{"id": "2020/635", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2020/635", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T12:02:28Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/635", "title": "Two-Round Oblivious Linear Evaluation from Learning with Errors", "creators": ["Pedro Branco", "Nico Döttling", "Paulo Mateus"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Oblivious Linear Evaluation (OLE) is the arithmetic analogue of the well-know oblivious transfer primitive. It allows a sender, holding an affine function $f(x)=a+bx$ over a finite field or ring, to let a receiver learn $f(w)$ for a $w$ of the receiver's choice. In terms of security, the sender remains oblivious of the receiver's input $w$, whereas the receiver learns nothing beyond $f(w)$ about $f$. In recent years, OLE has emerged as an essential building block to construct efficient, reusable and maliciously-secure two-party computation.\n\nIn this work, we present efficient two-round protocols for OLE over large fields based on the Learning with Errors (LWE) assumption, providing a full arithmetic generalization of the oblivious transfer protocol of Peikert, Vaikuntanathan and Waters (CRYPTO 2008). At the technical core of our work is a novel extraction technique which allows to determine if a non-trivial multiple of some vector is close to a $q$-ary lattice.", "date_submitted": "2020-06-03T09:36:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T12:02:28Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/276", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/276", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T10:00:42Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/276", "title": "Reduce and Prange: Revisiting Prange's ISD for Solving LPN/RSD over Large Fields", "creators": ["Jiseung Kim", "Changmin Lee"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Syndrome decoding (SD), together with its regular-noise variant (RSD), is fundamental to many cryptographic primitives; in the generator formulation used in cryptography, it is closely related to learning parity with noise (LPN). \nWhile recent proposals extend these problems to larger fields, the concrete security of SD over large fields remains comparatively less understood. This gap leaves room for more effective attacks against SD-based primitives over large fields.\nIn this paper, we present an improved algorithm for solving SD over large fields. Our method modifies Prange's information-set decoding algorithm by iteratively applying Gaussian elimination to reduced-size matrices rather than to the full-size matrix.\nWe call this the ``Reduce and Prange (RP)\" algorithm and demonstrate its effectiveness for both SD and its variant with regular noise over large finite fields (e.g., $\\mathbb{F}_{2^{128}}$). On the comparison rows of our numerical section, RP lowers the SD estimate by up to $6$ bits, and on the 128-bit recommended SD rows the drop is up to $7$ bits, relative to Liu et al. (Eurocrypt'24). For SD with regular noise, regular-RP gives the lowest listed estimate on the small and medium tested parameter sets, improving on the best previously listed estimate by up to $15$ bits; on the largest tested sets the algebraic estimate of Briaud and {\\O}ygarden (Eurocrypt'23) remains lower.", "date_submitted": "2024-02-19T08:17:24Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T10:00:42Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/655", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/655", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T21:36:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/655", "title": "Implementation and Performance Analysis of Homomorphic Signature Schemes", "creators": ["Davide Carnemolla", "Dario Catalano", "Mario Di Raimondo", "Federico Savasta"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Homomorphic signatures allow to validate computation on signed data. Alice, holding a dataset, $\\{m_1 , \\ldots , m_t \\}$ uses her secret key $\\sf sk$ to sign these data and stores the authenticated dataset on a remote server. The server can later (publicly) compute $m = f(m_1,...,m_t)$ together with a signature $\\sigma$ certifying that $m$ is indeed the correct output of the computation $f$. Over the last fifteen years, the problem of realizing homomorphic signatures has been the focus of numerous research works, with constructions now ranging from very efficient ones supporting linear functions to very expressive ones supporting (up to) arbitrary circuits. In this work we tackle the question of assessing the practicality of schemes belonging to this latter class. Specifically, we implement the GVW lattice based scheme for circuits from STOC 2015 and two, recently proposed, pairings based constructions building from functional commitments. Our experiments show that (both) pairings based schemes outperform GVW on all fronts.", "date_submitted": "2024-04-29T08:07:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T21:36:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/772", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/772", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T16:48:07Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/772", "title": "Reducing the Share Size of Weighted Threshold Secret Sharing Schemes via Chow Parameters Approximation", "creators": ["Oriol Farràs", "Miquel Guiot"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "A secret sharing scheme is a cryptographic primitive that allows a dealer to share a secret among a set of parties, so that only authorized subsets of them can recover it. The access structure of the scheme is the family of authorized subsets.\n\nIn a weighted threshold access structure, each party is assigned a weight according to its importance, and the authorized subsets are those in which the sum of their weights is at least the threshold value. For these access structures, the share size of the best known secret sharing schemes is either linear on the weights or quasipolynomial on the number of parties, which leads to long shares, in general. \n\nIn certain settings, a way to circumvent this efficiency problem is to approximate the access structure by another one that admits more efficient schemes. This work is dedicated to the open problem posed by this strategy: Finding secret sharing schemes with a good tradeoff between the efficiency and the accuracy of the approximation.\n\nWe present a method to approximate weighted threshold access structures by others that admit schemes with small shares. This method is based on the techniques for the approximation of the Chow parameters developed by De et al. [Journal of the ACM, 2014]. Our method provides secret sharing schemes with share size $n^{1+o(1)}$, where $n$ is the number of parties, and whose access structure is close to the original one. Namely, in this approximation the condition of being authorized or not is preserved for almost all subsets of parties. \n\nIn addition, we apply the recent results on computational secret sharing schemes by Applebaum et al. [STOC, 2023] to construct computational secret sharing schemes whose share size is polylogarithmic in the number of parties.", "date_submitted": "2024-05-20T11:12:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T16:48:07Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/1583", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/1583", "datestamp": "2026-10-01T06:56:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1583", "title": "Efficient Pairing-Free Adaptable k-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer Protocols", "creators": ["Keykhosro Khosravani", "Taraneh Eghlidos", "Mohammad reza Aref"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Oblivious Transfer (OT) is one of the fundamental building blocks in cryptography that enables various privacy-preserving applications. Constructing efficient OT schemes has been an active research area. This paper presents three efficient two-round pairing-free k-out-of-n oblivious transfer protocols with standard security. Our constructions follow the minimal communication pattern: the receiver sends k messages to the sender, who responds with n+k messages, achieving the lowest data transmission among pairing-free k-out-of-n OT schemes. Furthermore, our protocols support adaptivity and enable the sender to encrypt the n messages offline, independent of the receiver’s variables, offering significant performance advantages in one-sender-multiple-receiver scenarios. We provide security proofs under the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) and RSA assumptions, without relying on the Random Oracle Model. Our protocols combine minimal communication rounds, adaptivity, offline encryption capability, and provable security, making them well-suited for privacy-preserving applications requiring efficient oblivious transfer.", "date_submitted": "2024-10-07T14:01:27Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-01T06:56:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/1625", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/1625", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T14:50:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1625", "title": "On the Tight Security of the Double Ratchet", "creators": ["Daniel Collins", "Doreen Riepel", "Si An Oliver Tran"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The Signal Protocol is a two-party secure messaging protocol used in applications such as Signal, WhatsApp, Google Messages and Facebook Messenger and is used by billions daily. It consists of two core components, one of which is the Double Ratchet protocol that has been the subject of a line of work that aims to understand and formalise exactly what security it provides. Existing models capture strong guarantees including resilience to state exposure in both forward security (protecting past secrets) and post-compromise security (restoring security), adaptive state corruptions, message injections and out-of-order message delivery. Due to this complexity, prior work has failed to provide security guarantees that do not degrade in the number of interactions, even in the single-session setting.\n\nGiven the ubiquity of the Double Ratchet in practice, we explore tight security bounds for the Double Ratchet in the multi-session setting. To this end, we revisit the modelling of Alwen, Coretti and Dodis (EUROCRYPT 2019) who decompose the protocol into modular, abstract components, notably continuous key agreement (CKA) and forward-secure AEAD (FS-AEAD). To enable a tight security proof, we propose a CKA security model that provides one-way security under key checking attacks. We show that multi-session security of the Double Ratchet can be tightly reduced to the multi-session security of CKA and FS-AEAD, capturing the same strong security guarantees as Alwen et al.\n\nOur result improves upon the bounds of Alwen et al. in the random oracle model. Even so, we are unable to provide a completely tight proof for the Double Ratchet based on standard Diffie-Hellman assumptions, and we conjecture it is not possible. We thus go a step further and analyse CKA based on key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). In contrast to previous works, our new analysis allows for tight constructions based on the DDH and post-quantum assumptions.", "date_submitted": "2024-10-10T20:26:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T14:50:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/1626", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/1626", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T08:00:53Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1626", "title": "Faster Proofs and VRFs from Isogenies", "creators": ["Shai Levin", "Robi Pedersen"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We improve recent generic proof systems for isogeny knowledge by Cong, Lai, Levin based on circuit satisfiability, by using radical isogeny descriptions to prove a path in the underlying isogeny graph. We then present a new generic construction for a verifiable random function (VRF) based on a one-more type hardness assumption and zero-knowledge proofs. We argue that isogenies fit the constraints of our construction and instantiate the VRF with a CGL walk and our new proofs. As a different contribution, we also propose a new VRF in the effective group action description of isogenies. Our protocol takes a novel approach based on the polynomial-in-the-exponent technique, but without the need of a trusted setup or heavy preprocessing. We compare our protocols to the current state-of-the-art isogeny VRFs by Leroux and Lai, with a particular emphasis on computational efficiency.", "date_submitted": "2024-10-10T20:36:24Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T08:00:53Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/1906", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/1906", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T09:16:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1906", "title": "On Efficient Computations of $y^2=x^3+b/\\mathbb{F}_p$ for Primes $p\\equiv 1 \\mod 3$", "creators": ["Guangwu Xu", "Wei Yu", "Ke Han", "Pengfei Lu"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Since its introduction, Solinas' window $\\tau$-NAF algorithm has been a landmark method for accelerating scalar multiplication on Koblitz curves over binary fields. A long-standing open problem has been to identify a suitable family of elliptic curves over prime fields for which the window $\\tau$-NAF approach can be effectively extended. In this paper, we settle this problem by establishing such an extension for the family $E_b: y^2=x^3+b$ over $\\mathbb{F}_p$ with prime $p\\equiv1\\pmod 3$. This family includes several practically important curves used in blockchain applications (e.g., secp256k1) and pairing-based cryptography (e.g., BN254 and BLS12-381). By considering a nonzero nonunit element of minimal norm in the ring of Eisenstein integers $\\mathbb{Z}[\\omega]$, we identify the endomorphism $\\tau=1-\\omega$ as a natural choice for $\\tau$-adic scalar multiplication on $E_b/\\mathbb{F}_p$. In Jacobian projective coordinates, the map $\\tau P$ can be evaluated using only $6\\mathbf{M}$ (where $\\mathbf{M}$ denotes a field multiplication). This also yields a new point-tripling formula requiring only $10\\mathbf{M}$, improving upon the previous best cost of $15\\mathbf{M}$. Furthermore, we optimize the pre-computation stage by choosing a set of coefficients invariant under the unit group $U\\subset\\mathbb{Z}[\\omega]$. Exploiting this sixfold symmetry reduces the pre-computation cost by approximately five-sixths. The $U$-invariant structure also plays an important role in further accelerating window $\\tau$-NAF evaluation. Our optimized method achieves performance improvements of $16.7\\%$, $17.6\\%$, and $18\\%$ over the current state-of-the-art GLV method for $256$-, $384$-, and $512$-bit group orders, respectively. We also develop a regular window $\\tau$-NAF variant as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. Compared with the regularized GLV method, this variant reduces the scalar multiplication cost by $17.7\\%$, $19.8\\%$, and $20.9\\%$ for $256$-, $384$-, and $512$-bit group orders, respectively.", "date_submitted": "2024-11-23T13:53:41Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T09:16:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2024/2038", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2024/2038", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T16:45:13Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/2038", "title": "Adaptive Special Soundness: A new framework for knowledge extraction with applications to Kilian’s protocol", "creators": ["Thomas Attema", "Michael Klooß", "Russell W. F. Lai", "Pavlo Yatsyna"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The knowledge soundness of an interactive proof is often proven via various ``special soundness (SS)'' frameworks which separate knowledge extraction into:\n(1) extracting accepting transcripts conforming to some structure;\n(2) recovering a witness from structure-conforming transcripts.\nHowever, even access-structure SS [TCC'23], one of the most general, does not handle proof systems employing probabilistic tests, a protocol design technique common in more advanced and especially succinct proof systems. The reason is that its extraction strategy decides whether a challenge is ``useful'' from the challenges used in previous transcripts alone, ignoring the prover messages. While predicate SS [CRYPTO'24] captures probabilistic tests, it does not capture access structures and forgoes the combinatorial nature and simplicity of SS.\n\nWe introduce adaptive special soundness (AdSS), which generally captures extraction strategies that adaptively pick challenges for the prover taking the history of entire transcripts into account. AdSS in particular captures protocols employing probabilistic tests, formally generalises access-structure SS, and provides a simpler interface than predicate SS while retaining the same expressiveness under mild conditions. We provide knowledge extractors for AdSS protocols with optimal knowledge error $\\kappa$ and almost optimal tradeoffs between extraction probability and runtime.\n\nTo demonstrate the utility of AdSS, we provide a new (knowledge) soundness analysis of Kilian's succinct argument, resolving an open problem in [TCC'24]. In passing, we tighten the existing soundness error bound and unify the analyses in the strict and expected polynomial time regimes. We also provide a range of other examples, from simple ones showing how AdSS captures prior notions, to a new analysis of lattice-based Bulletproofs with unstructured challenges, which improves modularity and covers certain rings beyond $\\mathbb{Z}$ compared to [TCC'23].", "date_submitted": "2024-12-17T21:23:19Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T16:45:13Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/395", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/395", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T01:25:57Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/395", "title": "On the (In)security of Approximate Computation Protocols from CKKS", "creators": ["Intak Hwang", "Yisol Hwang", "Miran Kim", "Dongwon Lee", "Yongsoo Song"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) enables collaborative and privacy-preserving computation over private inputs. Recent advances in Homomorphic Encryption (HE), particularly the CKKS scheme, have significantly improved the practicality of secure computation, making it suitable for real-world applications involving approximate arithmetic. However, the inherent errors introduced by CKKS pose substantial challenges in the design and analysis of CKKS-based secure computation protocols.\n\nIn this work, we investigate the correctness and security of existing CKKS-based MPC protocols. Most prior constructions rely on the noise smudging technique, in which each party independently adds exponentially large noise to the output to guarantee the security of the protocol. However, we show that this approach does not achieve standard simulation-based security for MPC.\n\nTo address this limitation, we apply an alternative method, called collaborative sampling, in which all participating parties jointly generate additive shares of the smudging noise. We consider both asymmetric two-party protocols between a client and a server, and symmetric multiparty protocols among mutually distrusting parties.\nFor each setting, we present concrete protocol constructions based on collaborative sampling, explicitly define the corresponding ideal functionalities, and provide formal security proofs. We further provide concrete constructions and implementations of collaborative sampling protocols.\n\nAs an alternative perspective, we show that existing protocols, despite failing to achieve standard simulation-based security, still satisfy a weaker security notion called liberal security for approximate MPC protocols.", "date_submitted": "2025-03-03T02:34:42Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T01:25:57Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/722", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/722", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T14:44:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/722", "title": "One-Step Schnorr Threshold Identification", "creators": ["Foteinos Mergoupis-Anagnou"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Threshold cryptographic primitives have not been widely adopted in real-world distributed systems (i.e., beyond the closed committee model) presumably due to state-synchronization overhead and complex certification processes for the shareholders. These are both aspects of infrastructure overreliance,  an assumption that is usually glossed over in their design. In this work, we propose OSST, a real-time threshold identification protocol that achieves non-interactivity and non-reliance on public shares by means of direct proof interpolation. Given a Shamir $(n, t)$-shared secret $x$, the proposed scheme allows any $t^* \\ge t$ (but no less) shareholders to prove over designated communication channels that their key shares interpolate to $x$ without revealing any information beyond that. Provers do not engage in distributed computations, sending their packets to the verifier asynchronously; conversely, verifiers need only know the combined public key $y \\equiv g ^ x$, without need to pre-validate and register the individual member identities. The protocol is intended for use in permissionless or unmanaged meshes that lack both overlay networks and trust infrastructure or governance, a use case space that has been tacitly neglected as ''niche'' by the current mainstream. No publicly verifiable setup is required beyond distributing $x$ according to Shamir's secret sharing (or equivalent distributed key generation scheme) and advertising its public counterpart; in particular, the protocol is intended to be secure against impersonation without relying on the auditability of any advertized public shares. We provide evidence that this has good chances to hold true by giving a security proof in the random oracle model under the one-more discrete-logarithm (OMDL) hardness assumption.", "date_submitted": "2025-04-22T21:06:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T14:44:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2025/815", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/815", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T02:42:28Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/815", "title": "Security Analysis of NIST Key Derivation Using Pseudorandom Functions", "creators": ["Yaobin Shen", "Lei Wang", "Dawu Gu"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Key derivation functions can be used to derive variable-length random strings that serve as cryptographic keys. They are integral to many widely-used communication protocols such as TLS, IPsec and Signal. NIST SP 800-108 specifies several key derivation functions based on pseudorandom functions such as CMAC and HMAC, that can be used to derive additional keys from an existing cryptographic key. This standard either explicitly or implicitly requests their KDFs to be variable output length pseudorandom function, collision resistant, and preimage resistant, which are also demanded by practical applications. Yet, since the publication of this standard dating back to the year of 2008, until now, there is no formal analysis to justify these security properties of KDFs.\n\nIn this work, we give the formal security analysis of key derivation functions in NIST SP 800-108. We show both positive and negative results regarding these key derivation functions. For KCTR-CMAC, KFB-CMAC, and KDPL-CMAC that are key derivation functions based on CMAC in counter mode, feedback mode, and double-pipeline mode respectively, we prove that all of them are secure variable output length pseudorandom functions and preimage resistant. We show that KFB-CMAC and KDPL-CMAC are collision resistant. While for KCTR-CMAC, we can mount constant-time collision attack against it. For KCTR-HMAC, KFB-HMAC, and KDPL-HMAC that are key derivation functions based on HMAC in modes, we show that all of them behave like variable output length pseudorandom functions. When the key of these key derivation functions is of variable length, they suffer from collision attacks. For the case when the key of these key derivation function is of fixed length and less than \\(d-1\\) bits where \\(d\\) is the input block size of the underlying compression function, we can prove that they are collision resistant and preimage resistant. Finally, we extend our analysis to the plain CMAC-based KDFs for which mitigation techniques against key-control attacks do not apply, as well as to the KMAC-based KDF.", "date_submitted": "2025-05-07T16:23:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T02:42:28Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1130", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1130", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T09:40:54Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1130", "title": "An Open-Source Framework for Efficient Side-Channel Analysis on Cryptographic Implementations", "creators": ["Takuya Kojima", "Masaki Morita", "Hideki Takase", "Hiroshi Nakamura"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "Side-channel attacks (SCAs) are increasingly recognized as a significant threat to hardware roots of trust. As a result, cryptographic module designers must ensure that their modules are resilient to such attacks before deployment. However, efficient evaluation of side-channel vulnerabilities in cryptographic implementations remains challenging. This article introduces an open-source framework integrating field-programmable gate array (FPGA) designs, power measurement tools, and high-performance side-channel analysis libraries to streamline the evaluation process. The framework provides design templates for two widely used FPGA boards in the side-channel analysis community, enabling Shell-Role architecture, a modern FPGA design pattern. This shell abstraction allows designers to focus on developing cryptographic modules while utilizing standardized software tools for hardware control and power trace acquisition. Additionally, the framework includes acceleration plugins for ChipWhisperer, the leading open-source side-channel analysis platform, to enhance the performance of correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks. These plugins exploit modern many-core processors and graphics processing units (GPUs) to speed up analysis significantly. To showcase the capabilities of the proposed framework, we conducted multiple case studies and highlighted significant findings that advance side-channel research. Furthermore, we compare our CPA plugins with existing tools and show that our plugins achieve up to 8.60x speedup over the state-of-the-art CPA tools.", "date_submitted": "2025-06-16T06:02:41Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T09:40:54Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1325", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1325", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T10:00:07Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1325", "title": "Revisiting the IPA-sumcheck connection", "creators": ["Liam Eagen", "Ariel Gabizon"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Inner Product Arguments (IPA) [BCC+16,BBB+17] are a family of proof systems  with $O(\\log n)$ sized proofs, $O(n)$ time verifiers, and transparent setup.\n  Bootle, Chiesa and Sotiraki [BCS21] observed that an IPA can be viewed as a sumcheck protocol [LFKN92] where the summed polynomial is allowed to have coefficients in a group rather than a field. We leverage this viewpoint to improve the performance of multi-linear polynomial commitments  based on IPA.\n    Specifically,\n   - We introduce a simplified variant of Halo-style accumulation that works for multilinear evaluation claims, rather than only univariate ones as in [BGH19,BCMS20].\n   - We show that the size $n$ MSM the IPA verifier performs can be replaced by a  ``group variant'' of $\\mathsf{basefold}$[ZCF23].\n    This reduces the verifier complexity from $O(n)$ to $O_{\\lambda}(\\log^2 n)$ time at the expense of an additional $4n$ scalar multiplications for the IPA prover.", "date_submitted": "2025-07-19T23:44:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T10:00:07Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1495", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1495", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T22:45:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1495", "title": "Pairwise independence of AES-like block ciphers", "creators": ["Tim Beyne", "Gregor Leander", "Immo Schütt"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We prove that $4r + 4$ rounds of an AES variant with independent and uniform random round keys are $\\varepsilon$-close to pairwise independent with $\\varepsilon = 2^{14}\\, 2^{-39r}$. This result follows from a near-optimal bound for a two-norm version of pairwise independence for the Shark construction, depending on the third singular value of the difference-distribution table of the S-boxes. Our analysis combines insights from cryptanalysis — in particular, truncated differentials — and linear algebra over the reals.", "date_submitted": "2025-08-19T16:24:38Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T22:45:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1575", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1575", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T13:41:13Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1575", "title": "BitPriv: A Privacy-Preserving Protocol for DeFi Applications on Bitcoin", "creators": ["Ioannis Alexopoulos", "Zeta Avarikioti", "Paul Gerhart", "Matteo Maffei", "Dominique Schröder"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Bitcoin secures over a trillion dollars in assets, yet its scripting language limits expressive decentralized-finance applications. BitVM enables arbitrary off-chain computation to be enforced through Bitcoin fraud proofs, but it does not provide privacy for inputs such as bids, quotes, and reserve prices.\n\nWe present BitPriv, to our knowledge the first protocol that conditions payments on the outcome of an arbitrary secure two-party computation over private inputs on unmodified Bitcoin. Its core primitive, the Garbled Hashed Timelock Contract (GHTLC), binds Bitcoin payments to garbled-circuit output labels. Parties evaluate the circuit off-chain, while cut-and-choose detects malformed garbling and BitVM punishes detected violations. Under application-specific bounds, collateral can make deviations unprofitable for rational adversaries.\n\nWe instantiate BitPriv in BitMarket, a Bitcoin-native sealed-bid auction, and BitBridge, an intent-based cross-chain bridge. Inputs remain private until the protocol execution fixes the outcome. Optimistic settlement costs less than \\$3 in both applications. Depending on the backend, BitMarket disputes cost \\$47–\\$312 and BitBridge disputes cost \\$47–\\$657. BitPriv provides a blueprint for enforceable, privacy-preserving DeFi primitives on Bitcoin without trusted hardware, sidechains, or consensus changes.", "date_submitted": "2025-09-02T14:27:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T13:41:13Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1606", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1606", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T17:02:57Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1606", "title": "Collatz Hash: Hash Algorithm Using 3x+1 Conjecture", "creators": ["Shaurya Pratap Singh", "Bhupendra Singh", "Alok Mishra"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "In this paper, we introduce a new hash algorithm in that we used the Collatz problem, focusing on its conditional branching structure, an element often overlooked despite the fame of the 3x + 1 conjecture. This hash algorithm takes an arbitrary-length input and produces a fixed length 512/384/256 bit output. The presented hash algorithm is in the category of strong one-way Hash Function (OWHF), and this hash algorithm is designed by focusing on its use in password storing and Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG).\nUntil now, quantum computers also didn’t show any speedup in the Collatz conjecture problem, so the proving and disproving of the Collatz conjecture is still a big question, so we believe that there is no structural attack on this hash algorithm.", "date_submitted": "2025-09-07T08:28:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T17:02:57Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1952", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1952", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T16:51:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1952", "title": "KPIR-C: Keyword PIR with Arbitrary Server-Side Computation", "creators": ["Ali Arastehfard", "Weiran Liu", "Qixian Zhou", "Zinan Shen", "Liqiang Peng", "Lin Qu", "Shuya Feng", "Yuan Hong"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Keyword Private Information Retrieval (KPIR) enables clients to retrieve database entries by keyword without revealing their query, with many efficient schemes relying on Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). However, existing FHE-based KPIR schemes fix parameters to a bounded computation depth, which becomes a bottleneck in privacy-sensitive settings such as distributed ledger systems and private web search, where databases grow dynamically and clients are lightweight: exceeding this bound incurs significant overhead, forces larger parameters, and leaves any post-retrieval computation to the client or to communication-heavy interactive protocols.\n\nWe introduce Keyword PIR with Computation (KPIR-C), a new paradigm that enables arbitrary, non-interactive server-side computation on query responses while preserving query privacy. Unlike prior designs, KPIR-C fixes parameters independently of database size or computation depth by leveraging bootstrapping via a co-design of Torus Fully Homomorphic Encryption (TFHE) and KPIR that keeps bootstrapping overhead practical. We further introduce Keyword PIR with Default (KPIR-D) to handle mismatched queries non-interactively. We instantiate KPIR-C with two constructions: one based on equality circuits and constant-weight codes, and one based on Learning With Errors (LWE)-based KPIR, offering complementary communication-runtime trade-offs. We demonstrate experimentally that both achieve competitive performance compared to state-of-the-art KPIR schemes that do not support arbitrary computation.", "date_submitted": "2025-10-19T16:05:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T16:51:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/1993", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/1993", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T14:06:58Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1993", "title": "A Simplified Round-by-round Soundness Proof of FRI", "creators": ["Albert Garreta", "Nicolas Mohnblatt", "Benedikt Wagner"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The FRI protocol (ICALP '18) is one of the most influential and widely deployed building blocks at the core of modern SNARK systems. While its concrete security is well understood, existing security proofs are intricate and technically complex.\n\nIn this work, we present a significantly simpler security analysis of FRI, in particular its round-by-round soundness. Our approach is more accessible to a broader audience, lowering the barrier to understanding this fundamental protocol. Furthermore, the simplicity of our analysis may pave the way for future formal verification efforts of modern SNARK constructions.", "date_submitted": "2025-10-24T13:27:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T14:06:58Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/2247", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/2247", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T20:40:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2247", "title": "Beyond Incentive Compatibility: Rational Harm-Proof Transaction Fee Mechanisms", "creators": ["Forest Zhang", "Elain Park", "Ke Wu"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "On a blockchain, users compete for scarce block space in an auction run by the miner to get their transactions confirmed in the block. This auction is called transaction fee mechanism (TFM). Recent work [Rou21, CS23, SCW23] has been focused on incentive compatibility (IC), requiring that honest behavior maximizes the payoff for each type of strategic player: users, the miner, or miner–user coalitions. In this work, we introduce rational-harm proofness (RHP), which rules out deviations that harm honest parties without also reducing the deviator’s own utility relative to the honest baseline. RHP closes a gap left by IC: IC does not forbid utility neutral yet externally harmful deviations. For example, in a second-price auction, the second-highest bidder can increase the winner’s payment without affecting their own payoff. Such deviation is eliminated by RHP.\n\nWe characterize TFMs satisfying RHP alongside incentive compatibility for users (UIC) and miners (MIC). For finite block size, we develop a complete characterization in two models:\n- In the plain model---where a single miner unilaterally implements the auction---we prove a tetrilemma (3-out-of-4 impossibility): among the four desired properties {positive miner revenue, UIC, MIC, RHP against miner–user coalitions}, no mechanism achieves all four simultaneously. This trade-off is tight: any three are jointly achievable in the plain model.\n- In the MPC-assisted model---where a committee of miners jointly implement the auction via multi-party computation (MPC)---we construct a randomized TFM with a positive miner revenue that achieves UIC, MIC, and RHP against all three types of strategic players. We further show that randomness is necessary: any deterministic TFM satisfying UIC and RHP in this model must confirm no transactions when the number of users exceeds the block size.\n\nFinally, we show that IC and RHP are incomparable: for each strategic role, there are mechanisms satisfying one but not the other in both models. Our results broaden the design objectives for TFMs: beyond incentive compatibility, mechanisms should also preclude costless harm to honest participants.", "date_submitted": "2025-12-14T01:01:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T20:40:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2025/2328", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2025/2328", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T13:52:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/2328", "title": "Micali’s SNARG, Function Vector Commitments, and Fiat–Shamir", "creators": ["Ziyi Guan", "Eylon Yogev"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Micali's construction of succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARGs) combines a probabilistically checkable proof (PCP), a vector commitment, and the Fiat--Shamir transformation. Its security is established in the random oracle model, but replacing the random oracle with an explicit hash function presents a fundamental challenge: Fiat--Shamir can fail for interactive arguments, and certain choices of the commitment scheme make Micali's construction unsound for every instantiation of the Fiat--Shamir hash.