol at hand.\n\nFor these reasons and more, I argue that calling ProVerif and Tamarin \"provers\" is misleading: we should call them symbolic protocol analyzers and report their results with the models, assumptions and evidence that support them. They remain useful for finding attacks and establishing symbolic properties, including for unbounded sessions.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T12:51:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T12:51:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2684", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2684", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T12:55:01Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2684", "title": "SoK: Multiple Concurrent Proposer Blockchains", "creators": ["Benjamin Marsh", "Alejandro Ranchal-Pedrosa", "Max Resnick"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Multiple concurrent proposer (MCP) protocols let several parties contribute transactions to the same ledger update. They can distribute communication and reduce one proposer's control over inclusion and order, but these benefits depend on how the contributions are combined. We describe a common architecture from transaction receipt through proposal formation, agreement, data recovery, ordering, execution, and state finality. Within it, we identify four direct MCP families: fixed proposal vectors, selected proposal collections, persistent proposal streams, and causal proposal DAGs. We compare them with constrained assembly, where several parties restrict a block assembled by one party. Across 39 configurations, we distinguish agreement and progress from service for a particular transaction, and compare hiding, ordering, communication, throughput, and latency at explicitly named endpoints. The comparison shows why additional proposers alone do not guarantee inclusion, why hiding does not settle who can react last, and why parallel disseminations need not improve useful execution. It also identifies the recovery, payment, and organizational assumptions needed to turn independent proposal rights into reliable transaction service.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T12:55:01Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T12:55:01Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2685", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2685", "datestamp": "2026-10-29T14:07:58Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2685", "title": "Quasi-polynomial time algorithms for block basis reduction of linear codes", "creators": ["Kolesnikov N.S.", "Novoselov S.A."], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The block code basis reduction algorithm (BKZ) proposed by Ghentiyala and Stephens-Davidowitz requires an exponential number of calls to the minimum weight codeword (MWC) oracle according to the weak complexity bounds established in the original paper. In almost all cases these bounds are worse than plain enumeration of codewords, despite the fact that in practice the algorithm works much better. In this work we propose block code basis reduction algorithms with polynomial and quasi-polynomial complexity for fixed $\\beta$. Our algorithms are relaxations and modifications of the original algorithm. First, we show that the truncated version of the BKZ algorithm requires heuristic quasi-polynomial time of calls to MWC-oracle with the same basis quality as in the full BKZ algorithm. Second, we add some weak restrictions on the code basis that enables the algorithm to run in polynomial number of calls to the oracle. Third, we introduce the DeepBKZ algorithm which is adapted from lattice reduction. Under some relaxations (analogs of PotBKZ from the lattices) it also runs in quasi-polynomial number of calls to the MWC-oracle. We provide an implementation of proposed algorithms which is capable to process block sizes $2-24$ and more. Based on this implementation, we provide concrete complexity estimates and an analysis of the approximation factors achieved for the low-weight codeword problem on random linear codes.", "date_submitted": "2026-10-29T14:07:58Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-29T14:07:58Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