\n\nWe show how to instantiate Micali's construction in the standard model assuming LWE and function vector commitments with \\emph{function statistical binding} for $\\Ppoly$, obtaining a non-adaptively sound SNARG for $\\NP$. Our construction combines such a commitment with an LWE-based correlation-intractaxble hash and a PCP satisfying a new property, \\emph{shadow soundness}. A PCP shadow is a short digest that preserves the information needed to determine the verifier's decision. By statistically binding the commitment to this shadow, we obtain the sparse relation needed to prove Fiat--Shamir soundness.\n\nWe construct shadow PCPs for $\\NP$ whose shadow algorithms lie in $\\NC$, and we give a feasibility instantiation of the commitment scheme from strong assumptions. Our results thus identify a concrete cryptographic target for instantiating Micali's SNARG under weaker assumptions, and show that the framework does not admit an attack that succeeds for every choice of its components.", "date_submitted": "2025-12-26T14:38:00Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T13:52:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/107", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/107", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T09:55:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/107", "title": "Veriﬁed non-recursive calculation of Beneš networks applied to Classic McEliece", "creators": ["Wrenna Robson", "Samuel Kelly"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "The Beneš network can be utilised to apply a single permutation to different inputs repeatedly. We present novel generalisations of Bernstein's formulae for the control bits of a Beneš network and from them derive an iterative control bit setting algorithm. We provide verified proofs of our formulae and prototype a a provably correct implementation in the Lean language and theorem prover. We develop and evaluate portable and vectorised implementations of our algorithm in the C programming language. Our implementation utilising Intel's Advanced Vector eXtensions 2 feature reduces execution latency by 25% compared to the equivalent implementation in the libmceliece software library.", "date_submitted": "2026-01-23T11:29:49Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T09:55:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/197", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/197", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T11:03:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/197", "title": "Derivative-Based Evaluation of Multivariate Polynomials over Product Hamming Balls", "creators": ["Vaibhav Dixit", "Santanu Sarkar", "Fukang Liu", "Willi Meier"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Efficient evaluation of multivariate polynomials over finite spaces is an important problem in algebraic cryptanalysis, particularly in exhaustive-search attacks on multivariate public-key cryptosystems. Existing fast exhaustive-search techniques, including those of Bouillaguet et al. (CHES 2010), Dinur (EUROCRYPT 2021), and Furue and Takagi (PQCrypto 2023), mainly target the complete space $\\mathbb F_q^n$, whereas many cryptanalytic applications require evaluation only over structured subsets. Recently, Liu et al. proposed a memory-efficient algorithm for evaluating degree-$d$ polynomials over product Hamming balls\n\\[\nB(\\textbf{\\textit{n}},\\textbf{\\textit{w}})=B(n_s,w_s)\\times\\cdots\\times B(n_1,w_1)\\subseteq\\mathbb F_2^n,\n\\]\nwhere $\\sum_{i=1}^{s}n_i=n$ and $B(n_i,w_i) \\subseteq \\mathbb F_2^{n_i} $ denotes the set of vectors of length $n_i$ and having at most $w_i$ nonzero coordinates. In this work, we extend this structured-subset paradigm by developing a unified derivative-based framework, comprising initialization and evaluation phases, first over prime fields $\\mathbb F_q$ and subsequently over arbitrary finite fields $\\mathbb F_{q^\\rho}$ through basis expansion. We derive two initialization methods with time complexities $\\mathcal O(nrM)$ and $\\mathcal O(rM^2)$, where $M\\leq\\min\\{\\binom{n+d}{d},q^n\\}$ and $r=\\min\\{d,q-1\\}$. After initialization, evaluation over $B(\\textbf{\\textit{n}},\\textbf{\\textit{w}})$ requires $\\mathcal O(d|B(\\textbf{\\textit{n}},\\textbf{\\textit{w}})|)$ arithmetic operations, apart from a linear setup cost. The corresponding overall memory bounds are $\\mathcal O((M+r^2)\\log q+n\\log(nq))$ and $\\mathcal O(((d+1)M+r^2)\\log q+n\\log(nq))$, respectively, and are independent of the number of evaluated points.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-06T17:02:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T11:03:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/230", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/230", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T14:37:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/230", "title": "Rule Variant Restrictions for the Tamarin Prover", "creators": ["Felix Linker"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We introduce an optimization to the Tamarin prover that reduces its search space. The optimization applies to protocol models that use equational theories with cancellative operators, for example, when modelling Diffie-Hellman groups or bilinear pairings. We prove the optimization's soundness and evaluate its performance.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-11T13:42:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T14:37:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/403", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/403", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T20:23:14Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/403", "title": "On the Need for (Quantum) Memory with Short Outputs", "creators": ["Zihan Hao", "Zikuan Huang", "Qipeng Liu"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "In this work, we establish the first separation between computation with bounded and unbounded space, for problems with short outputs (i.e., working memory can be exponentially larger than output size), both in the classical and the quantum setting. Towards that, we introduce a problem called nested collision finding, and show that optimal query complexity can not be achieved without exponential memory.\nOur result is based on a novel ``two-oracle recording'' technique, where one oracle ``records'' the computation's long outputs under the other oracle, effectively reducing the time-space trade-off for short-output problems to that of long-output problems. We believe this technique will be of independent interest for establishing time-space tradeoffs in other short-output settings.", "date_submitted": "2026-02-27T05:05:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T20:23:14Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/431", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/431", "datestamp": "2026-10-01T01:27:07Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/431", "title": "Revisiting the Security of Sparkle", "creators": ["Ojaswi Acharya", "Georg Fuchsbauer", "Adam O'Neill", "Marek Sefranek"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We revisit the three-round threshold Schnorr signature scheme Sparkle of Crites, Komlo, and Maller (CRYPTO 2023), as well as its variant Sparkle+. While Sparkle+ was accompanied by a claim of full adaptive security, subsequent work identified a gap in the analysis. The original—and simpler and more efficient—Sparkle scheme has so far lacked even a proof of static security.\n\nWe resolve this by proving static security for Sparkle; our main result is then a tight proof of its full adaptive security in the pure random oracle model, i.e., without relying on the algebraic group model. The core obstacle is that, in the fully adaptive setting, rewinding arguments fundamentally break down. To address this, we base our proof on the Vandermonde circular discrete-logarithm (VCDL) assumption, an interactive strengthening of the circular discrete-logarithm assumption of Cho et al. (CRYPTO 2025), originally introduced to prove tight security of basic Schnorr signatures. Circular-style assumptions eliminate the need for rewinding. Beyond tightness, our analysis highlights circular-style assumptions as a new approach to achieving security in other settings where rewinding is problematic.\n\nWe justify VCDL by reducing it to the low-dimensional vector representation (LDVR) problem of Crites et al. (CRYPTO 2025) in the elliptic-curve generic group model. Finally, we generalize VCDL (and similarly LDVR) and identify a different assumption within this framework that yields a tight proof of adaptive multi-user security for the basic Schnorr signature scheme, a result of independent interest.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-03T05:35:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-01T01:27:07Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/435", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/435", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T08:57:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/435", "title": "Information-Theoretic Strong Traceable Secret Sharing Schemes", "creators": ["Oriol Farràs", "Miquel Guiot"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Traceable secret sharing complements traditional schemes by enabling the identification of parties who sell their shares. Recently, two independent works extended traceable secret sharing to general access structures.\n\nGoyal, Jain, and Partap [EC'26] introduced a model in which a reconstruction box is augmented with a label $I \\subseteq [n]$ and is only required to distinguish between two secrets when queried with the shares of parties in $I$. Based on how this label relates to the corrupted set $J$ that built the box, they defined two notions of traceability. If $I \\cap J = \\emptyset$, the model is called $\\emptyset$-strong traceability, for which they presented a construction based on indistinguishability obfuscation (iO). Otherwise, their model is calledstrong traceability, for which they proved an impossibility result.\nFarràs and Guiot [EC'26] proposed a different model, which we call hiding traceability, where the reconstruction box has no label and the access structure is hidden from the parties. \n\nIn this work, we improve traceable secret sharing for general access structures in three directions. First, we present a fully information-theoretic scheme for the $\\emptyset$-strong traceability model, eliminating the need for strong cryptographic assumptions. This resolves an open question posed by Goyal, Jain, and Partap, who asked what are the minimal assumptions needed in the $\\emptyset$-strong traceability model.\n\nSecond, motivated by the impossibility of strong traceability, we introduce a relaxed notion calledhidden mildly strong traceability. This model is relevant in practice and bridges the strong and hidden models. For this setting, we present an information-theoretic scheme for general access structures.\n\nFinally, we consider the more general model of stateful traceability, where reconstruction boxes may keep state across queries, and we prove an impossibility result for this setting.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-03T15:45:48Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T08:57:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/450", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/450", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T14:40:21Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/450", "title": "A unified toolkit for advanced arithmetic in FHE", "creators": ["Lorenzo Rovida"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "We suggest an extension of discrete--CKKS that enables advanced computations over real, Boolean and large integers (e.g., 64/128-bit), including standard arithmetic operations, comparison, shift, bit length, quotient, square root, and other non linear functions based on binary representation. The flexibility of our approach lies in the synergy between the integer and the real arithmetic layers. At the core of our approach  lies indeed a novel non-iterative binary decomposition technique extracting the $i$-th bit of $x$ by evaluating an approximation of $\\lfloor x/2^i \\rfloor \\bmod 2$, very efficient when $x$ has at most 8 bits.\n\nWe show how such procedure can decompose not only a value $x$, but also a more general $g(x)$ at no additional cost by generalizing the evaluation to $\\lfloor g(x)/2^i \\rfloor$, enabling fast LUT evaluation over integers. Interestingly, the output of our LUTs can be arbitrarily large at the cost of requiring redundant slots: this unlocks the computation of large seeds for Newton--Raphson algorithms, enabling for the first time the practical evaluation of (exact) non linear functions over large integers such as square root and quotient within the discrete--CKKS family of schemes.\n\nBy supporting computations over different domains, our framework is usable in various applications: smart contracts naturally fit our framework, as it efficiently supports both arbitrary logical gates and operations over large integers. It also allows integer computations on the output class of a real-valued neural network, such as metadata lookup. \n\nCompared to the state-of-the-art by Gao and Zheng (CRYPTO '26), our solution does not require ad-hoc encoding or expensive integer to Boolean conversions, making it more suitable when some non arithmetic structure is involved. %has lower latency on all standard integer operations  (additions, multiplications, comparisons and logical shifts), and we additionally support nonlinear integer operations. \nOur current limitation lies in the throughput, which is lower. \nWe additionally provide an open source proof of concept for GPU, showing that our work has better latency and throughput than TFHE-rs on most arithmetic and non-arithmetic operations.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-04T15:10:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T14:40:21Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/452", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/452", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T08:19:01Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/452", "title": "On the CCA security properties (and more) of a new variant of Paillier-ElGamal", "creators": ["Duong Hieu Phan", "Renaud Sirdey", "Jean Vacher"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We solve the long-standing open question of designing a \"truly\" linearly homomorphic scheme -- meaning it supports homomorphic additions on arbitrary plaintexts, with no restriction, in contrast to \"somewhat\" ones -- that achieves CCA1 security under a standard assumption. We do so by introducing a new variant of Paillier-ElGamal, which we call Damgard-Paillier-ElGamal (DPEG) as its design follows a Knowledge-of-Exponent pattern. On top of being linearly homomorphic without any restriction, our scheme enjoys the following properties:\n\n- It achieves CCA1 security solely under the DCR assumption. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first \"truly\" linearly homomorphic proven CCA1 secure solely under this assumption (or any other standard one).\n\n- It can be extended to support one level of multiplication while still preserving its CCA1 security under the same assumption. This extension is then the first concrete scheme supporting both homomorphic additions and multiplications (even limited to one-level) that is proven CCA1 secure under DCR.\n\n- It also achieves Manulis&Nguyen's stronger notion of vCCA security under an additional non-falsifiable linear-only homomorphism assumption that is commonly used in proof-of-knowledge constructs. DPEG is then the first scheme that is proven vCCA secure while being CCA1 secure under a standard assumption. This also carries over to the multiplicative extension.\nInterestingly, DPEG achieves the above at only 1.5 times the cost of the baseline CPA-secure Paillier-ElGamal scheme.\n\nTo establish the CCA1 security of DPEG, we introduce a new abstract framework that allows to prove CCA1 security of a large class of of group-based PKE that also covers other somewhat linearly homomorphic schemes previously known to achieve CCA1 security under falsifiable assumptions such as Damgard-ElGamal, Cramer-Shoup-Lite and the recent variant of Paillier-ElGamal with plaintext zero padding of Libert. This framework may be of independent interest to more easily prove the CCA1 security of other schemes.\n\nLastly, on the negative side, we take a first step in connecting vCCA security to an impossibility result of Gentry&Wichs and show that, under mild assumptions, the vCCA security of DPEG cannot be established from any falsifiable assumption by means of a black-box reduction.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-04T16:12:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T08:19:01Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/454", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/454", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T14:54:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/454", "title": "The principal ideal problem for endomorphism rings of superspecial abelian varieties", "creators": ["Wouter Castryck", "Jonathan Komada Eriksen", "Riccardo Invernizzi", "Frederik Vercauteren"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We describe a Las Vegas algorithm for the principal ideal problem in matrix rings $M_g(O)$ for $g \\geq 2$, over maximal orders $O$ in the rational quaternion algebra $B_{p, \\infty}$ ramified at $\\infty$ and a prime number $p$. Under plausible heuristic assumptions, the method has expected polynomial runtime. An implementation in SageMath shows that it runs very efficiently in practice, with compact output. Our main auxiliary result is a method for finding endomorphisms of superspecial abelian varieties (i.e., powers of supersingular elliptic curves) with a prescribed kernel.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-04T16:51:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T14:54:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/477", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/477", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T04:53:57Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/477", "title": "DAC-PRE: Practical Anonymous Data Access Scheme Control with Proxy Re-encryption for Implantable Medical Devices", "creators": ["Jayaprakash Kar", "Xiaoguang Liu", "Fagen Li"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "One of the most important fundamental elements in\nguaranteeing data security is data access management. The two primary security components of data access control are typically authorisation and authentication. Data access control is the selective restriction of data access. First, we present an effective data access control mechanism for medical devices that are implanted in this study. Through a signcryption method with proxy reencryption\n(DAC-PRE), the protocol guarantees anonymous data\naccess control and supports the user’s anonymity behaviour. The security is proven in oracle model. Our experimental analysis shows the proposed protocol has low computational cost.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-08T01:53:54Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T04:53:57Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/494", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/494", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T12:05:03Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/494", "title": "GlueLUT: Efficient Lookup Table Arguments over Residue Rings", "creators": ["Yuanju Wei", "Zhelei Zhou", "Xinxuan Zhang", "Songyu Wu", "Binwu Xiang", "Cheng Hong", "Yi Deng", "Xiaofeng Chen"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Lookup table polynomial interactive oracle proofs (LUT PIOPs) make SNARK arithmetizations concise, yet almost all efficient constructions assume field arithmetic. We show that directly instantiating them over a composite residue ring \\(\\mathbb Z_Q\\) can be unsound: component-wise set checks preserve the residue multiset in each CRT component but lose the alignment across components. We formalize this obstruction, which we call the CRT alignment ambiguity.\n\nTo overcome this ambiguity, we present GlueLUT, a family of efficient LUT PIOPs over residue rings. GlueLUT runs the lookup over an auxiliary field while retaining the arithmetic proof over \\(\\mathbb Z_Q\\), and then proves consistency between the two witness representations. Our first construction, GlueLUT-4Sq, introduces a cross-modulus consistency (CMC) PIOP, which proves that witnesses over two coprime moduli encode the same integer vector. We construct the CMC PIOP via a range-check PIOP over the product ring using the Lagrange four-square decompositions, structured Johnson–Lindenstrauss projections, and a GKR-style consistency check. For a witness of size \\(n\\), a table of size \\(m\\), and security parameter \\(\\lambda\\), GlueLUT-4Sq has \\(O(n+m)\\) algebraic prover work after witness generation and \\(O(\\operatorname{poly}(\\lambda,\\log n,\\log m))\\) verifier work and proof size. Our second construction, GlueLUT-Fold, uses random rank-one folded consistency checks to achieve better concrete prover efficiency and has \\(O(n+m)\\) prover work, at the cost of \\(O(\\sqrt n+\\operatorname{poly}(\\lambda,\\log n,\\log m))\\) verifier work; its proof size is \\(O(\\log n+\\log m)\\). We implement GlueLUT-4Sq and GlueLUT-Fold as stand-alone PIOPs and report prototype results that corroborate our theoretical efficiency analysis.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-10T08:54:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T12:05:03Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/563", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/563", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T15:25:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/563", "title": "Optimizing FROST for Message Capacity", "creators": ["Philipp Jovanovic", "Ben Riva", "Arnab Roy"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The FROST threshold signature scheme achieves round optimal Schnorr signing through a double-nonce construction, but requires two presignatures per signature. Since each presignature demands an expensive distributed key generation (DKG) protocol, this overhead is significant for high-throughput applications. FROST builds on a core presignature protocol (that we call FROST-core) that uses hash-based re-randomization of presignatures. We investigate whether fewer presignatures can be used to sign multiple messages, improving FROST-core's message capacity.\n\nWe first show that the natural generalization of using $k$ presignatures for $k$ messages is insecure: an extended ROS attack enables forgery even for $k=2$. However, we prove that using $k+1$ presignatures for $k$ messages achieves security in the Generic Group Model combined with the Random Oracle Model. This improves message capacity from 50% (standard FROST-core) to $\\frac{k}{k+1}$, approaching 100% as $k$ grows.\n\nWe further extend our analysis to a modified FROST-core protocol in which a set of presignatures is generated by different parties and used for signing $k$ messages. Security holds as long as at least $k+1$ presignatures were created by honest parties.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-20T19:44:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T15:25:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/595", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/595", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T03:57:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/595", "title": "Registration-Optimized Dynamic Group Time-based One-time Passwords for Mobile Access", "creators": ["Jiaqing Guo", "Xuelian Cao", "Zengpeng Li", "Yong Zhou", "Zheng Yang", "Jianying Zhou"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Mobile access within public finance and enterprise environments often requires lightweight anonymous authentication, allowing users to prove authorization without disclosing their identities. Group Time-based One-Time Passwords (GTOTP) has recently been proposed as a lightweight primitive meeting this need with post-quantum security.  To address dynamic group membership, Cao et al. introduced DGTOne, the first dynamic GTOTP construction. It employs chameleon hashes to precompute a fixed set of Merkle-tree leaves (mount points), into which conventional TOTP verification points (VPs) contributed by group members are adaptively inserted. However, DGTOne partitions mount points by time epochs, so they can expire and become unusable, causing capacity waste due to unpredictable join times. Moreover, its outsourced proof generation requires verifiers to be online each epoch to fetch refreshed credentials from Registration Authority (RA), defeating offline verification needed in mobile access. \nWe address these limitations with two new schemes. First, we propose NWDGT, a no-wastage DGTOTP design that constructs Merkle trees of members' verification points (VP-trees) on demand, eliminating expired mount points at the cost of added handling latency. To mitigate this latency, we introduce LWDGT, which instantiates multiple small one-time signature (OTS) trees whose leaves (OTS public keys) serve as mount points. New members' VPs are signed immediately using unused leaves, achieving low wastage. We formally prove that the wastage rate of LWDGT is, with overwhelming probability, lower than that of DGTOne. By modeling the registration process and optimizing OTS-tree size, for deployments with up to 500 members (209 initially, 20 added monthly), LWDGT reduces mount point wastage rate by 10.2% over one year compared to DGTOne.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-25T11:52:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T03:57:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/629", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/629", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T07:25:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/629", "title": "Towards Formal Security Proofs of MQOM", "creators": ["Haruhisa Kosuge", "Keita Xagawa"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Recent MPC-in-the-Head (MPCitH) signatures increasingly rely on aggressive GGM-tree optimizations to reduce signature size and cost, culminating in secret-key-root correlated GGM trees as used in SBC (Huth and Joux, CRYPTO 2024), MQOM (NIST PQC Standardization for Additional Signature Round-2, 2024), and rBN++ (Kim, Lee, and Son, EUROCRYPT 2025). While this technique yields substantial compression, it introduces a dependency loop in the proof (Kosuge and Xagawa, ePrint 2025/1999).\n\nWe analyze MQOM and resolve this circularity by providing EUF-CMA security proofs for a slightly modified variant. The modifications consist of incorporating a salt into the input of a hash function and modifying the evaluation domain to ensure that all evaluation points are nonzero.\n\nFor the resulting variant of MQOM, we prove EUF-CMA security for the GF(2) parameter sets in the random-oracle plus ideal-cipher model, assuming EUF-NMA security, standard one-wayness, and a heuristic conjecture on matrices. Our proof combines the H-coefficient technique with one-wayness, which may be of independent interest.\n\nWe also prove EUF-CMA security in the (quantum) random-oracle model, where block-cipher-based hash functions are modeled as random oracles. The proof relies on EUF-NMA security and partial-guessing one-wayness (Feneuil and Rivain, ASIACRYPT 2026), which can be reduced classically to partial-domain one-wayness and, in the quantum setting, to a new notion introduced in this work called domain-extension one-wayness.", "date_submitted": "2026-03-31T12:45:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T07:25:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/676", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/676", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T05:46:23Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/676", "title": "An Efficient SM9-Compatible Identity-Based Blind Signature Scheme for One-Time Issuance Identities", "creators": ["Zhiwei Wang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present an identity-based blind signature scheme built on\nthe SM9 Chinese national cryptographic standard. The scheme\noutputs standard SM9 signatures, removes all online pairing\noperations through a single setup-time pre-computation, and\nadds only one user-side exponentiation to achieve blindness.\nWe prove two properties rigorously: \\emph{restricted\ntarget-identity unforgeability} (RTU) under the $Q$-BCAA1\nassumption, and \\emph{computational blindness} against a\nmalicious signer in the random oracle model (ROM), where the\nsigner is given the final signatures and still cannot link\nthem to its protocol views. We state clearly that RTU is\nstrictly weaker than the standard one-more unforgeability\n(OMU) notion for blind signatures: RTU forbids signing queries\non the target identity and is therefore meaningful only when\nthat identity encodes a fresh, one-time issuance context, as\noccurs in coin-, ballot-, and credential-issuance protocols.\nThe $Q$-BCAA1 assumption is the inversion-type assumption that\nmatches the SM9 private-key structure\n$d_{\\ID}=[s/(s+\\tau)]P_1$; it lets the reduction answer\nadaptive key-extraction queries without any decisional (Gap)\noracle. We give a partial-blind extension with a formal\npartial-blindness model, discuss implementation requirements,\nand compare costs against prior SM9-based proposals.", "date_submitted": "2026-04-07T03:17:17Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T05:46:23Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/792", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/792", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T19:35:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/792", "title": "Equivocal Broadcast Encryption: Adaptively-Secure Optimal Distributed Broadcast Encryption from Lattices", "creators": ["Rishab Goyal", "Saikumar Yadugiri"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We present the first Distributed Broadcast Encryption (DBE) scheme from falsifiable lattice assumptions that achieves adaptive security with optimal parameters (short public/secret keys and ciphertexts). Our construction enjoys transparent setup and offers flexible instantiation: we achieve a succinct CRS in the Random Oracle Model, or a long CRS in the standard model. Previously, no lattice-based DBE simultaneously achieved adaptivity and optimal parameters in either setting.\n\nTo achieve this, we introduce a new methodology for proving adaptive security: $\\textit{Equivocal Encryption Systems}$. This framework operates in two indistinguishable modes: a 'real' mode utilizing standard algorithms, and a 'fake' mode where keys and ciphertexts are jointly sampled with auxiliary trapdoors, enabling the dynamic equivocation of ciphertexts to arbitrary challenge values. While our approach is technically distinct from the celebrated Dual System Encryption (Waters, CRYPTO'09), we believe it could serve as a similarly powerful paradigm for realizing adaptive security across a broad class of lattice-based encryption systems.", "date_submitted": "2026-04-22T01:41:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T19:35:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/843", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/843", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T07:55:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/843", "title": "Efficient Fair Data Exchange without In-Circuit Public-Key Operations", "creators": ["Dongwook Kim", "Jihye Kim", "Hyunok Oh"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Fair data exchange (FDE) ties payment to recovery of data matching an agreed commitment.  Code-based FDE offers near-plaintext communication, but the sampled-ElGamal baseline incurs costly in-circuit checks when low redundancy requires many samples.  We replace auxiliary ElGamal ciphertexts with direct KZG authentication and external witness linking.  This leaves only field arithmetic in the consistency circuit and permits a BLS12-381 instantiation with EVM precompile support for settlement-key verification. We prove correctness, soundness, and zero knowledge under an external KZG setup in the algebraic group and random oracle models.  Our implementation reduces aggregate sender computation from \\(179.6\\) to \\(2.75\\) seconds (\\(65.3\\times\\)) for a \\(2\\,\\)MiB file at redundancy \\(\\beta\\approx1.1\\), relative to the sampled-ElGamal baseline.  Bulk ciphertext remains about \\(1.1\\times\\) the plaintext size.  The corresponding EVM implementation reduces gas for successful seller settlement by a factor of \\(31.3\\).", "date_submitted": "2026-04-30T07:16:54Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T07:55:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/862", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/862", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T21:14:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/862", "title": "Adaptively-Secure Flexible and Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption from Lattices", "creators": ["Rishab Goyal", "Saikumar Yadugiri"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Broadcast encryption (BE) allows a sender to succinctly encrypt a message to any dynamically chosen subset of recipients. The gold-standard for BE is $\\textit{optimal succinctness}$ (parameters independent of the number of users) and $\\textit{adaptive security}$. Attaining both from falsifiable post-quantum assumptions has been a central open problem. Recently, Goyal and Yadugiri (GY) [Goyal-Yadugiri; CRYPTO'26] gave the first adaptively-secure and optimally-succinct slotted distributed BE under a falsifiable lattice assumption, but their techniques inherently require an a-priori bound on the number of users and a slotted user structure. Two highly-sought-after generalizations thus remained open: $\\textit{flexible BE}$ (FBE), where users asynchronously sample and register their own keys and $\\textit{identity-based BE}$ (IBBE), where a trusted authority issues keys for identities drawn from a super-polynomially large space.\n\nIn this work, we present the first adaptively-secure FBE and IBBE schemes with all parameter sizes independent of the number of users, both under the same falsifiable lattice assumption (decomposed LWE) and in the same model (Random Oracle Model) as the prior state-of-the-art for slotted distributed BE. Our FBE additionally enjoys a $\\textit{transparent setup}$, in line with the trustless ethos motivating distributed and flexible BE. At the technical heart of our results, we extend the equivocal encryption framework of GY to capture $\\textit{unbounded}$ and $\\textit{dynamic}$ broadcast systems, and introduce $\\textit{Equivocal Matrix Commitments}$ --- a strengthening of matrix commitments that supports adaptive equivocation of the committed matrix. We expect this new abstraction to find broader applications in designing adaptively-secure trustless lattice-based encryption.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-02T23:53:20Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T21:14:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/872", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/872", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T12:33:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/872", "title": "Privacy Coins Under Viewing Key Compromise", "creators": ["Adrian Cinal"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Anonymity guarantees of privacy-oriented cryptocurrencies are garnering negative attention from lawmakers who view them as antinomic to accountability. Having recognized their potential for innovation, however, regulators may not want to outright ban privacy coins but instead seek a middle ground where financial oversight is effective, and still some privacy is maintained. Mature designs, such as Zcash, Monero, or Firo, are expected to facilitate this through so-called viewing keys that can be disclosed to third parties for the purpose of supervision. This paper studies which privacy guarantees continue to hold once they have been. In doing so, it fills the gap in provable anonymity guarantees for Zcash and Firo under the compromise of the incoming viewing key, while, at the same time, exposing problems with Monero. Finally, the paper shows that malicious parties may happily surrender all their viewing keys in each of Zcash, Monero, and Firo and yet still find very efficient ways of evading financial monitoring.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-05T06:02:58Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T12:33:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/908", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/908", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T05:47:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/908", "title": "Titan: Efficient Polynomial Commitments from IOPs over Groups", "creators": ["Chethan Kamath", "Ravi Prakash", "Samipa Samanta", "Sruthi Sekar", "Nitin Singh"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "In this paper, we propose Titan, an efficient polynomial commitment scheme (PCS) with transparent setup. It achieves commitment time of $O(n)$, evaluation time of $O(\\sqrt{n})$ while the proof size and verification scales as $O(\\sqrt[4]{n})$. Titan features an order of magnitude smaller proof sizes than hash based PCS, while featuring a significantly more efficient prover and verifier compared to state of the art group based schemes like Dory and Hyrax. To achieve this balance, Titan borrows two-tiered commitments from Dory, and realizes outer commitment using interactive protocols of proximity (IOPP) over groups, such as Basefold and WHIR, instead of expensive bilinear pairings. This allows Titan to be instantiated over general curves with discrete-log hardness such as Pasta Curves, instead of requiring pairing friendly curves.\n\n    We compile a variant of Spartan protocol for R1CS with Titan PCS to realize a SNARK. Our SNARK construction preserves the prover efficiency of the existing Spartan protocol, while improving proof size and verification quadratically from $O(\\sqrt{n})$ to $O(\\sqrt[4]{n})$. Concretely, for circuits of size $\\geq 2^{22}$ this results in around $3\\times$ more efficient proof size and verification.\n\n    Our blueprint of combining IOPPs over groups with Pedersen style inner commitments is of independent interest, as are several optimizations towards efficiently realizing WHIR IOPP over prime-order groups.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-08T09:50:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T05:47:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/945", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/945", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T02:34:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/945", "title": "SPRITZ: A Short PRISM-Based Threshold Signature via Zero-Knowledge Proof", "creators": ["Hyeonhak Kim", "Won Kim", "Changmin Lee"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Threshold signatures for distributed systems require compact public keys and signatures to reduce communication overhead by avoiding packet fragmentation.\nHowever, with existing post-quantum threshold signatures, either the public key or the signature does not fit within a single unfragmented network packet.\n\nIn this work, we present SPRITZ, an isogeny-based post-quantum threshold signature scheme whose public keys and signatures both fit within a single unfragmented network packet at every NIST security level.\nTo the best of our knowledge, SPRITZ is the first post-quantum threshold signature scheme to do so with an arbitrary number of parties.\nWhile isogeny-based signatures such as SQIsign and PRISM are known for exceptionally compact public keys and signatures, their algebraic structure makes thresholdization for an arbitrary number of parties highly nontrivial.\nWe address this challenge by introducing a novel graph-based threshold access structure tailored to the isogeny setting.\nFor security against known attacks, we employ a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocol for the verification of isogeny push-forward procedures.\n\nAt NIST security levels I/III/V, SPRITZ achieves public keys of 129/193/257 bytes and signatures of 223/335/447 bytes, respectively.\nAmong the schemes submitted to the NIST MPTC (Multi-Party Threshold Cryptography) previews phase 2 whose public keys fit within a single unfragmented network packet, SPRITZ achieves the smallest signature size.\nWe also provide a proof-of-concept implementation of SPRITZ.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-13T04:47:38Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T02:34:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/978", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/978", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T01:08:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/978", "title": "Verifying Consensus Protocols from LLM-assisted TLA$^+$: A Case Study of Byzantine Reliable Broadcast", "creators": ["Shuhe Cao", "Xin Wang", "Chenxu Wang", "Xiao Sui", "Sisi Duan"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "TLA$^+$ (Temporal Logic of Actions) is a formal specification language well-suited for distributed systems. However, writing proper TLA$^+$ scripts requires high domain expertise. When it comes to modeling Byzantine behaviors for Byzantine fault-tolerant consensus protocols, the simulation of malicious behavior is a fundamental challenge: overly simplified modeling misses critical vulnerabilities, and verbose modeling leads to state-space explosion.\n\nIn this paper, we present TLAssist, a large language model (LLM)-assisted tool for semi-automated TLA$^+$ generation tailored for Byzantine reliable broadcast (RBC) protocols. We provide a highly structured workflow and domain-specific data format to improve the quality of LLM prompts. Using five RBC protocols as case studies, we have some interesting findings. First, the specification generated by TLAssist outperforms many open-source TLA$^+$ scripts we are aware of, including those written by domain experts. Second,  TLAssist can assist domain experts in identifying deep design flaws. Notably, our case study on the (2,3,4)-Optimistic RBC (a CCS'25 distinguished paper) captures a subtle issue that causes the violation of the totality property. Finally, TLAssist is useful for non-experts. Namely, we show that by revising the protocols slightly, the generated error traces effectively show complex corner cases that can facilitate understanding of the design.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-18T02:09:47Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T01:08:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1054", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1054", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T01:47:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1054", "title": "Improved Complexity Estimates for Underdetermined MQ Systems via Generalized Variable Partitioning", "creators": ["Hideki Asanuma", "Yilong Chen", "Hiroki Furue", "Kosuke Sakata", "Tsuyoshi Takagi"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Multivariate quadratic (MQ) signature schemes are an important class of post-quantum digital signatures. These schemes rely on the hardness of solving underdetermined MQ systems, where the number of variables \\(n\\) exceeds the number of equations \\(m\\). Therefore, analyzing the efficiency of algorithms for underdetermined MQ systems is essential for evaluating the security of MQ-based signature schemes. Several algorithms have been proposed to solve underdetermined MQ systems efficiently. Among them, Hashimoto's method is one of the best known partition-based direct attacks; it partitions the variables into three groups and reduces the original problem to two smaller MQ subproblems. \nIn this paper, we propose a generalized partition-based algorithm for solving underdetermined MQ systems. The proposed algorithm extends Hashimoto's method by partitioning the variables into more groups and reducing the original problem to smaller MQ subproblems. We derive its applicability conditions and time complexity, and develop an efficient parameter search strategy to find the best partition parameters without a naive exhaustive search. Finally, we evaluate the proposed algorithm on parameter sets of MAYO, QR-UOV, and SNOVA, and compare the resulting estimates with those of existing algorithms for underdetermined MQ systems. In the classical case, the proposed method improves on Hashimoto's method for some parameter sets; in particular, it reduces the estimate for MAYO1 from \\(2^{156}\\) to \\(2^{145}\\). In the quantum case, the proposed method gives estimates smaller than both Just Guess and Hashimoto's method for many parameter sets.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-26T04:59:19Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T01:47:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1084", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1084", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T05:40:06Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1084", "title": "BRaccoon: Concurrently Secure Blind Lattice Signatures from Raccoon", "creators": ["Lucjan Hanzlik", "Mark Manulis", "Marzio Mula", "Alan Pulval-Dady", "Tjerand Silde", "Daniel Slamanig"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Blind signatures are a central primitive for privacy-preserving applications such as e-cash, anonymous credentials, and e-voting. \n\nClassical constructions such as blind Schnorr adapt an ordinary signature scheme while producing signatures that follow the same format and distribution as those generated by the ordinary signing algorithm. This property is particularly relevant in settings where blind and non-blind signatures coexist within the same infrastructure. Achieving an analogous result for lattice-based Fiat--Shamir signatures, with security based on the underlying ordinary signature scheme, has remained open.\n\nWe present $\\mathsf{BRaccoon}$, the first concurrently secure lattice-based realization of the ``blind signatures from a signature assumption'' paradigm of Fuchsbauer and Wolf (EUROCRYPT~2024).\nOur construction builds on the rejection-free lattice signature scheme $\\mathsf{Raccoon}$, yielding signatures that retain the algebraic format and verification relation of $\\mathsf{Raccoon}$.\n\nAt a high level, we introduce blinding at the commitment stage and enforce correct challenge and response generation via linearly homomorphic encryption combined with $\\mathsf{NIZK}$ proofs. Since these proofs already bind the hidden message to the resulting signature, their relation can naturally incorporate predicates on that message, providing a direct route toward predicate blind signatures.\n\nA central technical challenge stems from discrete Gaussian sampling, where blinding induces a non-trivial distributional shift that precludes direct security reductions. To overcome this, we introduce a modified scheme $\\mathsf{Raccoon}^\\star$ that explicitly captures this shift. We analyze one-more unforgeability through non-rounded versions of $\\mathsf{Raccoon}^\\star$ and $\\mathsf{Raccoon}$. The deployed blind-signing protocol retains rounding.\n\nFor a concrete instantiation, we encode the lattice relations and the non-linear challenge computation in a common mixed Boolean and arithmetic relation. Our instantiation retains SHA3-256 and SHAKE256 and proves both protocol statements using the ZK-LaBRADOR toolkit. For up to $2^{32}$ signing queries, its total communication is estimated at approximately $862$ KB.", "date_submitted": "2026-05-28T15:24:45Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T05:40:06Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1099", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1099", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T05:45:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1099", "title": "Lynx: Symmetric Primitive for Shorter and Faster VOLE-in-the-Head Signatures", "creators": ["Lin Jiao", "Hongsen Yang", "Hongrui Cui", "Yituo He", "Yonglin Hao", "Xiaojie Guo", "Qunxiong Zheng", "Jiang Zhang", "Yu Yu", "Kang Yang"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "VOLE-in-the-Head (VOLEitH) is one of the most promising frameworks to design post-quantum digital signatures based on symmetric primitives. However, all existing symmetric primitives do not capture the specialized characteristics of the VOLEitH framework and are not VOLEitH-friendly, leaving room for improving the efficiency of VOLEitH-based signatures. In this paper, we propose a VOLEitH-friendly symmetric primitive called Lynx, which is optimal in terms of the number of required VOLE correlations that directly determines the efficiency of VOLEitH-based signature schemes. In particular, Lynx adopts a multi-branch structure featuring a new truncation function: (a)~nonlinear components are set to minimize the witness length and polynomial degree, as well as the number of finite-field multiplications; (b)~linear layers are strategically interleaved to strengthen security. The security of Lynx is rigorously validated by covering all current attacks in the presence of both classical and quantum adversaries. Built upon Lynx, we design a post-quantum signature scheme, Lynxer, in the VOLEitH framework, which is shorter and faster than all known post-quantum signature schemes from symmetric primitives. According to our experimental results, compared to the state-of-the-art symmetric-based signature schemes in the same setting, i.e., Rainier (CCS'22), AIMer (CCS'23) and FAESTv2 (Crypto'25), our signature scheme Lynxer reduces the ``public-key size + signature size'' by 25%~51%, and improves the signing (resp., verification) time up to 90.5% (resp., 89.9%).", "date_submitted": "2026-05-29T14:01:44Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T05:45:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1163", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1163", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T10:53:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1163", "title": "SWIFT: Shallow and SIMD-Aware CKKS Functional Bootstrapping for Low-Latency", "creators": ["Jung Hee Cheon", "Daehyun Jang", "Jaehee Kang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme\ncan achieve high throughput for large batches, typically of\ntens of thousands of inputs, whereas DM/CGGI schemes offer low latency for a single input.\nIn existing CKKS approaches, the multiplicative depth required for nonlinear function evaluation demands a large ciphertext modulus, which forces a large ring degree regardless of the input size.\nPractical applications, such as encrypted MLP inference, may require\nonly a few hundred function evaluations at a time.\nFor these moderate batch sizes, existing CKKS-based methods\nrequiring large multiplicative depth incur high latency\nwithout fully benefiting from their high throughput.\n\nWe present $\\mathsf{SWIFT}$, a CKKS functional-bootstrapping\nmethod that reduces latency by using multiple slots to lower\nmultiplicative depth.\nFor input $x$, $\\mathsf{SWIFT}$ packs its integer multiples $\\ell x$ into unused slots. Exponential bootstrapping then generates the powers $\\exp(2\\pi\\mathrm{i}\\ell x)=\\exp(2\\pi\\mathrm{i}x)^\\ell=\\alpha^\\ell$ in parallel. Compared to previous approaches that compute these powers through homomorphic multiplications, $\\mathsf{SWIFT}$ directly generates those powers and reduces the required multiplicative depth and ciphertext modulus, allowing a smaller ring degree and lower latency.\n\nWe also introduce a trigonometric approximation method for\nsingular functions such as $1/\\sqrt{x}$, whose derivative\nis unbounded near zero.\nWe observe that the previous Fourier extension method of Bian et al.\n(EUROCRYPT'26) can produce extremely large coefficient norms\nfor these functions when focusing solely on reducing the polynomial degree.\nInstead, we solve an optimization problem to find a trigonometric polynomial that minimizes the coefficient norm while satisfying the required approximation accuracy for the target function.\nThe resulting trigonometric polynomial can be evaluated\nefficiently and with numerical stability using $\\mathsf{SWIFT}$.\n\nOur implementation evaluates $\\mathsf{ReLU}$ on $[-1,1]$ and $1/\\sqrt{x}$ on $[0.0005,1]$ with 12-bit absolute and relative precision, respectively, at ring degree $\\log N=15$. For batches of 512 inputs, $\\mathsf{SWIFT}$ achieves speedups of $3.94\\times$ and $2.86\\times$ over the corresponding CKKS baselines for $\\mathsf{ReLU}$ and $1/\\sqrt{x}$, respectively.\nCompared with latency estimates of DM/CGGI-based methods, $\\mathsf{SWIFT}$ achieves\nlower latency for $\\mathsf{8\\text{-}to\\text{-}8\\ LUT}$ and $\\mathsf{12\\text{-}to\\text{-}12\\ LUT}$\nat batch sizes as small as 32 inputs.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-04T02:04:20Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T10:53:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1207", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1207", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T15:22:51Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1207", "title": "\"Sticking their heads out above the parapets\": Lived Experiences of Legal Risks in Research (Extended)", "creators": ["Sunoo Park", "Daniel R. Thomas"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Overbroad computer crime, intellectual property, and other laws are well known to create legal risks that can discourage essential research. Notable examples include the US Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and the UK Computer Misuse Act. Because such laws fail to distinguish malicious hacking from good-faith testing and research, researchers face serious legal risks for public-interest research activity like identifying software or hardware vulnerabilities or scraping data. Despite the research community's broad awareness of these risks, our understanding of their practical impacts is limited, as most of the community's knowledge comes from anecdotal evidence rather than systematic study.\n\nWe conduct the first qualitative study focused on researchers' lived experiences, to empirically document the *impacts of legal risks and threats* on research and researchers*, and *how researchers navigate legal risk situations*. Our study engages two participant groups: researchers with legal-risk experiences in the UK or the US ($N_R=36$), who discuss 130 projects and incidents spanning over three decades, and professionals that offer support to researchers navigating legal risks ($N_S=8$), who have collectively supported thousands of researchers. We thus provide an unprecedented big-picture view of researchers' experiences with legal risks. We synthesise actionable strategies for researchers, and our findings provide evidence to support policy reform.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-08T13:43:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T15:22:51Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1240", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1240", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T01:35:10Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1240", "title": "Adaptive attacks on FESTA variants with masked-degree isogenies", "creators": ["Tomoki Moriya"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "FESTA is an isogeny-based trapdoor function proposed as a high-performance trapdoor function in isogeny-based cryptography. Its core design principles have inspired a number of related constructions, collectively referred to as FESTA variants.\n\nThe MOXZ attack is an adaptive attack that exploits malicious ciphertexts together with access to a checking oracle, aiming to compromise FESTA and its variants. This attack applies to FESTA variants whose secret keys are derived from isogenies of known degree; however, it does not extend to variants employing masked-degree isogenies.\n\nIn this work, we present a novel adaptive attack that generalizes the MOXZ attack. Our attack successfully targets several FESTA variants even when their secret keys are isogenies of masked degree. We also identify POKE-4D as an exception for which our attack does not appear to be applicable.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-11T04:27:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T01:35:10Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1326", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1326", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T08:27:38Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1326", "title": "LaMS: A p-adic Layered Modulus Switching for Provable Dual Attacks on LWE", "creators": ["Rui-Jie Wang", "Zhong-Xiao Wang", "Qun-Xiong Zheng", "Xuan Zhao"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem is a central foundation for post-quantum schemes such as Kyber and Dilithium. Dual attacks are among the main tools for assessing the concrete hardness of LWE instances. At EUROCRYPT 2024, Pouly and Shen introduced the first provable dual attack against LWE. Subsequently, at ASIACRYPT 2025, Qu and Xu incorporated modulus switching into this framework by recovering the guessed secret mod several small primes and recombining the resulting residues via the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT). Although this CRT-based strategy substantially reduces the search space, it reconstructs the full guessed secret through several distinct primes whose product must exceed \\(q\\). Consequently, the total guessing cost is dominated by the largest CRT prime \\(p_k\\). This raises a natural question: can the same recovery effect be achieved by repeatedly applying the subroutine with a fixed small prime, while further reducing the overall complexity?\n\nWe answer this question affirmatively by proposing layered modulus switching (LaMS), a provable modulus switching dual attack based on a \\(p\\)-adic view of the guessed secret. Instead of recovering residues mod several distinct primes, LaMS fixes a single small prime \\(p\\) and recovers the guessed secret digit by digit in its \\(p\\)-adic expansion. After each digit is recovered, its contribution is subtracted from the LWE samples, producing a new target LWE instance in which the next digit becomes the new secret mod \\(p\\). As a result, the guessing cost is reduced from \\(O(\\mathrm{poly}(m,n)(N+\\sum_{j=1}^{k}p_j^{n_{\\mathrm{guess}}}))\\) in the CRT-based attack to \\(O(\\mathrm{poly}(m,n)\\lceil\\log_p q\\rceil(N+p^{n_{\\mathrm{guess}}}))\\), where \\(p \\ll p_k\\).\n\nWe also correct a parameter issue in two previous works (EUROCRYPT 2024 and ASIACRYPT 2025) on Kyber estimates. After this correction, LaMS lowers the estimated attack cost by up to 1 bit for Kyber compared with the corrected CRT-based attack of Qu and Xu.", "date_submitted": "2026-06-26T13:40:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T08:27:38Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1439", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1439", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T08:55:17Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1439", "title": "ABE for Unbounded Circuits from Circular LWE and Pairings", "creators": ["Shweta Agrawal", "Supriyo Banerjee", "Anuja Modi", "Rajeev Raghunath", "Anshu Yadav", "Shota Yamada"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Constructing attribute based encryption (ABE) for unbounded circuits, namely circuits with both depth and width being unbounded, and for Turing machines are perhaps the most important open questions in ABE research. Recent years saw some much-awaited progress on these long-standing problems -- (i) the work of Hsieh, Lin and Luo [HLL23] (HLL23) provided the first construction of ABE for unbounded circuits from a new circular evasive LWE assumption, (ii) the follow-up work of Agrawal, Kumari and Yamada [AKY24b] and Cini and Wee [CW25] gave the first constructions of ABE for Turing machines.\n\nUnfortunately, all these works relied on different versions of the ``private-coin'' Evasive Learning With Errors assumption which was invalidated in a sequence of attacks [BUW25, BDJ+25, DJM+25, AMYY25, HJL25, HHY26]. Finding new constructions from better-understood assumptions (without relying on compact functional encryption or obfuscation) is therefore an important open problem.\n\nIn this work, we make progress towards this goal. Our contributions are:\n1. *KP-ABE for Unbounded Circuits from Circular Small-Secret LWE and Bilinear GGM.*\nWe provide a new candidate for key-policy ABE for unbounded circuits from circular small-secret Learning With Errors (csLWE) and the Bilinear Generic Group Model (BGGM). Since the BGGM has a long history of study, we believe that this provides strong evidence for the security of our scheme. \n\nIn the standard model, we argue security from a novel, falsifiable ``doubly circular'' assumption which combines csLWE with key dependent message security of a variant of ElGamal encryption in an inseparable manner. \nWe show that in a restricted setting, it is implied by the standard SXDH assumption and csLWE. \n\n2. *SK CP-ABE for Unbounded Circuits from Circular Small-Secret LWE. *\nIn the symmetric key setting, we provide a new candidate for ciphertext-policy ABE for unbounded circuits from only the csLWE assumption. \n\n3. *SK KP-ABE for Turing Machines from Circular Small-Secret LWE.*\nIn the symmetric key setting, we provide the first key-policy ABE for Turing machines from the csLWE assumption.\n\nCuriously, each of our constructions is intrinsically key-policy or ciphertext-policy and stubbornly resists adaptation to its dual variant. Thus, our work exhibits a surprising (to us) dichotomy between the key and ciphertext policy versions of ABE for unbounded circuits. Finding dual versions of the above constructions, removing pairings altogether or dispensing with the symmetric key setting are fascinating open problems.", "date_submitted": "2026-07-15T01:01:33Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T08:55:17Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1547", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1547", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T21:14:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1547", "title": "Silent Distributed Cryptography for DNFs and Threshold Policies from Lattices", "creators": ["Abtin Afshar", "Rishab Goyal", "Saikumar Yadugiri"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We study two central problems in threshold cryptography from lattices: (1) threshold encryption with silent setup for general thresholds $t \\geq 2$, where no post-quantum constructions were previously known, and (2) threshold fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE) with sublinear parameters, an open problem since the work of [Boneh et al.; CRYPTO'18].\n\nWe introduce $\\textit{$(\\alpha,\\beta)$-Scaled Linear Secret Sharing Schemes}$ (LSSS), a relaxation of standard LSSS in which each authorized set $S$ reconstructs a scaled version of the secret, $\\gamma_S \\cdot k$, where both the reconstruction coefficients and the set-dependent scaling factor $\\gamma_S$ are bounded over the integers. Unlike prior approaches based on bit decomposition, this preserves the uniform distribution of unauthorized shares. Building on this, we obtain:\n\n1. $\\textbf{Silent Threshold and Distributed monotone-policy encryption.}$ We provide the first post-quantum construction supporting: (i) threshold policies with ciphertexts growing as $\\tau^{16} \\cdot \\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda, \\log N)$, where $\\tau = \\min(t^2,N{-}t)$, and (ii) DNF formulas with fully compact parameters. Our constructions are proven secure under the decomposed LWE assumption in the random oracle model. If we additionally rely on a common reference string, then the ciphertext size for our threshold policy scheme can be reduced to $\\tau^4 \\cdot \\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda, \\log N)$ under the Succinct LWE assumption.\n2. $\\textbf{Decentralized TFHE with silent setup.}$ We provide the first $\\textit{decentralized}$ TFHE, for threshold policies and DNFs, from the decomposed LWE assumption. Our construction supports homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary circuits, one-round distributed decryption, and silent setup. This was left as an open problem by [Boneh et al.; CRYPTO'18] and, prior to this work, we did not have any non-trivial construction for decentralized TFHE from any assumption.\n3. $\\textbf{Sublinear centralized TFHE from LWE.}$ We also extend our techniques to $\\textit{centralized}$ TFHE. We provide a TFHE scheme under the standard LWE assumption, where all parameters are simultaneously sublinear in $N$ for any threshold $t$ as long as $\\min(t^2,N{-}t)=o(N^{1/6})$. This breaks the $\\omega(N)$ barrier that has persisted in the TFHE literature since 2018.", "date_submitted": "2026-07-29T04:09:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T21:14:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1645", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1645", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T12:51:15Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1645", "title": "Track me if you can: Ephemeral coin tracing", "creators": ["Ignacio Amores-Sesar", "Christian Cachin", "Rohit Chatterjee", "Luiza Soezima", "François-Xavier Wicht", "Michelle Yeo"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Privacy-preserving payment systems are well understood, yet concerns about their misuse for financial crime have led to only limited adoption in regulated settings such as central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and institutional stablecoins. Tracing is one tool for addressing these concerns: acting on external evidence implicating a user, law enforcement follows the suspect's funds through the ledger to uncover laundering routes and accomplices. Existing coin-tracing schemes, however, provide no cryptographic bound on tracing reach: once initiated, a trace may propagate indefinitely through the transaction graph or persist across all future transactions of a targeted user. Keeping surveillance targeted and temporary therefore depends on the restraint of the authority or a committee.\n\nWe introduce ephemeral coin tracing (ECT), a primitive that bounds tracing reach by construction. Each account carries an encrypted tag that records which traced identifiers its funds carry while hiding its tracing status from users. When funds move, the sender's tag degrades and merges with the recipient's tag. Each tracing contribution expires independently after a policy-defined number of hops and then becomes unrecoverable even to the tracing authority, without affecting other live contributions in the same tag. Public parameters also bound how many identifiers a tag can distinguish simultaneously. We formalize ECT and give constructions based on exponential ElGamal, Damgård-Jurik encryption, and Ring-LWE, the last providing post-quantum security.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-10T08:18:10Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T12:51:15Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1650", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1650", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T08:08:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1650", "title": "D-James: Ultra Short Multivariate Signatures", "creators": ["Jacques Patarin", "Alexandre Roullet"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Multivariate signature schemes are among the few post-quantum candidates capable of providing very short signatures, but designing secure constructions has proven challenging. HFE-based schemes such as G$e$MSS were compromised by algebraic MinRank attacks. This motivates the HFE$_\\text{IP}^-$ framework, which combines IP and minus modifiers to address these attacks. We introduce James and D-James, the latter achieving signatures of only 156 bits at the 128-bit classical security level and 348 bits at the 256-bit classical security level, among the shortest signatures reported for practical post-quantum public-key signature schemes, with estimated signing and verification costs comparable to those of G$e$MSS. The main technical contribution is the introduction of Dragon terms, which decouple the number of public equations from the hash output length, allowing the signature size to be reduced independently of the security parameter. We characterize the algebraic structure introduced by Dragon terms and show that it does not enable known MinRank attacks when combined with the HFE$_\\text{IP}^-$ countermeasures. We also show that the known differential attack does not appear to extend to the minus variant. We further present parameter sets over both binary and small non-binary finite fields. For small values of $q>2$, the public-key size decreases by up to a factor of 10, while signature size and computational cost remain close to the binary case.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-10T16:15:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T08:08:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1654", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1654", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T12:19:29Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1654", "title": "From Toy to Instrument: Seven Years of Verifpal", "creators": ["Nadim Kobeissi"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Symbolic protocol verifiers must make a difficult tradeoff: their models and counterexamples should be accessible to protocol designers, but their results must still have a precise meaning. Verifpal addresses the first goal with a compact modeling language and source-level attack explanations. Its original analysis engine, introduced in 2019, had only a preliminary account of its guarantees. This paper presents and evaluates the replacement engine.\n\nThe engine searches backward from a violated security query to candidate attacker actions. It then runs every session and peer configuration of the protocol together as one execution under those actions, in which each injected value must be derivable from what that same execution has already disclosed, and evaluates the query on that execution. We specify this process from the term algebra and primitive registry through knowledge deduction, bounded sessions, peer configurations, execution, and counterexample presentation. We also give a single-history reference semantics, prove that every execution the engine judges is a history of that semantics, prove termination under the engine's search bounds, and state exactly what each result category establishes.\n\nOur evaluation combines targeted regression models, mutation analysis, corpus measurements, and comparisons with ProVerif, Tamarin, and Scyther. It shows that the engine can express and find attacks that require several sessions, different peer assignments, or staged compromise, while exposing the implementation choices that limit its search. The result is an auditable account of Verifpal as a bounded counterexample finder: every reported attack is an explicit protocol execution, but a passing query is not an unbounded proof, and no report is a machine-checked certificate.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-11T01:18:04Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T12:19:29Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1740", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1740", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T23:54:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1740", "title": "Non-Local Search-to-Decision Reduction over $\\mathbb{F}_2$, and More", "creators": ["Prabhanjan Ananth"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Non-local search-to-decision asks whether the difficulty of two non-communicating (non-local) parties both predicting $x$ given a bipartite state (that possibly depends on $x$) implies the difficulty of non-local parties both predicting the inner product $\\langle r,x\\rangle$, for a uniformly random $r$. This problem and its variants have been extensively studied and are motivated by applications to unclonable cryptographic primitives such as unclonable encryption and copy-protection. We study the identical-challenge setting, in which both parties receive the same uniformly random vector $r$, in contrast to the independently sampled challenges considered in prior works. We demonstrate positive results for the cases when $x$ and $r$ are vectors over $\\mathbb{F}_2$ and over large finite fields. As a consequence, we obtain a conceptually different proof of indistinguishability-secure unclonable encryption.", "date_submitted": "2026-08-19T16:52:12Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T23:54:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1862", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1862", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T11:53:17Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1862", "title": "HEAT: Faster Fully Homomorphic Inference via Approximations-Weights Co-Adaptation", "creators": ["Alessandro Zirilli", "Davide Marincione", "Evgenios M. Kornaropoulos", "Giuseppe Ateniese", "Emanuele Rodolà"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) allows a server to run a language model directly on encrypted user prompts, but current approaches remain prohibitively slow. Ciphertexts natively support only addition, multiplication, and rotation, and multiplications may be composed only to a bounded depth before a costly bootstrapping operation is required to continue. Every nonlinearity must therefore be approximated by an iterative method; each iteration increasing the number of multiplications. A higher iteration count buys precision but exhausts the available depth more frequently and thus triggers more bootstraps, which dominate latency. We introduce Homomorphic Encryption-Aware Training (HEAT), a fine-tuning method that makes the per-nonlinearity iteration counts learnable, enabling them and the model weights to co-adapt during training. HEAT optimizes iterations with respect to the task objective, allowing the model to adapt to approximation errors encountered during inference without architectural changes or retraining from scratch. We further relate iteration count to quantization bit width and bound, at fixed weights, the gap between our objective and quantization-aware training. On encrypted GPT-2 decoding, HEAT reduces iterations by $3.1\\times$, bootstraps by $1.6\\times$, and end-to-end latency by $1.4\\times$, while improving decode agreement over the calibrated encrypted baseline.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-02T08:38:30Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T11:53:17Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1884", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1884", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T11:01:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1884", "title": "Correction of parameters  in ``Computing Optimal Ate Pairings   on Elliptic Curves with Embedding Degree 9, 15 and 27''", "creators": ["Walid Haddaji"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We correct two errors in Section~8 of the above-mentioned paper\nconcerning the seed parameters proposed for BLS27 elliptic curves\n(embedding degree $k=27$) at the $256$-bit and $192$-bit security levels.\nIn both instances, the disclosed seeds produce a composite $r(x)$,\nviolating the primality condition essential for constructing\npairing-friendly curves. Additionally, for the $192$-bit seed the\ncharacteristic $p(x)$ is also composite. We provide verified corrected\nseeds for each security level, obtained by exhaustive search, and confirm\nwith SageMath that both $p(x)$ and $r(x)$ are prime in each case.\nAll other results of the original paper remain valid.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-03T22:10:32Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T11:01:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1897", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1897", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T08:41:38Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1897", "title": "What to Guess in Key-Recovery Attacks?", "creators": ["Tim Beyne", "Gregor Leander", "Patrick Neumann", "Yevhen Perehuda", "Michiel Verbauwhede"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Determining the precise parts of the key that need to be guessed in a key-recovery attack is fundamental for judging its cost: if the same attack can be executed by guessing less key material, then the cipher's resistance against this attack is overestimated. Although a multitude of prior works provide upper bounds on the key material required, and although these bounds might be tight in some special cases, a precise evaluation of the required key material and the tightness of these bounds is still missing.\nWe remedy this by enumerating linear trails to iteratively compute the affine hull of the support of the Fourier transform of the key-recovery map. This leads to a generic and practical algorithm that identifies the smallest subspace of key material to be guessed. This algorithm is ready to be used in many different attacks and for a large variety of cipher structures. We demonstrate its impact by showcasing improvements on several published integral, linear, differential-linear, and zero-correlation attacks on the block ciphers PRESENT, SIMON, SKINNY, and GIFT.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-05T01:19:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T08:41:38Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1958", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1958", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T09:48:06Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1958", "title": "Arithmetic for Large-Characteristic Finite Fields in CKKS", "creators": ["Daehyun Jang", "Junho Lee"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Seur\\'e and Suvanto (ePrint 2026/1102) recently showed that, for small-characteristic primes $p$,\narithmetic over $\\mathbb{F}_{p^r}$ can be homomorphically evaluated in CKKS via a technique\nthey call \\emph{spectral encoding}.\nTheir construction is, however, restricted to small\ncharacteristic: ciphertext multiplication amplifies the error by the operator norm of the multiplied plaintext. \nUnder the spectral encoding, a field element in $\\mathbb F_{p^r}$ is encoded to a plaintext with operator norm at most $O(rp)$. The error\ntherefore grows by a factor of $rp$ in the worst case, limiting the supported size of the characteristic prime $p$.\n\nIn this work, we propose \\emph{bi-spectral encoding}, which decomposes the\ncoefficients of the plaintext polynomials used in the spectral\nencoding of Seur\\'e and Suvanto.\nWith a decomposition parameter $d$, a field element in $\\mathbb F_{p^r}$ can be encoded to a plaintext with operator norm $O(rd{p^{1/d}})$, for a suitable choice of encoding parameters.\n\nWe give a comprehensive analysis of error growth and derive\na bound on error amplification under multiplication.\nFor fields with a 256-bit prime characteristic (secp256k1) and extension\ndegrees $1$, $2$, and $4$, we provide numerical simulations of\nerror amplification and compute the maximum multiplication counts satisfying\nthe decoding condition under stated error bounds.\n\nWe further present a bootstrapping procedure that reduces both the size of the plaintext and its noise.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-10T03:29:30Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T09:48:06Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1976", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1976", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T06:03:49Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1976", "title": "Properties of the Me Operation and Me-Scalar Multiplication on Elliptic Curves over Finite Fields", "creators": ["Masaaki Shirase"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The M operation was introduced by Yura as an alternative to the max operation appearing in the box-ball system (BBS) to construct a BBS over finite fields. The Me operation is a version of the M operation for an elliptic curve $E$ over a finite field ${\\mathbb F}_p$. As with the M operation, the Me operation satisfies the idempotent law and does not satisfy the associative law. Nevertheless, for $P,Z \\in E({\\mathbb F}_p)$ and $n \\in {\\mathbb N}$, the 1st Me-scalar multiplication $P_{n,Z}^{\\,I}$ with auxiliary element $Z$ can be defined. Moreover, for $P,Z \\in E({\\mathbb F}_p)$ and $n \\in {\\mathbb Q}_+$, the 2nd Me-scalar multiplication $P_{n,Z}^{II}$ with auxiliary element $Z$ can be defined. This paper shows the following properties that may be useful to construct cryptographic protocols: $(P_{n_0,Z}^{\\,I})_{n_1,Z}^{\\,I}=(P_{n_1,Z}^{\\,I})_{n_0,Z}^{\\,I}$, $(P_{n_0,Z}^{II})_{n_1,Z}^{II}=(P_{n_1,Z}^{II})_{n_0,Z}^{II}=P_{n_0n_1,Z}^{II}$; the 1st MeDLP and the 2nd MeDLP, which are Me versions of the ECDLP, are difficult to solve on classical computers under certain conditions; the 1st MeCDH and the 2nd MeCDH, which are Me versions of the ECCDH, are NOT difficult to solve; and the sequence $\\{ P_{n,Z}^{II}:n=1,2,3,\\ldots \\}$ is nonperiodic unless it is constant.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-11T04:52:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T06:03:49Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1984", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1984", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T21:25:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1984", "title": "Improving GIJS Key Recovery for Classic McEliece", "creators": ["Stephen A. Weis"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Ghoshal, Ishai, Jain and Sun (GIJS) recently gave the first distinguisher for Classic McEliece public keys that is cheaper than generic decoding, at an estimated $2^{114}$ to $2^{124}$ bit operations for the five NIST candidate parameter sets, and have since extended it to a key-recovery algorithm. The distinguisher is one large sparse linear-algebra computation. We show that this computation already contains the secret key, and we give two ways to extract it. The first takes the gradients of the polynomials that the distinguisher computes. We prove which subcode of the public code they span at each column, and the key follows from these subcodes by linear algebra, at the cost of $100$ to $1400$ runs of the distinguisher. The second builds on the key recovery of GIJS and reads the whole support from a single run.\n\nWe also lower the cost of a run by about $20$ bits, using two facts about binary Goppa codes that we prove and two heuristic assumptions that we test. Key recovery then costs $2^{94}$ to $2^{102}$ bit operations in the model of GIJS, against $2^{151}$ to $2^{287}$ for information-set decoding. That model does not charge for memory, and nine tenths of the operations fetch a bit from a vector of $2^{48}$ to $2^{52}$ bits. Charging for memory as the Classic McEliece security guide does gives $2^{110}$ to $2^{128}$. The cost depends on $m$ and $t$ but not on the length $n$, and it grows by about eight bits per unit of $m$. Raising $m$ to $18$, $26$ and $34$, with $n$ well below $2^m$, puts a run above $2^{143}$, $2^{207}$ and $2^{272}$ at public keys of about $0.6$, $2$, and $7$ MB.\n\nNone of this is close to practical, and several ingredients are heuristic. We state each as an explicit assumption and test it by running the attacks end to end on small keys and, where no run is needed, at full Classic McEliece size. As a demonstration we recovered the secret key of instance 253 of the TII McEliece key-recovery challenges ($m=8$, $t=9$, $n=214$), a toy-sized code that had not been solved, with two sparse kernel computations of about $10^7$ unknowns and $700$ core-hours each.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-11T16:11:38Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T21:25:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/1986", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/1986", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T06:44:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/1986", "title": "Two-Anchor Holdout/Hermite: Solving the TII-254 McEliece Key Recovery Challenge", "creators": ["Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We report on the solution to the TII-254 McEliece key recovery challenge -- currently the hardest solved challenge under the original brute-force metric ($2^{254}$). The parameters of TII-254 are $(m,t,n) = (8,12,223)$, defining a binary $[223,127]$ code specified by a full-rank $(96 \\times 223)$ parity-check matrix. We state the method as a thirteen-step process, separating heuristic and non-heuristic choices. At a high level, we computed two complete $121$-dimensional relation kernels conditioned at distinct public coordinates, combined them to isolate a certified $80$-dimensional pair core, removed a $64$-dimensional common nuisance space, and identified the remaining $16$ dimensions as an $\\mathbb{F}_{2^8}$ projective-line geometry. This yielded all $87$ visible locators, after which a deterministic completion search recovered the full support and polynomial. The two final Krylov sequences alone used $27.2$ GPU-hours on NVIDIA GH200s, excluding GPU reconstruction and CPU processing. We provide a self-contained artifact with compact recovery inputs and code, an independent key verifier, and Lean proofs of the reusable linear-algebraic steps.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-11T19:10:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T06:44:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2011", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2011", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T10:28:32Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2011", "title": "CauchyFold: Residue-Optimal High-Arity Lattice Folding via Scaled Cauchy Challenges", "creators": ["Xiang Wang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Folding schemes combine a batch of relation instances into one accumulator. For quadratic relations, applying the fold directly creates a mixed term for every pair of inputs. We present CauchyFold, a lattice protocol that folds one accumulator with \\(k\\) fresh quadratic instances without enumerating these pairwise terms.  \nThe companion work [WX26] uses Cauchy folding coefficients to represent the mixed contribution through a vector-valued polynomial of degree below \\(k\\). We give two algorithms that compute its coefficients with quasi-linear arithmetic in \\(k\\) for fixed relation dimensions. The protocol commits this polynomial before the folding challenge. Since the folding coefficients need not be short integers, it computes the fold over an extension field and canonically re-encodes the result as bits. This preserves the accumulator’s commitment layout and honest opening bound.  \nFor classical resettable provers, we give explicit extraction-error and expected-time bounds for a folding node with a fixed-depth reduction chain. It recovers valid source openings or a short nonzero vector in the kernel of a commitment matrix. A compiled profile at \\(k=1024\\) uses 162.67 KiB of no-retry interactive communication, excluding incoming commitments and the CRS.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-14T04:47:13Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T10:28:32Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2062", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2062", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T17:06:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2062", "title": "Hamming Ideals and Grobner Bases for ISD-like Syndrome Decoding", "creators": ["Roberto La Scala", "Marco Marchesin", "Sharwan K. Tiwari"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We investigate an algebraic approach to the Syndrome Decoding Problem, based on a reformulation of the Hamming weight constraint and its integration with the Information Set Decoding paradigm. We begin with a systematic analysis of the Hamming variety, deriving its defining equations in terms of elementary symmetric functions. Since these equations may have high degree, we exploit convolution identities for elementary symmetric functions, together with factorizations based on Lucas' identity, to derive an equivalent formulation with auxiliary variables and equations of bounded degree.\n\nBuilding on this modeling, we generalize the ISD paradigm through an ISD-like decoding strategy, implemented by the GBDecode algorithm, in which only a subset of an information set is fixed. This approach reduces the size of the combinatorial search space at the cost of solving the associated multivariate nonlinear systems. To handle this algebraic component, we employ the MultiSolve algorithm, which replaces a single Grobner basis computation with a collection of computations on simpler systems, obtained by exhaustively assigning a varying number of indeterminates over the finite field. This provides a tunable balance between combinatorial search and algebraic solving.\n\nWe evaluate the resulting approach experimentally on instances of the Syndrome Decoding Problem for random binary linear codes, using parameters corresponding to the NIST Security Category 1 parameter set of the Classic McEliece cryptosystem. The experiments assess the feasibility of this combinatorial-algebraic approach and provide insights into the practical behavior of Grobner basis techniques within an ISD-like decoding framework.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-16T15:30:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T17:06:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2070", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2070", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T08:00:06Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2070", "title": "Polynomial Time Algorithms for the Kadison-Singer Problem", "creators": ["Zhao Song", "Song Yue"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Marcus, Spielman, and Srivastava [MSS15] established the existence of Kadison--Singer partitions. We provide polynomial-time algorithms for the Kadison--Singer problem. For Hermitian matrices $A_1,\\ldots,A_m\\in\\mathbb C^{n\\times n}$ of rank at most one, we give two algorithms that find signs $\\sigma\\in\\{\\pm1\\}^m$ satisfying $\\|\\sum_i \\sigma_iA_i\\|\\le C\\|\\sum_i A_i^2\\|^{1/2}$. The deterministic algorithm achieves $C=3.3443$ using $\\widetilde O(mn^2+n^{4.75})$ arithmetic operations. The randomized algorithm achieves $C=4.8628$ using $\\widetilde O(mn^2+n^{3.58})$ arithmetic operations in expectation. For vectors satisfying $\\sum_i a_ia_i^*=I$ and $\\|a_i\\|^2\\le\\alpha$, the algorithms yield partitions $[m]=I_1\\cup I_2$ satisfying $\\|\\sum_{i\\in I_j}a_ia_i^*-I/2\\|\\le (C/2)\\sqrt\\alpha$ for $j=1,2$.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-17T06:50:24Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T08:00:06Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2090", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2090", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T14:27:48Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2090", "title": "Refining Probabilistic-Linearization TIDA for 5-Round SHA3-384 Collision Attacks (Full Version)", "creators": ["Luhan Yan", "Zhenzhen Bao", "Huina Li"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Since the SHA-3 family was standardized by NIST in 2015, its collision resistance has been extensively studied. The previous best-known collision attack on 5-round SHA3-384 is based on internal differentials and the probabilistic-linearization variant of two-block Target Internal Differential Algorithm (TIDA). Its connector replaces deterministic affine restrictions that guarantee S-box differential validity by higher-dimensional affine relaxations, reducing the number of linear constraints and preserving more degrees of freedom. The price is that solutions of the linearized system are only probabilistically valid. In particular, once the first message block fixes the inner part variables, the remaining affine solution space cannot be treated as a set of independent trials; only part of its freedom effectively contributes to the connector probability.\nThis paper refines the probabilistic-linearization framework in two ways. We first propose SA-PIDS, a simulated-annealing-based search for affine-subspace assignments, improving the trade-off among capacity constraints, the product-density estimate, and the remaining solution-space dimension. We then give a structural evaluation of the actual connector probability, explaining how the effective remaining freedom in the solution space after fixing the first block could be used and counted.\nUsing the same target internal differential characteristic as the previous 5-round SHA3-384 attack, our refinements reduce the theoretical complexity from $2^{170.73}$ to $2^{164.11}$.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-18T12:45:53Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T14:27:48Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2092", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2092", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T13:29:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2092", "title": "Indifferentiability of the Sum of Two Permutations: Tight 3n/4 Security for the Uniform Simulator and a New Simulator for 4n/5 Security", "creators": ["Sunyeop Kim"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We study the regular indifferentiability of the sum of two n-bit permutations. Previous work proved 2n/3-bit security and gave a 5n/6-bit attack against the uniform simulator. We prove 3n/4-bit se curity for the simulator and give a matching attack. Our proof bounds the KL divergence between response distributions by tracking the bias in unrevealed construction values through their conditional distribution, which was not analysed in detail in previous work. To exceed this thresh old, we introduce the Gyroscope simulator, which adjusts inverse-query acceptance probabilities to compensate for the bias left by earlier re sponses. The Gyroscope simulator achieves 4n/5-bit security.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-18T13:05:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T13:29:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2097", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2097", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T13:10:04Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2097", "title": "End-to-End Hard-Label Cryptanalytic Model Extraction Using Efficient Sign Recovery", "creators": ["Akira Ito", "Takayuki Miura", "Yosuke Todo"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The importance of deep neural networks (DNNs) is widely recognized, and the parameters obtained through training are regarded as valuable assets. Recently, attacks that extract these parameters using only oracle queries to a DNN have been actively studied at IACR conferences. The hard-label setting is the most challenging setting for model extraction, where an adversary can observe only the final output label, such as “dog” or “cat.” At Eurocrypt 2025, Carlini et al. proposed polynomial-time hard-label extraction of ReLU-based MLPs. However, one step of this attack process, i.e., sign recovery, requires a large number of queries and substantial computation. Implementing this step in a black-box setting remains difficult. Consequently, a fully black-box end-to-end demonstration on trained deep ReLU MLPs has remained a challenge. In this paper, we propose a new sign-recovery algorithm based on a completely different principle from the existing method. Our method requires no dedicated queries for sign recovery. In our experiments, it achieves higher sign-recovery accuracy than the existing method. Consequently, it enables efficient sign recovery even for trained models. With our sign-recovery algorithm, all steps of hard-label model extraction can be implemented in a black-box setting. By combining these implementations, we demonstrate end-to-end model extraction from models trained on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, with width 16 and 4 or 6 hidden layers, achieving over 98% label agreement.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-18T15:44:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T13:10:04Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2141", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2141", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T11:08:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2141", "title": "BitZ: proofs and commitments in arbitrary rings through binary fields", "creators": ["Remco Bloemen", "Albert Garreta", "Marcin Kostrzewa", "Shreyas Londhe", "John Wu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We introduce BitZ, a hash-based Polynomial Commitment Scheme (PCS) for committing to multilinear polynomials $\\mathbf{f}$ with coefficients in an arbitrary finitely generated ring $S$, e.g.\\ a finite field $\\mathbb{F}$, the integers $\\mathbb{Z}$, a cyclotomic ring, etc. Moreover, given another arbitrary ring $R$ and a ring homomorphism $\\psi:S\\to R$, BitZ then proves evaluation claims over $R$ for the polynomial $\\psi(\\mathbf{f})$. BitZ's costs depend almost exclusively on the number of bits in the coefficients of $\\mathbf{f}$, and not on $S$, $R$ or $\\psi$. Moreover, BitZ provides range checks (or more generally, bit-size checks) essentially for free. \n\nBitZ can thus be used as a PCS in essentially any proof system. We do so to build a SNARK, called BitZ-SNARK, for integer polynomial constraints, following the fingerprinting technique of Campanelli and Hall-Andersen, where one commits over $\\mathbb{Z}$ and proves the constraints over a random prime field $\\mathbb{F}_q$, i.e. BitZ is deployed with $S=\\mathbb{Z}$, $R=\\mathbb{F}_q$, and $\\psi$ reduction modulo $q$. BitZ applies equally to other ring-based proof systems, or field-based ones.\n\nTo commit to $\\mathbf{f}$, BitZ first decomposes  $\\mathbf{f}$ into a string of bits, and then commits to it over a binary field $\\mathbb{F}_{2^{\\nu}}$, in packed form. The scheme then  proves the linear claim on $\\psi(\\mathbf{f})$ over the arbitrary ring $R$, even though it committed to the bits forming $\\mathbf{f}$ over a binary field.\n\nWe implement BitZ-SNARK and use it to prove, among others, SHA-256 hashing followed by ECDSA signature verification; RSA modular exponentiation and Poseidon hashing;  integer multiplication; and SHA-256 hashing followed by multiplication modulo $2^{32}$, consistently obtaining better performance than prior approaches on most tasks. As an example, we achieve a throughput of $5$ million proved 32-bit integer multiplications per second on a  MacBook Air M5 24 GB (10 threads, CPU-only) with proof sizes under $150$ kB. We prove a SHA-256 hash of a $2$ kB ($2^5$ compressions) message followed by a P-256 ECDSA signature verification with $50$ ms and $3.3$ ms prover and verifier time, respectively, and with a proof of $76$ kB, single-threaded. With $10$ threads the times are $20$ ms and $3.4$ ms.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-21T15:16:27Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T11:08:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2147", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2147", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T07:59:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2147", "title": "ReedWeave: Faster Reed-Solomon Polynomial Commitments from Interleaving and Folding", "creators": ["Yuhao Jia", "Zhe Li", "Chaoping Xing", "Yizhou Yao", "Chen Yuan", "Jielong Zhang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Polynomial commitment schemes (PCSs) allow a prover to commit to a polynomial and later prove its evaluations succinctly. Among hash-based constructions, FRI (Ben-Sasson et al., ICALP 2018) and its follow-up works achieve polylogarithmic proofs by recursively ``folding'' Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. However, their concrete evaluation costs remain relatively high, as the first few folding rounds operate on the largest codewords and dominate the prover work.\nWe present \\emph{ReedWeave}, a Reed-Solomon PCS that successfully incorporates interleaving with folding, achieving the best of the two worlds. ReedWeave decomposes a degree-$d$ polynomial into $m$ smaller components and commits to their RS encodings over a common domain. Under our novel decomposition, a random linear combination of these codewords is exactly an $m$-ary folding. At a high level, ReedWeave starts with an $m$-ary folding, followed by standard binary folding as in FRI. The prover costs are substantially reduced in the sense that at the very beginning it suffices to do interleaved-RS encoding rather than standard RS encoding. That is, we reduce prover costs from $\\mathcal{O}(d \\log d)$ to $\\mathcal{O}(d\\log(d/m))$ for constant code rate while maintaining efficient polylogarithmic verification. Moreover, our approach essentially works for arbitrary $m$, relaxing the smoothness requirements of the underlying fields by a multiplicative factor of $m$.\nWe benchmark our Rust implementation over Goldilocks using\n32 threads and targeting 100-bit security. At $d=2^{24}$, $\\rho=1/4$, and $m=64$, the DEEP variant commits in $475.0$ ms, opens in $111.6$ ms, verifies in\n$2.07$ ms, and produces a $594.7$ KiB proof. Compared with FRI (ICALP 2018), commitment, opening, and verification are $6.9\\times$, $51.5\\times$, and $4.2\\times$ faster, respectively. Against STIR (CRYPTO 2024), the corresponding speedups are $2.9\\times$, $68.5\\times$, and $2.1\\times$. Its proof is only $0.69\\times$ the size of FRI's and $2.31\\times$ that of STIR's.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-22T04:13:03Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T07:59:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2152", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2152", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T00:59:01Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2152", "title": "Structural Analysis of Seven Hash Functions Submitted to the NGCC", "creators": ["Yufei Yuan", "Ruichen Wu", "Shanpeng Wei", "Junxu Shen", "Jinpeng Liu", "Yixin Zhang"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards (ICCS) launched the Next-generation Commercial Cryptographic Algorithms Program (NGCC) and invited worldwide comments on draft submission requirements and evaluation criteria for cryptographic hash algorithms. Our analysis of seven submitted hash functions gives the following results:\n\n- Message differences that cancel in every key injection give explicit collisions for all four fixed-output variants of \\textbf{MoFang} and both XOF variants at every finite output length.\n- Two distinct states of \\textbf{Neulaser} become equal after one update, giving collisions for all three variants with the initialization used by the v2 reference and optimized implementations.\n- An invariant subspace of \\textbf{CHIME-512} permits collision search using at most \\(2^{64}\\) hash evaluations when shifts act separately on 64-bit words, as in both submitted implementations.\n- \\textbf{CHAMP}'s determinant constraint gives collision searches using at most \\(2^{192}\\) and \\(2^{384}\\) hash evaluations for its 512- and 1024-bit variants, respectively.\n- We exhibit explicit free-start collisions for all three \\textbf{QSH} variants. In the semi-free-start setting, both messages and every tree node share one chosen complete reset. We prove upper bounds of \\(2^{64},2^{128},2^{128}\\) compression evaluations for finding collisions with 512-, 768-, and 1024-bit digests, respectively, plus constant preparation and finalization costs.\n- In both versions of \\textbf{WChain}, the message expansion preserves invariant sets and admits sequences of expanded blocks with periods one, three, and six over all prescribed steps.\n- On a set of 256 message blocks, \\textbf{Cuishen}'s message expansion acts as a cyclic shift of eight binary coordinates throughout all 64 rounds. With the same initial chaining register and counter, these blocks give XOR differences between round keys with periods dividing eight.\n\nThe stated evaluation budgets for \\textbf{CHIME-512} and \\textbf{CHAMP} give success probabilities greater than \\(0.39\\).", "date_submitted": "2026-09-22T07:32:33Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T00:59:01Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2157", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2157", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T00:33:05Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2157", "title": "Jolt-QED: Formally Verifying Bytecode Expansions In Lean", "creators": ["Ari Biswas", "Quang Dao", "Daniel Ross", "Justin Thaler"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "In this work, we verify, using the Lean 4 proof assistant, that the Jolt zk-VM's expanded programs faithfully emulate a RISC-V CPU. Prior work translated the official Sail specification of RISC-V into Lean. We extend this model to define the Jolt ISA in Lean. We build a generator that runs Jolt's Rust bytecode expander and renders its output as Lean programs. Finally, for 51 out of 58 such programs, we prove these expansions are equivalent to their corresponding RISC-V instructions. This lays the groundwork for proving completeness and soundness of further stages of Jolt's proving pipeline.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-22T10:24:21Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T00:33:05Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2160", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2160", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T10:11:49Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2160", "title": "Accordion: Efficient Batch Proving via Algebraic Folding", "creators": ["David Balbás", "Anca Nitulescu", "Maxime Plançon"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present $\\mathsf{Accordion}$, a new proof system that works in two steps:\n  - $\\textit{Accumulate}$: The first building block is a multi-folding scheme that efficiently accumulates $k$ different instances of a degree-$d$ polynomial relation into a single accumulated instance, without using recursion. Our scheme builds on the Protostar [Bünz & Chen, ASIACRYPT '23] and Protogalaxy [Eagen & Gabizon, ePrint 2023/1106] line of work, improving further the verifier efficiency.\n    It supports the same expressive class of relations, arbitrary-degree polynomial constraints, enabling efficient folding for CCS, Plonkish constraints, and even custom gates.\n   - $\\textit{Decide}$: The second block is a SNARK decider for the folding scheme, which efficiently proves the validity of the resulting accumulated instance using off-the-shelf optimized building blocks. We give a concrete instantiation consisting of a Plonk-based proof plus an additional KZG polynomial commitment opening. \n  \nThis design is especially attractive in batch-aggregation settings where a prover collects many independent witnesses, folds them into a single accumulator, and then runs one succinct decider to certify the entire batch. Our scheme avoids costly recursion overheads. \n\nWe implement $\\mathsf{Accordion}$ and evaluate it against a highly optimized Plonk proving pipeline ($\\texttt{midnight-zk}$). For $k=64$ instances, $\\mathsf{Accordion}$ is up to $2.5\\times$ faster than computing $k$ Plonk proofs for SHA-256 preimages, with a $3\\times$ faster verifier and $4\\times$ smaller proofs. Its prover is also an order of magnitude faster than using IVC to aggregate the $k$ proofs.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-22T14:39:00Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T10:11:49Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2190", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2190", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T13:16:30Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2190", "title": "Stay in Your Lane: Fast Arithmetic over Large Finite Rings with CKKS", "creators": ["Hyeongmin Choe", "Robin Köstler", "Tim Seuré"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Recent CKKS-based constructions support homomorphic arithmetic modulo powers of two and more general moduli. We explore a complementary tradeoff: using polynomial rings native to CKKS simplifies arithmetic and refreshing but restricts the message spaces. Building on Kim's interpretation of GBFV ciphertexts as CKKS ciphertexts, we use the decomposition $\\mathbb{R}[X]/\\langle X^N+1\\rangle \\cong(\\mathbb{R}[X]/\\langle X^n+1\\rangle)^{N/n}$ into $N/n$ polynomial lanes, where $2\\leq n\\leq N$ is a power of two dividing the RLWE dimension $N$. Following GBFV, each lane represents a message in $\\mathbb{Z}[X]/\\langle X^n+1,t\\rangle$, where $t$ is coprime to $X^n+1$ over $\\mathbb{Q}$. These message spaces include $\\mathbb{Z}_{\\beta^n+1}$ for $t=X-\\beta$, products of modular integer rings, specific 128-, 256-, 512-, and 1024-bit prime fields, and extension fields such as $\\mathbb{F}_{5^{16}}$, $\\mathbb{F}_{17^4}$, and $\\mathbb{F}_{37^{32}}$. Unlike the triangle encoding of Gao and Zheng's construction (GZ), our lanes occur at intermediate stages of conventional CoeffToSlot and SlotToCoeff transformations, avoiding additional encoding-specific linear maps. We thus \"stay in our lane\" by performing arithmetic and refreshing within CKKS-native polynomial rings. Our arithmetic bootstrapping restores ciphertext levels, bounds polynomial representatives, and reduces approximation error. At $N=2^{16}$, it takes less than 4.5 seconds in every tested configuration, with little variation across $t$ and $n$. Comparing our arithmetic modulo $2^n+1$ with GZ's arithmetic modulo $2^n$, same-machine, same-library experiments show a $2.2\\times$–$3.8\\times$ speedup for $2^3\\leq n\\leq 2^6$. Our bootstrapping time remains nearly constant as $n$ grows, whereas GZ's dense encoding-specific transformations increase its cost and, at larger $n$, exceed available memory, preventing direct comparisons. At $n=2^{14}$, extrapolating GZ's published timings suggests a $26\\times$ speedup.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-23T20:05:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T13:16:30Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2196", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2196", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T00:27:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2196", "title": "Revisiting Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange: Unified Leakage and Improved Efficiency", "creators": ["Sihang Pu", "Li Yao", "Yu Yu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Fuzzy Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (fuzzy PAKE) was introduced at Eurocrypt'18, enabling two parties to securely establish a shared cryptographic key using passwords that are close and potentially low-entropy. This is a generalization of standard PAKE and is particularly useful for handling mistyped passwords or inherently “noisy” samples such as biometrics.\n\nWhile this primitive sounds promising, existing definitions and protocols face several challenges: they may suffer from gapped leakage (namely, leakage of a small amount of information from failed authentications), or they may be restricted to Hamming distance.\n\nWe review the functionality and describe our contributions below:\n\n1. Leakage under Reuse.\nWe show that, when a password may be reused across multiple sessions, any leakage from the functionality has the same eventual compromise consequence under repeated use. Concretely, we construct an efficient ideal-world adversary that recovers an n-character password within O(n) active sessions, assuming it starts from a password not too far from the target. Our attack applies to both Hamming distance and Minkowski (L_p) distance under reasonable parameter choices. This implies that, for common distance metrics in practical settings, several notions of leakage are effectively unified when passwords are reused, thereby resolving an open question from Eurocrypt'18.\n\n2. Supporting L_p Distances.\nWe propose substantially more efficient protocols for generalized Minkowski (L_p) and Hamming distances in the random oracle model. As a key technical step, we show how to achieve malicious security using only a semi-honestly secure oblivious key-value store, while addressing several subtleties in the proof. Concretely, compared with existing approaches for L_2 distance, our protocol reduces runtime by about 86% and bandwidth by about 99%.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T00:27:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T00:27:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2197", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2197", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T01:56:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2197", "title": "MultLA: A Framework of Fast Correlation Attack Exploiting Multiple Linear Approximations and Its Application to SNOW 5G", "creators": ["Jiang Wan", "Lin Ding", "Jiekun Sun", "Xinhai Wang"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The complexity of fast correlation attack is fundamentally determined by the correlations of the linear approximations used. Conventional fast correlation attacks either rely on a single dominant linear approximation or use the lower bound to evaluate the resulting correlation of multiple linear approximations, which have the same output mask and distinct input masks. How to exploit multiple linear approximations with distinct output masks remains an open problem. In this paper, we propose a framework of fast correlation attack exploiting multiple linear approximations called \\texttt{MultLA} to solve this problem. \\texttt{MultLA} utilizes the arithmetic mean of the absolute correlations of linear approximations, rather than the lower bound of that. For SNOW 5G, our attack has time/memory/data complexities of\n  ${{2}^{279.25}}/{{2}^{265.03}}/{{2}^{263.62}}$, which are all better than those of the existing work. When the time and memory complexities are slightly better than those of the existing work, the data complexity is significantly reduced from ${{2}^{265.4}}$ to ${{2}^{261.21}}$. To the best of our knowledge, our attacks achieve the best known cryptanalytic results of SNOW 5G up to now.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T01:56:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T01:56:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2198", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2198", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T05:26:31Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2198", "title": "Lifting Symmetries for Dimension Reduction in Module-LIP: rank 2 and rank 4", "creators": ["Hengyi Luo", "Kaijie Jiang", "Yanbin Pan"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The module lattice isomorphism problem (module-LIP), introduced with HAWK, has attracted growing interest. Its most studied case is ${\\mathcal O_{\\mathbb{L}}}^2$-LIP, underlying HAWK key recovery, where $\\mathbb{L}$ is a power-of-two cyclotomic field and ${\\mathcal O_{\\mathbb{L}}}$ its ring of integers. Three recent independent algorithms reduce this $2n$-dimensional problem to polynomially many exact-SVP calls: the Claude-derived algorithm uses dimensions at most $n/2+1$, and the ChatGPT-derived and Mureau--Pellet-Mary algorithms use $3n/4+1$. These improve Ducas's generic $\\mathbb Z$LIP bound $n+1$ (DCC 2024). Although known SVP methods still give exponential running times, the impact on parameter selection led the HAWK team to withdraw the scheme. All three approaches rely substantially on rank-two structure. Higher-rank module-LIP is a possible direction for alternatives, calling for further study of its hardness.\n\nWe first use the symmetric square to obtain a rank-two reduction, matching the bound $3n/4+1$ above. Its auxiliary objects correspond geometrically and algebraically to those of the ChatGPT-derived algorithm, so this does not constitute a substantively new reduction; the differences lie in the interpretation and post-processing. This viewpoint nevertheless motivates our dimension reduction in rank four.\n\nIn rank four, the conjugate Hodge star on the exterior square yields a publicly computable fixed lattice isometric to $\\mathbb Z^{3n}$, from whose orthonormal basis we reconstruct a module isomorphism. For ${\\mathcal O_{\\mathbb{L}}}^4$-LIP with the standard free module as reference, we reduce the $4n$-dimensional problem to polynomially many SVP calls in dimensions at most $3n/2+1$, improving the generic bound $2n+1$. All computation outside the oracle runs in deterministic polynomial time.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T05:26:31Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T05:26:31Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2199", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2199", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T07:07:10Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2199", "title": "PulpoPay for Auditable Privacy CBDCs: Introducing High Concurrency and Offline Confirmation", "creators": ["Chenke Wang", "Shuangcheng Liu", "Yu Long", "Xian Xu", "Dawu Gu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) aim to replicate the utility of physical cash in the digital era by balancing privacy with regulatory auditability. Despite recent advancements, existing CBDC schemes suffer from limited concurrency and the lack of offline payment confirmation, forcing users to process concurrent payments one by one and requiring counterparts to remain online. These constraints severely limit CBDC's applicability in high-frequency, real-world payment scenarios.\n\nThis paper proposes PulpoPay, the first CBDC scheme to provide high concurrency and offline confirmation, while maintaining auditable privacy. To achieve high concurrency and offline confirmation, PulpoPay, at its core, introduces a coin-based payment protocol that facilitates users to concurrently withdraw, transfer, and deposit coins without synchronization or online requirements for counterparts. For auditable privacy, we leverage signatures on randomizable ciphertexts to enable fine-grained auditing without compromising privacy. Furthermore, we design a coin identifier with offline-checkable uniqueness to resist double-spending attacks even in disconnected (offline) environments. We formally prove PulpoPay's security within the Universal Composability (UC) framework.\n\nWe implement a prototype of PulpoPay. \nExperimental results demonstrate that (1) a payment with an offline receiver can be finished within 0.3~s using a mobile phone; (2)  PulpoPay outperforms the state-of-the-art PEReDi [CCS'22] in the scenarios of concurrent payments. For a typical setting of 200 concurrent payments, PulpoPay reduces processing time by at least 66.89% and communication overhead by at least 76.45%. This advantage becomes even more significant as the number of concurrent payments grows.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T07:07:10Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T07:07:10Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2200", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2200", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T09:18:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2200", "title": "On the Power of Slicing and Dicing: Linear Garbling Beyond Two-Input Gates", "creators": ["Tianren Liu", "Luojian Wei"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Communication is a central efficiency bottleneck in garbled circuits. Rosulek and Roy (CRYPTO 2021) introduced \\emph{slicing} and \\emph{dicing}, obtaining a garbling scheme in which XOR gates require no communication and each two-input AND gate costs \\(1.5\\lambda + 5\\) bits, where \\(\\lambda\\) is the security parameter.\n\nIn this work, we investigate the power of these techniques for garbling gates of larger fan-in. We develop a linear-algebraic framework that yields concrete constructions and asymptotic bounds. For three- and four-input gates, we obtain constructions with communication costs $7\\lambda/3 + 35$ and $15\\lambda/4 + O(1)$ bits, respectively. For arbitrary fan-in \\(n\\), we give a construction for any single-output gate with communication cost bounded by \\(22 \\cdot 2^n\\lambda/n + 2^n\\) bits.\n\nOur constructions are compatible with free-XOR, and all hash queries within each gate are nonadaptive. We prove security of the framework in the random-oracle model and under a circular correlation robustness (CCR) condition for any number of slices.  \n\nWe also evaluate simple uses of the three-input construction against the best two-input circuits collected in our experiments, finding evidence of communication savings on control circuits.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T09:18:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T09:18:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2201", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2201", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T09:32:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2201", "title": "Dance with Noise: Safely Trade Minor Decryption Failures for More Compact KEMs with Applications to IKEv2", "creators": ["Zidi Zhuang", "Yuyang Xiao", "Long Chen", "Qiang Tang", "Zhenfeng Zhang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The standardization of post-quantum cryptography, notably ML-KEM, introduces a severe network bottleneck: large public keys and ciphertexts often exceed the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) limits of UDP-based protocols. This size explosion inevitably leads to unreliable IP-layer fragmentation or forces complex protocol workarounds.\n\nTo overcome this, we propose a novel design philosophy for post-quantum Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE). We challenge the rigid cryptographic paradigm that mandates negligible decryption failure rates (DFR). By safely trading minor, manageable decryption failures for aggressive size compression, we drastically reduce the bandwidth footprint of lattice KEMs in ephemeral exchanges. We demonstrate this approach via a compact AKE for the Internet Key Exchange protocol (IKEv2). Integrating standard ML-KEM into IKEv2 currently necessitates the high-latency IKE_INTERMEDIATE exchange (RFC 9242) to distribute large payloads. By employing our compressed KEM design (800-byte public key, 928-byte ciphertext), the entire key exchange fits within the initial IKE_SA_INIT packet, completely eliminating the need for RFC 9242.\n\nTo ensure that protocol aborts caused by decryption failures do not introduce security vulnerabilities, we formalize IND-CPAF (Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack with Failures) to rigorously bound failure-dependent leakage. More importantly, we prove our IKEv2 instantiation still secure in the classical Canetti-Krawczyk model. Finally, our implementation in the strongSwan IPsec library confirms a fragmentation-free handshake: over 10,000 real-world connections, it achieves a 48.8 ms average setup time---matching classical ECDH---and keeps initial packets strictly under the 1280-byte IPv6 MTU, with merely a 0.002% retry rate.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T09:32:45Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T09:32:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2202", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2202", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T12:38:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2202", "title": "Fully Anonymous Perfect Threshold Secret Sharing: Explicit One-Bit Construction and Rate Amplification", "creators": ["Chongxu Ren", "Hongbo Yu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Fully anonymous perfect threshold secret sharing combines exactly uniform unauthorized shares with reconstruction from unlabeled share values. Con, Li, and Mazor proved that short-share schemes exist for every threshold, leaving efficient general constructions and constant rate open. We address both questions. First, we give an explicit one-bit scheme with $(2t-3)\\lceil\\log_2n\\rceil$-bit shares, expected-polynomial-time sharing, and deterministic polynomial-time reconstruction. The key is an exact sampler for localized affine relations, including collision patterns. Second, an affine-hull compiler turns any one-bit primitive with alphabet $\\{0,1\\}^b$ into a long-secret scheme with additive share overhead $b(t-1)\\lceil\\log_2(n+1)\\rceil$, up to field-alignment padding. Authorized payloads determine an affine space; a short anonymously shared certificate identifies the secret within it. Instantiation gives $L+O(t^2\\log^2n)$-bit shares and rate $1/2$ at $L=\\Theta(t^2\\log^2n)$. For fixed $2\\le t<n$, the rate approaches one, which the classical bound of Kishimoto et al. shows is unattainable at any finite nontrivial secret alphabet. Finally, we prove the universal bound $|\\Omega|\\ge(n-t+1)(n-t+2)$ for $3\\le t\\le n-2$. Together with Con--Li--Mazor's specialized threshold-three construction, this establishes the exact fixed-length optimum of $2m$ share bits for $(t,n)=(3,2^m)$, $m\\ge3$. All guarantees are information-theoretic and exact. The technical work is done by GPT 6 Astra.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T12:38:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T12:38:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2203", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2203", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T15:19:54Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2203", "title": "On FROST and Unconditional LDVR Security", "creators": ["Ian Goldberg", "Chelsea Komlo", "Stefano Tessaro"], "subjects": [], "abstract": "Inspired by the recent polynomial-time adaptive attacks on threshold Schnorr signatures, we contextualize the Low-Dimensional Vector Representation (LDVR) assumption and its impact on relevant threshold Schnorr signature schemes. Our analysis focuses in large part on FROST, a widely deployed threshold Schnorr signature scheme. However, our analysis is applicable to any relevant threshold Schnorr signature scheme, such as Lindell's three-round threshold Schnorr protocol.\n\nWe show that for cases where FROST is used with 131 parties and fewer, and for parameter choices of 128-bit generic (discrete log) security, FROST is secure for any signing threshold. This bound increases to 260 parties for parameter choices of 256-bit security; our analysis similarly can be extended to other parameter choices. This bound assumes the best possible LDVR adversary, even more powerful than the results by Rodríguez García and Tessaro.\n\nIn other words, for real-world uses of FROST with parameter choices of 128-bit security, and with a small (131 and fewer) number of parties, the security of FROST is determined entirely by the hardness of the Algebraic One-More Discrete Logarithm (AOMDL) assumption, as LDVR is unconditionally hard for this parameter regime. It is an open research question whether the concrete attacks given by Rodríguez García and Tessaro can be improved to approach the unconditional LDVR security bound considered in our analysis.\n\nWe then show for each additional party for 132 total number of signers and greater, again for parameter choices of 128-bit generic security, the resulting security of FROST is at worst reduced by approximately one bit (or less) of security for the worst-case choice of corruption threshold. This analysis can be used by practitioners to determine the worst possible security of even large-scale FROST deployments.\n\nFinally, we give two variants to FROST that build upon prior masking techniques to allow for full adaptive security. The first variant allows for masking keys to be derived from Diffie-Hellman identity keys, allowing for constant memory overhead, at the tradeoff of increased computation. The second variant allows for a 50% reduction in memory overhead for storage of pairwise masking keys, by employing symmetric key predistribution techniques.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T15:19:54Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T15:19:54Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2204", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2204", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T16:45:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2204", "title": "Provenance Proofs: Linkable Zero-Knowledge Derivation Relations for Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets", "creators": ["Vincenzo Botta", "Michal Pospieszalski", "Emanuele Ragnoli", "Justus Ranvier"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "ZKPoSP proves that a public key or address was honestly derived from a hidden wallet seed, without revealing the seed or the private derivation state. This paper studies relationships among several derived values: whether public keys or addresses, possibly on different curves and different blockchains, share a hidden origin, which is the seed or an anchor of the wallet, and who else can recognize this relation.\n\nWe give a model for such provenance proofs, with derivation proofs, which carry a link value, and provenance proofs, which show that several derivation statements share an origin. We define correctness, derivation soundness, provenance soundness, non-frameability and unlinkability. We give four constructions, which differ in who can link: only the user, with a joint proof or with commitments linked later; anyone within a linking context, with a deterministic tag, which can also act as a nullifier; or a designated authority, with an encryption of that tag. We prove, in sketch form, that the constructions satisfy the five properties under the security of the ZKPoSP derivation relations, the random oracle model, and the zero knowledge and simulation extractability of the proof system.\n\nWe describe an application to cross-chain transfers from Bitcoin to Solana, in which the payout address must come from the same wallet as the source address, so that an attacker cannot substitute the destination. We report Plonky3 benchmarks of the derivation proofs on which the constructions are built.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T16:45:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T16:45:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2205", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2205", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T23:31:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2205", "title": "DKG Is All You Need", "creators": ["Guru-Vamsi Policharla"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We construct the first Batched Threshold Encryption scheme with a \\emph{transparent} setup where public parameters are \\emph{independent} of the batch size. As a result batches of arbitrary sizes can be decrypted, without imposing an a priori fixed bound. We prove security under a constant size assumption -- the decisional bilinear square Diffie--Hellman assumption.\n\nSetup is just a distributed key generation protocol to sample secret shares of a random value. Ciphertexts consist of two $\\mathbb{G}_1$ elements, one $\\mathbb{G}_2$ element and the encrypted message, plus a NIZK for CCA security (two $\\mathbb{F}$ elements with a sigma protocol). Partial decryptions are a single $\\mathbb{G}_1$ element, computed with one scalar multiplication. Decrypting a batch of $B$ ciphertexts costs $O(B)$ pairings and $O(B\\log^2 B)$ group operations.\n\nIn the ramp setting, with a gap between the reconstruction threshold $t$ and corruption threshold $f$ as in consensus protocols with $n\\ge3f+1$, we construct a pairing-free batched threshold encryption scheme from DDH whose partial decryptions are $2B/(t-f)$ group elements, and reduce the aggregation cost of our pairing-based scheme to $O(B\\log^2(B/(t-f)))$ group operations.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T16:46:29Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T23:31:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2206", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2206", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T17:05:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2206", "title": "GovBind: From Authenticated Fetch to Zero-Knowledge Predicate over Government Documents", "creators": ["Yunus Gürlek", "Ahmet Ramazan Ağırtaş"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Government portals often issue PDF certificates whose provenance can be verified only through a live HTTPS verification service. Proving a limited fact from such a document therefore commonly requires disclosing the complete document or giving the verifier access to the portal. We present GovBind, a protocol that combines zkTLS provenance with a zero-knowledge content proof, without requiring the issuer to modify its service or embed an independently verifiable signature. A baseline construction binds both stages through a commitment to the complete response body. To make client-side proving feasible for compressed PDFs, an optimized construction instead commits separately to private ranges, discloses the remaining bytes, requires their exact partition, and opens the claim-bearing compressed stream in a document profile-specific proof that constrains DEFLATE decompression. \nWe formalize GovBind with game-based definitions of correctness, soundness, and privacy, where soundness jointly captures authenticity, content validity, and binding, and we prove both constructions secure relative to the explicit leakage and trust assumptions of Proxy-mode TLSNotary. Our prototype supports proofs of no overdue tax debt, bounded traffic penalties, and residence city over documents returned by the Turkish government verification service, e-Devlet. Across 72 generated proofs in 24 sessions, end-to-end generation took 54-119 seconds, verification took 44-127 milliseconds, and proofs were 11-12 KiB.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T17:05:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T17:05:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2207", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2207", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T21:48:25Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2207", "title": "Two Laws of Public-Key Cryptography", "creators": ["Trey Li"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We discover two laws governing public-key key exchange and public-key encryption. The first states that a non-interactive key-exchange scheme is secure only if it is kleptographically insecure. The second states that a public-key encryption scheme is secure only if it is kleptographically insecure. They give two impossibility results: no kleptographically secure non-interactive key exchange with pseudorandom shared keys exists, and no kleptographically secure public-key encryption with pseudorandom ciphertexts exists. More precisely, no non-interactive key-exchange scheme can simultaneously establish pseudorandom shared keys and support black-box execution in which the user observes only the public keys and the final shared keys output by the black box, and no public-key encryption scheme can simultaneously have pseudorandom ciphertexts and support black-box execution in which the user observes only the public keys and plaintexts input to the black box and the ciphertexts output by it. Our argument turns the very shield of a primitive into a spear against itself, showing that the security guarantee of the primitive is precisely what enables a kleptographic attack. We instantiate the laws with two post-quantum schemes: CSIDH and Regev encryption.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T21:48:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T21:48:25Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2208", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2208", "datestamp": "2026-09-24T22:37:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2208", "title": "A Note on CDS for Random Functions", "creators": ["Marshall Ball"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We record the following bound: almost all Boolean functions $f : \\{0,1\\}^n \\times \\{0,1\\}^n \\to \\{0,1\\}$ require $2n - 2\\log n - O(1)$ bits of communication for perfect two-party conditional disclosure of secrets with a one-bit secret. This only gives a factor 2 improvement over the previous best bound due to Applebaum, Holenstein, Mishra and Shayevitz [EUROCRYPT 2018], but at least (nearly) matches the input length. The proof is a straightforward compression argument that uses the birthday bound to give a succinct representation of transcript collisions (the latter being a technique from Feige, Kilian and Naor [STOC 1994], refined in Applebaum et al.).\n\nViewing transcript-collision testing as an elementary case of distribution testing extends the argument to imperfect correctness and privacy. We do not currently know how to extend the argument to an explicit hard predicate.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-24T22:37:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-24T22:37:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2209", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2209", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T06:12:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2209", "title": "The Cost of Rewinding for Succinct Arguments: Strict-Time Barriers and Expected-Time Security", "creators": ["Alessandro Chiesa", "Ziyi Guan", "William Wang", "Yuetian Wu"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Succinct arguments are central cryptographic objects, underlying various applications such as blockchains and image authentication. Almost all succinct arguments used in practice follow the commit-and-open paradigm introduced by Kilian (STOC 1992): commit to a probabilistic proof, then open the few locations the verifier queries. Decades of work have generalized and optimized this paradigm, yet its exact provable security in the standard model remains unclear. Existing analyses proceed by rewinding, and they leave gaps: strict-time analyses lose an inverse-polynomial factor, while expected-time analyses are sharper but apply only to special cases of this paradigm.\n\nWe resolve both gaps. On the negative side, we show that the strict-time loss is inherent: no strict polynomial-time reduction relying on a black-box extractor can achieve negligible knowledge error (unless the underlying language is easy). On the positive side, we give a new expected-time analysis, achieving negligible soundness and knowledge errors via an expected polynomial-time reduction against expected polynomial-time adversaries, at the full generality of the paradigm, capturing multi-round and functional variants such as polynomial and linear IOPs compiled with the corresponding commitments. This is the first standard-model analysis to reach this regime for succinct arguments deployed in practice.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T06:12:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T06:12:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2210", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2210", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T12:13:14Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2210", "title": "Skyhook: Trustless Cross-Chain Value Transfer with a Fully Scriptless Pool", "creators": ["Abhinav Vishnu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Facilitating value transfers with a scriptless chain is a longstanding problem in cryptography. We present a cross-chain messaging and value transfer protocol that maintains game-theoretic atomicity even when one party is operating on a chain which is fully scriptless, such as shielded Zcash, which has no scripting capabilities at all and requires transactions to be virtually identical.\n\nThe observation is that consensus protocols which utilise segregated witness schemes to ensure transaction ID unmalleability (such as ZIP244 in Zcash, SegWit in Bitcoin), segregate transaction data from transaction witness component (which is the part that is actually signed). The transaction identifier is, therefore, a virtually collision-resistant commitment to the effects intended by the transaction, computable before signing, and in many chains, even without the knowledge of the signer.\n\nWe then use this primitive to build a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument (NIZK) to prove that a given future transaction ID reliably commits to a specific effect, often without revealing the sender, confidential data, or requiring the recipient to sign. Combined with an SPV light client on the Turing-complete chain, this yields fully trustless verification that a shielded transaction occurred with a reliable guarantee, with no requirements of a validator consortium or multisig that can be hacked or stalled.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T12:13:14Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T12:13:14Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2211", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2211", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T12:19:58Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2211", "title": "Structural Cryptanalysis of Polar-KEM: Direct Recovery of the Secret Isometry", "creators": ["Yuyang Xiao", "Long Chen", "Zhenfeng Zhang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Polar-KEM is a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism submitted\nto the Next-generation Commercial Cryptographic Algorithms Program.\nIts security is claimed to rely on a lattice isomorphism problem over\npolar-code-defined Construction-D lattices. In its core key-generation\nalgorithm, a polar lattice basis is constructed from a polar-code chain,\nreduced using LLL, and left-multiplied by a secret orthogonal matrix.\nThe resulting matrix is published as the public key.\n\nWe show that the key-generation procedure does not instantiate a\ngeneral lattice isomorphism problem. The reduced reference basis is\ngenerated through a public chain of computations: public parameters\ndetermine frozen sets, the frozen sets determine a polar-code chain,\nthe code chain determines a Construction-D basis, and the basis is\nthen reduced by the public LLL procedure. Under the natural executable\ninterpretation of the specification, an adversary can reproduce the\nsame reduced basis.\n\nIf the public key is\n\\ensuremath{B_{\\mathsf{pk}}=O B_{\\mathsf{red}}},\nthe secret orthogonal matrix is recovered by the single linear-algebra\noperation\n$$\nO=B_{\\mathsf{pk}}B_{\\mathsf{red}}^{-1}.\n$$\nThe attack is polynomial time and recovers the exact secret isometry,\nor its numerical representation, without solving a shortest-vector\nproblem or a general lattice isomorphism problem.\n\nWe also examine the erasure parameter used by the frozen-set selection\nalgorithm. The specification neither assigns it a concrete value nor\ndefines it as a sampled secret with a distribution, encoding, entropy\nrequirement, or storage mechanism. Treating this unspecified value or\nunspecified LLL tie-breaking as secret entropy would define a different\nscheme and would not repair the published construction.\n\nThe present paper focuses on this direct basis-alignment weakness.\nAdditional structural and correctness analyses are left to an extended\nversion.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T12:19:58Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T12:19:58Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2212", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2212", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T12:38:07Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2212", "title": "Hidden-Bits Generators with Succinct CRS and Openings", "creators": ["Pedro Branco", "Nico Döttling", "Yao-Ching Hsieh", "Abhishek Jain", "Akshayaram Srinivasan", "Brent Waters"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Feige, Lapidot, and Shamir [FOCS'90] presented a generic approach for building non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs via the notion of hidden-bits generators (HBGs). At a high level, an HBG allows a prover to statistically commit to a $k$-bit pseudorandom string in the CRS model with a succinct commitment. Later, the prover can open this pseudorandom string at an arbitrary subset $S \\subseteq [k]$ of positions by providing a proof $\\pi_S$. The hiding property requires that unopened positions remain pseudorandom.\n\nIn this work, we study the efficiency of HBGs, focusing on direct constructions that make black-box use of cryptography. We obtain the following results:\n\nSuccinct CRS: Assuming learning with errors (LWE), we construct an HBG with {\\em succinct} CRS of size $\\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda,\\log k)$ for generating $k$ hidden bits. This achieves an exponential improvement over a recent sequence of works by Waters [STOC'24], Branco et al.~[EUROCRYPT'25], and Waters, Wee, Wu~[EUROCRYPT'25] that required a CRS of size at least $k \\cdot \\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda)$.\n\nBatch opening: Using pairings, we construct an HBG with batch opening, where the proof size for any subset is $ \\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda)$. Previously, this was only known from the Naccache-Stern public-key cryptosystem [Groth, ASIACRYPT'10].\n\nSuccinct CRS and Batch opening: Assuming the hardness of RSA, we construct an HBG where both the CRS and the opening proof for any subset are of size $ \\mathsf{poly}(\\lambda,\\log k)$. No black-box constructions achieving this efficiency were previously known.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T12:38:07Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T12:38:07Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2213", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2213", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T13:57:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2213", "title": "Practical Attacks Against EALPN Using Belief Propagation", "creators": ["Pierre Galissant", "Guilhem Jazeron", "Léo Perrin"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Weak and shallow pseudo random functions form a new class of symmetric primitives that is seeing a growing relevance, from their use in the initialization phase of some MPC protocols to the internals of some FHE-based protocols. However, their security is hard to ensure: \"weak\" means that chosen plaintext attacks are irrelevant, and \"shallow\" means that their construction cannot be round-based: in this exotic setting, how can we define secure PRFs?\n\nIn this paper, we investigate EALPN, a recent proposal of this type. We identify critical blind spots in the initial asymptotic analysis of the designers: the role of l, one of its parameters, turns out to be crucial. Indeed, we present a key recovery attack with a complexity that is polynomial in all other parameters, and whose complexity grows exponentially but still slowly with l. As a consequence, some parametrizations intended to provide 128 bits of security only offer 37 bits. Our attack is based on novel use of the belief propagation algorithm. Our analysis of its efficiency in our specific setting can be of independent interest.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T13:57:33Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T13:57:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2214", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2214", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T14:25:43Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2214", "title": "Communication Preserving SFE from Obfuscation", "creators": ["Omkant Pandey", "Christopher Smith", "Yuhao Tang"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The communication complexity of computing a function in the two party setting\ncan be much smaller than requiring one of the parties to send its input. We\nrevisit how this communication complexity must change if the function must be\ncomputed securely.\n\nHubáček and Wichs show that any protocol for computing a function\nsecurely must communicate at least as many bits as the length of the function's\noutput. However, all positive results in this direction require much more\ncommunication than optimal. In particular, the state of the art for general\nprotocols requires a $\\textit{multiplicative}$ overhead polynomial in the security\nparameter, achieving only ''rate 0'' asymptotically.\n\nWe show that, assuming the existence of input-succinct\nindistinguishability obfuscation for Turing machines, it is possible to achieve\nconstant rate for this task. This compiler works even when the original protocol\ncommunicates single bits in each round, which is the main obstacle in prior\nworks, and necessitates the use of obfuscation. The compiler can be based on\nstandard non-succinct indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits (instead of\nTuring machines) in the common random string or random oracle models.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T14:25:43Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T14:25:43Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2215", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2215", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T15:18:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2215", "title": "Quantum security analysis of unrestricted isogeny-based group actions", "creators": ["Xavier Bonnetain", "Max Duparc", "Dania Lazzarini", "Luciano Maino", "Chloe Martindale", "Christophe Petit", "Sina Schaeffler", "André Schrottenloher", "Alessandro Sferlazza"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Setting concrete parameters for group action based cryptographic protocols is notoriously difficult due to the incomplete understanding of the concrete efficiency of Kuperberg's subexponential quantum attack. Estimates for the CSIDH group action do exist in the literature, but they do not easily translate into meaningful estimates  for the many recent and far more efficient alternative group actions.\n\nIn this paper, we implement the recent qt-Pegasis group action framework as a (simulated) quantum circuit, allowing for concrete estimation of its efficiency and Kuperberg's attack. Our results suggest that using a 2048-bit base field in qt-Pegasis offers reasonable quantum security, while a 4096-bit base field is required to reach NIST security level 1.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T17:55:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T15:18:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2216", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2216", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T20:15:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2216", "title": "On the Multi-User Security of CSI-FiSh with Tight Reductions", "creators": ["Seunghoon Lee", "Maher Mamah", "Bruno Sterner"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The security of isogeny-based signatures is almost exclusively studied in the single-user setting, leaving a gap for realistic multi-user deployments. This gap is especially crucial for CSI-FiSh, where the small challenge space and parameter sensitivity directly impacts security estimates. We address the multi-user security of CSI-FiSh and obtain tight concrete classical multi-user bounds in the random-oracle model (ROM) plus generic group-action model (GGAM). Crucially, our analysis only incurs an additive degradation in the number of users rather than a multiplicative one. As a byproduct, we show that CSI-FiSh attains $125$ bits of provable classical security even with $2^{46}$ users. We extend this analysis to preprocessing attacks, where an adversary with nation-state resources can perform offline precomputations. We capture this by extending the preprocessing security framework of Coretti et al. to ROM+GGAM and obtain concrete multi-user bounds for CSI-FiSh with preprocessing. Finally, we address the multi-user security of CSI-FiSh in the quantum random-oracle model and obtain results in the algebraic group action model which also avoids this multiplicative loss. This gives a unified concrete security treatment of plain CSI-FiSh in the deployment regimes where multi-user and preprocessing effects are unavoidable.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T20:15:18Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T20:15:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2217", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2217", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T20:19:27Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2217", "title": "Interactive Proofs of Proximity for Model Evaluation", "creators": ["Geoffroy Couteau", "Nikolas Melissaris", "Tamara Paris"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We study interactive proofs of proximity (IPP) for model evaluation: a resource-limited verifier interacts with an untrusted prover, typically the model owner, to certify statistical properties of a model under an unknown input distribution. Our formulation is shaped by the constraints of practical evaluation: it separates sampling the input distribution from querying the model and evaluating its output, allowing their costs and access patterns to be treated independently; it distinguishes real audit data (black-box sampling) from generated data (chosen-randomness, or gray-box, access to the sampler); and it allows the prover and the verifier to score outputs with different evaluators, as happens when scores come from human or judge models. We focus on doubly-sublinear $\\mathsf{IPP}$s, in which both the verifier and the designated honest prover use sublinear resources, and on (weighted) Hamming weight properties, which capture the expectation of a Boolean evaluation rule under an unknown distribution and, consequently, a broad range of model-evaluation statistics.\n\nAs a first step, we give a tolerant $\\mathsf{dsIPP}$ for ordinary Hamming weight. For completeness and soundness radii $\\varepsilon_c <\\varepsilon_f$ and gap $g=\\varepsilon_f-\\varepsilon_c$, its logarithmic-round instantiation uses $\\tilde{O}(1/g)$ verifier queries and $O(1/g^2)$ honest-prover queries, improving the cubic dependence of Amir, Goldreich, and Rothblum [ITCS 2025]. We prove matching query lower bounds up to polylogarithmic factors.\n\nWe then study distribution-weighted Hamming weight under several access models. Under black-box sampling, the verifier uses $\\Theta(1/g^2)$ samples but only $\\tilde{O}(1/g)$ evaluations, and we show that the quadratic sample complexity is necessary in the interior regime. With chosen-randomness access to a sampler, the problem reduces to ordinary Hamming weight, giving $\\tilde{O}(1/g)$ verifier calls and evaluations. When the two parties' evaluators may disagree arbitrarily on a $\\rho$-fraction of the distribution and by up to $\\gamma$ elsewhere, we give protocols that remain doubly sublinear whenever $g$ exceeds twice the mean mismatch $\\kappa = \\rho + (1-\\rho)\\gamma$. Finally, we show how our technical results can improve the efficiency of model evaluation in natural motivating scenarios by shifting the bulk of the evaluation burden to the model owner while letting any number of auditors verify claims cheaply; we apply them to auditing criteria including accuracy, group fairness, calibration, harmlessness, usefulness, and average-case robustness.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T20:19:27Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T20:19:27Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2218", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2218", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T20:48:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2218", "title": "Codetta: High-Capacity, Keyless, and Undetectable Multi-Agent Collusion", "creators": ["Qi Pang", "Virginia Smith", "Wenting Zheng"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in high-stakes settings such as finance, healthcare, and software engineering, where agents coordinate through natural-language messages. These same communication channels, however, can also enable colluding agents to exfiltrate confidential information or coordinate unauthorized actions. Steganography makes such behavior particularly difficult to detect by hiding covert communication within outputs that appear ordinary to an auditor reading the transcript.\n\nExisting provably undetectable LLM steganography protocols, however, are not suited to realistic deployments. High-capacity schemes typically assume a symmetric setting where the receiver can reproduce the sender's output distribution. The state-of-the-art practical protocol for asymmetric agents has very low capacity. Additionally, most existing approaches rely on a pre-shared secret key.\n\nIn this paper, we make the systematic threat of undetectable agent collusion concrete by proposing Codetta, a high-capacity steganographic protocol for independently deployed agents under realistic asymmetric settings. Codetta combines a shared public model for estimating the communication channel, a sampling mechanism that preserves the sender's output distribution, and an adaptive error-correcting code for high-capacity communication. It further removes the need for a pre-shared secret key through a steganographic key-exchange protocol, enabling independently deployed agents to establish a shared key while keeping their communication transcript computationally indistinguishable from ordinary model outputs.\n\nAcross three agent workloads and three sender models, Codetta achieves up to $94\\times$ the capacity of the state-of-the-art asymmetric protocol. Its key exchange establishes a shared key using approximately 80k visible tokens, with an empirically certified failure probability of at most $4.1\\times10^{-3}$ across all three workloads.\nThese results show that effectively undetectable collusion is becoming feasible even between independently deployed agents, and we suggest that auditing mechanisms must be amended with complementary techniques beyond simply inspecting agents' communication transcripts.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T20:48:36Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T20:48:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2219", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2219", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T00:37:44Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2219", "title": "Incrementally Verifiable Computation without Extraction", "creators": ["Abhishek Jain", "Surya Mathialagan", "Brent Waters"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Incrementally verifiable computation (IVC) [Valiant, TCC '08] allows one to iteratively prove that a configuration $x_0$ reaches a configuration $x_T$ via $T$ repeated applications of a (possibly non-deterministic) machine $\\mathcal{M}$. An IVC scheme is fully succinct if the proof size is independent of both $T$ and the size of the intermediate configurations.\n\nIn this work, we develop a new indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\\mathcal{O}$)-based approach to IVC that avoids the extraction-based security analyses central to prior constructions. Assuming subexponential hardness of $i\\mathcal{O}$ and one-way functions, we construct an adaptively sound fully succinct IVC scheme for deterministic computations. This yields the first IVC for deterministic computations that does not rely on algebraic assumptions.\n\nUnder the same assumptions, we further obtain a fully succinct two-hop IVC scheme for $\\mathsf{NP}$ with non-adaptive soundness, allowing one to prove that $x_0$ reaches $x_2$ via an intermediate configuration $x_1$. This is the first IVC scheme for $\\mathsf{NP}$ achieving full succinctness.\n\nOur constructions are based on a new connection between IVC and secret sharing for $s$-$t$ connectivity in graphs.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T21:29:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T00:37:44Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2220", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2220", "datestamp": "2026-09-25T23:58:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2220", "title": "Threshold Key Encapsulation Mechanisms via MPC: ML-KEM Compatibility and Optimization", "creators": ["The-Anh Ta", "Dongxi Liu", "Sid Chau", "Jiafan Wang"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "There is currently a strong interest in designing standard-compatible threshold cryptographic primitives, a trend bolstered by NIST's Call for Multi-Party Threshold Schemes (NIST IR 8214C). While Multi-Party Computation (MPC) can be applied to the construction of threshold Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) from NIST standard ML-KEM scheme to preserve the compatibility with ML-KEM, such a direct construction yields a high number of threshold decapsulation rounds as many as 384 for MK-KEM-512. In this paper, we optimise the round complexity of MPC-based threshold ML-KEM decapsulation. Our first construction (Scheme A) uses masked predicates, parallel coin expansion and global scheduling methods to improve the round complexity of MPC-based ML-KEM decapsulation, while maintaining ML-KEM encapsulation, public key and ciphertext formats. For ML-KEM-512, 768 and 1024, our construction improves the round complexity to 145, 218, and 290, respectively. We also introduce a variant (Scheme B) that uses an MPC-friendly variant of Kyber KEM and KangarooTwelve hash to further improve the round complexity to $35$ at the security level of ML-KEM-512, without full ML-KEM compatibility. In the semi-honest MPC model, we prove Scheme A security by exact composition with ML-KEM, and Scheme B IND-CCA security in the QROM from Module-LWE and negligible decryption failure.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-25T23:58:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-25T23:58:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2221", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2221", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T02:02:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2221", "title": "Dimension-4 SQIsign at Round-3 Parameters: Sizes and Costs of the Compact Format", "creators": ["Dustin Ray"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "SQIsign holds the smallest known combination among post-quantum signatures, and its dimension-2 signature carries an auxiliary curve whose only role is to make the response computable in dimension 2. SQIsignHD's dimension-4 response has no such curve. We take that construction to the round-3 SQIsign primes, which replaced the round-2 primes in September 2026 after the attacks of Wesolowski and others, on our Rust port of the SQIsign reference code, and measure it in one session next to the reference's own assembly build. At NIST level I the dimension-4 signature is 142 bytes against 200 for the specification's format, with an 84-byte public key: 226 bytes for key and signature together, the smallest level-I combination we are aware of, among isogeny schemes and post-quantum signatures alike, at parameters that stand after those attacks. The price is verification: the dimension-4 verifier costs 9.9 times the dimension-2 verifier of the same code (120.3 against 12.2 megacycles). The dimension-4 parameters published with SQIsignHD are for its authors' own primes; we derive them for the round-3 primes, state which choices are SQIsignHD's and which are ours, and report what was built and measured.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T02:02:47Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T02:02:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2222", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2222", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T06:24:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2222", "title": "SoK: The Landscape of Post-Quantum Multi-Party Signature Aggregation", "creators": ["Gaurav Kumar"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Post-quantum signature schemes such as ML-DSA, FN-DSA\n(Falcon), and SLH-DSA have significantly larger keys and signatures\nthan their classical counterparts, making compact multiparty signing\nan increasingly important research problem. We survey more than 30\nschemes published between 2021 and 2026, covering threshold and dis\ntributed signing, proof-based aggregation, and algebraic half-aggregation.\nOur survey shows that most existing work is designed around blockchain\nand validator-consensus applications, where large numbers of mostly ho\nmogeneous signers sign a common message and accountability is typically\nrepresented by a compact signer set.\nWe found that a different and practically important setting has received\nlittle attention: institutional multiparty document signing, where tens to\nhundreds of signers may use different post-quantum schemes or parame\nter sets during a gradual migration, while requiring non-interactive sign\ning and exact per-signer accountability. To study this gap, we develop an\neight-dimensional taxonomy based on deployment requirements and sys\ntematically classify existing approaches. We also formulate three testable\nhypotheses and propose a common benchmark methodology for evalu\nating communication, computation, verification cost, scalability, signer\nheterogeneity, and accountability. Our analysis finds no published study\nthat quantitatively evaluates the institutional workload across the ag\ngregation paradigms covered in our survey. We therefore identify the key\nexperimental and architectural requirements for assessing whether ex\nisting post-quantum aggregation techniques can support heterogeneous,\naccountable, and non-interactive institutional signing.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T06:24:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T06:24:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2223", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2223", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T06:30:08Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2223", "title": "Linear Key Recovery in the BAG-Loong Reference Implementation", "creators": ["Zihan Liu"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The BAG-Loong reference implementation samples its secret matrices X and Y from\nfixed, publicly known subspaces, although the specification calls for secret random supports.\nThis makes the public-key relation S = HX + Y , with public H, amenable to Gaussian\nelimination. Expanding the relation over F2 and projecting away the support of Y leaves a\nlinear system for X. We prove an exact recovery criterion based on its column rank. All\n40 supplied known-answer-test records, covering four parameter sets, satisfy this criterion:\ntwo independent solvers recover each X exactly, and the unmodified decapsulation code\nreproduces the corresponding session keys. For the largest parameter set, the reduced system\nhas 9360 equations in 728 unknowns per column; one elimination solves all 15 columns.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T06:30:08Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T06:30:08Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2224", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2224", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T09:16:26Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2224", "title": "The Tower of Babel: Large Language Models for Side-channel Analysis", "creators": ["Iris Dania Jimenez", "Stjepan Picek", "Michael Hutter"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "Deep learning-based side-channel analysis (DLSCA) is dominated by CNNs and from-scratch Transformer architectures, while pretrained Large Language Models (LLMs) as side-channel distinguishers remain largely unexplored. We present the first systematic study of seven off-the-shelf pretrained LLMs (DeepSeek, Falcon, GPT-J, GPT-2, GPT-2m, Qwen2, T5) on three masked AES datasets, i.e., ASCADf, ASCADv, and eShard. With lightweight fine-tuning and no architectural redesign of the backbone, Falcon and GPT-2m reach GE=1 on ASCADf in only 12 to 16 traces (16, 12 and 12 traces for Falcon and 15, 14 and 13 for GPT-2m on desync0, desync50 and desync100) and uniquely sustain this trace count under desynchronization, an order of magnitude below the best prior desynchronized results. The strongest reported alternatives, EstraNet (13 traces) and Order-vs-Chaos (1 trace), are bespoke architectures trained from scratch and report only synchronized results, while other CNN- and Transformer-based baselines degrade substantially under desynchronization. The pretrained LLMs additionally extract exploitable leakage from all 16 first-round AES key bytes, the first such result outside of multi-task CNNs trained from scratch. We further provide the first per-share evaluation and the first interpretability analysis of LLM-based SCA using Effective Perceived Information (EPI), revealing a correlation between the models' leakage extraction capability and their attack performance. Strikingly, randomly initialized backbones perform on par with their pretrained counterparts, indicating that much of the advantage is architectural rather than derived from language pretraining. Our findings establish LLM architectures as unexpectedly powerful, robust, and reusable side-channel distinguishers whose inductive bias yields very low trace complexity and strong robustness to desynchronization.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T09:16:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T09:16:26Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2225", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2225", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T10:09:09Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2225", "title": "Breaking the G\\'omez-Torrecillas--Lobillo--Navarro Cryptosystem: LLL Recovers the Secret Key Within Seconds", "creators": ["Abul Kalam", "Santanu Sarkar"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We present a key-recovery attack on the knapsack McEliece-based public key cryptosystem recently proposed by G\\'omez-Torrecillas, Lobillo, and Navarro in DCC 2026. Given the public key alone, the attack recovers the complete private key in time polynomial in the bit-length of the public key, and therefore constitutes a total break. The attack combines two observations based solely on the public key. An integer combination of the public entries whose coefficients sum to zero eliminates the secret mask. If such a combination is also orthogonal to the public key and sufficiently short, then its coordinates are divisible by the corresponding private key integers. The modulus required for correct decryption creates a large norm gap between these short vectors satisfying the hidden private key relations and the remaining vectors in the lattice. LLL reduction exploits this gap to recover the short vectors and hence the corresponding divisibility relations. The private key integers and the remaining secret parameters are then recovered by combining information from multiple overlapping lattices and using greatest common divisors. We implemented the attack in SageMath and recovered the complete private key for all twenty four parameter sets proposed by the authors within 3 seconds, despite claimed security levels ranging from $64$ to $156$ bits. Our analysis further shows that the weakness is structural rather than a consequence of the particular parameter choices.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T10:09:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T10:09:09Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2226", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2226", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T16:09:54Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2226", "title": "FALCON++: Shorter Signatures without NTRU Smoothing Estimates", "creators": ["Hao Yan", "Nicholas Zhao"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "\\Falcon{} is a digital signature scheme based on NTRU lattices,\nknown for its compact signatures.\nIts weak-smoothness variant, \\FalconWS{} (ASIACRYPT 2025),\nreduces signature sizes by allowing narrower Gaussian sampling distributions.\nFurther reductions require efficient sampling at narrower widths\nand a security analysis that accounts for the resulting distributions.\nWe analyze the distribution of accepted preimages directly, without\nestimating the smoothing parameter of the NTRU lattice.\nWe also modify the rejection-corrected Klein--GPV sampler to reduce\nsampling cost while controlling the resulting distributional error.\nWe combine these results to construct \\FalconPP{}, a variant of\n\\Falcon{}, and give UF-CMA and SUF-CMA bounds in the\nclassical random-oracle model.\nFor ring degrees $512$ and $1024$, our estimates give signature\nsizes of $419$ and $921$ bytes, respectively.\nThese are $37.09\\%$ and $28.05\\%$ smaller than \\Falcon{} signatures,\nand $11.60\\%$ and $5.92\\%$ smaller than the estimates for \\FalconWS{}\nat their respective parameter sets.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T16:09:54Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T16:09:54Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2227", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2227", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T08:43:18Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2227", "title": "A Fiat-Shamir Transformation for Private-Coin Protocols", "creators": ["Shany Ben-David", "Eylon Yogev", "Agni Datta"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The Fiat--Shamir transformation is a fundamental paradigm in cryptography for compiling interactive public-coin protocols into non-interactive arguments. While this transformation has been extensively studied for public-coin protocols, the setting of private-coin protocols, where the verifier's messages depend on secret randomness, remains largely unexplored. To date, there are no candidate transformations for private-coin protocols, neither in the standard model nor in idealized settings.\n\nIn this work, we present a generic transformation that compiles any 3-message private-coin interactive proof into a non-interactive argument in the standard model, while preserving zero-knowledge. Our construction relies on sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, pseudorandom functions, and input-hiding obfuscation (IHO). As a corollary, this rules out the existence of 3-message weak zero-knowledge proofs with small enough soundness error.\n\nWe complement this positive result by showing that the reliance on IHO is inherent: any secure Fiat--Shamir transformation for general private-coin protocols necessarily implies the existence of IHO.\n\nFinally, we rule out Fiat--Shamir transformations for multi-round private-coin protocols. Specifically, assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions, we prove that no such transformation exists in the multi-round setting.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T16:32:10Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T08:43:18Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2228", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2228", "datestamp": "2026-09-26T20:55:23Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2228", "title": "Adelic reduction of module lattices", "creators": ["Henry Bambury", "Seungki Kim", "Changmin Lee", "Phong Q. Nguyen"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We give a strict generalization of the LLL algorithm over number fields, based on the reduction theory of $\\mathrm{GL}(n)$ over the adele ring of a number field. Our algorithm is free of heuristics, with rigorous bounds on output quality and complexity. As a consequence, we obtain a hierarchy of reductions from module-(H)SVP to ideal-HSVP, an example of which has runtime and approximation factors subexponential in the field degree. More importantly, we uncover a close connection between structured lattice reduction and a Diophantine approximation over number fields.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-26T20:55:23Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-26T20:55:23Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2229", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2229", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T00:45:53Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2229", "title": "Local Rewriting under Assumed Erasure", "creators": ["Napassorn Litchiowong"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We study local rewriting after an assumed erasure step in an ideal oblivious-transfer protocol. Bob transforms his retained record while Alice's actual record remains fixed. Exact rewriting between shared-source and independent-source records is possible in both directions precisely when the retained records of the shared source are independent. For balanced deterministic maps retaining $k$ and $\\ell$ bits from an $n$-bit source, the optimal error over the maps is $\\max\\{0,1-2^{n-k-\\ell}\\}$. For fixed full-row-rank linear maps, it is $1-2^{-d}$, where $d$ is their row-space intersection dimension. A nonlinear example shows that an optimal approximate rewrite may change Bob's marginal distribution.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T00:45:53Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T00:45:53Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2230", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2230", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T02:10:26Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2230", "title": "Indistinguishability of Sum of Permutations: A Fourier Analytic Route to Classical and Quantum Security", "creators": ["Ritam Bhaumik", "Chun Guo", "Xiaoning Guo", "Ashwin Jha"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We study classical and quantum indistinguishability of sums of independent random permutations and related transformations from permutations to functions. Let $G$ be a finite abelian group of order $N$, and let $\\pi^k_+(x)=\\pi_1(x)+\\cdots+\\pi_k(x)$ for $k\\geq2$ independent uniform random permutations of $G$. We give a unified Fourier analytic treatment in which the construction is represented by its probability density and a distinguisher by its acceptance function, with the classical and quantum query models imposing different restrictions on the Fourier support of the latter.\n\nClassically, we obtain the bound $O_k(q/N^{k-1/2})$ for every $q<N$, and refine it below the birthday threshold to $O_k(q^2/N^k)$. In the quantum model, a simulation argument gives $O_k(N^{-(k-3/2)})$ for $q\\leq(N-1)/2$, while Fourier interpolation gives concrete finite bounds up to $q\\leq4N/15$ and the query-dependent bounds\n\\[\n    O\\!\\left(\\min\\left\\{N^{-1/2},\\frac{q^3}{N^2}+\\frac1N\\right\\}\\right),\n    \\qquad\n    O_k\\!\\left(\\min\\left\\{\\frac{q^3}{N^k},N^{-(k-3/2)}\\right\\}\\right),\n\\]\nfor $k=2$ and $k \\geq 3$, respectively, throughout $1\\leq q\\leq(N-1)/2$. For $q = 1$, the first bound sharpens to $O(N^{-2})$. Over $G=\\mathbb F_2^n$, a one-query Fourier attack matches the order of our one-query bound, while an $N/2$-query parity attack with advantage $1/2$ shows that our bounds reach the constant-advantage query threshold.\n\nWe further study two variants of sum of permutations over binary vector spaces. First, we allow arbitrary surjective linear postprocessing, which includes truncation, and obtain classical and quantum bounds that retain the output-size dependence. Second, we analyse Dinur's variable-output single-permutation construction, $\\mathsf{LXoP}$, for every fixed output width, and derive its classical and quantum security bounds; for one- and two-block outputs, we give concrete quantum security bounds.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T02:10:26Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T02:10:26Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2231", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2231", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T08:27:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2231", "title": "Truncated Differential Preimage Attacks via Differential-Linear Correlations", "creators": ["Chunning Zhou", "Kai Hu", "Zhongfeng Niu", "Thomas Peyrin", "Hongyi Zhang"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We derive joint truncated differential (TD) probabilities from multiple differential-linear (DL) approximations and use them in a framework for preimage filtering. For a fixed input difference, the inverse Walsh transform recovers the probabilities of affine output cosets from DL correlations over a complete mask subspace. In our applications, these correlations are estimated using the round-based DL method. A filter accepts a selected union of affine cosets, whose probability is computed from their joint distribution without assuming independence among the DL events. The framework handles multiple targets, sharing base evaluations and confirming each accepted candidate only once. An independent sampling analysis allows candidate sets from different iterations to overlap and relates success probability to confirmation cost. Applying this framework, we obtain the first preimage attacks on KNOT-Hash below the designers' claimed preimage bounds, for $9$ to $12$ rounds. For all four JH members, we obtain preimage attacks on the reduced-round hash functions under the padding rule of the specification, covering $3$ rounds per compression-function call forJH-224/256/384 and $4$ rounds for JH-512, with speedups ranging from $2^{54}$ to $2^{158}$ over generic preimage search. For reduced-round SKINNY-Hash, we also present the first second-preimage attacks on target messages containing at least two padded blocks, covering $5$ and $6$ rounds of SKINNY-tk2-Hash and $5$, $6$, and $7$ rounds of SKINNY-tk3-Hash. As a further application of the DL-to-TD construction, we give a $6$-round TD distinguisher on Xoodoo/Xoodyak in the related-key setting, whose estimated sample complexity improves on the previous best by about $25$ bits.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T08:27:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T08:27:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2232", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2232", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T03:40:41Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2232", "title": "Cryptanalysis of the ICCS NGCC Round-1 Public-Key Candidates", "creators": ["Zhenyu Xiong", "Mingsheng Wang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The ICCS Next-Generation Commercial Cryptography (NGCC) round-1 call received 84 public-key candidates for public evaluation. We present a design-level assessment that targets weaknesses no local code fix can close, identifying eight such flaws. Each recurs a pitfall already known from NIST PQC standardization: reducible-ring sub-ring projections that break IND-CPA below the claimed level; public data that fixes a value meant to remain secret, enabling public-key-only forgery or keyless decapsulation; static-key reuse without a chosen-ciphertext transform; and rejection sampling whose sign handling leaks an equivalent signing key. All findings were obtained with AI assistance. Artifacts: https://github.com/acprk/ngcc-round1-cryptanalysis.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T09:13:50Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T03:40:41Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2233", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2233", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T09:13:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2233", "title": "Mind the Gap: Proving and Improving RPKI", "creators": ["Shay Cohen", "Nicholas Scaglione", "Yossi Gilad", "Hemi Leibowitz", "Bing Wang", "Amir Herzberg"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We present the first rigorous security analysis of the \nResource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), an IETF standard for protecting inter-domain routing from basic yet effective attacks: prefix and subprefix hijacks. Existing evaluations of RPKI's security focus on empirical studies: adoption measurements, simulations evaluating the security provided by different adoption levels, and identification of implementation and specification flaws. \nIn contrast, we focus on rigorous, modular security specifications and analysis of RPKI, including its interactions with the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) and the Internet Protocol (IP). \nWe identify sufficient conditions for RPKI to provably achieve its goals (requirements), under explicit, well-defined assumptions (models). We show that existing RPKI deployments do not always meet these conditions, e.g., because of circular dependencies, and propose standard-compliant improvements that restore them.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T09:13:59Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T09:13:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2234", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2234", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T10:09:20Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2234", "title": "Enhanced Embarrassingly Parallel Attacks against EC-HMQV-C and ECMQV", "creators": ["Augustin P. SARR"], "subjects": [], "abstract": "In~\\cite{sarr25}, Sarr introduced an embarrassingly parallel impersonation\nattack against ECMQV and ECHMQV-C whose core step is an adding-based\npseudo-random walk over a cyclic group $G$, of order $n$, searching for a\n\\emph{decomposed $i$-point}.  \nIn this work, we revisit that construction in the richer multi-party\nsetting where two sets of parties, \nthe initiators $\\{\\hat{A}_1,\\cdots,\\hat{A}_{z_1}\\}$, and the \nresponders $\\{\\hat{B}_1,\\cdots,\\hat{B}_{z_2}\\}$, interact under ECHMQV-C.\nFirst, we exhibit an embarrassingly parallel attack such that, when $m$~processors\nare available, the attack runs in expected time\n$$\n  \\frac{\\sqrt{n}}{m\\,z_1 z_2}\\left(\\costa(z_1)+\\costd(z_1 z_2)\\right),\n$$\nwherein \n$\\costa(z_1)$ is the time for a batch of $z_1$ elliptic-curve additions\nand $\\costd(z_1 z_2)$ is the time for a batch of $z_1 z_2$ digest computations.\nSecond, for any positive integer $z_3$ such that $z_1 z_2 z_3\\ll \\sqrt{n}$, \nwe propose an improved attack that runs in time \n$$\n  \\frac{\\sqrt{n}}{m\\,z_1 z_2 z_3}\\left(\\costa(z_1 z_3)+\\costd(z_1 z_2 z_3)\\right),\n$$\nThird, for ECMQV, assuming $z_1z_3 \\ll \\sqrt{n}$, we  propose an attack that runs \nin time\n$$ \\frac{\\sqrt{n}}{m\\,z_1 z_3}\\costa(z_1 z_3).$$\nThe attacks require no shared storage among processors, they require respectively \n$\\mathcal{O}(z_1 z_2)$,  $\\mathcal{O}(z_1 z_2 z_3)$, and $\\mathcal{O}(z_1 z_3)$ memory complexity at each processor,\nand only marginal server--processor communication.\n\n\nAs a concrete illustration, for a 128-bit ECHMQV-C instance, with $m=2^{10}$ processors, $z_1=z_2=2^{15}$, and $z_3=2^{10}$, our improved attack yields an effective parallel running time corresponding to 78 bits of security under an idealized massively parallel architecture in which the required batch elliptic-curve additions can be evaluated concurrently. This figure refers to parallel time rather than total computational work, which remains proportional to the number of elliptic-curve additions performed.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T10:09:20Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T10:09:20Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2235", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2235", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T11:03:06Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2235", "title": "Practical Null-Branch Witness Attacks on In-the-Head Signatures", "creators": ["Guoxiao Liu", "Zhuoqing Peng", "Guowei Liu", "Keting Jia", "Xiaoyun Wang", "Zongyue Wang", "Junfeng Fan"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "In-the-head signatures provide a route to post-quantum authentication based on symmetric primitives. Their algebraic instantiations rely on constraint relations that faithfully encode the underlying one-way function (OWF). We give a classical, public-key-only forgery attack on AIM2-based AIMer v2.0; AIMer was selected in Korea's KpqC competition. For every honestly generated public key of every v2.0 parameter set, the attack forges signatures on arbitrary messages with probability one, without signing queries.\n\nWe introduce a \\emph{null-branch witness attack} exploiting zero factors that leave intermediate values unconstrained. We complete these local assignments into witnesses satisfying the full relation, including public-output binding, using only public data and without solving an OWF inversion problem. Prover completeness ensures that the original message-bound prover can use these witnesses to generate signatures accepted by the unmodified verifier. Proof-system soundness applies to the encoded relation, which the constructed witnesses satisfy.\n\nTests with reference implementations confirm accepted forgeries from satisfying witnesses whose decoded values are not valid OWF preimages. The median AIMer-256f forgery API time is approximately $11.6$ ms in our reference benchmark. We identify a gap in AIMer's security reduction: a satisfying relation witness need not decode to an OWF preimage. A complementary application to vulnerable Lynxer variants extends the analysis to VOLE-in-the-Head. We give quadratic encodings that are sound and complete for the full AIM2 and Lynx computations, including zero inputs. These results highlight relation encoding as a distinct security obligation between OWF hardness and proof-system soundness.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T11:03:06Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T11:03:06Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2236", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2236", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T11:26:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2236", "title": "A Complete Classification of Whole-Output Linear Structures in FEILIAN-Type Components", "creators": ["Mounir IDRASSI"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "We determine all input differences with constant whole-output XOR derivatives for a four-word ARX topology containing FEILIAN SubColumn. For every word width $w\\geq2$ and arbitrary XOR-linear internal maps, the complete linear-structure space contains a universal two-dimensional MSB family and has dimension at most five, with equality attained. We give a necessary-and-sufficient classifier involving at most 32 candidate masks and characterize all additional structures, including an exceptional coset possible only when the first map's image lies in the span of the least and most significant bits. For the specified 64-bit FEILIAN component, the complete space is exactly the universal family. With FEILIAN's actual ShiftRow, no nonzero member remains constant after both of the first two SubColumn layers. We also classify propagation at every boundary for all 20,160 invertible binary four-row mixers composed with ShiftRow. The five profiles stabilize by the third SubColumn layer, and exactly 4,032 mixers (20%) retain a nonzero family indefinitely. Algebraic proofs are supplemented by exhaustive small-word checks and a separate census audit. These results concern component structures and constancy at successive boundaries; they neither classify all endpoint structures of the iterated permutation nor establish an attack on the hash.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T11:26:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T11:26:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2237", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2237", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T09:09:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2237", "title": "Lower Bounds on Random-Oracle-Model Signature Length", "creators": ["Alon Chayet", "Iftach Haitner", "Mathias Marty", "Eylon Yogev"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Hash-based signatures offer a conservative foundation for post-quantum authentication, but their large signatures impose substantial communication and storage costs. For security parameter $\\lambda$, discrete-logarithm-based signatures have length $O(\\lambda)$, while known hash-based constructions have quadratic signature length, up to logarithmic factors, even for one-time signing. Is this gap inherent?\n\nWe prove what are, to the best of our knowledge, the first lower bounds on the length of signature schemes in the (pure) random oracle model. Our bounds apply to schemes with non-adaptive verifiers and a natural security property called salted soundness: a scheme with such security is unforgeable even against an adversary that is granted a limited ability to resample and restore oracle answers. This class essentially captures all known hash-based constructions (possibly after low-cost modifications). We show that the combined public-key and signature length of a one-time signature scheme must be $\\Omega(\\lambda^2/\\log\\lambda)$. For many-time signatures, we prove the stronger conclusion that the signature length alone must satisfy the same lower bound, irrespective of the public-key length. More precisely, if the relevant length is $o(\\lambda^2/\\log\\lambda)$, then an adversary making $2^{o(\\lambda)}$ random-oracle queries breaks salted soundness with inverse-polynomial probability.\n\nOur proof uses the high-entropy hitting lemma of Haitner, Nukrai, and Yogev (Crypto 22) to transform a short signature scheme into a scheme whose verifier makes only a few\nqueries. We then apply the Barak and Mahmoody-Ghidary (FOCS 07) attack on one-time signatures with a low-query verifier. Balancing these two steps yields the\nnear-quadratic lower bounds.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T12:16:09Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T09:09:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2238", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2238", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T21:28:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2238", "title": "Threshold Signatures with Identifiable Abort from One-way Functions", "creators": ["Mojtaba Fadavi", "David Jao", "Samuel Jaques"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "A $(T,N)$-threshold signature scheme distributes a signing key among $N$ participants so that any $T$ participants can jointly generate a valid signature, while fewer than $T$ cannot.\n\nIn this work, we first introduce a threshold one-time signature scheme with \\emph{identifiable abort} based on a variant of Lamport one-time signature and Shamir secret sharing, enabling authorized participants to jointly reconstruct signatures from partial signatures. We then extend the scheme to support multiple messages using multi-layer Merkle trees.\n\nOne-time signatures introduce specific coordination challenges: participants must agree on both the message and the one-time key index to avoid unsafe key reuse. We address this using a bulletin-board mechanism for consensus. Under this framework, our construction produces signatures with one message from the bulletin board to each signer and one response message from each signer, while the bulletin board may require additional communication to reach agreement. With a simple majority-vote bulletin board, the scheme signs in four rounds.  Subject to this coordination constraint, the construction inherits the guarantees of the underlying threshold framework: Universal Composability (UC) unforgeability with identifiable abort, non-UC robustness, and a bulletin-board mechanism that is UC-secure with an honest super-majority and robust when the central aggregator is honest.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T21:28:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T21:28:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2239", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2239", "datestamp": "2026-09-27T22:59:33Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2239", "title": "One Unverified Coordinate Is Enough: Key Recovery from Faulty Fujisaki–Okamoto Rejection Checks in ML-KEM", "creators": ["Bhabani Sankar Das"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform makes ML-KEM IND-CCA secure by re-encrypting the decrypted message and returning an implicit-rejection value on any mismatch. Deployed implementations of ML-KEM and its predecessor Kyber have realized this check incorrectly: a skipped conditional move (pqc_kyber/cosmian_kyber, RUSTSEC-2026-0290/-0288) and truncated ciphertext comparisons (wolfSSL, CVE-2026-10097 and CVE-2026-6330). We ask how much of the check must be broken before the key is recoverable, and show that one unverified ciphertext coordinate suffices. For a valid ciphertext the adversary knows the encryption randomness, so sweeping an unverified v-coordinate over the compression grid measures the decryption noise there, a known short-coefficient linear form in the secret; one bounded-error observation per message, solved by least squares, recovers the key. Under a regularity assumption we prove that O(kn log kn) observations identify the key, and we demonstrate full recovery from a single unverified coordinate on all three parameter sets in a few times 10⁵ decapsulation queries against a simulated incomplete comparison built on the kyber-py implementation, with ML-KEM-1024 cheapest owing to its finer compression grid. Sessions fall inversely with the number of unverified coordinates but query cost does not: one unverified coordinate costs what a leaked tail of fifty does. The skipped conditional move yields a complete plaintext-checking oracle and Θ(kn) queries.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-27T22:59:33Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-27T22:59:33Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2240", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2240", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T02:47:59Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2240", "title": "Improved Cryptanalysis of Local PRGs", "creators": ["Shihan Lyu", "Mo LI", "Chuhan Ma", "Ximing Fu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We present two seed-recovery attacks on a family of local PRGs, which map an $n$-bit random seed to an $m$-bit pseudorandom string by applying $\\XorMaj$ predicates.\n\nFor PRGs with large locality, we extend the Group-and-Solve (GAS, Eurocrypt 26) framework to Guess-Filter-Solve (GFS).  GFS first guesses that a set of seed bits are all $1$s and then filters for outputs whose inputs to $\\Maj$ contain a sufficiently large subset of the guessed bits. Then high-bias noisy equations can be collected for the correct guess and solved by specific solvers. Compared with GAS, GFS collects substantially more noisy equations with high bias and hence outperforms GAS significantly, especially when the output is short. For example, for the challenge parameter $n=256$ and $m=2^{16}$ (STOC 16), the complexity for GFS is $2^{68.78}$ while it is $2^{157.91}$ for GAS. In addition, the asymptotic complexity of GFS is $2^{0.15n+o(n)}$.\n\nIndependently, inspired by the Guess-and-Decode (GADec, TIT 22), we propose the Filter-Guess-Propagate (FGP) attack. Compared with GADec, FGP introduces two speed-up techniques at each iteration of Belief Propagation (BP): a filter scheme to reduce the number of equations and a dynamic-programming technique to update the log-likelihood ratios of variables efficiently.  Together, these improvements enable FGP to perform fast BP and outperform GADec significantly.  For $\\XorMaj_{10,64}$ with $n=256$ and $m=2^{40}$ (Eurocrypt 24), the total complexity of FGP is $2^{52.66}$, whereas even a single BP iteration of GADec costs $2^{106.42}$.\n\nFGP is further applied to a ZKP protocol from Eurocrypt~25 and QuietOT from Asiacrypt~24, with only a small computational overhead. For the ZKP protocol, FGP leads to an attack on witness indistinguishability, while for QuietOT, it similarly yields an attack on OT receiver privacy.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T02:47:59Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T02:47:59Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2241", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2241", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T04:29:35Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2241", "title": "Quantum Security of XOR of Permutations via Fourier Analysis", "creators": ["Wonseok Choi", "Minki Hhan", "Junyoung Jang"], "subjects": ["Secret-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The XOR of two or more independent random permutations (XoP) is the prototypical pseudorandom function built from permutations achieving the security beyond the birthday bound.  The security of the XoP construction is now well established against classical adversaries, however, its security against quantum adversaries that query the construction in superposition has remained widely open.\n\nWe prove that the XOR of $r\\ge 2$ independent random permutations over $\\{0,1\\}^n$ is indistinguishable from a random function by any $q$-query quantum algorithm with advantage\n\\[\nO\\left(\\min\\left\\{\n\\frac{q^3}{2^{rn}},\\frac{q^{1.5}}{2^{(r-0.5)n}},\\frac{1}{2^{(r-1.5)n}}\n\\right\\}\n\\right)\n\\]\nfor all $q\\le 2^n/57774$, where the hidden factors depend only on $r$. In particular, the XoP construction remains secure throughout the entire query range, far beyond the $2^{n/3}$ quantum birthday bound due to the quantum collision finding attack. To our knowledge, this is the first construction from permutations that achieves the quantum version of the beyond birthday bound security.\n\n\nWe present several heuristic attacks suggesting the tightness of our bounds. \nFor $q\\lesssim 2^{n/2}$, the quantum collision finding-based attacks heuristically give the advantage $\\Omega(q^3/2^{rn})$ and $\\Omega(q^{1.5}/2^{(r-0.5)n})$, and for $q\\approx 2^n$, the heuristic collision counting-based attack appears to have the advantage about $2^{-(r-1.5)n}$.\n \nWe use a Fourier-analytic variant of the polynomial method on the space of functions: the distinguishing advantage of any $q$-query quantum algorithm is controlled by the Fourier components of degree at most $2q$, which is controlled by $2q$ input-output data of the construction. Most components are bounded as a $\\ell_2$ norm of the Fourier weights of the XOR of permutations, which gives the bound $2^{-(r-3/2)n}$.\n\nFor the bound $q^3/2^{rn}$, few low-degree components are too large. We reinterpret these low-degree components as (sums of) distinguishing advantages of the other problems. For example, the degree-2 and degree-4 terms are interpreted as the advantages against random functions with and without \\emph{planted collisions}, which in turn are bounded using Zhandry's small-range distributions.\n\nFinally, the $q^{1.5}/2^{(r-0.5)n}$ bound can be proven using another bound for the planted collisions. This new bound is proven using the compressed oracle by interpreting the advantage as the other bound about random functions. It also gives a new bound for the small-range indistinguishability for (ironically) large ranges, which is of independent interest.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T04:29:35Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T04:29:35Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2242", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2242", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T05:26:24Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2242", "title": "Error Propagation-Aware Scale Design for Efficient Homomorphic Encryption-Based LLM Inference", "creators": ["Sieun Seo", "Chohong Min"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables privacy-preserving inference by allowing neural networks to operate directly on encrypted data, but its computational cost remains a major obstacle to deploying large language models in practice. In particular, CKKS-based inference consumes ciphertext modulus through homomorphic multiplications and requires costly bootstrapping when the available modulus is exhausted. In this work, we propose an error-propagation-aware scale design for efficient CKKS-based privacy-preserving LLM inference. We characterize the numerical errors introduced by individual homomorphic operations and analyze how they propagate through subsequent Transformer computations. Based on this analysis, we quantify the contribution of each local error to the final inference error and determine the precision required for individual operations. We then allocate operation-wise scales and modulus levels accordingly, avoiding unnecessarily conservative precision while maintaining the target inference accuracy. As a result, more computation can be performed within a given modulus chain, reducing the frequency of costly bootstrapping operations and improving overall inference efficiency. Compared with THOR, our method reduces modulus consumption by 30.0% and the number of bootstrapping operations by 83.6% for the standard Transformer. For the HE-friendly Transformer, our method reduces modulus consumption by 33.6% and the number of bootstrapping operations by 80% compared with PowerFormer.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T05:26:24Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T05:26:24Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2243", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2243", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T06:13:07Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2243", "title": "TPOKÉ: Threshold Public-Key Encryption from POKÉ via Isogeny Sharing", "creators": ["Toshiki Takatera", "Hiroshi Onuki", "Tsuyoshi Takagi"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "POKÉ, introduced by Basso and Maino, is one of the most efficient isogeny-based public-key encryption schemes. The generic parallel-encryption approach yields a $(t,n)$-threshold variant by running $n$ independent POKÉ instances and secret-sharing the message, but this multiplies the public-key and ciphertext sizes by roughly $n$. We present S-TPOKÉ, a POKÉ-based $(t,n)$-threshold construction for every $1\\le t\\le n$, and Ch-TPOKÉ, an $(n,n)$ variant that arranges the parties' secret isogenies differently. Both schemes avoid repeating part of the isogeny computation that appears in every independent POKÉ instance. Compared with the trivial construction, they reduce the number of degree-$3^{b}$ isogenies computed during encryption from $2n$ to $n+1$ and reduce the ciphertext size by about a factor of two when $n$ is large. The two schemes differ in how the parties' secret isogenies are arranged. S-TPOKÉ is our main construction: the dealer samples $n$ independent secret isogenies, while encryption samples one sender-side secret isogeny and shares it across the parties. Ch-TPOKÉ instead arranges the parties' secret isogenies into a chain. For S-TPOKÉ, we prove SIM-CPA security under static corruption in the random oracle model from the $(k,n)$-S-C-POKE assumptions for all $1\\le k\\le t$, which extend C-POKE to the threshold setting. For Ch-TPOKÉ, we prove only SIM-CPA security under static maximal corruption from the $(j,n)$-Ch-D-POKE assumptions for all $j\\in\\{1,\\ldots,n\\}$, which extend D-POKE to a chain-based threshold setting. This guarantee is strictly weaker than SIM-CPA security under static corruption. We also give asymptotic parameter choices targeting $\\lambda$-bit security and derive closed-form expressions for the public-key, ciphertext, and partial-decryption sizes in terms of $\\lambda$ and $n$.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T06:13:07Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T06:13:07Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2244", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2244", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T08:41:52Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2244", "title": "An Operator-Norm Approach to Security with Quantum Advice", "creators": ["Minki Hhan", "Sunghyuk Jo", "Qipeng Liu"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Non-uniform security allows an adversary to receive bounded advice about an oracle before attempting a fresh challenge. This captures the most realistic attacks and has already been studied extensively in prior work. In this work, we introduce an operator-norm approach for non-uniform security in the quantum random oracle and random permutation models. This new approach yields a unified reduction for both search success probability and distinguishing advantage. Previously, the reduction only worked with success probability even in the decision games, yielding a worse bound.\n\n    Our framework enables tight bounds for Yao's box, both with and without salting, and improved bounds for pseudorandom generators. We also prove an optimal generic salting theorem for decision games. By defining a property of a game, which separates the contributions of the existing queries in the offline stage and subsequent online queries, we obtain stronger bounds for specific salted constructions. These include salted permutation inversion, tight up to logarithmic factors, and salted random-function inversion, tight up to logarithmic factors and the gap already present in classical function inversion.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T08:41:52Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T08:41:52Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2245", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2245", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T09:13:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2245", "title": "An improved near-capacity lower bound for Reed-Solomon lists on multiplicative subgroups", "creators": ["Al Kindi"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "We give an elementary construction of large Reed-Solomon lists on multiplicative subgroups. For every fixed rational rate $\\rho\\in(0,1)$, suitable sequences of lengths give lists of size at least $2^{(2-o(1))H(\\rho)/\\eta}$ at agreement fraction $\\rho+\\eta$ as $\\eta\\to0$, where $H$ is binary entropy. This doubles the leading entropy exponent of the antipodal lower bound stated by Arnon, Boneh, and Fenzi, building on the construction of Krachun, Kazanin, and Haböck. If the reduced denominator of $\\rho$ is a power of two, the lengths can also be chosen as powers of two. The construction lifts subsets with a prescribed product from a quotient subgroup of size $s$. This fixes a coefficient while losing at most a factor $s$ in the number of subsets. More precisely, for $n=hs$, $h\\ge2$, and $1\\le m\\le s-2$, a code of dimension $\\kappa=mh$ on a subgroup of order $n$ has a word with at least $\\binom{s-1}{m+1}/s$ codewords at agreement $\\kappa+2h-1$. \nThis holds over every field containing the required roots of unity. Consequently, the exponent constant $c_2$ in the universal list-size conjecture of the S-two whitepaper must satisfy $c_2\\ge2$.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T09:13:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T09:13:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2246", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2246", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T09:25:15Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2246", "title": "Binding Humans to Keys: A Secure Decentralized Proof of Personhood Protocol", "creators": ["Bilel Zaghdoudi", "Gewu BU", "Frederic Hayek", "Pascal Lafourcade", "Maria Potop-Butucaru"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "Decentralised proof of personhood, cryptographically binding a digital identity to a unique living human without a trusted central authority, is a foundational problem in permissionless networks. We present a novel protocol, Secure-GYID (S-GYID), resilient to Identity Theft Attack (i.e., adversarial authorities substitute a victim's biometric fingerprint under a malicious public key) and Ghost Key Attack (i.e., colluding authorities fabricate a registration for a non-existent user). Our protocol closes both vulnerabilities by replacing raw biometric transmission with an encryption-based digital fingerprint derivation $F = E(pk_u, P_u)$ computed under a one-way, chosen-plaintext-secure, deterministic scheme, so that no authority can substitute or forge a binding pair without knowledge of the user's secret key. S-GYID further introduces a three-stratum generational authority hierarchy with bounded tenure and VRF-based session selection to limit long-term collusion structurally. We prove Identity Theft Resistance, Biometric Detectability, and Ghost Key Resistance under standard cryptographic assumptions, and provide a hypergeometric session-capture analysis that establishes concrete parameter design rules for both the key activation and authority promotion thresholds.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T09:25:15Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T09:25:15Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2247", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2247", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T09:57:11Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2247", "title": "Geometric Forgeries: Structural Cryptanalysis of MAYO", "creators": ["Massimo Ostuzzi"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "MAYO is a post-quantum signature scheme based on UOV that uses the whipping transformation to achieve more compact public keys and retain efficient signing. We present the first structural forgery attack that exploits the geometry of the resulting multivariate quadratic (MQ) maps. Our starting point is the observation that whipping amplifies polar cancellations in the underlying MQ map, producing subspaces with low-dimensional quadratic and polar images. We combine this geometric insight with the Pseudo-Oil Attack (ASIACRYPT 2026) and a descent to the binary field into a structural forgery algorithm.\n\nIndependently, we introduce a multi-target reduction for homogeneous MQ maps. Projecting onto a quotient of the codomain reduces the number of equations, and homogeneity allows suitable solutions to be rescaled to the original targets.\n\nConcretely, the combination of our forgery attacks lowers the estimated bit security of the Security Level I and III parameter sets of MAYO Round 2 by roughly 18 and 16 bits, respectively. In particular, the Level I parameter set falls 15 bits short of its required security level. For the recently released MAYO Round 3 parameters, our attack still reduces the estimated security by roughly 6, 4 and 2 bits for the new MAYO1, MAYO2 and MAYO3 respectively, bringing MAYO2 below the required security by 3 bits.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T09:57:11Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T09:57:11Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2248", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2248", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T11:59:50Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2248", "title": "ML-DSA masking sweetened with SUCRE: Shuffle-and-Unmask Countermeasure for REjection sampling", "creators": ["Sonia Belaïd", "Ryad Benadjila", "Julien Devevey", "Morgane Guerreau", "Thomas Legavre", "Ange Martinelli", "Thomas Ricosset", "Matthieu Rivain", "Mélissa Rossi"], "subjects": ["Implementation"], "abstract": "We present SUCRE, a novel countermeasure designed to physically protect the rejection sampling step of ML-DSA, one of the post-quantum signature schemes standardized by NIST. At the core of SUCRE is a masking gadget that securely unmasks a vector while simultaneously applying a random permutation of its coefficients. This lightweight mechanism preserves the vector’s infinity norm, enabling rejection sampling to proceed as usual without requiring any complex mask conversions.\n\nWe formally prove that a $d$-probing adversary can learn at most some permuted rejected values---information which, we show, should remain insufficient to endanger the security of the signature scheme. This security argument relies on a new variant of the Module Learning with Rounding (MLWR) assumption, for which we provide a dedicated concrete security analysis to assess its hardness relative to the standard MLWR assumption.\n\nOur implementation of SUCRE achieves a significant performance improvement over previous masked non-bitsliced implementations of rejection sampling---delivering four to six times faster execution than Coron et al. (TCHES 2024)---albeit at the cost of increased memory usage. Since the rejection step accounts for approximately 25% of the total runtime in masked ML-DSA implementations, and given the expected adoption of ML-DSA on embedded platforms, this speedup could significantly enhance efficiency in real-world applications.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T11:59:50Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T11:59:50Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2249", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2249", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T12:14:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2249", "title": "Cyclotomic Cosets: Hidden Subgroup and Quantum Sieving Algorithm for Prime-Power Moduli", "creators": ["Mathias Boucher", "Pierre-Alain Fouque", "Yixin Shen"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is a fundamental assumption in post-quantum cryptography. Regev established a quantum reduction from LWE to the Dihedral Coset Problem (DCP). Later, Brakerski et al. introduced the Extrapolated Dihedral Coset Problem (EDCP), proving its equivalence to LWE. However, unlike DCP, EDCP no longer admits a coset structure. This limits the direct application of techniques for hidden subgroup problems.\n\nIn this work, we introduce the Cyclotomic Coset Problem (CCP), a cyclotomic generalization of DCP that preserves an exact hidden-subgroup structure.  Let $\\zeta_p$ be a primitive $p$-th root of unity, let $\\pi=\\zeta_p-1$, and write $q=p^t$ and $L=t(p-1)$.\nWe work over $R_q=\\mathbb Z_q[\\zeta_p] \\cong \\mathbb Z[\\zeta_p]/(\\pi^L)$, where the isomorphism follows from the total ramification identity $(p)=(\\pi)^{p-1}$.We exploit the resulting $\\pi$-adic ideal chain to construct a quantum sieve that successively reduces phase states modulo $\\pi^{L},\\pi^{L-1},\\ldots,\\pi$. For every \nfixed prime $p$ and modulus $q=p^t$, our algorithm solves the CCP in time and sample complexity $2^{O_p(\\log n\\log q)}$, using polynomial quantum space. The sieve also applies to uniform EDCP and Gaussian $S\\ket{\\text{LWE}}$, yielding quasi-polynomial time algorithms for all the above problems when $q=\\text{poly}(n)$. This extends the power-of-two EDCP sieve of Bai et al. (CRYPTO 2025) to a cyclotomic setting.\n\nHowever, we emphasize that our result does not, by itself, yield a quasi-polynomial-time algorithm for standard LWE, because the currently known reduction produces only a limited number of approximate CCP states.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T12:14:47Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T12:14:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2250", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2250", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T12:24:36Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2250", "title": "Decryption Failures in NGCC Lattice KEMs: Correlated Blocks, Omitted Compression Noise, and Failure Boosting under a Query Cap", "creators": ["Yuyang Xiao"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "The Chinese NGCC post-quantum competition received a family of lattice KEMs\nwhose decryption failure rates (DFRs) are certified by their designers with\nmodels that differ in detail. We recompute the failure probability of the\nfirst-round lattice KEMs whose claimed DFR, or a simple recomputation of it,\nlies near or below the nominal level, and we estimate the offline search for\nweak ciphertexts under a cap of $2^{64}$ or $2^{80}$ decapsulation queries.\nThree distinct mechanisms are relevant.\n\n(i)~\\emph{Correlated decoding blocks.} DTRU decodes 16-coefficient\nDoubleE$_8$ blocks; in the tricyclotomic ring\n$\\mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(x^n-x^{n/2}+1)$ and the LPPNF ring, the two octets of a block\nare ring-paired and the repetition code places the same bit on both. Our\ncovariance-aware estimates raise the DFR of six of the seven sets by roughly\n$50$--$110$ bits. Their estimated uncapped first-failure costs are\n$2^{85}$--$2^{111}$ decapsulations. Under a fitted ciphertext-tail model,\nDTRU-648, DTRU-768, and DTRU-Prime fit within $2^{64}$ expected queries after\n$2^{22}$--$2^{26}$ estimated offline encapsulations.\n\n(ii)~\\emph{Omitted compression noise.} Cheetah compresses its public key and\nboth ciphertext components. Section~2.2 of the specification omits the\npublic-key term $\\langle e_b,r\\rangle$, while the $v$-compression error can be\ntreated as a known, ciphertext-dependent shift. Under the\ncoefficient-independence model, exponentially tilted one-dimensional FFTs give\nDFR estimates of $2^{-79.1}$ and $2^{-51.8}$ for Cheetah128 and Cheetah256,\nrather than the claimed $2^{-129}$ and $2^{-176}$. Their expected\nrandom-query waiting times are below $2^{80}$. We check the noise model at\nobservable rates on a scaled-down instance and against full-size shallow-tail\nsamples.\n\n(iii)~\\emph{Bounded noise in two-dimensional codes.} Rudraksh2 and Scabbard\ndecode coefficient pairs with B2-Minal codes and already evaluate their joint\ndistribution by two-dimensional FFT. We rederive the two-dimensional atoms and\nevaluate one-dimensional projections onto failure radii of the real decoder.\nThe resulting projected-tail estimates are $2^{-103.9}$ for\nRudraksh2-128-I and $2^{-102.1}$ for Scabbard-128, a few bits below the\nclaimed $2^{-100}$ and $2^{-99}$. Under a $2^{80}$ query cap, the estimated\nclassical totals are $2^{112}$ and $2^{188}$, respectively.\n\nNo attack described here recovers a key. Under the first-failure DFR metric,\nseveral estimated costs lie below their nominal levels; the formal far-tail\nfigures remain subject to the modelling, extrapolation, and geometric\nlimitations stated in the paper.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T12:24:36Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T12:24:36Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2251", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2251", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T13:20:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2251", "title": "Adaptively UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer from Group Actions", "creators": ["Olivier Blazy", "Céline Chevalier", "Saqib Kakvi", "Lola-Baie Mallordy"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a fundamental building block for secure computation, in which a sender holds two messages and a receiver learns\nexactly one of them, without revealing which one was chosen and\nwithout learning the other. While generic constructions for Universally Composable (UC) OT exist, instantiating them from post-quantum assumptions remains challenging, particularly under adaptive corruption.\nIn this work, we present the first adaptively UC-secure OT protocol based on Group Actions, specifically assuming weakly pseudorandom Effective Group Actions (EGA) like CSIDH. We adhere to the framework of [BC15], which derives an adaptively UC-secure OT protocol from SPHF-friendly extractable and equivocable (E²) commitment schemes.\n    The central challenge in instantiating this construction from group actions is the lack of SPHF-friendly IND-CCA encryption. Classical CCA transformations such as Fujisaki-Okamoto destroy the algebraic structure required for building SPHFs over ciphertexts, while known group action-based schemes offer no native mechanism to prove ciphertext validity. To overcome this obstacle, we construct from group actions an  IND-CCA encryption scheme  with enough algebraic structure to efficiently recognize valid ciphertexts.\n    Our  contributions are threefold: (1) a verifiable chameleon hash function with perfect soundness in the standard model, (2)  an SPHF-friendly, publicly verifiable IND-CCA encryption scheme in the random oracle model, and (3) we combine these to build an SPHF-friendly E²  commitment scheme and derive a fully adaptively secure OT protocol in the UC framework. This is the first construction of its kind under group action assumptions, enabling post-quantum secure OT with adaptive security guarantees. These building blocks may also be of independent interest e.g., to obtain digital signatures, non-malleable commitment schemes, or verifiable encryption.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T13:20:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T13:20:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2252", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2252", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T13:56:15Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2252", "title": "Batch Decryption from New Standard Assumptions", "creators": ["Nico Döttling", "Bernardo Magri", "Benjamin Marsh", "Mahesh Sreekumar Rajasree"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Batch decryption allows an authority to release a short key that enables\npublic decryption of a selected batch of ciphertexts. Motivated by encrypted\nmempools, we study this capability through two constructions with different\nauthorization semantics and assumptions.\n\nFirst, we provide a simple and compact epochless construction in an RSA group based on Fiat's Batch RSA [CRYPTO'89]. Its batch-decryption hint is just one group element, and its keys and ciphertexts have size independent of the batch size, with no batch bound fixed at setup. We prove adaptive security under the strong RSA assumption in the random-oracle model. The scheme permits repeated releases for overlapping batches, with each release authorizing decryption of the selected ciphertexts.\n\nSecond, we give an adaptively secure generic construction of identity-based\nencryption with batch decryption in the epoch-based model, which permits at\nmost one batch-key query for the challenge epoch. The construction combines\ndeferred encryption via garbled circuits, non-inclusion secure\nregistration-based encryption, and weak receiver non-committing IBE. We\nconstruct the latter primitive from ordinary IBE and pseudorandom functions,\nobtaining an instantiation of the epoch-based construction from the\ncomputational Diffie--Hellman assumption.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T13:56:15Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T13:56:15Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2253", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2253", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T14:12:02Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2253", "title": "Generic Bounds for Multi-Instance Problems: The Strange Case of Inverse Diffie-Hellman", "creators": ["Akshima", "Eike Kiltz", "Aysan Nishaburi", "Samin Nooripoor", "Emiel Wiedijk"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "In a multi-instance problem, the adversary is given $n$ independent problem instances and succeeds if it solves at least $k$ of them. \n\nWe study the generic hardness of a broad class of multi-instance problems over prime-order groups, including multi-instance Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH), Square Diffie-Hellman (SDH), Inverse Diffie-Hellman (IDH), and Linear Kernel Diffie-Hellman (LKDH). As expected, we show that, in generic groups, solving multi-instance CDH and SDH is as hard as solving $k$ independent discrete logarithm instances. In contrast, although the single-instance versions of CDH and IDH are known to be equivalent, we establish  generic upper and lower bounds showing that multi-instance IDH (and LKDH) can be significantly easier to solve than multi-instance CDH in certain parameter regimes. All problems, however, offer $1/2(\\log(p)+\\log(k))$ bits of security.\n\nOur lower-bound techniques extend Yun's information-theoretic hyperplane query model (EUROCRYPT 2015). At the core of our approach lies an inductive argument showing that, in order to establish a generic-group lower bound, it suffices to bound the adversary's \"zero-hyperplane-query\" advantage in the hyperplane query model. For the multi-instance problems considered in this work, we derive such bounds using techniques from algebraic geometry. More precisely, we analyze the Krull dimension of suitable algebraic varieties, either by explicitly computing Gröbner bases or by upper bounding the number of algebraically independent elements in the associated coordinate rings.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T14:12:02Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T14:12:02Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2254", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2254", "datestamp": "2026-09-28T17:17:19Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2254", "title": "AEBAP: An Efficient ECC-Based Authentication Protocol Designed for Wireless Networks", "creators": ["Reza Hooshmand", "Sajjad Alizadeh"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "The Internet of Things (IoT) comprises a vast array of interconnected devices\nthat rely heavily on wireless communication to enable applications in domains\nsuch as healthcare, transportation, and smart environments. However, intrinsic\nvulnerabilities in wireless networks, such as susceptibility to eavesdropping,\nimpersonation, and message tampering, require the development of robust yet\nlightweight authentication mechanisms. To address these concerns, we introduce\nAEBAP, an efficient authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography\n(ECC), specifically designed for secure communication in resource-constrained\nIoT environments. AEBAP ensures mutual authentication, data integrity, and\nresilience against both passive and active attacks by leveraging the cryptographic\nstrength and computational efficiency of ECC. We evaluate the protocol’s performance\nthrough experimental implementation and analyze its security using both\ninformal reasoning and formal verification tools, including Scyther and ProVerif.\nThe results demonstrate that AEBAP achieves strong security guarantees with\nminimal computational and communication overhead, making it a promising\nsolution for securing next-generation wireless IoT systems", "date_submitted": "2026-09-28T17:17:19Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-28T17:17:19Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2255", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2255", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T02:44:45Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2255", "title": "Improved Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of Orthros, Gleeok, ZIP-AES, and ZIP-GIFT", "creators": ["Yuanxin Wang", "Chengcheng Chang", "Kai Hu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We improve differential-linear distinguishers and derive key-recovery attacks on reduced-round versions of the PRFs Orthros, Gleeok, ZIP-AES, ZIP-GIFT-64, and ZIP-GIFT-128. Relative to previous differential-linear analyses, we extend the reported coverage for Orthros from 7 to 9 rounds and for Gleeok-128 from 4 to 5 rounds. For Orthros and Gleeok-128, we obtain estimated correlation magnitudes \\(2^{-61.40}\\) and \\(2^{-31.71}\\), respectively. We also obtain distinguishers for 6-round Gleeok-256, \\((3,3)\\)-round ZIP-AES, \\((7,7)\\)-round ZIP-GIFT-64, and \\((10,10)\\)-round ZIP-GIFT-128. For key recovery, we give a \\((3,3)\\)-round differential-linear attack on ZIP-AES requiring approximately \\(2^{122.42}\\) chosen plaintexts and \\(2^{122.88}\\) ZIP-AES evaluations. Our \\((10,10)\\)-round ZIP-GIFT-128 attack has estimated data, time, and memory complexities of \\(2^{93}\\) chosen plaintexts, \\(2^{117}\\) full PRF evaluations, and \\(2^{25.01}\\) bits. We further obtain weak-key attacks on 9-round Orthros, 5-round Gleeok-128, and 6-round Gleeok-256, with key-space coverages of \\(2^{-2.87}\\), \\(2^{-3}\\), and \\(2^{-1}\\), respectively. The Orthros key-recovery result reaches one round beyond the previous DL key-recovery coverage. These results use automated differential and linear trail search together with existing round-based correlation estimation. We enforce the compatibility constraints between branches and select input-side extensions that make their prescribed differences jointly reachable.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T02:44:45Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T02:44:45Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2256", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2256", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T06:53:16Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2256", "title": "Affine-Padding Rabin-Oracle Factoring in $L_n\\!\\left(\\frac{1}{3},\\sqrt[3]{\\frac{32}{9}}\\right)$", "creators": ["Alexandra-Ioana Buzățoiu", "Diana Maimuț", "David Naccache"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The 2007 algorithm of Joux, Naccache, and Thomé (JNT) shows that, with subexponential access to an $e$-th root oracle, one can forge RSA signatures for odd  $e$ in time close to the special number field sieve, without factoring the modulus; a recent JNT implementation by Shea et al. carried that attack to $1024$-bit RSA. \nWe revisit the JNT construction at $e=2$, the Rabin case, where an $e$-th root oracle is a square-root oracle. A raw square-root oracle factors $n=pq$ in one query, so it is of no interest; the interesting object is a redundancy-constrained (affine-padded) Rabin oracle that returns a single canonical root and thereby resists the one-query attack. We show that a one-sided number field sieve against such an oracle produces a congruence of squares $X^2\\equiv Y^2\\pmod n$ with $X\\not\\equiv\\pm Y$ with probability $1/2$ per dependency, and hence factors $n$ in special-number-field-sieve time\n\\[\nL_n(1/3,\\sqrt[3]{32/9})\\simeq L_n(1/3,1.526\\ldots),\n\\]\nstrictly below the general number field sieve's\n\\[\nL_n(1/3,\\sqrt[3]{64/9})\\simeq L_n(1/3,1.923\\ldots).\\]\nThe mechanism is a pleasant inversion: the sign ambiguity that the odd-$e$ algorithm must suppress becomes, at $e=2$, the very quantity that leaks the factorization. We give the algorithm in full --- LLL polynomial selection for a quadratic field, a line sieve producing prime-ideal relations, quadratic characters, $\\mathbb F_2$ linear algebra, and an exact number-field square root --- prove the half-rate splitting, and analyse the complexity, including the precise reason the attack collapses when the padding is a hash rather than an affine function of an attacker-chosen message. A small toy example run of it, from the padded modulus to the recovered factors, is given in Appendix A. A measurement campaign on larger moduli is currently running and will be reported as updates to this ePrint.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T06:53:16Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T06:53:16Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2257", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2257", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T08:56:54Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2257", "title": "Screaming Channel: Recent Advances in Far Field EM Side-Channel Attacks based on Radio Coupling", "creators": ["Huanyu Wang", "Pei Cao", "Chi Zhang", "Dawu Gu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "The Internet of Things (IoT) is revolutionizing society by enabling anytime, anywhere connectivity, but its widespread deployment also makes IoT devices attractive targets for malicious activities. Over the past decade, radio-coupling based Far-field EM Side-Channel Attacks (FEM-SCAs), also known as screaming channel attacks, have emerged as a new threat to these wireless IoT edges. Unlike conventional power or near-field EM side-channel attacks, FEM-SCAs exploit the unintended coupling between digital computation and the Radio Frequency (RF) transmission chain, allowing sensitive information to be captured through radiated radio signals at long distances. Since the first screaming-channel demonstration, this field has progressed rapidly: attacks have become more efficient, DL-enabled methods have been developed, and recent studies have begun to examine more realistic wireless-protocol settings. Despite existing practical cases of remote FEM-SCA attacks, the literature remains fragmented. To systematically understand this security threat and to aid future countermeasure design, this paper presents the first systematic survey of existing screaming channel attack methodologies and case studies. We organize studies into a hierarchical framework covering leakage discovery and understanding, enhanced attack capability, attack targets and variants, and public data collections. Through a fine-grained cross-paper analysis, we compare representative works in terms of target implementation, attack distance, analysis method, profiling requirement, acquisition environment, and other factors. Building on this end-to-end review, we provide a focused discussion that distills FEM-SCA research into one central trade-off, three major limitations, and three future research roadmaps. Taken together, this survey offers a structured framework for understanding a rapidly developing far-field side-channel attack class, and provides practical guidance for evaluating its real-world threat boundaries.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T08:56:54Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T08:56:54Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2258", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2258", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T09:09:22Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2258", "title": "Superposition Key-Recovery Attacks on Dilithium and Fiat-Shamir Signature Schemes", "creators": ["Carlos Cid", "David Elkouss", "Manuel Goulão"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "In this work, we assess the security of the main signature scheme standardised by NIST, ML-DSA, and its precursor identification schemes under an extended quantum adversarial model, one in which the adversary is allowed to use quantum resources to interact with a prover/signer. We begin our analysis by developing new techniques for superposition attacks that realise a relative phase oracle for the LSBs of a classical function evaluated in a quantum computer. We then extend these techniques to enable a relative phase oracle for arbitrary bits. Leveraging these techniques, we demonstrate full key-recovery attacks on several lattice-based identification schemes, exploiting the affine structure of the output. Finally, we extend these attacks to the corresponding Fiat-Shamir signature schemes and obtain key-recovery attacks under reasonable implementation assumptions. As a result, we are able to mount full key-recovery attacks in the Q2 model against the original CRYSTALS-Dilithium scheme, as well as the corresponding NIST Standardisation Rounds 1 and 2 proposals. However modifications introduced in the scheme during the NIST process preclude our superposition attacks against the final standardised version ML-DSA. We identify and discuss the specific aspects of the algorithm's execution that affect the applicability of our techniques. Overall, our work expands the body of research on superposition attacks and represents a further step towards establishing full quantum security for cryptographic constructions.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T09:09:22Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T09:09:22Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2259", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2259", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T09:29:15Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2259", "title": "Supersingularity and Superspeciality Verification of Abelian Surfaces", "creators": ["Maria Corte-Real Santos", "Gioella Lorenzon", "Krijn Reijnders"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Supersingular abelian surfaces are essential in isogeny-based cryptography. Despite this, we have no efficient algorithm to verify if a given abelian surface is supersingular. In this work, we initiate this research topic by giving an efficient Monte Carlo algorithm to verify if an abelian surface over $\\mathbb{F}_p$ is supersingular in $O(\\log p)$ with negligible failure probability, and an efficient conclusive algorithm if the order is smooth. We derive this algorithm by a careful analysis on the structure of supersingular Jacobians over $\\mathbb{F}_p$. Furthermore, we derive efficient algorithms to verify if an abelian variety of any dimension is minimal or maximal, and to verify if a Jacobian of any dimension is superspecial.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T09:29:15Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T09:29:15Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2260", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2260", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T10:38:32Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2260", "title": "PQMZ: Formally Verified Falcon-PKR for Post-Quantum Cryptographic Migration in Zcash", "creators": ["Hannes Hacker", "Shekoufeh Neisarian", "Sara Zain", "Elif Bilge Kavun"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Migrating blockchain systems to Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) requires not only replacing classical primitives, but also analysing transformations that change how signatures are represented and verified. We study Falcon-PKR, a public-key-recovery variant of Falcon, motivated by Zcash-like transparent transaction workflows. Falcon-PKR replaces explicit storage of the full Falcon public key with a compact stored digest and reconstructs a candidate public key from the signature during verification. In our construction, this reduces the combined representation size of public key and signature by approximately 15%, but it also introduces a distinct security case in which verification depends on a reconstructed key derived from adversarially supplied signature data.\n\nWe address this with a machine-checked EasyCrypt formalisation in the Random Oracle Model (ROM). We mechanically verify an EUF-CMA reduction showing that the security of Falcon-PKR is bounded by the security of standard Falcon together with collision resistance of a domain-separated public-key hash. The analysis therefore treats both assumptions explicitly and does not claim a proof of Falcon itself. We also machine-check correctness for honest signing under an abstract Falcon signing interface. We implement Falcon-PKR for Falcon-512 and Falcon-1024 in Python and C, and evaluate runtime and size against ECDSA and selected Post-Quantum (PQ) alternatives, exposing explicit verification and storage trade-offs. As a complementary case study, we implement and analyse an extended SECUER-based Multi-Party Computation (MPC) ceremony architecture. Together, the two case studies address both transaction-signature and ceremony-infrastructure layers of PQ blockchain migration.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T10:38:32Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T10:38:32Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2261", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2261", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T13:31:30Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2261", "title": "A Provable Subexponential-Time Algorithm for LWE from \\(n+o(n)\\) Samples via Wagner-Style Gaussian Sampling", "creators": ["Xuyuan Han", "Yiming Gao", "Honggang Hu"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "We give a randomized subexponential-time algorithm for decision Learning with Errors (LWE) in two complementary parameter regimes. For polynomial prime modulus \\(q=n^{\\kappa+o(1)}\\) with any fixed \\(\\kappa>1/2\\), the algorithm handles independent discrete Gaussian errors drawn from \\(D_{\\mathbb Z,s_e}\\), with Gaussian parameter \\(s_e\\) satisfying \\(\\ln(2+s_e)=(\\ln n)^{a+o(1)}\\) for any fixed \\(0\\le a<1\\). Conversely, polynomial error \\(s_e=n^{\\gamma+o(1)}\\), for any fixed \\(\\gamma>0\\), can be handled with a quasipolynomial prime modulus \\(q=\\exp\\!\\left((\\ln n)^{1+\\eta+o(1)}\\right)\\) for any fixed \\(\\eta>0\\). In both regimes, for an arbitrary secret distribution, the algorithm succeeds with probability \\(1-o(1)\\) using \\(m=n+\\Theta(n/\\ln\\ln n)\\) original samples, with expected time and space \\(2^{\\Theta(n/\\ln\\ln n)}\\).\n\nOur starting point is the Wagner-style Gaussian sampler of Ducas, Engelberts, and Loyer (CRYPTO 2025). We instantiate its auxiliary extensions with random \\(P\\)-ary lattices whose improved smoothing bound supports the accuracy required for LWE without increasing the leading list size exponent. At the smaller Gaussian width enabled by this geometry, the basis-dependent condition of the exact sampler used in prior work is no longer available. We therefore use the statistically approximate shifted discrete Gaussian sampler of Aggarwal, Dadush, and Stephens-Davidowitz (FOCS 2015) and control its error for adaptively chosen shifts. Finally, a martingale analysis applies the Aharonov--Regev Fourier distinguisher (JACM 2005) directly to the dependent output, avoiding the loss incurred by comparison with an independent product distribution.\n\nOur analysis applies to unstructured LWE with independent uniform public vectors. In particular, it does not directly apply to ML-KEM, whose security is based on the Module-LWE problem: the algebraic dependencies arising from its module structure are not covered by our analysis.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T13:31:30Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T13:31:30Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2262", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2262", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T14:08:01Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2262", "title": "NOMOS: Secure Non-Interactive $k$NN under CKKS", "creators": ["Shihao Li", "Wenhao Wang", "Xiaomei Tang", "Jian Liu", "Rongmao Chen", "Lu Li", "zhigang chen", "Guangfu Sun"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "The $k$-nearest neighbor ($k$NN) algorithm is a core primitive for similarity search over sensitive data, but evaluating $k$NN under fully homomorphic encryption remains expensive because it requires distance computation, encrypted ranking, and top-$k$ extraction. CKKS is attractive for this setting because it natively supports packed approximate arithmetic, yet existing CKKS-based systems such as Engorgio (USENIX Security 2025) incur high overhead when used for reranking candidate sets.\n\nWe present NOMOS, an encrypted $k$NN protocol for candidate sets that targets the ranking and top-$k$ extraction bottleneck. NOMOS builds on Mazzone et al.'s matrix-based ranking method (USENIX Security 2025), but introduces a gap-amplified sign approximation that focuses precision on near-zero distance gaps, where $k$NN rank decisions are most sensitive. NOMOS integrates this primitive into a complete encrypted $k$NN pipeline, using slot-index alignment and ReLU-based top-$k$ extraction to avoid full sorting. For large databases, offline k-means preprocessing forms fixed-capacity candidate sets, allowing NOMOS to avoid global top-$k$ extraction and reduce sign-approximation calls from quadratic global growth to near-linear clustered scaling. With these techniques, NOMOS outperforms state-of-the-art encrypted ranking and top-$k$ baselines. Across the Mazzone-style ranking benchmark and candidate-set workloads compared with Engorgio, NOMOS reduces latency by nearly $8\\times$ and up to $828\\times$, respectively. On the real-world SIFT dataset, NOMOS achieves $100\\%$ top-1 and top-8 retrieval accuracy on evaluated candidate sets, showing consistent retrieval quality on real data.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T14:08:01Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T14:08:01Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2263", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2263", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T14:24:25Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2263", "title": "Levis: Extension-Free Multi-Key Fully Homomorphic Encryption in the Plain Model", "creators": ["Baoyu Li", "Binwu Xiang", "Kang Yang"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Multi-key fully homomorphic encryption (MKFHE) enables computation over ciphertexts encrypted under keys independently generated by different parties. Recently, Min, Park, and Song (MPS, CRYPTO 2026) constructed the first RLWE-based MKFHE scheme in the plain model, i.e., without trusted or interactive setup. Their construction requires each local compact Gentry-Sahai-Waters (GSW) ciphertext to be extended to a joint-key GSW-like ciphertext before evaluation, incurring $O(dk^2)$ gadget products per input for $k$ parties and gadget length $d$.\n\nIn this paper, we first construct an extension-free MKFHE scheme (called Levis-fast) in the plain model, eliminating the $O(dk^2)$ gadget products required for joint-key ciphertext extension before homomorphic evaluation. Our core technique is a compatibility technique, termed Cofactor Compatibility, which establishes a common projective decryption relation across ciphertexts encrypted under independently generated local keys, enabling their direct homomorphic evaluation. We further present a compact variant (named as Levis-small) that reduces the communication of each fresh ciphertext from $O(dk^2)$ to $O(d)$ ring elements with only a lightweight lifting operation. A proof-of-concept implementation shows that, compared with MPS, for $k\\in\\{2,4,8\\}$, our construction Levis-fast achieves evaluation speedups of $67.7\\times$, $52.8\\times$, and $139.4\\times$, respectively, while our compact variant Levis-small reduces communication by a factor of $2.5\\times$, $8.7\\times$ and $14.2\\times$, and achieves evaluation speedups of $11.8\\times$, $19.7\\times$, and $54.4\\times$, respectively.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T14:24:25Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T14:24:25Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2264", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2264", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T14:24:55Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2264", "title": "THEMIS: A Co-Designed System for Encrypted Transformer Inference", "creators": ["Shihao Li", "Wenhao Wang", "Lu Li", "Xiaomei Tang", "Jian Liu", "Rongmao Chen", "Cheng Hong", "Guangfu Sun"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "Secure Transformer inference can be made non-interactive under fully homomorphic encryption (FHE), but the computation is extremely expensive. Existing FHE-based systems reduce that cost by optimizing individual stages in isolation, each within its own component rather than against the CKKS level budget they all share. A local gain therefore may not translate into an end-to-end speedup.\n\nWe present THEMIS, a co-designed system for encrypted Transformer inference organized around two design principles, one bounding the depth each kind of stage may spend and one fixing where on the modulus chain it runs. THEMIS generalizes coefficient-encoded plaintext-ciphertext matrix multiplication (PCMM) to slot-encoded ciphertexts without format conversion, retaining the same accelerated coefficient-side backend and amortizing its nearly fixed cost through multi-batch packing. Two attention ciphertext-ciphertext matrix multiplication (CCMM) kernels combine the idle imaginary lane of each slot with baby-step giant-step accumulation and hoisting, so the attention multiplications issue far fewer key switches. For softmax, THEMIS conditions the first denominator with a calibrated row-wise offset and reserves high precision for the final normalization alone, which cuts the depth the reciprocal path consumes while keeping the precision of the returned probabilities. For a single stage, THEMIS accelerates PCMM and the attention CCMMs by $21.66\\times$ and up to $7.39\\times$ over MOAI (ICLR'26), and by up to $23.02\\times$ and $16.49\\times$ over Euston (S&P'26), while THEMIS's softmax runs $2.57\\times$ faster than THOR (CCS'25) at higher precision. For the complete pipeline, THEMIS serves BERT-base on a CPU in $400.06$ amortized seconds per input, with accuracy on GLUE tasks comparable to plaintext. Of that latency, the stages around bootstrapping account for only $10.83\\%$, which is the lowest share among all works compared here.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T14:24:55Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T14:24:55Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2265", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2265", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T15:02:28Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2265", "title": "The Illusion of Payload Blindness: Why MEV Mitigations Fail in Practice", "creators": ["Simona Češková", "Martin Perešíni", "Ivan Homoliak"], "subjects": ["Applications"], "abstract": "In public blockchains, the ability to order visible transactions allows block producers to extract value from users, a problem known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). Proposer-Builder Separation has turned that right into a formalized auction, and the leading protocol-level mitigations answer it with payload blindness: encrypted mempools, verifiable permutations, and block delay hide or scramble transactions before the order is fixed. Every such mitigation carries a security argument that assumes an adversary who learns nothing before the order commits. Deployed systems face a different adversary, and this paper measures the cost of that difference. We evaluate the three families of mitigations against a single adversary hierarchy, using closed-form analysis and simulations calibrated to Ethereum. Against a fully blind adversary, the outcome follows from the definitions: encryption with a permutation removes the attack classes that depend on transaction content, and block delay increases extraction rather than reducing it. Once that idealization is dropped, deployment problems dominate. The unencrypted envelope identifies the sender, so past behavior restores a usable guess at hidden content. Optional encryption gives builders a reason to starve the transactions it protects, and voluntary adoption then collapses. Key rotation turns a cryptographic parameter into a source of queueing congestion. Suppressing extraction, finally, removes far more producer revenue than it returns to users in lower fees, so the cost of every mitigation falls on the party that controls its deployment. The binding obstacles to MEV-free blockchains are therefore liveness and deployment incentives rather than cryptography.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T15:02:28Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T15:02:28Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2266", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2266", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T18:59:24Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2266", "title": "Chinese NGCC Algorithms: The First Week of AI Cryptanalysis", "creators": ["Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen"], "subjects": ["Attacks and cryptanalysis"], "abstract": "On September 20, 2026, the Chinese Institute of Commercial Cryptography Standards published the 119 first-round candidates of its Next-generation Commercial Cryptographic Algorithms (NGCC) program: 34 signature schemes, 41 key encapsulation mechanisms, 9 key exchange protocols, and 35 hash functions. The program follows the template of the open NIST competitions for AES, SHA-3, and post-quantum cryptography. It opened just after cryptographers' ``Lee Sedol moment'' in the summer of 2026, when AI analysis overtook humans in analyzing the HAWK signature scheme. During the first 7 days of the NGCC competition, according to our harvested sources, 191 active findings were published for 89 candidates, 78 of them rated Critical: universal forgeries, signing-key recovery, trivial hash collisions, broken implicit rejection, and seeds too short for the claimed security level. Our independent evaluation effort discovered, verified, and disclosed 110 of those issues (47 Critical) using the agentic workflow described in this work; outside researchers, some AI-assisted, found the rest. Early AI-assisted findings mostly concerned implementations; by the end of the week, reproduced AI-assisted attacks also included new design-level key recovery. We describe the workflow, review loop, classification ruleset, and observed failure modes. As part of the evaluation, we also benchmarked all algorithm candidates and found that NGCC hash selection may significantly affect final public-key performance, as candidate implementations spend a large share of their cycles on ``placeholder'' hashes.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T18:59:24Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T18:59:24Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2267", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2267", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T19:07:17Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2267", "title": "Impersonation Resilience of Subversion-Resilient UC Protocols", "creators": ["Paula Arnold", "Sebastian Berndt", "Jörn Müller-Quade", "Astrid Ottenhues", "Johannes Ottenhues"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Subversion attacks where the attacker aims to replace parts of a cryptographic system by manipulated parts in an undetectable manner have been shown to model both theoretical and practical attacks such as supply chain attacks. Originally proposed by Young and Yung (CRYPTO 1996), interest in them has increased dramatically after the revelations about the inner workings of intelligence agencies due to Snowden and the following paper by Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway (CRYPTO 2014).\n\nOne of the most promising countermeasures against such attacks are cryptographic reverse firewalls, proposed by Mironov and Stephens-Davidowitz (EUROCRYPT 2015), which are small devices used by the parties with the aim to rerandomize the protocol message to remove possible leakage. A wide range of protocols and corresponding firewalls have been developed based on this notion. The usage of such firewalls, however, also introduces another attack surface as an attacker might also corrupt these firewalls. In most works, this problem is either not addressed or treated as if in this case, the complete party using the firewall is compromised. However, as firewalls typically only perform rerandomization without knowledge of secret key material, this is a very coarse over-approximation, as an honest party Alice is now treated as maliciously corrupted. Instead, the  main security problem comes from the fact that the firewall can impersonate Alice.\n\nIn this paper, we introduce the notion of impersonation resilience, which allows us to develop protocols that are also secure against such a corrupted firewall and thus result in an honest complete party. We show a generic compiler that transforms subversion-resilient protocols for commitment or coin toss into protocols that are also impersonation resilient. Following a recent research line, our protocols and security analysis are built on the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti. Of independent interest, we show that existing UC subversion models are either too strong and do not allow secure string commitments, or too weak and allow trivially secure protocols. We addressed this by developing a new, intermediate UC subversion model.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T19:07:17Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T19:07:17Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2268", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2268", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T19:49:46Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2268", "title": "Kopis: A KEM for Obfuscation", "creators": ["Andrea Basso", "Michael Rosenberg"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) and obfuscated key exchange (OKEX) are widely used protocols, appearing in passport access control, Tor's censorship evasion, and more. As quantum threats grow nearer, there have been an increasing number of proposals for post-quantum PAKE and OKEX. All such protocols are similar in that they build on a KEM, obfuscating public keys and/or ciphertexts sent over the wire, e.g., by adding a random mask or applying an ideal cipher. Many propose instantiation with ML-KEM, a NIST-standardized lattice-based KEM.\n\nUnfortunately, ML-KEM is a poor fit for these obfuscating protocols. The algebraic structure of ML-KEM public keys and ciphertexts means that obfuscating these values requires custom procedures for hash-to-vector, matrix expansion, serialization/deserialization, and randomized ciphertext decompression. In order to be broadly useful, these procedures also must be constant-time to prevent side channels and must be standardized to permit interoperability. No such set of procedures exists today.\n\nWe observe that the barriers to instantiating PAKE and OKEX disappear if some of the KEM's algebraic structure is removed, i.e., if ML-KEM is replaced with a KEM whose public keys and ciphertexts appear to be uniform as bytestrings.\n\nIn this work, we specify Kopis, a Module Learning-with-Rounding (MLWR) KEM with public keys and ciphertexts that are uniform as bytestrings. Kopis is intended to be a drop-in replacement for ML-KEM, in size, speed, and security. Kopis is nearly identical to Saber, a NIST PQC finalist, and thus inherits its years of cryptanalysis.\n\nWe demonstrate that Kopis bears the security properties needed for use in various PAKE and OKEX schemes and provide a formally verified Rust implementation complete with portable, AVX2, and NEON backends, and a non-formally-verified C implementation for Cortex-M4. We perform benchmarks and find that Kopis is comparable to and often outperforms the fastest known ML-KEM implementations.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T19:49:46Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T19:49:46Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2269", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2269", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T22:34:28Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2269", "title": "Consensus in One Shot: Fast Agreement Beyond Classical Limits", "creators": ["Omri Shmueli", "Ilan Tennenhouse"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Good-case latency, studied in early fast-consensus protocols (Martin and Alvisi, DSN 2005) and formalized by Abraham, Nayak, Ren, and Xiang (DISC 2020), captures a natural efficiency goal: when the sender is honest, agreement should be reached quickly for the honest parties. In the standard classical model, however, there exists a barrier for any $f\\geq n/3$ corrupted parties. Specifically, synchronous broadcast requires good-case latency at least $\\Delta+\\delta$ for $f\\geq n/3$, where $\\delta$ is the actual, unknown message-delay bound and $\\Delta \\gg \\delta$ is its known, conservative upper bound. Under partial synchrony, consistency and liveness cannot even both hold for $f \\geq n/3$ (Dwork, Lynch, and Stockmeyer, JACM 1988).\n\nIn this work we study the use of quantum information to get past these classical barriers, and specifically using one-shot signatures (OSS) (Amos et al., STOC 2020, Shmueli and Zhandry, CRYPTO 2025). OSS prevents even a corrupt signer from issuing signatures on different messages under the same verification key, which provides cryptographic non-equivocation without trusted hardware assumptions. \n\nAssuming OSS and a public-key infrastructure, we obtain two main results against quantum polynomial-time static corruptions. First, under synchrony, we construct a state-machine replication (SMR) protocol without clients, with optimal $\\delta$ good-case latency, tolerating any $f<n$ corruptions among $n$ parties. Second, under partial synchrony, we obtain SMR with $2\\cdot \\delta$ good-case latency which is consistent under any number of corruptions and live assuming $2n>f$. Specifically, a corrupt majority may cause progress to stop, but cannot create conflicting histories. Such an always consistent protocol is impossible classically (without assumptions like trusted hardware) even if liveness is only required to hold against a single corrupt party. In both our SMR protocols, communication is entirely classical, with only local quantum computation.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T22:34:28Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T22:34:28Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2270", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2270", "datestamp": "2026-09-29T23:26:47Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2270", "title": "UC PAKE and Concrete Security", "creators": ["Tingfei Feng", "Jiayu Xu"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "The Universal Composability (UC) framework provides a paradigm for security definitions that allows for arbitrary composition, but has been criticized for being unamicable to the concrete security approach, as the meaning of a concrete UC-security statement is hard to interpret in practice. This work aims at alleviating this concern in the context of Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE): we show that any concrete UC-security statement for PAKE can be easily converted to a concrete game-based security statement, whose real-life meaning is clearer. We also briefly discuss potential generalizations of our result to other cryptographic primitives.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-29T23:26:47Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-29T23:26:47Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2271", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2271", "datestamp": "2026-10-01T03:23:58Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2271", "title": "Exact SVP on Haar-Random Lattices at the Heuristic Sieving Exponents", "creators": ["Yang Zhou", "Zhedong Wang", "Mingsheng Wang"], "subjects": ["Foundations"], "abstract": "We give a Monte Carlo algorithm for exact Euclidean SVP on Haar-random lattices with arithmetic time $(3/2)^{n/2+o(n)}$ and space $(4/3)^{n/2+o(n)}$, up to polynomial factors in the logarithmic condition number of the input basis. The leading exponents match those of heuristic lattice sieving. For a set of lattices of Haar measure $1-o(1)$, the algorithm succeeds with probability $1-o(1)$ on every input basis.\n\nOur algorithm regenerates each sieve list by running a Markov chain on the nonzero lattice points in a smaller ball. The parent list supplies signed increments. Each step reports all admissible proposals and assigns each the same probability, with the remaining probability assigned to staying put. The resulting chain is symmetric and has uniform stationary distribution. Trajectories using independent transition randomness produce endpoints jointly close to independent uniform samples once the chain mixes. Matrix Chernoff bounds transfer a Laplacian gap from the full angular graph to the graph defined by the parent list. The main proof task is to establish the required graph estimates on Haar-random lattices. We do so by adapting Rogers's moment method to centered trace moments and lattice-point counts. Spherical filtering reports the complete proposal sets and the final short differences within the claimed bounds.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-30T00:18:41Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-10-01T03:23:58Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2272", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2272", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T01:03:37Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2272", "title": "Attacking UOV-based Signatures over divided power algebras", "creators": ["Peigen Li", "Siyong Tao"], "subjects": ["Public-key cryptography"], "abstract": "Merz and Ran derive additional equations\nfrom divided powers of the public polar forms in characteristic two.\nWe extend this construction to finite fields of arbitrary characteristic and apply it to the security analysis of QR-UOV.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-30T01:03:37Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T01:03:37Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
{"id": "2026/2273", "oai_identifier": "oai:eprint.iacr.org:2026/2273", "datestamp": "2026-09-30T07:36:40Z", "status": "active", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/2273", "title": "Slashable Secrecy for Witness Encryption over Ethereum Finality", "creators": ["Yihsuan Wu"], "subjects": ["Cryptographic protocols"], "abstract": "Witness encryption over blockchain state aims to release a secret on a ledger condition without a key custodian. Validators with enough stake to construct a valid fork witness can obtain the secret although the condition never holds on the canonical chain. They finalize a private fork that satisfies the condition, and keeping the fork hidden withholds the conflicting votes that slashing needs. We propose slashable secrecy to address this gap with Ethereum’s native slashing rules, without an additional key-custody committee or separate collateral. In executions where the condition never holds on the finalized canonical chain through completion, an information advantage yields evidence of those votes against keys the adversary controlled, or a solution to a designated hard problem. We give a construction from a witness KEM and prove slashable secrecy conditionally on its extraction interface. We bound the implicated historical stake under changing validator weights. For an archived Ethereum mainnet state, the historical evidence-weight floor exceeds 3.5 percent of its active stake, about 1.44 million ETH, under stated budget and coverage assumptions. Experiments on a synthetic Ethereum network confirm native processing of the evidence, without WE decryption. Two limitations remain. A witness KEM satisfying the full relation and extraction interface remains uninstantiated. Enforcement requires that the evidence is available, converted to native form and included while its signers remain eligible.", "date_submitted": "2026-09-30T02:10:49Z", "date_last_revised": "2026-09-30T07:36:40Z", "rights": "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/"}
